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FOREWORD
The study described in this report was conducted by Convair Division of
General Dynamics Corporation under NASA Contract NASB-31012e The
work was under the mana;ement of the NASA Marshall Space Flight
Center, Tug s Tasl!, Team, in conjunction with four complementary Tug-
related study efforts.
The study was conducted between July 1974 and March 1875.
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SUMMARY
The Space Tug/Shuttle interface compatibility study was performed to
identify, evaluate, and develop Tug plus payload-to-Orbiter accommoda-
tions requirements. The study was the instrument through which de-
sign changes to satisfy these requirements were submitted to NASA.
A
]Previously performed Tug-related studies slid not specifically address
the use or suitability of Orbiter-supplied general.-purpose payload sup-
port equipment or provide detail description of any Tug-dedicated peri- 	
^l
pheral equipment. The interface study investigated these areas and
supplied the lacking data.
Shuttle interfaces required for Space Tug accommodations are primarily
involved with supporLdng and servicing the Tug during launch countdown,
flight, and post landing; deploying and retrieving the Tug on orbit; and
maintaining control, over the Tug when it is in or near the Orbiter. Each
of these interface areas was investigated during the study to determine
the best physical and operational method of accomplishing the required
functions, with an overriding goal of establishing simple and flexible
Orbiter interface requirements suitable for Tug, Tug payloads, WS and
other cargo.
The Space Tug/Shuttle interface compatibility study was arranged into
six tasks that were accomplished sequentially within the eight-month
performance period. The study was managed by the Tug Task Team. at
NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, along with four other Tug-related
contracted activities. These other studies, involving ground and flight
operations, payload/Tug interfaces, and Tag avionics, supported the
interface study by generating accommodation requirements within their
respective study areas.
A systematic approach was used to ensure that no interface function was
missed or ignored. This approach 1) defined functional requirements
derived during Tug/Orbiter operations as they related to determining
Interface needs, and 2) organized these functional interface require-
ments to permit systematic evaluation within technical disciplines.
Major elements of this approach were: use of operational functional
flow diagrams to Identify all interface re quirements, a safety and relia-
bility assessment of identified operations and interface requirements,
and a suitably organized compilation of these interface requirements„
v
a^
Using these functional requirements, each interface subsystem was
evaluated to develop the best implementation technique, and an inter-
face system concept was assembled.
The recommended system, concept for supporting and deploying Tugfrom
Orbiter employs a cylindrical load-carrying structure called a deploy-
ment adapter. The deployment adapter contains all Tag-peculiar mech-
anisms required for transfer of Orbiter/ground services and support of
deployment, retrieval, and abort operations. Because the deployment
adapter is a cylindrical structure to provide efficient axial load distrib-
ution, a rotational deployment feature is incorporated to allow Tug re-
moval during deployment without infringing on the Orbiter cargo bay
volume available for Tug payloads. By using the deployment adapter
concept, Tug umbilical and deployment mechanisms can be attached and
checked out before Tug installation into the Orbiter. The entire Tug,
adapter, and umbilical support is installed as an autonomous unit into
the Orbiter.
Detail description of deployment adapter and other Tug-peauliax periph-
eral equipment (crew compartment interface panels and cargo bay
electrical umbilical kits) were prdvided as study output. In addition to
peripheral equipment definition, use of orbiter-supplied equipment was
investigated.
An evaluation of documented Orbiter payload services (JSC 07700, Vol.
.HIV, Rev, C) indicated that some changes would be desirable for Tag
plus its payloads. Twenty two proposed ch.-uges to this document
were prepared by the Space Tug/Shuttle Interface Compatibility Study
Team and submitted to MSFC for their assessment and processing.
These proposed changes covered detail requirements for Tag service
umbilicals, RMS control capability, Orbiter dump/vent provisions,
structural attachments, and improved Tug accessability to Orbiter-
supplied avionics equipment.
As a final study result, interface areas that would benefit from further
technical analyses and predevelopment work have been identifie& This
!	 euggested additional effort includes structural dynamic response analy-
ses and software design and demonstration in areas of RMS deployment/
retrieval, control., Tug plus deployment adapter monitor and control,
and caution and warning implementation.
vi:
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
	
I
The Space Transportation System Right vehicle, the Space Shutd,e, consists of the
major segments shown in Figure 1--1.., Included as part of this transportation system
is a proplusion stage called the Space Tug, depicted In Figure 1-2,which is carried into
low-earth orbit by the Space Shuttle in the Orbiter cargo bayy. The lug extends Shuttle
capability by placing payloads into higher orbits, such as geosynchronous and inter-
planetarytrajectories,so that more payload users may be accommodated.
Figure 1-1. Space Shuttle Configuration	 Figure 1»2. MSFC Baseline Tug
1.1 STUDY BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES
Current resource constraints preclude simultaneous development of bath Space Shut''de
and Tug. The government }clans to have the Air Force develop an interim upper stage
(IUS), to be followed by a NASA-developed M capability Tug at a later date. The TUS
is planned to be operational at or near the Shuttle's initial operational capability (IOC).
Although the Space Tug operational date is planned for 1983, it is importaut that
Shuttle/Tug interface requirements will be identified early so that they can be incorpo-
rated into the Shuttle. This will prevent having to constrain. the Tug design due to
prior Shuttle development. This advanced planning will also avoid major and costly
Shuttle modification when Tug is introduced.
The Space Tug/Shuttle Interface Compatibility Study was strtaetu3.-ed to compile, screen,
evaluate, and recommend suitable Orbiter interface provisions for Space Tug integration.
The Shuttle/Orbiter, as currently configured, tacludes some general payload accom-
modations applicable for Space Tug, but a detailed investigation of specific interface
requirements ^ad not previously been undertaken. Tug interface requirements needed
immediate deBhItIon and consideration In conjunction with other payload interface
1-1
requirements for incorporation into the Shuttle Orbiter at the earliest possible date.,
Tug/Shuttle interface compatibility achieved early during Shuttle development gill re-
sult in lower Space Transportation System program costs.
	 *'
The purpose of the Space Tug/Shuttle hi-terfa.ce Compatibility Study was to provide time-
ly detailed identification of Tug-related interface requirements, and to act as the Instru-
ment by which design changes to satisfy these requirements were submitted to NASA.
Figure 3-1 identifies the typical Tug-related Orbiter interfaces for the MSFC baseline
cryogenic Tug.
The Interface Study was managed by the Tug Task Team at NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center, along with four other parallel Tug-related contracted activities. These
other studies, involving ground and flight operations, payload/Tug interfaces, and
Tug avionics, supported the Interface Study by generating accommodation requirements
within their respective study areas.
1.2 FINAL REPORT ORGANIZATION
The results of the Space Tug/Shuttle Interface Compatibility Study are contained in the
four volumes of the final report. The four.volurnes are organized as follows-
Volume I Executive Summary --- Contains in summary form the objectives, re-
lationship of the interface Study to other NASA efforts, approach,
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a
data generated and significant results, l imitations, research implications,
and recommendations for additional effort made as a result of the study.
Volume 11 Tug/Payload/Orbiter Interface Analysis o includes the subsystem
technical analysis performed, including the definition of the Tug f1mc-
tional interface requirements and payload service requirements, de-
tailed analyses and track: „tadies of Tug/Orbiter interfaces, appropriate
sensitivity studies, and special emphasis ta sks.
Volume III Tug/Payload/Orbiter interface Requirement -- Contains the system level
interface assessment and the operation./physical definition of the recom-
mended Tug/Orbiter interface, plus a description of the Orbiter and base- 	 -
line Tug changes needed to accommodate the recommended interface. It
also includes a comparison, of IU'S and Tug interface requirements, and
recommends interface simulation-demonstration candidates.
Volume IV Cost Analysis -- Provides the detailed study economic analysis approach,
methodology, and results.
The study was arranged into six tasks, which were accomplished sequentially within
the eight-month performance period:
Task 1 - Functional Interface Requirements Definition. Tug ground and flight operations
were analyzed to obtain a complete accounting of all potential Tug/Orbiter interfaces,
their related operations, and safety fimctional requirements. This analysis was con-
ducted using baseline vehicle and operations definitions supplied by NASA-MSFC at the
start of the study effort.
Task 2 - Baseline Tug Interface Analyses. Approved functional interface requirements
were systematically evaluated to obtain, alternative solutions and determine the optimum
interface approach to satisfy each baseline Tug need. Specific payload through Tug and
direct to Orbiter service requirements obtained by trade study were included. From
these subsystem investigations and trade studies, detailed interface requirements for
Tug/Shuttle compatibility were itemized.
Task 3 - Sensitivity Analysis.  Using undated subsystem requirements from Task 2,
sensitivity analyses were performed to evaluate the effect of Tug operations and de-
sign changes on Tug/Orbiter interface requirements.
Task 4 --Tug/orbiter interface Reguirements. Results from baseline Tug interface
analyses (Task 2) were assemblers through a total Tug systems interface concept trade
study, and a composite set of preliminary Tug/payload/Orbiter interface requirements
were submit, ed for NASA. evaluation. These proposed Orbiter accommodation revisions
were submitted as recommended Neves II changes. The NASA assessment included re-
quirements reviews by ATSFC and the Shuttle project.
Task 5 - Interface and Baseline Revisions. Revised interface requirements were pre-
pared In areas where the government disapproved the initial requirements. Revisions
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were defined through trade studies of alternative approaches and baseline Tug changes.
Since relatively few proposed changes were rejected, unused resources were applied
to Tug/Orbiter interface related special emphasis tasks.
Task 6 - IUS/Tug Interface Comparison. Approved Tug requirements from Tasks 4
and 5 were compared with similar IUS requirements. Interface requirement incom-
patibilities were evaluated to identify and define major problems and recommend com-
promise solutions.
1.3 VOLUME 11 ORGANIZATION
The Tug/payload/Orbiter interface; analyses, contained in this volume of the final re-
port, consists of work performed under Study Tasks 1, 2, and 3. Specifically, it con-
tains the data and information required to satisfy the four study objectives listed below.
a. Assurance that no Tug to Orbiter functional interfaces (hardware or procedural)
are missed or ignored. This objective was addressed in Study Task 1, (Section 2),
where all functional interface requirements were derived and categorized by oper-
ational sequence and subsystem.
b. Allocation. of Tug payload services and their associated interface requirements
either as through Tug to Orbiter or directly from payload to Orbiter. The payload/
Orbiter services accommodations trade study, performed under Study Task 2 (Sec-
tion 3) assembled all identified tug payload service requirements, established rec-
ommended support levels, and allocated service routings. The results of this
trade study, combined with Tug requirements delineated in Task 1, gave complete
visibility to all combined Tug-plus -payload functional interface requirements.
c. Evaluation of alternative techniques for implementing the Tug and payload func-
tional, safety, and service interface requirements. These subsystem interface
analyses and trade studies were performed as the major effort of Task 2 as wen
as special emphasis studies within Task 5. Documentation of this work is con-
tained in Section 4.
d. Determine interface requirements impacts associated with potential baseline Tug
vehicle changes. This objective was addressed in Study Task 3 (Section 5) where
sensitivities of recommended interface solutions were investigated for the effect
of baseline Tug configuration/design revisions.
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SECTION 2
BASELINE TUG FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
Fundamental to a study of Tug interface requirements is the assurance that no inter-
face function has been overlooked or ignored. Thus a systematic approach was used
to identify and document, in this section, all interface requirements encountered dur-
ing Tug/Orbiter operations. This approach, illustrated in Figure 2-I, defined func-
tional requirements derived during Tug/Orbiter operations as they relate to determin-
ing interface needs and organized these functional interface requirements to permit
systematic evaluation within technical disciplimes. Major elements of this approach
are: 1) use of operational functional flow diagrams to identify all interface require-
ments, 2) a safety and reliability assessment of Ideated operations and interface
requirements, and 3) a suitably organized compilation of these interface requirements.
a. Operations Functional Flows and Interface Requirements. The first step In the
Task I analytical approach was to develop, or modify, Space Tug ground and
flight operations function Slow diagrams. The top level flow diagram and all
ground operations first-level flow diagrams vmre based on those in the Baseline
Space Tug Ground Operations (MSFC 68M000 39-4) document. The top-level flow
provided in that source was modified to include flieY'L mission functions that in-
volve Tug/Orbiter interfaces. The resulting modified or derived function flow
diagrams used in this tast y are presented in Section 2.1 together with their asso-
ciated operationally phased functional interface requirements data sheets.
b. Safety and Reliability Requirements. A systematic evaluation of Tug/Orbiter
interface requirements In terms of interface safety was performed. The func-
tional flow diagrams and the associated functional interface requirements were
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Figure 2-1. Pmet .onal Interface Requirements Definition Approach
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used as the basis in performing the safety analysis. A hazard analysis was per-
formed for each of the functional interfaces identified. The controls/design
constraints/operations constraints required to counteract each of the potential
hazards were then identified. Safety requirements are compiled in Section 2.2.
c. System. Functional Interface Requirements. Requirements from a. and b. above
were arranged by subsystem or technical discipline to better support the Task 2
trade studies. This tabulation, in conjunction with the operationally phased tab-
ulation obtained in a. provided a complete data matrix listing all Tug/Orbiter
functional interface requirements generated during a complete Tug/Orbiter oper-
ations cycle. 1. Section 2.3 these functional interface requirements are collated
by Tug system or Tug/Orbiter procedural interface and augmented by the addition
of safety/reliability criteria.
The functional interface requirements data contained here were initially documented
in report CASE/LVP 74- ,048-FIRM. This compilation of Tug functional requirements
was published early in the study far use by the interface study and the parallel MSFC
Tug studies, to ensure that the detail implementation of Tug/Orbiter interfaces satis-
fied all safety and functional needs. This Functional.  Interface Requirements Matrix Is
republished in its entirity in tree follovAng sections.
2.1 MISSION PHASED FUNCTIONAL, INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS
The first step in the functional interface requirements definition analytical approach
was to develop, or modify, Space Tug ground and flight operations function flow dia-
grams. The top
 level flow diagram shown in Figure 2-2, and all ground operations
first level flow diagrams, are based on those in the Baseline Space Tug Ground Oper-
ations (MSFC 68M00039-4) document. The top level flow provided in that source has
been modified to include flight mission functions that involve Tug/Orbiter interfaces,
as shown in Figure 2-2 (blocks 11.0 through 14.0).
All flight mission functions used in this study were develo ped by Convair based on in-
formation in the Baseline Space Tug Flight Operations (MSFC 68M00O39-3), Baseline
Space Tug System. Requirements and Guidelines (MSFC 68M00039-1), Space Shuttle
System. Payload Accommodations (JSC 07700, Vol. XIV), and Tug Operations and Pay-
load Support Study (Vol. 3, Part 1; Contract NAS8-28876 Final Report) documents, All
function flow diagrams used in the study are included in this section.
The Tug/Orbiter operations cycle sequence used in the functional interface require-
ments tabulations is:
Block 5.0 Postlanding Operations
Block 2.0 Tug/Spacecraft/Orbiter lobate and Checkout
Block 1.0 Launch Operations
Block 11.0 Flight MMi.ssion-Ascent Phase
Block 12.0 Flight Mission-Tug/Spacecraft Retrieval & Landing
Block 13.0 Flight Mission-Abort Termination
.2-2
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Figure 2-2. Space Tug Ground and Flight Operations
Blocks 6.0 throul h 10. 0, the DDT&E and Production functions, do not involve Tug/
Orbiter interfaces and are not further considered in this study. Similarly, Blocks
3.0 and 4. 0, the Tug refurbishment, checkout and Tug/spacecraft mating functions
do not involve any Tug/Orbiter interfaces and are not further considered in this study.
Within this operational cycle, the Space Tug/Shuttle Interface Compatibility Study en-
compasses all operational, procedural and hardware interfaces, both physical and RF,
that occur between the Tug and Orbiter during joint operations. This initial identifica-
tion of Tug/Orbiter interface functional requirements is organized in a typical opera-
tional mission sequence beginning with Tug/Orbiter landing, through ground turnaround,
launch, and subsequent flight mission. The following sections present the first-level
function flow diagram and its associated functional interface requirements data sheets
for each major block of activities i the operational cycle that involve joint Tug/Orbiter
operations.
2. l..1 POST LANDING OPERATIONS. The £t rst-level, post landing operations function
flour diagram is shown in Figure 2-3. This flow corresponds to Exhibit 3-8 in Refer-
ence 1 and is modified to include additional functions associated with special post land-
ing operations following flight mission abort terminations (Flocks 5.1.-RTLS and
5.1A AAA/ATO). Related functional, interface requirements data sheets follow the
flow diagram. No data sheets are included for Block 5.4 and 5.5 since there are no
Tug/Orbiter taterfaces during these activities.
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FFUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Tag Safimg & Pining
5.1 CONFIGURATION:	 All sheet 1	 of 2
INTERFACE: MA Tug•Orbiter	 Tug-Payload	 ,-_.o Tug-Payload•©rbiter
— Tug•GSE	 Tug-Facility
Iii = Mechanical Handling	 P = Prapallent/Prmurant/Fluid 	 A = Atiianics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.1. 1 Following Orbiter landing, tow Structure Provide attach/support fittings compati-
to safing area. ble with Orbiter payload support location
Interface surface details and loads. 	 Pro
vide load--carrying deployment adapter.
5. 1.2 Verify power & purge gas Structure Same as 5.1.1
availability, set. all controls to safe Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
position. ment capability to display power & purge
gas data at payload/mission specialists
station.
Procedural Provide instructions in payload/mission
specialists check list to accomplish this
task.
5. 1.3 Flight crew egress, ground crew Structure Same as 5.1.1
ingress.
5. 1.4 Verify propellant tank pressure- Strumture Sanxe as 5. 1.1
vent cycling. Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to display pressure/vent
data at payload/mission specialists
station.
Fluid Provide hydrogen/oxygen vent connection
to overboard vent ports.
Procedural, Provide instructions in ground crew
checklist to accomplish this task.
5.1.5 Verify ins.nlatlon. purging. Structure Same as 5.1..1
Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to display purge opera-
tion data at the payload/mission special-
ist station.
Fluids Provide overboard dump line connection.
Procedural Provide instructions in ground crew
checklist to accomplish this task.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCI•ION TITLE:
	
Tug ^{ing & PurgingBLOCK M O.
5.1 r5ldFIGURATION-	 All	 5heat _A_ of 2
INTERFACE:
'A TuryElrulter
	 ^. Tug Pdyluad
	 Tt^g Payload-®rlaiter
^._	 Tug•GSE	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Propellant/PrmurantlFluld
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.1.6 Continue purging until systems Structure Same as 5.1.1
are safe. Axionics Same as 5.1.5
Fluids Same as 5,.1.5
Procedural Provide instructions in ground crew
checldist to monitor puxge operation.
5.1.7 Move Orbiter to OPF. Structuxe Same as 5.1.1. Must be adequate to
support Tug during horizontal orbiter
tow from landing/safety area. to OPF.
Much accommodate transit induced
loads.
Rte.
NE,
FUNCTION Flaw FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Tag Sg
	
& Pur eBLOCK NO.
5. IA (RTLS) CONFIGURATION:	 Post-RTLS-Abort	 Shalt ? of
INTERFACE:
nPATug•orbitar
	
Tug-Payload	 __.	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA Tug.GSE	 .. Tuo-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P=Fropalfant/Pressurant/Fluid 	 A=Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5. 1.1A (RTLS) Following Orbiter Structure Provide attach/support fittings to mate
landing rollout, tow to Safing Area. with Orbiter payload support fittings
and/or payload deployment adapter.%.
5. 1.2A (RTLS) Verify tank condition, Structure Same as 5.1.3A (RTLS)
fluid levels, power & set controls to Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage--
safe conditions.	 (Accomplish during anent capability to display required data
rollout or tow) at payload/mission specialist station.
(Implies hardline interface between Tug
and Orbiter via aft bulkhead interface
panels.)
Environment Provide payload bay air conditioning
purge following Orbiter landing.
Procedural. Provide instructions in payload/mission
specialist checklist to accomplish fhis
task.
5.1.3A (RTLS) Flight crew egress, Structures Same as 5.1. 1A (RTLS).
ground crew ingress.
5.1. a..A (RTLS) Position and connect Structures Same as 5.1. IA (RTLS).
propellant vent & reactant drain Avionics Same as 5.1.2A (RTLS).
equipment. Fluids Provide reactant drain & propellant
vent interface panels at Orbiter mold
line & thru aft bulkhead panel to Tug.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter ground operatio
checklist to accomplish or support tlds
task.
S. L SA (RTLS) Drain ALPS Structure Same as S.1. IA (RTLS).
propellant Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
anent capability to display required data
at payload /mission specialist stations
& to control propellant drain from these
(Implies hardline interface between  Tug
& Orbiter via aft bulkhead pu mels). (Ma
require ground power interface.)
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Tug Safing & PurgingBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION: 	 Post--ATLS-Abort Sl^aet A_ o€5. 1A (RTLS)
INTERFACE:
'4	 A. Tug-Orbiter	 _ tug-payload	 ____ Tug-Payload -Orbiter
RA Tug-GSE	 — Tug•Fasility
M = Me6anical fiat-idling
	
P = Propallent/Frenurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5. L 5A (RTLS) Cont-d Fluids Provide ALPS propellant drain inter-
face panels at Orbiter mold line &
via aft bullhead to permit Tug fluid
drain in horizontal attitude. (Requires
low point drain laze connection &
routing.)
Procedural Same as 5. 1.4A (RTLS).
5. 1.6A (RTLS) Disconnect drain Structure Sams as 5.1.1A (RTLS).
equipment. Fluids Same as 5. 1.4A (RTLS).
Procedural Same as 5. 1.4A (RTLS).
5. 1.7A (RTLS) Connect purge equip- Structure Same as 5. 1. 1A (RTLS).
merit. Avionics Same as 5. 1.2A (RTLS).
Fluids Provide ALPS & main propellant
tank purge interface connectors an
Orbiter mold lice & thru aft bulkhead
panel to Tug.
Procedural Same as 5.1.4A (RTLS).
5.1.8A (RTLS) Purge L0 2 & LH2 Structure Same as S. 1. lA (RTLS).
tanks to acceptable concentration level. Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to display required data
at payload/mission specialists stations
& to control tank purge from there.
(Implies hardline interface betwben Tug
& Orbiter via aft bullhead panels & lines
to Orbiter crew compartment.) (May
require ground power interface.)
Fluids Provide main L02 & LH2 interface
,panels at Orbiter mold line & via
aft bullhead to permit tank
purge.
Procedural Same as 5.1.4A (RTLS)
5. 1.9A (RTLS) Purge ALPS propellant Structure Sartre as 5.1.1A (RTLS).
storage tank to acceptable concentration Avionics Same as 5.1. SA (RTLS).
level.. Fluid Same as 5.1.8A (1^S) except 	 Rey'
for ALPS tank.	 A
ii
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE:	 Tag Saf#ng & Purging
BLOCK NO.
5. 1.A (RTLS) CONFIGURATION:	 Post-RTLS-Abort	 Shoot 3 of ..3
INTERFACE:
'A Tug•Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload	 -.-	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
_'A Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P= Prapellant/Prenurant/Pluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUM3ER & TITLE SYSTEM! FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.1.9A (RTLS) Co t'd Procedural Same as 5. I.4A (RTLS).
S. L 10A (RTLS) Disconnect purge Structures,
equipment. Avionics, Same as 5.1.7A (RTLS) for all systems.
Fluids
& Procedural
5.1.11A (RTLS) Move Orbiter to OPP. Structure Same as S. ?.1A (RTLS) plus adequate
latches or restraints to react loads
imposed by Orbiter horizontal tow.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Saf'	 & Purge
CONFIGURATION:	 Post AOA/ATO Abort	 Sheet ? of5.1A (AOA/ATO
INTERFACE:
X12A Tug-Orbiter	 _
	 Tug-Payload	 Tug•Payload-Orbiter
— Tug-GSE	 __-_ Tug-Facility
FA = Mechanical Handling 	 P = P:opellent/Pressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5. 1. ]A (A.OA/ATO) Following Orbiter Structure Provide attach/support fittings to mate
landing rollout, tow to Safiug Area. with Orbiter payload support fittings
and/or payload deployment adapter,
5. 1.2A (AOA/ATO) Verify tank con- Structure Same as 5.1 .1A (AOA/ATO)
dition and power available & set controlE Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage--
to safe
	 (Accomplish daring anent capability to display required data
rollout or tow.) at payload/mission specialist station.
(hnplies hardline interface between Tug
& Orbiter via aft bulkhead interface
panels.)
Environment Provide payload bay air conditioning
purge following Orbiter landing.
Procedural Provide Instructions in payload/mission
specialist checklist to accomplish this
task.
5. 1.3A (AOA/ATO) Flight crew egress, Structure Same as 5.1. 1A (AOA/ATO).
ground crew ingress.
5. 1.4A (AOA/ATO) Position and Structures Same as 5.1. lA (AOA/ATO).
connect ACPS propellant drain Avionics Same as 5.1.2A (AOA/ATO).
equipment. Fluids Provide reactmt drain & propellant
vent interface panels at Orbiter mold
line & thru aft bulkhead panel to Tug.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter ground oper-
ations checklist to accomplish or
support this task.
5.1.5A (AOA/ATO) Drain. the ACPS Structure Same as 5.1. L4. (AOA/ATO).
propellant tanks. Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to display required data
at payload/mission specialist stations
& to control propellant drain from there.
(Implies hardline interface between Tug
and Orbiter via aft bulkhead panels.)
(May require ground power Interface.)
REV.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:
	
Tug Safiug & Purging
CONFIGURATION:	 Post AOA/ATO Abort	 sheet -.L of
	
35. ]A (AOA/ATO)
INTERFACE:
DOA Tuorbiter	 — Ttig-Nylmd	 Tug•Payload-061tor
P`4Tug-CSI=	 — Tug-Facility
M = Meehanisal Handling 	 P = Propellent/Pramirant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.1.5A (AOA/ATO) Cont'd Fluids Provide ALPS propellant drain
interface panels at Orbiter mold
line & via aft bulkhead to permit
Tug fluid drain in horizontal attitude.
(Requires low point drain line connection
& routing.)
Procedural Same as 5 .1.4A (AOA/ATO).
5.1.6A (AOA/ATO) Disconnect drain
equipment.
Structure
Fluids
Same as 5. 1.1A (AOF./.kTO).
Same as 5.1. 4.A (t,"	 'A'.20).
Procedural Same as 5.1.4A (A .-/ATO).
5.1.7A (AOA/ATO) Connect purge Structure Same as 5.1.1A (AOA/ATO).
equipment. Avionics Same as 5.1.2A (AOA/ATO).
Fluids Provide ACPS & propellant tank
urge interface connectors on Orbiter
mold line & thru. aft bulkhead panel to
Tug.
Procedural Same as 5.1.4A (AOA/ATO).
5. 1. BA (AOA/ATO) Purge ACPS pro- Structure Same as 5.1.1A (AOA/ATO).
pellant storage tank & main propellant Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
tanks. ment capability to display required data
at payload/mission specialists station
to control tank purge from there.
(Implies hardline interface between Tug
& Orbiter via aft bulkhead panels & lines
to Orbiter crew compartment.) (May
require ground power interface.)
Fluids Provide ACPS propellant and main, pro-
pellant tank purge interface panels and
lines at Orbiter mold line & tbru aft
bulkhead to permit tank purge.
Procedural Same as 5.1.4A (AOA/ATO).
5.1.9A (AOA/ATO) Disconnect gorge Structures, Same as 5.1.7A (AOA/ATO) for afl
equipment. Avionics, systems.
Fluids & Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BL13CK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Tug Safing & Purging
5. ]A (AOA/ATO) CONFIGURATION:	 Pose AOA/ATO Abort Sheet	 3	 of
INTERFACE:
T	 A Tug-Orbiter
	
—	
Tug-Payload
	 _. __	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
_RA_ Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Propallant/Pressurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.1. 10A (AOA/ATO) Move Orbiter to Structures Same as 5. Y. lA (AOA/ATO) plus ade-
OpF. quate latches or restraints to react
loads imposed by Orbiter horizontal tova
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Remove Tag/Spacecraft
5.2 CONFIGURATION:
	
All Shoot -!-- of ?
INTERFACE:
A Tug Orbiter	 Tug-Payload	 W._ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug•GSE	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Prapellant/Frsssurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.2.1 Install arbiter work stands & Structure Provide attach/support fittings to mate
open Orbiter cargo bay doors. with Orbiter payload support fittings
and/or payload deployment adapter.
Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to monitor tank and in-
sulation condition at payload/mission
specialists station daring this task.
Procedural Provide instructions in ground crew
checklist to Accomplish condition monitor
during this task.
5.2.2 Install cargo bay workstands & Structure Same as 5.2.1 plus provide
attach handling equfptnont to Tug. attach points for handling equipment to
lift Tug (& Spacecraft) clear of Orbiter
and which are compatible with Orbiter
installation & clearance requirements.
Procedural Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
crew operations checklist to accomplish/
assist with this task.
5.2.3 Disconnect Tug & adapter infer- Structure Same as 5.2.2.
faces from Orbiter. Avionics Provide Avionics interface disconnect
panel/receptacles for all Tug/Shuttle
avionics interface connections.
Fluids Provide fluids Interface disconnect panel
:receptacles for all Tug/Shuttle fluid inter
face connections.
Procedural Same as 5.2.2.
5.2.4 Lift Tug/deployment adapter/ Structures Same as 5.2.2.
spacecraft from cargo bay & install on Procedural Same as 5.2.2.
pallet/transporter.
5.2.5 Install Tug workstands. No Tug/Shuttle interface.
5.2. ti Remove Tug handling gear. No Tug/Shuttle interface.
Elea.
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION T iTLE: Remove FI' ht Data
	 -	 -	 --BLOCK NO.
5.3	 CONFIGURATION: All	 Shast i of
INTERFACE:
IK-A Tug-Orbiter 	 Tug-Paylnad	 Tug•Payload-ftitar
M Tag-GSE	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = FrnpellantlPrezurant/Fluid 	 A - Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE 	 SYSTEM	 I	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
5.3.1 Remove flight data from Orbiter: Avionics
CAUTION- Orbiter/Tug sa- ing opera-
tions must be completed and/or clear-
ance obtained from the Safety iagineer.
Note: Flight data storage wM probably Procedural
use a mag-bubble or CCD device. Thus
there will be no tapes to physically
remove, but ratifier an avionics interfac
plug to dump the data electronically to
a ground station.
5.3.2 Remove flight data tapes from
Tug.
Note: Accomplish when access is
available following Tug removal from
payload bay.
Provide interface to store ata at
payload/ani.ssion specialists station
during joust Tug-Shuttle flight phases of
mission
Provide instructions in Orbiter groinnd
crew* operations checklists to assist with
and/or provide access to accomplish thl
No Tug-Orbiter bterfaoe involved when
accomplished following Tug removal.
2.1.2 TUC/SPACECRAFT/ORBITER MATE AND CHECKOUT. The first-level Tug/
spacecraft/Orbiter mate and checkout function flow diagram is shown in Figure 2-4.
This flow corresponds to Exhibit 3--7 in Reference I modified to include a bypass flow
line for payload installation at the launch. pad. Related functional, interface require-
ments data sheets follow the flow diagram.
RE F. 60
SHUTTLE ASS-)
PRELAUNCH &
MOVE TO PAD
3.0	 REF.	 2.1	 B	 2.2	 16	 2.3	 60	 I.0	 RI F.
TUG SPACE-
	
INSTALL IN
	
INTERFACE.	 TUG
	
&	 R LAUNCH
CRAFT MATE	 ORBIT£H AT	 VERIFICATCOA
	 MONITORING
	
OPERATIONS
& CH£CM TT	 .OPF'
PAYLOAD INSTALLATION AT LAUNCH PAD
Figure 2-4. apace Tug Spacecraft Orbiter Mate and Checkout;
Block 2. 0, First-Level Functional Flow Diagram.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Install in Orbiter at OPF
2.1 CONFIGURATION:	 All Sheet -L- of 2
INTERFACE:
MPATug-Oibitar	 — Tug-Payload	 . ___	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
M Tug-GSE	 — Tag-Fadlity
M = Macharicsl Handling
	 P = PraPallant/Presnurant/Fluid
	
A = Avlanics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
2.1.1 Verify Tug/Spacecraft mating No Tug/Shuttle interface
and checkout
2.1.2 Transport Tag/Spacecraft to No Tug/Shuttle interface
OPP
2.1.3 Remove covers & attach handling No Tug/Shuttle interface
equipment
?.1.4 Verify Orbiter payload bay door Procedural Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
open & workstands in place; Orbiter crew operations checklist to install
support fitting beams, receptacles in necessary work platforms for Tug/
proper position; Orbiter payload bay Spacecraft loading.
panels; MSS/PSS panels & all umbilicals
In place.
2.1, 5 Iaft Tug/Spacecraft into Orbiter Structure Provide attach fittings/mounting pads to
bay and secure mounting pacts. fit lifting equipment and match Tag
(payload) support provisions in Orbiter
bay.
Procedural Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
crew operations checklists to assist wit
this task.
2.1.6 Connect interface panels & verlf Avionics Provide interface panels) receptacles
for all Tug/Orbiter avionics interface
connections.
Fluid Provide interface panels to accommodst
all Tug/Orbiter fluid interlace conner. -
tions .
MOTE: Implicit within these require-
ments is the requirement to provide
avionics & fluid interface lines favia
interface panels on aft bulldtaad of
Orbiter bay to disconnect panels on the
Orbiter meld ling to connect with ground.
lines at launch pad.
l Procedural Provide Instructions in Orbiter ground
crew operations checklist to provide
access and support to accomplish this
task.
Nov.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Install in Orbiter at OP5
BLOCK NO.
2.1 CONFIGURATION: All Shoot ? of ?
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter	 e Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
M	 Tup•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
Its _ Mechanical Handling	 P = PropoliantlPrenurantlFluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 144TERFACE
2.1.7 Remove handling equipment Structure Same as 2.1.5
Procedural Sams as 2.1.5
NOTE: Avionics/Fluid interfaces conn-
ected in 2.1, 6 remain throu.gbout
subsequent ;prelaunch, munch, flight
(thra deployment & subsequent to
retrieval), landing and postlanding
operations until Task 5.2.8.
Rev.
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aFUNCTION FLOWBLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: Interface VerificationJCONFIGURATION: All Shut _L of2.2
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter — Tug-Payload
	 __	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA' Tug-SSE — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling P - Propeliant/Primurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
2.2.1 Verify connection of fluid line Fluid Provide interface panels to accommrdal
interface panels all Tug-Shuttle fluid interfaces from Tug
(or deployment adapter) to aft bulkhead
and lines from aft bulkhead to Orbiter
mold line disconnect panels.
Structure Provide bard point mourting locations
for Orbiter bay work platforms to afford
access to interface panels.
Procedural Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
crew operations checklist to provide
access and support far this task.
2.2.2	 Connect leak test equipment, and Fluid. Same as 2.2.1
2.2.3 Perform leak tests Structure Same as 2.2.3
Procedural Same as 2.2.1
NOTE: Requirements to accomplish
this task and determine availability of
time in Orbiter Allocated Processing
Plan.	 (Presently, there is not enough
time for extensive leak tests.)
2.2.4 Verify connection of electrical Avionics Provide interface pads to accommadat
(anionic) interface panels. all Tug-Shuttle avionics interfaces from
Tug (or deployment adapter) to aft bulk-
head and lines from there to Orbiter
mold lime disconnect panels and crew
compartment umbilical lines and panels.
Structure Same as 2.2.1
Procedural Same as 2.2.1
2.2.5 luota.11 electrical (avionics) chec -Avionics Same as 2.2.4
out equipment & connect to LPS, and Structure Same as 2.2.1
MSS/PSS. Procedural Same as 2.2.1
2.2,6 Perform electrical tests. NOTE: See nots for Tasks 2.2.2 & 2.2.
2.2.7 Remove CSE Avionics Same as 2.2.4
Fluids Same as 2.2.1
Structure Same as 2.2.1
Procedural Same as 2.2.1
2.2.8 Verify satisfactory completion Procedural Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
Of tests crew operations checklist to verify with
Tug Test Conductor that tests
	
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE:
BLOCK NO.
	2.3 I CONFIGURATION: 	 All Shaet z of 3
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug
-Orbiter
M Tug•GSE
M = Mechanical Handling
TASK NUMBER & TITLE
Tug-Payload
— Tug-Facility
F = Propellant/Pressumnt/Fluid
SYSTEM
— Tug-Payioad-Orbiter
A = Avionics
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
measurement capability to collect
& display critical safety & warning
parameters at a location wde3mal to the
Orbiter payload bay. This location
should be in one of the MLP rooms with
available access during all Shuttle
buildup & transport operations. This
implies an interface path through
the normal interface panels, out the
bay aft bu dicad, to a disconnect panel
on the Orbiter mold line. During Orbite
tow from 0 P to VA.E data could be
displayed at payload/mission specialist
station. Instrumentation for data
gathering should be limited to normal.
flight instrumemation. All non-flight
items must be located such that payload
bay access is not required.
Fluids	 Provide all fluid interface lines require(
to maintain/replenish fluid system
pressures such as MM purge, retention
of main thrust chamber in a stated null
position or within specified limits of
movement if required for clearance or
load conditions. Fluid interface must
also include provision for Hues from
payload bay aft bulldmad panels to dis-
connect panels on Orbiter mold line to
matte with GSE rise-off disconnects.
Structure
	
Provide hard points for positioning any
required work or access platforms.
NOTE: This requirement may be delete
if all connections and equipment are
external to Orbiter and Orbiter payload
bay.
Procedural
	
Provide instructions in Orbiter ground
crew operations checklist to	 Rev.
m-ovide access and/or assist with"'"'
0^
	
2.3.1 lvstall equipment to mo:
critical Tug function
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 -Tug MonitoringHLOCK NO.
2.3 CONFIGURATION: 	 All Sheet	 2	 of	 3
WERFACE:
M A Tug-Orbiter
	
— Tug-Payload
	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
M Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
Ili = Mechanical Handling
	
P = Propellent/Pressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
2.3.2 Activate monitor equipm-ent Avionics Same as 2.3.1, interface lines necesaar
recorders to transmit data from Tug to recording/
display location. 	 Once activated,
monitors & interface remain on until
Task 1.3.
2.3.3 Remove payload bay workstands Structure Same as 2.3.1
NOTE:' Utilization of Tug flight instru-
mental-ion should eliminate requirement
to retain workstands until this task.
s"hus, they would probably be removed
in Task 2.2.7 by - or under supervision
of -Orbiter ground crew.
2.3.4 Close payload bay doors No Tug-Shuttle interface (Orbiter task)
2.3.5 Prepare Orbiter for transport No Tug-Shuttle interface (Orbiter task)
to VAB -
2.3.6 Monitor Tug system status Avionics Use inerface provided in Task 2.3.1 to
monitor Tug status during Shuttle build-
up, transport to launchpad and connect
to GSE rise-off disconnect panels.
Fluid Use interface provided in Task 2.3.1 to
replenish fluid supplies/pressure as
required by Tug status & system require
ments. Also connect to GSE rise-off
disconnect panels during orbiter pad
hookup.
Structure Provide support points for Tug/Space-
ordl & Tug deployment adapter capable
of supporting them with payload bay 	 r
with Orbiter in either horizontal or
vertical. (tail down) attitude .
	
Further,
support system must be capable of
maintaining Tag/Spacecraft in proper
pos=ition while Orbiter is towed. from OP
to VAB, while Orbiter is being rotated
from horizontal to vertical for Shuttle
buildup, and during Orbiter transfer
to the launch pad an the MLP.
Ray.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	
Tug Mpnitorlug
[CONFIGURATION:2.3 All of
INTERFACE:
M9'A Tuadlrbiter	 ..,.v Tup-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
P.,r.. Tug•GSE
	
, Tug-Fadiity
M - Mechanical Handling 	 P = PrapallantlftmurantlFiuid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
2.3.6 (Continued) Procedural Provide inatmetions in Orbiter ground
crew operadons che&11st to provide
access and/or assist in comeetbg G5E
r'{se-off disconne&-s to Orbiter mold
line panels for all Tug system iterfaces
Eev.
^Z
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F2.1.3 LAUNCH OPERATIONS. The first-level launch operations function floor dia-
gram is shown in Figpre 2-5. This flaw corresponds to ExMit 3-3 in Reference :L
modified to resequenes propellant loading (Block 1. 2), add payload installation at the
Launch pact (Blocks 2.4 and 2.5), and add provisions for special functions associated
with launch pad abort (Block 1.3A). Related functional °.nterface requirements data
sheets follow the flow diagram.
REF.	 -
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i
2.0	 REF.	 I.1
	
2
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Figure 2-5. Space Tug Launch Operations
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE:	 Launch Readiness Verif. & Countdown Prep.BLOCK NO.	 -^----	
==Sheet1.1 CONFIGURATION: All 
	 1 of 2
INTERFACE:
1UA Tug-Orbiter	 — TutPayload	 Tug-Payload -Orbiter
PA.
	
-.., Tug-Facility
M - Mach apical Handling	 P - Propellant/Prssauranr/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE 	 SYSTEM	 ^ FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.1.1 Verify status of Tug propellant Structure	 Provide support points for Tug & Tug
system	 deployment adapter capable of support-
ing Tug, spacecraft & adapter within
payload bay with Orbiter in vertical
attitude (tail down, Tug main engine
down) in both empty and fully loaded
condition (Task 1.2). In addition, this
support system must accommodate both
horizontal Tug/spaceoraft installation
('Task 2.1.5) & removal (Task 5.2. g)
and vertical. installation (Task 1.3.5) &
removal. (Task 1.3.3).
Avionics	 Provide instrumentation and data managt^-
ment capability to collect & display
required propulsion system data at
payload/mission specialist stations and
to appropriate ground monitor & control
stations. Interface lines required from
Tug (Tug deployment adapter) through si<
bulkhead interface panels to Orbiter
stations and through rise-off disconnects
g	 to ground stations.
l Fluids	 Provide instrumentation pickup/mountini
to supply required propulsion system
status to Data Mgmt subsystem for
collection & display.
Procedural	 Include instructions in Shuttle pre-
launch operations checklists to provide
for accomplishment of this task.
Provide required software to LPS if
task or data display requires computer
assist.
Finn.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Launch Readiness Verif. & Countdown Prep.
CONFIGURATION:
	
All Shset 2^ of 21.1
INTERFACE:
MPA	 Tug-Orbiter	 _____	 Tug-Payload
	 .„_-. Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA Tug-GSE	 _.._ Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Propellant/PranurantlFluld
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.1.2 Activate each Tug system & Structure Lazne as
verify status in conjunction with Shuttle Avionics Same as 1.1.1, plus data managementpad preparation and Avionics Opera--
and capability to accept system activa-
tions Test (AOT) tian commands, route to required Tug
system and report response to ground
coEtrol station and/or payload/mission
specialist station in Orbiter. Provide
required software to interface with LPS
as required to accomplish task.
Fluids Same as 1.1.1, plus all otber fluid
systems provide instrumantation pickup/
mounting to supply required data &
response for verification tests. Data
routed thru avionics data management
system.
Procedural Same as 1.1.1
1.1.3 Verify Tug ready for terminal Structures Same as 1.1.1
countdown Avionics Same as 1.1.2
Fluids Same as 1.1.2
Procedural Same as 1.1.2
1.1.4 Monitor Tug status during final Structure Same as 1.1.1
Shuttle prelaunch and countdown Avionics Same as 1.1..2preparation operations.
Fluids Same as 1.1.2
Procedural Same as 1.1.2
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Toad Propellants & PressurantsBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION: , 	 All Sheet	 of 41.2
INTERFACE:
MPA	 Tug-Orbiter	
— 
Tug-NVIiDed
	 _-
	 Tug•Payload-DMtar
Pp'	 Tug-rm	 — Tug-Facility
M _ Mechanical handling	 P = Propellent/Prusurant/Fiuid 	 A = Auinnics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.2.1 Purge propellant system	 Structure Continue to provide support paints
for Tug and Tug adapter
Fluids Provide interface pawls (aft bullduead
& Orbiter mold line) and lines to
accomplish propellant tank purge.
Requires lines for ground pressurization
purge and LH2/LO2 tank vent.
Avionics Provide instrumentation, data manage-
ment, interface panels (aft bulkhead
& Orbiter mold lim) and lines to
monitor and control tank purge operatic
Provide interface with LPS for pre-
! launch & countdouam data display at
' appropriate ground control stations.
Provide LPS interface software as
required.
Procedural Provide instructions for Shuttle & LPS
pre-launch & countdown operations
F checklists.
1.2.2 Verify systems ready for load-	 Structure Same as 1.2.1
ing.	 Avionics Essentially same as 1.2.1, and that
required for 1.1.1 (verify propellant
system status). within, interface
panels and lines, provide for total
propulsion system status monitor &
display.
Fluids Provide instrumentation pickup/mamtim
to supply required propulsion system
status data to Data Management sub-
system for collection and display.
Procedural Same as 1.2.1
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Load Propellants & PressurantsBLOCK NO.
1. 2 CONFIGURATION: 	 All Sheet
	
Z	
of	 4:
INTERFACE: MPA Tug-Orbiter	 _ Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	
P = Propel lant/Pressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.2.3 Toad helium system Structure Same as 1.2.1
Fluids Provide necessary interface panels
(Orbiter aft bulkhead & mold line)
and lines to accomplish helium system
fill, vent and status monitor during
system load and subsequent final count-
down. Provide instrumentation pickup/
mounting to supply required statue
data to Data Management subsystem for
collection and display.
Avionics Provide instrumentation, data manage-
ment, interface panels (Orbiter aft
bulkhead and mold line) and lines to
monitor & control helium loading.
Provide interface with LPS far loading
& count-down  data display at appropriate
ground control stations. 	 Provide LPS
interface software as required.
Procedural Same as 1.2.1
1.2.4 Load hydrogen system Fluids Same as 1.2.3, except for hydrogen
fill, drain, vent and Status monitoring.
Avionics Same as 1.2.3, except to monitor &
control hydrogen system fill, vent and
drain.
Structure Same as 1.2.1
Procedural Same as 1.2.1
1.2. S Load oxygen system Fluids Same as 1.2.3, except for oxygen fill,
drain, vent & status monitoring.
Avionics Same as 1.2.3, except to monitor &
control oxygen system fill, vent & drain
Structure Same as 1.2.1
Procedural Same as 1.2,1	 ilex.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:
	 Load Propellants & PressurautsBL0:.K NO.
1.2 CONFIGURATION:	 1Ul Sheet	 of	 4
11dTERFACE:
kNIPA Tug-Orbiter
	
._ _.	 Tug i yload	 _	 Tug-Paylaad-Orbiter
PA Tug-GSE	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Propellant/PrwtirantlFiuid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.2.6 Load ACPS system Fluids Same as 1.2.3, except for ACPS
Note: Will probably be accom- N2H4 fill, vent, drain and status
plisbed in Payload Changeout monitor.
Room (PCR) Avionics Same as 1.2.3, except to monitor &
control ACPS fill, vent & drain,
Structure SSame as 1.2.1
Procedural Same as 1.2.1
1.2.7 Loci fuel cell reactants Fluids Same as 1. 2.4 & 3..2.5 since fuel cells
probably use reactants from Tag main
t
#
LH2 & L02 propellant tanks.
Avionics Same as 1.2.4 & 1. 2. 5 since fuel cells
probably use reacts from Tug main
LH2 & L02 propellant tanks.
Structure Same as 1.2.1
Procedrual Same as 1.2.1
1.2.8 Place Tug & GSE in standby Fluids
condition Avionics Same as 1.2.1 thru. r.. 2.7 for all
Structure systems
Procedural
1.2.5 Replenish cryogenic tanIts Structure Satre as 1.2.1
Fluids Provide interface panels in Orbiter
payload bay aft bulkhead and on Orbiter
mold lure and lines between those
panels to accomplish liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen topping/replenish opera-
tions. Provide lines for replenish fill,
vent and tank pressurization as required
Avionics Provide instrumentation and data monagc
meat capability for monitor & control of
replenish operations. Provide inter-
face panels (aft bulkbead &. mold line)
and lines to trattamit replenish sta
= "
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Load Propellants & PressurantsBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION:
	 All Sbmt'^ of 41.2
INTERFACE:
MPA
	 Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload
	 . _ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA
— Tug•GSE	 r,..,. Tug-Facility
M - Machanical Handling	 P = Propidiant/Presaurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYVTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.2.9 (Continued) Avionics data to payload/mission specialist panel
(Cont ld.) and appropriate ground control stations.
Provide required interface software
for LPS and Shuttle pre-launch operation
Procedural Provide instruction input to Slmttle pre-
launch operations checklist to aceomplis
& monitor this task.
Rey.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 3ackout/Payload ChangeoutP--^---
ICONFIGURATION:	 All Tsheat Z of1.3
INTERFACE:
9RIA-Tug-4rhiter
	
— Tug-Payload
	 Tug-Payload-DNtar
PATug-GSE
	
..r. Tug-Facility
M = IVlachanical Haiudling	 P = Propsllant/I	 urent/Fluid	 A W Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
NOTE: Payload changeout tasks & fimc ;oral. interface r quirements are based on payload change
out occurring prior to attaining fina l- twc hoar standby st tus and, therefore, prior to propellant
loading.	 The changeout room is in pla.c with an en	 on nental seal established between the room
& Orbiter skin, and the payload bay doa s are closed.
1.3.1 Attach GSF & open payload bay Orbiter task - no Tug Orbiter interface.
doors
1.3.2.1 Install workstands Structural Provide structural support points for
wo*ntands. (May be provided by
Orbiter.) Provide structural support
for Tug and adapter within Orbiter pay-
load bay.
1.3.2.2 Safe Tug Strudural Same as 1.3.2.1.
Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to place Tug systsms
in safe condition, verify accomplish-
ment and display data on Orbiter
mission/payload specialist panel and
appropriate ground control panels.
Includes providing ad interface lines
and panels to transmit data from Tug to
Orbiter and gronnd locations.
Fluids Provide means to secure insulation
purge system in safe condition, verify
accomplishment, and display results at
appropriate Orbiter and ground control
stations.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter ground opera-
tions checklist to accomplish this task.
Provide required software input to LPS
to accomplish this task if computer
assist is required.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Backout/Payload ChangeoutBLOCK NO.
1.3 CONFIGURATION:	 All Sheet ? of 4
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug•Orbitar	 Tug-Payload	 _ _	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
— Tug•GSE	 . _ _	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	
P= Propellant/Pressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.3.2.3 Disconnect interface Avionics Provide interface pawl(s)/receptacles
connectors for all Tug-ghuttle avionics interface
connections and for all Tug to ground
interfaces routed through Orbiter to
ground.	 (Ref. Task 2.1.6 for interface
connection.)
Fluid Provide interface panels to accommodat
all Tug/Orbiter fluid interface connec-
tions and for all Tug to ground inter-
faces routed tbrough Orbiter to ground.
(Ref. Task 2.1.6 for interface ccnnnec-
tion.	 Ref. Task 1.2 for identification
of fluid subsystems involved.)
Structural Same as 1.3.2.1
Procedural Sarre as 1.3.2.2
1.3.2.4 Attach payload changeout unit Structural Same as 1.3.2.1. 	 Support points for
payload changeout unit & handling
equipment must not interfere with
normal Orbiter-Tag support paints
or payload bay clearance requirements.
Procedural Same as 1.3.2.2
1.3.2.5 Remove workstands Structural Same as 1.3.2.1
Procedural Same as 1.3.2.2
1. S.3 Remove Tug/spacecraft & Structural Same as 1.3.2.4
deployment adapter to clean roomy Procedural Same as 1.3.2.2
1. 3.4 Replace Tug and/or spacecraft — No Tug-Orbiter interfaces involved
and verify interface. in this task.
1.3.5 Install Tug and/or spacecraft in — See sub	 .ask steps
Orbiter bay & verify interfaces
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: 	 3ackout/Payload ChangeoutBLOCK NO.
1.3 CONFIGURATION: 	 Ali St3eet 3	 of 4
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-orbiter	 ._..® Tug-Payload 	 _____ Tug•Payload-Mitor
— Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
N1= Mechanical Handling 	 P = Prnpallant/Pm aurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.3.5.1 Install Tug and/or spacecraft- 6tmetural Provide Tag & Tug adapter support
points & latches to fix their position
in the payload bay for subsequent
propellant loading & flight loads.
:support points must not interfere with
Payload changeout unit & other handling
GSE.
NOTE: Task 1. 3.5 is essentially same
respect to determining functional mer-
face requirements, as the optional laune
pad installation concept.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter ground opera-
tions checklists to accomplish or assist
with this task.
1.3.5.2 Reinstall wmic platforms as Structural Provide structural hard points for acces
necessary to provide access to interface work platforms. (May be provided by
panel locations. Orbiter) Continue to provide Tug & de-
ployment adapter support bard points as
in 1.3.5.1.
Procedural Same as 1.3.5.1
1.3.5.3 Connect interface panels. Structural Saone as 1.3.5.2
Avionics Provide interface panel(s) or receptacle
for all 'pug-Orbiter avionics interface
connections.	 (lief. Task 2.1.6 for
horizontal connection task.) Panels mus
be located to facilitate access for
connection with Tug & Orbiter in either
horizontal or vertical attitude.
Fluids Provide interface panels to aircommodate
all Tug/Orbiter fluid interface connec-
tions and for all Ting-gro nd interfaces
routed thra the Orbiter. 	 (Ref. Task
2.1.6 for horizontal connection & Task
1.2 for fluid subsystem identification.)
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Backout/Payload ChangeoutBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION:	 AllSliest	 `^ f
	
41.3
INTERFACE:
MPA
	 Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload	 .._._ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
_ Tug-GSE
	
— Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = PropellantlPrmurantlFluld	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.3.5.3 (Conti d. ) Fluids (Cont td. Panels must be located to facilitate
access with Tug & Orbiter in either hori
zontal or vertical attitude.
Procedural Same as 1.3,5.1
1, 3, 5, 4 Verify interface connections Structural Same as 1.3.5.2
Avionics Same as 1.3.5.3 plus interface to
ground control stations.
Fluids Same as 1.3.5.3 plus :Ixterface to
ground fluid systems and ground control
stations.
Procedural Same as 1.3.5.1, plus required soft-
ware input to LPS to accomplish all
ground-controlled verification and status
checks,
1.3.6 Remove workstands & detach Structural Provide Tug & Tug deployment adapter
payload changeout unit. support points & latches to fix their
position in the payload bay. Provide
support for workstands.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter operations
checklists to accomplish or support
this task.
1.3.7 Initiate purges & return to Structural Continue to provide support for Ting &
standby Status. Tug adapter.
Avlon^cz Provide avionics interface pawl(s)/
receptacles to control & monitor main
propellant tank insulation purges.
Provide required software input to
;.,PS,
Fluids Provide fluid system interface panels
for main propellant tank insulatim
purge and vent.
Procedural Same as 1. 3.5 to initiate & monito
purge operations. 	 gv'
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTIONTITLE: 	 BackoutBLOCK NO.
1.3A CONFIGURATION:	 Pad Abort	 Sheet	 of	 2
INTERFACE:
	 0
SPA Tug-Orbiter
	
— Tug-P&ylaad	 ...	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
PA' Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	
P = PropaiianVPmurart/F€uid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.3.1A Terminate propellant loading Structural Provide support and latch or restraint
if still in progress. 	 (Or, terminate devices to maintain Tug & deployment
topping if in progress.) adapter in vertical position during
launch pad backoitt activities.
Avionics Provide instrumentation & data manage-
ment capability to monitor and control
Tug propellant loading /termination
operations and display required data
at payload/'mission specialist station
and ground control stations. Includes
interface panels at Orbiter mold lire &
aft bulkhead and all interconnecting lutes
Fluids Provide all fluid system interface panels
(Orbiter mold Sine & payload bay aft
builshsad) and interconnecting lines to
accomplish main propellant load,
terminate, drain= ALPS propellant
load terminate & drains and helium.
relief.
Procedural Provide input to launch operations
checklist to accomplish this task.
Provide required LPS software input
to support task.
Environment Provide payload bay GN2 purge while
oryo-propellaitts ars in Tug maize tames.
1.3.2A Return Tug systems to safe Structures,hold status Avionics,
Fluids, Same as 1.3.1A for all systems
Procedtwes &
Environment
1.3.3A Flight crew egress (if on board) Structures Satre as 1.3.1A
Procedural Orbiter crew task, no Tug-Orbiter
Interface.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 3ackout
BLOCK NO.
1.3A CONFIGURATION: 	 Pad Abort Sheet ? of 2
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug•Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload
	 _ _ Tug•Payload•OVditer
PA Tug,6SE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical  Handling 	 P = ProFellantftmurantlFluid
	
A = Avinnics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.3.4A Accomplish propellant drain: Strud;ural,
a.	 LI32 Avionics,
b. L03 Fluids, Same as 1 . 3.1A. for all systems
c. ACPS Procedural &
Environment
1.3.5A Purge propellant systems Structures & Same as 1.3.1.A
Avionics
Fluids Provide ground pressure source via
fluid system interface paxkels & lines
for propellant tank purge.
Procedural Same as 1.3.1A
1.3.6A Vent & safe pressurization Structures Same as 1.3.1A
systems Avionics Provide control. & monitor capability
for vent 9• safing thru e2isting
a:vrionics interface panels & lines.
Plaids Provide ^2 &i,H2 vent system iiter-
face panels & lines to vent tanks thru
Orbiter to ground locations (vent
stack or burn pond). Venting can not
be permitted into the Orbiter payload
bay.
Procedural Saone as 1.3.1A
1.3.7A Secure all systems in safe Structural,
condition Avionics, & I Same as 1.3.1A
Procedural
Fluids Saone as I.3.1A plus 1.S.-6A
Ray.
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F UNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Close Cargo Bay Doors, etc.
BLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION: 	 All Sheet	 x	 of1.4
INTERFACE:
MR'A Tug-Orbiter	 — T*Psylaad	 __ _	 Tug-Payload -Orbiter
— Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = i'illechaniW Handling 	 P a Propellant/Prmurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1..4.1 thru 1.4.5 Structure Contirsue to provide hard point support
NOTE: These are basically Orbiter & latches to maintain Tug & deployment
tasks to secure from payload cbangeout adapter position within, payload bay.	 +
or pad installation. During these tasks Avionics Provide instrumentation, data manage--
the %notional interfaces identified must meat, interface panels (Orbiter aft;be maintained, but are not associated bulkhead & mold line) and lines to word-
with a discrete Orbiter sub-tads. for 'leg stag during this & other Orbito
pro--launch and standby activity. 	 Provide
interface with LPS for data display
at appropriate ground control stations
as well as caution & warning display
at payload/mission specialist panel.
Provide required interface software.
Vluids, Provide interface panels (Orbiter a$
bulkhead & mold line), lines, instru-
mentation mounting/pickup to supply
required fluid-system status data to
Data Management for collection &
display. Also, provide fluid 1^elium s	!
LH2, L02 and R12H4) interface panels &
lines for required system fill, drain,
vent, purge or topping operations.
Procedural Provide input to Orbiter ground
operations checklist to accomplish
or support Tug monitoring during
Orbiter bmal. pre launch operations.
E!
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FUUNCTION FLOW
.,, 71 13M TITLE:
	
Final CountdownSTOCK NO.
C
fr
l}
^
NFiGURATiON:	 All Sheet X of's. S
INTERFACE:
MPA	 Tug•Oibiter
	 _ _	 Tug-Paylaad	 Tug•Fayload-Orbiter
.PA_ Tag- GSE	 ___
	
Tug-Facility
M = Pkehanical Handling	 P = Rmpellant/Fressursnt/Fluid	 A= Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
1.5.1 Very ?`tag system status Structuxe Continue to provide support points or
Tug, deplo;ment adapter & spacecraft.
Fluids Provide interface panels (Orbiter aft
bulkhead & mold line), litres, instra-
mentation mounting/pickup to supply
regxixed fluid systems status data to
Data Tdana.gement system for collection
and display. Also, all helium, hyd a-
gen, oxygen & N2H4 interface panels
and lines which may be required for
respective system fill, drain, vent or
purge.
Avionics Provide instrumentation, data manage-
ment, interface panels (Orbiter aft
buH,.bead & mold lines), and lines to
monitor Tug status. Provide interface
with LPS for pre-launch & caunLdau^m
data display at the appropriate ground
control station as well as caution &
warning display at payload/mission
specialist station. 	 Provide required
interface software.
Procedural. Provids instructions for Shuttle & LPS
pre-launch countdown operations ohacFc-
lists.
1.5.2 Control & monitor Tug during Structural,
terminal courddown Fluids, Sate requirements as 1. 5.1, all
Avionics & systems.
Procedural
Rev.
2.1.4 FLIGHT OPERATIONS-ASCENT PHASE. The first level flight operations-
ascent phase function flow diagram is shown in Figure 2-6. This flow was derived
by Convair based on data in the Baseline Tug Flight Operations (Reference 2) docu-
ment and the Tug Operations and Payload Sppport Study (Reference 3) final report.
It covers all activities from Tug/Shuttle launch through Tug/Spacecraft separation
from the Orbiter and transfer of control to mission ground control. The related
function interface requirements data sheets follow the flow diagram,
0'
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Figure 2-6. Space Tug, perform Flight Mission, Ascent Phase; Block 11, a, First-Level Functional Flow Diagram
FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: Tuff/SC Caution &
Monitor & Control
°1
11.1	 I CONFIGURATION: All
	
Sheet	 of
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter _.	 Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug-GSE Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling P = Propallant/P=Tm Lt/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.1.1 Lift-off of mated Shuttle & Avionics ao Provide control and monitoring capa-
Tug/SC bility to automatically perform follow-
ing functions at Orbiter ignition or
first movement of Shuttle to:
• Close LH2 and LO  tank vent
valves.
• Terminate helium purge.
• Purge bag vent valves are open
m Manual override capability is to be
provided from Orbiter crew compart-
ment control panel.
Note: All warning monitor and control ® Provide C &W monitor and control
circuits must be hardwired from C&W panel in crew compartment. This
panel to appropriate function. Number panel will be interconnected with
of functions to be: monitored and con-- Orbiter flight crew displays and con-
trolled should bo reduced to 'those fume- trol, . 7.ural alarm and illuminated
tions necessary to ensure Orbiter and talkbaL.n.	 Tn addition, provide C 
crew safety.	 It must be realized that ,	 data to be transmitted through Orbiter e
Shuttle flight involves risk and the only communication system to ground
requirement for Tug and SC C&W is not stations and ground controllers.
to unduly increase this risIt.	 Require- a+ Provide electrical power. 	 j
ments for C&W will be issued by {Note: Subject to trade study to 	 1
safety personnel. determine whether power is provided
by Orbiter or Tug fuel cells are . acti-
vated for ascent power.
® Provide capability to record C&W
data and Tug flight performance data.
acs Relay C&W data to ground station.	 1
Froeedure a Provide instructions for appropriate
control functions to be executed by
Orbiter crew based on C&W signals.
9 Monitor and control C&VII display/
panel.
tds^^.
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE: Tug/SC Caution & Warning Monitor & Control3I.L1CK N0.
11.1	 CONFIGURATION: All 	 Sheet _L_ Of
^INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Paylaad
	 _..._ Tug-Payload -Orbiter
— Tug-GSE	
— Tug-Facility
M = Machanical Handling
	 P = Prapellant/Pressurent/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTIM 11111TIONAL INTERFACE
11.1.1	 Cant' d. Fluids ® Provide fluid interface lines and
panels for L02 and IE2 tank vent and
pressurization.
	 Provide pressuri-
zation gas supply.
Provide purge bag vent line.
11. 1, 2 Shuttle powered flight Avionics a Provide control and monitoring capa-
bility to automatically perform, follow-
ing function during powered flight of
Shuttle,
. Open LH2 and LO2 tank vent
valves at —200 sees, or ^: 300, 000
ft altitude.
® Provide manual override capability
from Orbiter crew compartment
C&W panel.
* C&W monitor and control panel,
same as 11..1.1.
Procedural Same as 11.1.1
Fluid Same as 11, 1,1
11,1.3
	 Shuttle operational orbit Avionics a C&W monitor and control primary
monitor and control responsibility to be switched to
mission specialist station (NESS).
Panel planned for that }ncation.
Status data for Tug/SC to be trans-
mitted to ground station through
Orbiter communication link either
STDN for NASA missions or SGLS
for DoD missions.
	
(Baseline RP
Orbiter to ground station is assumed
to be TDRS subnet for NASA missions,
providing 90% orbital coverage at
160 n. mi. orbit. DoD AFSCF/SGLS
Rev.
A
FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	
Tug/SC Caution & Warning Monitor & Control
11.1 CONFIGURATION: Sheaf	 3	 of
INTERFACE:
AQA_ Tug-Orbiter 	 — Tug-Payload	 T ug•Payload-Orbiter
..-.r Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = medhanicai Handling	 P = Propellent/Prenurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER &'TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
IL 1.3 Conttd. Avionics is assumed to be via 11 remote track-
ing stations located at eight geo-
graphical stations providing approxi-
mately 15% communication coverage
per orbit. )
e Provide controls to activate zero g
vent systems and close positive g
vent valves.
Fluids a Provide zero g vent system and
mixer.
Procedure o Perform C&W monitor and control
from MSS.
a Record C&W data.
a Transmit status data to ground
station.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK CIO. FUNCTION TITLE: Perform Tug/ SC Predeployment Operations & Checkout
11.2 CONFIGURATION:
	
All Sheet _j_ of 2
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter
	 _ Tug-Payload
	 Tug-Payload -Orbiter
— Tug-GSE	
— Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical handling
	 P = Propellant/Preaurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUM0ER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.2.1 Transfer control. of Tug/SC to Avionics ® Provide through Orbiter communica-
ground controller (missions using tion system authority to receive
synchronous communication satellite command data and transmit status
-- TDRS) data from/to ground stations.
w In Tug DMS provide program to per-
form predeployment activation
and checkout.
	 (It is assumed SC
Note: Alternative Tug checkout method-- P''IAS would uave similar activation
ology is to perform function from Or- and checkout program If SC pre-
biter with ground monitoring c/o deployment checkout is prescribed.)
activity.	 This method is probably more ® Provide backup program capability
compatible with STDN/ground subnet in Orbiter.
and AFSCF/RTS. In addition, rather
than storing activation and checkout Procedure a Provide instructions for orbiter
program. in Tug DMS, this function, can mission specialist to monitor active
be stored In Shuttle computer or in tion and checkout procedure and pro-
Tug SSE. vide assistance as requested by
ground controller.
Structure a Provide primary structural support
of Tug and deployment adapter in
Orbiter during Shuttle Liftoff and
powered flight.	 Support must be com-
patible with Orbiter support locations,
interface surface details, and loads/
strength.
Fluid a Provide fluid interface lines and
panels for LO2 and LH2 vent and
preso urization.
* Provide pressurization gas supply.
9 Provide purge bag vent lines.
11.2.2 Perform Tug predeployment Avionics a Provide communication link to Orbiter
activation and checkout to receive ground command to initiate
programmed Tug predeployment actin
vadon and checkout.
a Relay ground com,nands to Tug to
initiate activation and checkout.
a Relay Tug status to ground station.
® Provide capability to store Tug	 i1eu.
data in Orbiter.	 A
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-UNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Perform Tug/SC Predeployment Operations & CheckoutBLOCK NO.
11.2 CONFIGURATION: All	 Sheet _2._, of	 2
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter
	 r.. Tug•Fayload
	 ,_._ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
— Tug•GSE
	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	 P = Propeilant/Pressurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE
^
SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.2.2 Cont'd. Procedure • Monitor Tug checkout operation.
a Provide backup assistance to ground
control as requested.
Structure Sane as 11.2. 1
Fluid Same as 11.2.1
11.2.3 Perform SC predeployment Avionics a Provide hardwire link from Orbiter
activation and checkout (optional func- through Tug to SC to Initiate activa-
tion depending on SC program) tioa and checkout of SC subsystems.
o Provide hardwire link to transmit
status data from SC through Tug to
Orbiter,
a Provide capability to receive com-
mands and relay to SC through. Tug
and to transmit SC status data to
ground station.
o Provide capability to store status
data.
Procedure Same as 11.2.2, except for SC
Structure Same as 11.2. 1
Fluid Same as 1.1.2.1
11.2. n Commit to deploy (including Avionics a Provide indication for Tug/SC sys-
disconnect of Tug-Orbiter fluid Inter- ten-IS in go Status for deployment.
face panels (No-go status results in abort condi-
tion, see Block 12.2. )
* Provide capability for visual moni-
toring of Tug/SC through CCTV to
verify go status.
* Receive verification of go status from
ground controller.
Procedure tae as 11.2.2
Structuxe Same as11.2.1aplus release Orbiter/Tug
suppoxt fitting latches.
Fluid ea Provide disconnect panels in inter-
face lines to enable disconnect- Rev.
ing fluid lines prior to or con-
A Ecurrent vrith Tug rotations
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Rotate Tug/SC Out of Payload DayBLOCK NO.
11.3 CONFIGURATION: All Shoat ? of ?
INTERFACE:
Tug-Orbiter 	 —	 Tug-Paylaad	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = PropellantlPrmurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.3.1 Activate deployment adapter Mechanical/ Same as 11.1 plus:
drive mechanism Structure a Provide drive mechanises to rotate
Tug/SC deployment adapter out of
Orbiter payload bay/disconnect fluid
umbilicals.
Avionics a Provide controls to initiate and oper-
ate drive mechanism.
a Provide instrumentation and DMS
Dote:	 Alternative means of rotating display capability to verify status of
Tug/SC out of payload bay is through drive mechanism.
use of RMS to provide force. a Provide communication link to trans-
mit status information to Orbiter
communication for relay of data to
ground controllers.
a Provide electrical power.
a Provide lights and CCTV to visually
inspect Tug/SC readiness for deploy-
ment.
a Provide controls to release Tug for-
ward attachment latches.
Procedure a Provide instructions to Orbiter crew
to orient Orbiter and maintain atti-
tude for Tug deployment (desired
orientation is to align Orbiter X-axis
along the radial vector from center of
earth.	 Nose of Orbiter is pointed
away from earth.
11.3.2 Deploy Tug/SC Mechanical/ a Provide loeldng mechanism to position
Structure Tug/SC at preprogrammed rotation
angle.
Avionics a Provide controls to perform rotation
Tug/SC.
a Provide instrumentation DMS and
data link to monitor operation and
Tug/SC status.
a Provide electrical power. LA
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: Rotate Tug/SC Out of Payload Bay
11.3 CONFIGURATION:	 All Sheet
	 of	 2
INTERFACE:
iA Tug-Orbiter
	 — 
Tug-Payload
	 _ _	 Tug-payload-Otblter
— Tug-SSE	 _._. Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Propellent/Fressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL. INTERFACE
11.3.2 Contd. Avionics * Relay Tug/SC operation and status
(Coat°d.) to ground controller.
Procedure s Maintain programmed orlentation
and attitude during deployment
operation.
a Provide lights and CCTV to visually
monitor operation.
Rev.
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I UNCTION FLOW FUNCTIONTITLE:	 Perform Tug Final Activatioi and Status CheckBLOCK NO.
111.4 CONFIGURATION:	 sheet-!— of	 1
INTERFACE:
	
._..
Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Miter
_	 Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Propellant/Pressurant/Fluid	 A - Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.4.1 Tug activation complete Structure • Provide Tag/SC support through the
deployment adapter and adapter
fittings.
Avionics o Provide controls and DMS to open
non--thrust vents for H 2
 and 02.
* Provide controls to disable zero g
vent devices.
a Provide controls to activate fuel cell
and changeover power from Orbiter
to internal.
a Provide data link to update C&N
state vector.
a Provide RF link for Tug to communi-
cate with Orbiter and ground after
umbilical panel disconnect.
Procedure o Maintain orientation and attitude
during operation.
11.4.2 Tug status verification and Avionics a Provide instrumentation DMS, data
commit to deploy link to verify 'pug readiness and
commit to deploy. Tug computer
program to perform verification on
command from ground controller or
Orbiter crew.
a Provide status data to Orbiter and to
relay to ground controllers.
a Provide voice and data uplink for
ground controller to verify Tug/SC
commit to deploy.
Procedural Same as 11.4.1
Stricture Same as 11.4.1
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: Attach RMS to Tu /SC
11.5 CONFIGURATION: 5haet	 —of 1
INTERFACE:
MA Tug-Orbiter	 v Tug-Payload	 r_ Tug-Paylaad-Orniter
_ Tug-SSE	 _ __ Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical dandling	 P = Pm Pellant/FreaurantlFluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.5 Attach RMS to Tug/SC Mechanical/ 9 Provide RMS mating mechanical
Structure fitting on Tug to mate with RMS end
effector.
* Continue to provide Tug Support
through deployment adapter.
Avionics m Provide capability to visually monitor
attachment of RMS and subsequent
deployment operations using CCTV an
necessary lighting system.
Procedure * Provide instructions. to MSS operator
to accomplish these tasks.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Disconnect umbilical and Adapter Latches
11.6 CONFIGURATION: Sheet
	
1	 of	 1
INTERFACE:
MA Tuo-Orbitsr 	 _.._	 Tog-Payload
	 .._ Tug-Payload-O rbiter
_._ Tug-GSE	
— Tug-Facility
M = Rachanical Handling 	 F =
 Fropellant/Prmsurant/Fluid	 A, W Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.6.1 Disconnect Tug electrical Avionics a Provide controls to initiate retracting
umbilicals Tug deployment adapter to vehicle
umbilical panels.
Note electrical umbilicals maybe ® Frs^vide instrumentation and DM5 link
concurrent; ,, with Tug/ to monitor demoting operation fromdeployment adapter separation in MSS display and also at ground con-
11.6, 2 troller station.
Mechanical/ a Provide drive mechanism to respond
Structure to command performing demating of
electrical umbilical panels from Tug
vehicle.
a Continue to provide Tug support
through deployment adapter.
Procedural a Provide instructions to Orbiter crew
to accomplish this task,
11. 6.2 Release deployment adapter A.vionic ® Provide controls to initiate demating
latches of Tug vehicle from deployment
adapter.
e Provide instrumentation and DMS
link to monitor release operation
from MSS display cow- ole aad also at
ground controller statism.
Mechanical/ Same as 11.6.1, plus:
Structure a Provide mechanism to release deploy-
ment adapter latches from vehicle.
Procedural Sane as 11.6.1, and
o Maintain orientation and attitude
during operation.
REV.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Deploy and Separate Tug/SC-^---r-
11.7 CONFIGURATION: All Sheet _L of
INTERFACE:
MA TugOrbiter 	 -__.	 Tug-Payload	 Tug•Payload• Orbitor
— Tug-SSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Fropellant(Prassurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER g TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.7.1 Position Tug/SC by withdrawing Structure/ a Provide attach socket for RMS end
from deployme..1 adapter and position- Mechanical effectors located to permit withdrawal
ing in release position. from deploymenc adapter.
Avionics o Provide capability to visually monitor
this operation from MSS panel as in
• 11.5.
e► Provide instrumentation, IDMS and
communication to transmit Tug
status data to Orbiter for monitor and
control.
Procedure o Provide instructions to MSS operator
to accomplish this task.
11.7.2 Separate Tug/SC Avionics a Provide control, data link to enable
ACS.
e Provide instrumentation, DMS and
data link to monitor and control Tug
operation and performance at ground
station through Orbiter.
Structure/ @ Release RMS from Tug socket.
Mechanical
Procedure Provide instructions for Orbiter crew
to:
o Perform separation maneuver.
* Relay telemetry and command
data from/to Tug to/from ground
station.
Provide instructions for ground crew
to
es Establish direct RF link to Tug
and assume flight control respon-
sibility after attaining proper
separation distance.
Rev.
.A
2-49
FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Activate Tug ACS Thrusters
11.8 CONFIGURATION:
	
All SheQt	 1	 of	 J
INTERFACE:
A
	 Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload 	 Tug-Payload-Miter
— Tug-GSE
	 — Tug-Facility
M - Mechanical Handling	 P = Prapellant/Fressurant/Fluld
	 A = AVIcuics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
11.8 Activate Tug ACS Thrusters Avionics e Provide controls, communication
subsystem, and data links to receive
command and send signal to ACS sub-
system to energize ACS thruster
propellant control valves.
Procedure * Transmit command to activate Tug
ACS.
e Continue relaying status data to
ground station.
s Perform separation maneuver.
* Transfer control of Tug to ground
controller.
Rev.
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2.1.5 FLIGHT OPERArJIONS-TUGETIUEV L	 LANDING. T R	 A AND ANB	 he first level
flight operations-Tug retrieval and landing function flow diagram is shown in Figure
2-7. This flow was derived by Convair based on data iu the Baseline Tug Flight Op-
erations (Reference 2) document and the Tug Operations and Payload Support Study
(Reference S) final. report. It covers all activities from re-establishing the Tug/
Orbiter RF link interface for retrieval through stowage in the payload bay, entry,
and 'landing. The related functional interface requLements data sheets follow the
flow diagram.
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Figure 2-7. Space Tug, Perform FlIgbt YAssion, T-ug/SC Retrieval; Block 12.0, first-Level Functional Flow
FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE.	 Transfer Tug/SC Control to OrbiterBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION-
	
All Sheet	 of12.1
INTERFACE:
.
	
Tug-Orbiter	 Tug-Payload	 Tug•Paylnad•Orhiter
Tug-GSE	 __._
 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P= Propellant/Prassurant/Fluid 	 A=Avionics
TASK NUMBE R & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.1	 Transfer Ttl	 SC control from Avionics 4 Provide communication system com-
ground controller to Orbiter crew patible with AFSCF & STDN (TDRS)
networks.
s Provide RF compatibility with Orbiter
as well as ground stations.
a Provide capability for Tug/SC to
	 j
NOTE: Tug/SC retrieval by Orbiter is receive 24 Hbps information rate &
based on following +,xidelines: total of S Kbps encoded cmd data with
® SC is inert & Wed with all BER of 10-5.
appendages retracted into stowed a Provide capability to transmit 18 Kbps ,
position. Procedure TM data Tug and S/C to Orbiter.® Only service provided SC is therm
control thru electrical pow6r ®Transfer prime operational responsi-
supplied by Tug (CMD & TLM) bility of Tug/SO from mission control
® Tug MPS has been safed. All to Orbiter for rendezvous and docking
propellants, other than FPR, operations. Mission control will
have been expended prior to monitor Tug activity as relayed thru
rendezvous maneuvers by Orbiter. Orbiter RF comm link with ground
* Tug active subsystems are stations.
communication, DIVIS, G&N and
ACS.
Iiay.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Command Tug to preferred Orientation & AttitudedLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION:
	
All Sheet 1 of12.2
INTERFACE:
A
	
Tug-Orbiter 	 —	 Tug-Payload
	 _	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug•GSE	
— Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	 P = Fropellant/Prassurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.2.1 Orient Tug/SC Avionics B provide transponder compatible with
Orbiter radar for rendezvous.
a provide communication, DMS &
fligbt control to receive commands
and compute signals for ACS.
e provide instrumentation, DMS & Data
link to transmit status data to
Orbiter.
procedure * provide instructions for Orbiter crew
to:
o Issue commands to orient & position
Tug/SC for rendezvous & dodring.
e Receive status data & monitor Tug
operations & performance.
e Rc'.ay TM data to ground station.
12.2.2 Stabilize Tug/SC Avionics & Same as 12.2.1
Procedure
Rev.FT
t
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{FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE. 	 Safe Tug for Doclting & Perform TPF ManeuverBLOCK NO.
	 - --------- _-^
L
_	
12.8	 CONFIGURATION.
	 All	 Sheet	 of 1
TERFACE:	
-I—
P	 Tug-Orbiter
	 _._,_	 Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
— Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Propellant/Pressurant/Fluid	 A W Avianics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM I=UNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.3.1 Perform safing operations Avionics s Provide instrumentation, DM8 and
communication subsystems to verify
status & safety of Tug/SC. Transmit
measurements, excitation & command
to other subsystems. Transmit
status & safety data to Orbiter.
a Provide G&N, DMS & flight control to
to maintain commended orientation
and attitude.
as Provide controls to deactivate trans--
ponder at direction of Orbiter.
Procedure Provide instructions for Orbiter crew to
s Perform TPY and TPA` rendezvous
maneuvers.
a Verify all Tug/SC subsystems safed
for dockin=g except ACS and com-
munication cmd link.
12.8.2 Perform. TPF maneuvers Avionics e< Provide ACS, communication link to
receive Orbiter commands and
execute.	 Transmit status to Orbiter
and to position Tug to preferred
docking attitude.
Procedure Provide instructions for Orbiter crew to
er Visually inspect Tug/SC for docking
readiness.
* Maneuver to docking at=titude &
location.
e Translate to final doeldng station.
Flee.
A
z
3
i
G
2-55	
iI
i
(I.
FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Bock RMS to Tag
BLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION:	 All Sheet x of	 112 .4
INTERFACE:
MA Tug-Orbiter	 _..._ Tug-Payload
	 ^„ Tug•Payload•Orbiter
— Tug•GSE	 _,_	 TLV•Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	 P = Prcpellent/Pranurant /Nuid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYST9M FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.4.1 Attach RMS to Tug Structure/ Provide fitting/receptacle compatible
Mechanical with RMS end erector (Ref_". Task 11. 5).
Avionics a Provide controls to transmit com-
mands to ACS to stabilize Tug/SC for:
maUng with RMS.
e Shutdown ACPS.
e Provide CCTV & lights to visually
monitor RKS-Tag mating.
Procedure Provide instructions to MSS personnel
to accomplish this task.
12.4.2 Safe Trtg/SC Avionics i Provide RF comna link & controls to
deactivate guidance & navigation and
flight control subsystems.
o Provide RF comm link & control to
safe ALPS.
0 Send C&W signal. to Orbiter.
Procedure Same as 12.4.1
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
	 I FUNCTION TITLE:	 Rotate Adapter & Activate Elements to AcceptBLOCK NO.
12.5	 CONFIGURATION:	 All	 Sheet i of
INTERFACE:
MA
 Tug-Orbiter
	
—	 Tug-Payload
	 ._	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
_	 Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Propellant/Pressurant/Fluid
	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.5.1 Ready Tug deployment adapter Avionics s Provide controls and instrumentation
to perform adapter readiness
functions-
* Umbilical panels in retracted
position.
° Tug-adapter latches in retracted
position.
° Power available to drive mechanism
° Relay status to ground stations.
a Transmit C &W data.
Procedures o Provide instructions to flight crew to
conduct deployment adapter readiness
checkouts.
Structure/ a Provide deployment adapter to accept
Mechanical Tug.
12.5.2 Verify adapter position & rotate Avionics a Provide controls & instrumentation
if required to rotate deployment adapter to
position for accepting Tug/SC.
a Relay status to ground station.
Structure/ o Provide drive mechanism and locking
Mechanical device to rotate adapter and lock
adapter at preset position.
Procedure 6 Perform adapter rotation operation.
9 VisLialiy inspect adapter for docking
readiness.
l3ev,
A
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tFUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE:	 Maneuver Tug/SC into AdapterBLOCK NO.
1-2 . 6 CONFIGURATION: 	 All Sheet? of
INTERFACE:
MA Tug-Orbiter 	 .—.	 Tug-payload	 _._. Tug-Payload-Orbiter
— Tug•GSE	 — Tug•FaaHity
M = Mechanical Handling
	
P = Propellent/ftsurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.6 Maneuver Tug/SC into adapter Avionics a Provide instrumentation & communica
Lion for Orbiter crew to monitor &
control. Tug safety stags.	 .
o Relay status to ground station.
Procedure Provide instructions to Orbiter crew to
accomplish these tasks.
Structure/ o Continue to provide attach fitti,nas for
Meebanical RMS end effectors.
e Provide indexing mechanism to
ensure propel' alignment of Tug to
deployment adapter for mating.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Remate Electrical Umbilical. Panels
CONFIGURATION:
	 All heet 1 of 1sheet_-12.7
INTERFACE:
IA Tug-Orbitu	 Tug-Payload	 .—	 Tug•Paylood-Orbiter
— 'Fug-GSE
	 Tug-Facility
M = WEichanical Handling 	 P = PropellantOwsurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.7.1 Butch deployment adapter to Structure/ Continue to provide fittings to mate with
Tug Mechanical RM5 end effectors.
Provide fittings to mate with deployment
adapter latches.
Avionics o Provide control capability in Orbiter t
activate Tug-to-adapter latches.
a Monitor status of latch operation.
a Relay status to ground control.
Procedure Provide instructions to flight crew to
accomplish these tasks.
12. 7.2 Remate electrical umbilicals Structure/ Same as 12.7.1, plus:
Mechanical Provide mechanism to remate electrical
NOTE: Umbilical remate may be disconnect umbilicals.
accomplished concurrent with Tug Avionics e Provide controls & instrumentation to
adapter latching in 12. V. 1. activate and monitor umbilical.
remate.
* Provide necessary power.
* Relay status to ground.
Procedure Same as 12.7.1
Nov.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: 	 Safe Tug/5C for StowageBLOCK NO.
12.8 CONFIGURATION:	 All Sheet —L of
INTERFACE:
MA	 Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload	 _ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug-GSE	 — Tug•Farility
M = Mechanical Handling
	 P = PropetlaRtPrmsurant/Fluid
	
A = Avinnic.;
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12, 8 Safe Tug/SC for stowage Avionics a Provide transfer switch from Tug
power to Orbiter power.
s :provide for deactivation of fuel cell
power system.
o Provide controls to safe all Tug
subsystems.
o Monitor Tug status hnd relay to grown
station.
Structure./ a Continue to provide fittings to mate
Felechanical with RMS end effectors and deploy»
merit adapter latches,
Procedure a Maintain programmed vehicle
orientation & attitude during sating
operations.
* Provide instructions to initiate safing
operations,
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 Rotate Tug into Payload Bay & Somme
CONFIGURATION:
	
All 5heat x of ^12.9
INTERFACE:
MA	 Tuorbiter	 _. Tug Payload
	 .^ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug•GSE	 Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handl ing 	 P = Propellant/P=urant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.9.1 Retract Tug into Payload Bay Strad	 / C ardi.nue to provide fittings to mate
Mechanical Tug with deployment adapter
latches.
Provide support fittings to rate with
Orbiter support points.
Avionics a Provide controls & pourer to activate
& operate adapter rotation drive.
* Provide instrumentation & DMS
display capability to verify status of
drive mechanism.
e Provide commimieation Tine to trans —
mlt status to ground station.
* Provide CCTV capability to visually
monitor operation.
Procedure Provide instructions to Orbiter crew W
maintain orientation and attitude while
accomplishing these operations.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE: Configure Tug/SC for Entry FlightBLOCK NO.
12.10 CONFIGURATION: All 	 Shoat -.Lot
INTERFACE:42A Tug-Orbiter	 Tug-Nylead
	 _____ Tug-Payload-Orbiter
Tug•GSE	 ____ Tug-Facility
M = Machanical Handling
	 P W Propellant/Pressurant/Fluid 	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE 	 SYS'rENI	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.10 Configure Tug/SC for entry flighl Avionics
	 o Provide controls & sensing system for
and remate fluid umbilicals
	
	 • Activating purge bags He purge
• Mabtaining 16 psia pressure in
MPS propellant tanks.
• Maintaining 0.5 to 1.5 psia
pressure in purge bags.
a Display status at MSS/PSS.
s Relay statue to ground stations.
c Provide program to purge MPS
liquid hydrogen tank and lines.
e Provide instrumentation to monitor
'rug subsystem status.
Structure/
	
Maintain primary support for Tug and
Mechanical
	
deployment adapter.
Provide capability to reconnect fluid
umbilicals.
Pluids	 a Provide helium gas, storage, flow
controls & lines for purging MPS Lilt
tank and for purging umbilical panel
& MPS purge bag.
e Provide He gas, storage, flow control
and lines for MPS tank purge bag.
e Provide He gas system to pressurize
MPS LH2
 tank to 16 psia.
o Provide vent system to maintain
16 psia pressure in MPS tanks.
Procedure
	
Provide instructions for flight crew to
accomplish/monitor these functions.
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW I=UNCTION TITLE: 	 Verify Tug/SC Status for Entry FlightBLOCK NO.
CONFIGURATION: 	 All	 Sheet ^ ofi ^12.11
INTERFACE:
EPA TuOrhiter	 — Tug-Payload	 Zug-Payload-Orbiter
-..^. Tug•6SE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Uaneting 	 P = Fropeflkwfflreasurant/Fluid 	 A = Avianics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12.11 Verify Tug/SC staters Structure Coabme to provide primary soppoit for
Tug & deployment adapter.
Fluid ConlJnue to provide purge & vent lines
and disconnects as in 12.10.
Avionics a Provide instrumentation and hardwire
C&'%f monitor & control for Crbfl:jr
crew safety.
to Transmit status data to ground control
and receive confirmation of Tug/SC
safe condition.
Procedure Provide instruct`lons to flight crew to
monitor Tug status and relay to ground
stations.
Rev.
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BLOCK NO. FUNCTION TITLE:	 T	 /SC C&W Monitor & Control
12.12 CONFIGURATION: Sheet --L of 1
INTERFACE:
MPA Tug-Orbiter	 — Tug-Payload	 .__ Tug-Payload•Orbiter
Tug•GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M z Mechanical Handling 	 P = PropeliantlPmurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TAV4 NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
12. 12 Tog/SC C&W monitor & control Avionics a Same as 12.11
Fluid s Continue to provide LH2 & LO2 tank
vent & purge line capability.
a Provide purge bag vent lines.
Structure/ @ Provide support fittings compatible
Mechanical with Orbiter support locations, surfan
details & loads necessary to react
loads associated with entry and
landing.
Note: Entry and landing loads for
post abort (R.TLS) lsndi)ig must
consider LH2 weight.
Procedure Provide instructions for flight crew to
monitor & control C&W displays during
entry and landing.
Rev.
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2.1.6 FLIGHT OPERATIONS-ABORT TERMINATION. The first level flight operations-
abort termination function flow diagram is shown. in Figure 2-8. This flow was derived
by Convair based on data in the Baseline Tug Flight Operations (Reference 2) document
and the Tug Operations and Payload Support Study (Reference 3) Bmal report. It covers
all activities associated with flight mission abort terminations initiated for return-to-
launch-site (RTLS), predeployment on-orbit Tug/Spacecraft abort, and postdeployment
Tug/Spacecraft abort conditions. The related functional interface requirements data
sheets follow the flow diagram.
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Figure 2-8. Space Tug, Perform Abort Operations, Post-DeploymentTtz9IS Abort;
Block 13.3, SOcond-Level Functional Fl©w
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Initiate Tug Propellant DumpBLOCK NO.
13.1.1 CONFIGURATION. All Sheet -I- of	 2
INTERFACE:
PIPA Tua-Orbiter 	 Tug-Payload	 TugPayload-Orbiter
^.	 Tug-GSE	 Tug•Fadllty
M = Mechanical Handling	 P = Propellant/Pmsurant{Fluid 	 A= Avionics
TASTE NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.1.1.1 Activate data management Fluid a Provide Clump lines which will enable
subsystem and propellant dump simultaneous dumping of L02 and LH2
sequence (-50,000 lb) wi'lddu 300 seconds.
a Provide pressurization gas, storage,
lines and controls to provide pres-
sure bead (not to exceed flight
pressure) for expediting dumpingNotes Recom3nended RTLS propellant
&unp includes dumping both LH2 and process.Provide dump line, controls and interI'02 through dump lines an Orbiter. face panels from Tug to Orbiter.L02
 and LH2 are dumped concurrent3.y
with Orbiter applying retrograde Avionics a Provide automatic segeiences for W
thrust. and LH2 propellant dump after initia-
tion of dump procedure by Orbiter
crew.
a Provide program stored in Tug DMS
to perform dump operation auto-
matically.
a Provide backup program in Orbiter.
e Provide instrumentation and lines to
Initiate and monitor dump progress.
o Relay about: status data to ground
station.
a Provide electrical. power.
Procedure a Provide instructions to include Tug
RTLS abort dump operations with
composite Shuttle RTLS abort
operations.
e Tnitiate Tug proprll..smt dump.
Structure a Provide support/restraint for Tug/
deployment adapter/spacecraft
compatible with Orbiter support
locations.
l;BY.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Initiate Tug Propellant DumpBLOCK NO.
l fi.,Y:I CONFIGURATION. AJI sheet _L_ of
INTERFACE:
NAPA Tug-Orbiter	 Tug-Payload-Orbiter
— Tug•GSE
	
._._ Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	
P = Prupelleut/Prauurant/Fluid
	 A = A fianict
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
Is13.1.1.2 Monitor HTLS propellant Fluid Same as 1.3.1.1.1
dump operation Avionics * Same as 13.1.1.1
Procedure s Orbiter crew relay Tug abort pro-
cess data to ground station,
e Mission control provide assist by
Note;
	
RT.LS abort is expected to be a monitoring abort process Sand main-
busy period for Shuttle flight crew and taming voice contact with Orbiter
the Live, flight crew rnernbers are ex- crew. Also, provide technical
pected to be supported by ground con- assistance by advising Orbiter crew
trollers in monitoring Tug dump of dump operation and corrective
process. actions to be taken for anomolies.
Rev.
FUNCTION FLOW
9L©CK NO. FUNCTION TITLE: Complete Tug Lump
13.1.2 CONFIGURATION:
.—.
Shaft 1 of
INTERFACE:
11	 A Tug-Orbiter 	 Ttri-Paylnad	 Tug•Payfoad•ONter
— Tug•GGE	 Tup•Faciiity
M = Machanical Ha ndling	 P = Propaliant/ftsu nt/Fluld 	 A ^ Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.1.2 Complete Tug dump Fluid a Provide sensors to detect propellant
depletion.
a Provide controls to halt dump
process.
e Stop LO2 and LH2 abort
pressurixatim
* Close drain/dump lines
*C rpen positive g vents
Avionics a :Orovlde program to safely shut down
dump operation after receiving dep l e-
tion. signal.
* Provide backup program m. Orbiter
to safely terminate dump operation.
a Provide instrumentation and data link
to transmit status data to Orbiter.
4D Monitor Tug propellant dump and
relay status data to ground station.
a< Provide electrical power.
Procedural Same as 13.1.1
Structure Same as 13.1.1
Bert.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Safe Tug for Lan LugBLOCK Hid.
13.1.3 CONFIGURATION: Sheaf
	
of
INTERFACE:
PA
	 Tueayload•Orhiter
Tu OSE	 _.. Tug-Facikv
M = Mechanical Handling 	 P = Prapellsnt/Prmumnt/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.1.3 Safe propulsion subsystem Fluid Same as 13.1.2
a Maintain helium purge of purge bag
for L02 and LFip.
• Provide sensors, He gas supply and
vent system to mriiatA a LO2 and L112
tank pressure at transport press
(-16  psis}
• Provide helium, purge system of
panels andlines.	 E
Avionics a Provide instrumentation, DMS and
data lines to inert main propellant
system and abort pressurization
system.
a Provide data link to Orbiter to tra us-
mit Tug status data and relay to
Procedural
Structure
ground stations.
w Provide instructions to perform, this
function.
Same as 13.1.1
Ray.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE, Deactivate Tug/SC and Return. to Safe StatusBLOCK NO.
13.2.1 CONFIGURATION: All Sheet _L of
INTERFACE:
MPA Tuorhiter
	 __,_. Tug-Payload
	 _. Tug•Payload -OjtI
— 'rug•GSE	 — Tug•Faciiity
?A = Mechanical Handling	 P = Pripellant/Pressurant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
TASK NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.2.1 Deactivate Tug/SC and return Avionics a Provide data link to Orbiter, DMS,
to safe status and data lines to subsystems to re-
ceive ground control command to
terminate activation and checkout
procedure.
a Provide DMS and data lines to sub-
systems to passivate all subsystems
Note:
	 As shows~ in Block 11. 0, this except DMS.
mission abort occurs during pre- * Provide instrumentation and data. link
deployment Tug/SC activation and to Orbiter tr transmit Tug status to
checkout.
	
Ground control during pre- Orbiter and relay to ground station.
deployment senses either Tug or SC @ C&W data transmittal.
malfunction which necessitates mission procedure s Provide instructions to perform this
wort'
abor
operation.
s Orbiter crew will relay commands
from and status data to ground sta-
tions, and
9 Monitor caution and warning to ensure
Orbiter safety.
Mission Control,.
o Make determination to abort mission.
Provide commands to Orbiter and Tug
to abort mission and return Tug/SC
to safe status.
a Transfer Tug/SC control to Orbiter.
Structure c Provide support/restraint for Tug/
deployment adapter/spacecraft during
abort operations sequence.
Fluid a Provide lines and gas supply to deac-
LLvate fluid systems and prep=e for
propellant dump. Includes interface
panels between Tug and Orbiter for
main tank vent.
Rev.
A n
FUNCTION FL13W FUNCTION TITLE: Activate Tag Propellant Dump SystemBLOCK NO,
13..2.2 CONFIGURATION: Slseat -!— of ?
INTERFACE-
M2?A Tag-Orbiter
	
Tug•Paylnad-Orbiter
— Tug-6SE	 'fug-Facility
M. -, [4ieslsenical Handling
	
P W PropellantlPrsamurant/Fluld 	 A= Avionics
TASK NUMBF-R &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
19.2.2.1 Settle propellants In Tug Fluid a Provide for switcbang from zero g
tans vent to positive g vent.
Avionics ® Provide controls to perforua transfer
of propellant tank vent system.
® Provide instrumentation and data link
to transmit status data to Orbiter.
' Procedure a Provide positive {+x) thrust (OMS or
RCS engine fi.rin„) to settle Tug pro-
pellants in tanks.
a Continue to relay Tug status data to
ground station.
Structure Same as 13.2.1
13.2.2.2 Initiate tank pressurization Fluid o Provide abort pressurization system.
a Provide drain/dump lines, controls
and interface panels. Damp lines to he
routed to aft end of Orbiter and ori-
ented axially to provide positive thrust
Avionics a Provide DMS and lines to initiate pres
surization of propellant tank.9 1-20 psia.)
a Provide instrumentation and data ask
to transmit Tug status to Orbiter aad
relay to ground stations.
Procedure o Transmit command to initiate dump-
ing procedure.
a Perform programmed orien, :tion and
attitude maueuve7s.
e Continue relaying status data to gro 	 '
stations,
Structure Same as 93.2.1
'off insslsffiofenf Orbiter RCS or OMS
propellant is avai zble for selling.
Rm
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FUNCTION FLOW
BLOCK NO. FUNGT.10M TITLE:	 F.nitiute Tug. Propellant Dump
13.2.3 CONFIGURATION: Sheet -I- of Z
INTERFACE-
PA Tugorbiter
	
— T11g-1%yload
	 . _.. Tug-Payload-orbiter
Tq-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Mechanical Handling
	 P ^ PrOPOIIO VTR Owrant/Fluid	 A = Avionics
'EASE{ NUMBER & TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.2.3 Initiate dump Fluid * Provide dump flow control atardug
with trickle flow to chill lines and
increasing flow to full flow condition.
o Provide pressurization system for
taifts.
Avionics a Provide instrumentation DM5 and
lines to control dump process and
transmit Tug status data to Orbiter
and relay to ground station.
Procedural. Same as 13.2.1, plus
o After dump process reaches full flow,
terminate OMS or ACS thrusting.
Assume propellant dumping of Ii2
and L02 will provide sufficient thrust
to maintain propellant settling.
e Maintain programmed orientation and
attitude.
® Continue relay of status data to ground
station.
Transmit C&W data..
Structure Same as 1,3.2.1
Rev.
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FUNCTION FLOW FUNCTION TITLE: Complete Tug Propellant Dump & Return to Safe StatusI3LOOK N@.
13.2.4 CONFIGURATION: All. Sheet —I— of
INTEIIFACE:
MPA Tel-orbiter 	 - ._..TugFayIoad	 Tug-Payload•Orbiter
_..... TuOSE	 .____ Tug•Fe ility
M = Wchanlc al Hxndlftq	 P - Propollant/P(mElmt/Fluid 	 A - Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.2.4 Complete Tug propelant damp Fluids Same as 13.2.1, plus
and return to saf-e status it Provide sensors to detect; propellant
depletion in LH2 and LO2 tanks.
* Provide controls to terminate damp
process
Note:	 LH2 tame purge will be accom-- . Shut down LH2 and LO2 tank
plished after landing as part of abort pressurization.
post-landing operations. . Close drain,/dump lines.
. Purge lines and panels.
* Provide lialium supply and interface
lines to reitif
 tiate LH2 tank purge bag
purge flow for entry and landing.
Avionics a Provide program to safely shut down
dump operation, of LO2 and 1,132 tmft
after receipt of sensor signals.
* Provide program to configure Tug
propulsion system for return.-to-
ground mode.
e Monitor status and provide to Orbiter
for Orbiter crew and for relay to
ground station.
Procedure Same as 13.2.1, plus
® Monitor dump process, verify comple-
tion, and return. Tag to safe condition.
e Continue to relay stags to ground
stasdon.
Structure Same ag 13.2.1:
Rau.
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FUNCTION FLOW	 FUNCTION TITLE: Verify Tug Sae for RetrievalBLOCK NO.
13.3.1	 CONFIGURATION:	 Sheer	 1	 of'.. I
INTERFACE:
PA Tuorhiter	 — Tug-Payload	 Tug-Payloaddlrbiw
._.. Tug-GSE	 — Tug-Facility
M = Machanical Handling 	 P	 Propellent/Prmurant/Fluld
	
A - Avionics
TASK NUMBER &TITLE SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
13.3. I Verify Tug Safe for Retrieval Avionics a Provide communication, 1. MS, G&N,
ACS to
r Establish RF communication link
with Orbiter.
Stabilize and orient Tug/Sc-
Perform commands received
Note:
	
This abort mode axises after from Orbiter.
Tug/SC has beea deployed and released . Transmit status data. to Orbiter
by Orbiter, but prior to Initial Tug including;	 main propulsion. sys-
main engine burn. Ground control is teen controls, lines and sensors
assumed to be performing a detailed to safe propellant tanks and
status verification of Tug and SC. Dur- pressurization system, and atti-
Lug this period, ground control identi- tude control system to perform
fies malfunction which results in deci- maneuvers and stabilize Tug/SC.
lion to abort Tug/SC flight mission.
Ground control. will return Tug/SC to oCedure Provide input to flight crew instruc-
safe status for retrieval by Orbiter.
b nt
tiflns to:
Establish RF link.
Transmit commands to orient
Tug/SC for rendezvous,
Verify Tug/SC subsystems are
safe and configured for retrieval.
Relay status data to ground
control..
Rev.
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2.2 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
The NASA Tug requirements document (Reference 4) has been reviewed to identify the
safety requirements that are applicable to the Interface Study. Except for the addition
of reference to hazards to the public and the ecology, the principal safety requirement
remains essentially unchanged from the Space Tug Systems Study (Reference 5). That
is, "No single Tug failure shall result in a hazard which jeopardizes the flight or
ground crews of the Shuttle, general public, public/private property, and the ecology.
It is, of course, of paramount importance that this particular criterion be complied
with. In any instance where compliance with this criterion cannot be achieved, the
noncompliance and the rationale for noncompliance, must be so noted.
Ia addition to the above stated principal safety requirement, other safety requirements
deemed to be specifically applicable to the interface Study have been extracted from
the requirements document and included in Table 2--1. The "Reference Paragraph" col-
umn in this table provides a cross reference between the table and MSFC 68M00039-1
(Reference 4), This five-digit number, followed by a letter or letters, is shown at the
top of each table page. Only the letter(s) referring to the number at the column head
is included for the remainder of the requirements on each page. Where two or more
criteria are grouped into a single requirement, this grouping is so noted by the addi-
tion Qf a paragraph reference(s) in parentheses. The safety requirements have been
further categorized in the following manner:
R - Indicates a safety requirement: that must be specifically addressed during the study.
We must either show how the requirement is reflected in our recommended designs
or show specific rationale for any noncompliance.
D - Indicates a safety regLdrement that can only be satisfied during detail design. The
designs developed during the study should, however, coiltain no feature that would
preclude atitainment of the requixement during detail. design,
I -- Indicates a joint safety requirement between the interface subsystems and other
rfug/Orb; ` .--/spacecraft systems. We must show how our designs are consistent
with the related Tug/Orbiter/spacecraft .safety requirements.
These safety requirements are the basis for ':ae safety f metional requirements con-
tained in Section 2.3 of this report.
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Table 2-1. Safety Requirements Summary
Reference
c
Tub Orbiter Requirements Paragraph Catenary
1. Tag safety data, controls, hardware, safety procedures, etc,
Ethatare necessary to prevert damage to and to insure the safety f
of the Orbiter shall be provided. 	 The safety critical data,
displays, and controIs sball be capable of being verified functionally.
r 2. Materials, fluids, etc., shall not be released or ejected into the l I
payload bay from the Tag. Venting, relief, and release of material (3.2.6.1.3a4)
F from the Tug shall be through the Orbiter provided vent system. (3.2.6.1.4all)
fControlof the venting, etc. , by the Orbiter for certain mission phases
' maybe required.
3. Redundant equipment having safety implications shall be located away n. R
:. from the primary source to which it provides safety protection or (3.2.6.1.4a20)
' which prevent hazard propagation.
C Where hazards can occur due to the presence or contact of mutually a R.
incompatible materials, fluids, electrical potential, etc, , such as (3.2, 6.1.2ah)
fuels and oxidizers, these materials,  fluids, etc., shall be separated
t to the maximum possible extent.
f 5. Provisions shall be included for emergency manual release of Tug t R
e to Orbiter connections.
6. Provisions shall be made for remote emergency jettisoning of Spacecraft u I
deploying equipment and antennas as necessary to complete retrieval
and stowage operations of the Tug.
7, Tug shall provide at all times to the Orbiter such information as v I
necessary concerning the status or condition of Tug and Spacecraft
systems to en-are safety of Orbiter and crew. Provisions shall also be
.` made for Orbiter override of safety critical Tug and Spacecraft functions
during stowage aboard the Orbiter and during Tug deployment and
retrieval phases of operations.
a
a i
"... ..	
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Table R-I. Safety Requirements Summa- y, Contd
Referenda
Tug Orbiter Rem rements	 ParaQr%ph
S. Provision shall be included for control of all safety critical Tug
	 3.2.6.1.2
functions, including attitude and translational position control by
	 w
Orbiter crew during past-deployment and pre-retrieval operation
for Orbiter/Tug separation distances TBD.
9. Provisions shall be made to confirm that all safety critical Orbiter/Tug	 X
electrical connections, fluid lines, etc., interfaces are securely
connected.
16. Tug deploy/release/retract mechanisms shall not cause a hazard even	 ae
after a failure has been experienced with that system(s).
11. Provisions must be made for verifying readiness of safety critical 	 of
Tug systems before activation. 	 (3.2.6.1.4c5)
(3.2.6.1.012)
d1	 12. All mechanical, electrical and fluidic connections between the Tug 	 ag
and Spacecraft and Orbiter shall be fail safe,
13. Provisions shall be made for detecting the presence of spilled 	 ak
hazardous fluids or materials during haaD3iing or transfer. 	 (3.2.6.1.3a7)
(3.2.6.1..4g2)
14. Enviromuental control of the Tug if required shall be provided after 	 3.2.6.1.3
pwpellants/pressurants are loaded until launch.	 a (3)
A6 • Purge provisions shall be available to neutralize propellant leaf 	 a (5)
tinting and after propellant servicing and after Orbiter landing.
16- Ventilation shall be provided under positive pressures for all 	 a (c)
propellant loading operations to prevent accumulation of hazardous
vapors.
17. Transfer lines shall be purged after the transfer of hazardous fluid. 	 b (7)
18. Integrated cheoltout and testing of safety critical Tug systems ahall be 	 b (15)
conducted prior to installation irx the Orbiter and verified after
installation into the Orbiter,
Category
I
R
R
X
R
I
I
I
R
I
rc (4)	 1
c (7)	 R
3.2.6.1.4
a (1) R
a (2) R
a (3) D
a (5)	 R
a (7) R
a (8) R
3.2.6.1.4
e^
a (10) 
y p^(3. 2.6.1.4a1$)
a (12)
I
R
r'
Fable 2--1. Safety Requirements Summary, Contd
Reference
Orbiter Re uirements	 Paragraph
19. Tug pressurized systems shall have a maximum operating 	 3.2.6.1.3
pressure helium leak check before installation into the Orbiter 	 b (16)
payload bay and an inert gas leak check before loading propeliar ts.
20„ Internal attitude control signal of the Tug shall be capable of being
checked for accuracy by the Orbiter crew before release.
21. Provisions shall be made to pressurize propellant tanks of Tug to
avoid implosion during return flight.
22. Tug propellant tank and pressure vessel design factors of safety
shall be as specified in Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations
dSC 07700, Vol MV, Rev. B, December 21, 1973.
23. Pressure vessels and tanks shall conform with and be maintained under
a. fracture mechanics control program.
24. Pressure lines and vessels shall be clearly coded to identify contents,
capacity and operating pressure.
25. Flexible sections of pressure hose disconnects shall be restrained so that
a failure will not cause damage to adjacent equipment or injury to personnel.
26. A structural interface shall be provided between the Tug and the Orbiter
payload bay support points that transmits the Tug and Spacecraft loads
imto the Shuttle structure witn a 25% margin of safety under the most
advUrse Shuttle design loads, excluding crash loads which are ultimate.
27. Provision shall be made to detect incipient failures of tanks containing
hazardous fluids or high pressures to the greatest extent possible.
28. A, redundant relief capability shall be provided for the Tug tanks which
automatically limits the maximum pressure.
29. Tug propellant drain and vent interface with the orbiter shall permit
main propulsion system propellant venting, and emergency detanking
(whether Orbiter is in horizontal or vertical attitude) until lauch commit,
vrith the Orbiter payload bay doors opened or closed and latched.
Category
i
e
r
1
Table 2-1. Safety Requirements Summary, Contd
-..	 Reference
Tug Orbiter Requirements
	 Paraaaph	 Category
30. A capability shall. be provided for t:.G Orbiter crew to dump main pro
	 3.2.6.1.4
pellant Tug fluids and vent Tug pressurants overboard within the time a (13)	 R
constraints imposed by an abort situation. This capability shall be
	 (3.2.6.1.4a18)
avaMble with the payload bay either open or closed.
31. Tug cryogen tank thermal protection systems shall be designed to
minimize (below ignition regimes) accumulation of flammable fluids
resulting from propellant system leakage.
32. Any Tug supplied deploymezzt/retrieval system shall provide positive
control of the Tug movements during translation out of or into the
payload bay. R. shall be designed for fail operational/fail safe
operation or shall be jettisonable to preclude exceeding the Tug
stowage envelope.
33. Tug fluid fill and drain umbilical disconnects shall have positive
sealing at disconated. Provisions shall be made to prevent pressure
A,	 buildup in the system.Q
34. Lealca.ge sources of the Tug or its equipment shall be minimized by
use of all welded or brazed construction where practical.
15 Components and assemblies selected for the Tug shall be marked
or tagged to identify their manned-mission application.
36. Cleanliness requirements and fluid contamination for propellants
and propellant systems shall be controlled and monitored to assure
that the STS safety is not jeopardized.
37. Hypergolic propellant tanks, fuel and oxidizers shall be pressurized
from separate pressure sources.
36. A leak sensing system shall be utilized to detect leaks at the
deployment adapter interface.
39. Tug propulsion system start sequence logic status and valve
positions shall be monitored and message signals shall be provided
at the Shuttle Data Management Interface. Transmissions shall be through
hardwire while within the Othiter bay but once outside it may be transmitted
directly from the Tug.
r„
r
i
r
a (17)	 1
a (19)	 R:
(3.2.6.1.2t)
(3.2.6.1.2u)
a (21) R
(3.2.6.1.4a6)
a (22) D
a (24) D
a (25) 1
a (26) 1
a (27) R
b (5)	 1
Table 2--I. Safety Requirements Summary, Contd
Reference
''	 I jug Orbiter Retuirements ParaEaph Category
46. Systems containing f[uids that are subject to decomposition
larough contamination or loss of passivation (such as monopropellants) b (5) Ic
shall be safed by appropriately sized and located vents for the worst
case decomposition rate.
^^. Message sigmils for Tug system, by hardwire and RF telemetry, c (1} I
shall be provided at the Shuttle Data Management System Interface.
. Measurements shall include Tug latched/released indications, deploy
meebanism position indications, discrete pyrotechnic event indications,
sequence logic status, valve positions, temperature and pressure
measurements, and failure indications. This information should also be
available prior to retrieval.
` 42. Tug critical command and control circuitry shall be designed to be fail c (3) I
operational/fail safe as a minimum.
00 	 43. Tag batteries shall have the case vented through relief valves into d (2) R
Orbiter overboard venting system.
44. Electrical umbilical disconnects between the Orbiter and the Tug and d 5 R
between the Tug and Spaceenaft shall be separated from hazardous fluid
.„' disconnects, shall be qualified as explosion pro7f, and shall not have power
applied during disconnact.
46. Power circuits shall be separated from critical pyrotechnic circuits within a d (6) D
cable oa wire bundle.
46. Tug structure shall be grounded to Orbiter structure to prevent electrostatic d (7) R
charge buildup and an electrical shock hazard. Within the Tug grounding
shall be such as to preclude an electrical shores-.
47. Safety critical electrical and electroDic components shall be potted, d (S) D
hermetically sealed or similarly protected against the effects of liquid leakage,
moisture condensation, vibration and arcing contacts.
g	 48. Capability shall be provided for static discharge between Tug and Orbiter d (g) R
and between the Tug and Spacecraft.
ii
Reference
Pax • h
3.2.67. 1.4
d (13)
d (15)
d (16)
d (17)
d (18)
d (19)
d (20)
g (1)
g (3)
Cate
D
I
D
D
l
F
I
R
R
Table 2--1. Safety Requirements Summary, Coutd
Tug Orbiter Requirements
49. Positive identification and adequate protection shall be provided
for'Aentical safety critical switches. Identical safety critical
switches shall not be located.in close proximity to each other.
50. Tug shall have a means of shutting ofd its electrical power under
eme:gtoy conditions.
51. Electrical wiring must not be routed against or around sharp edges,
52. Electrical wiring must not be in contact with flammable fluids.
53. Electrical circuits which will. be cut by guillotine cutters must be
deadfaced.
54. Provisions shall be included for Tug caution and warning functions which
do wlll provides both audible and visual warning to Orbiter personnel
of hazardous situations while the Tug is in the Orbiter payload bay
or being deployed.
55. Fuel cells are to be activated only after TBD distance separation
from the Orbiter.
56. Only ON2 shall be permitted to be dumped into Orbiter payload bay
from the Tug and then only under controlled conditions.
57. Artificial sources of radiation with the Tug shall be shielded, oriented,
otherwise limited to prevent exceeding flight crew dosimetry require-
ments as established by the NASA radiation constraints panel.
Compliance with critical equipment radiation requiremants shall azro
be maintained.
t
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2.3 SYSTEM FUNCT IONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS 	 E
The functional interface requirements identi- ed in. Section 2.3L and the safely require- 	 j
meats of Section 2.2 have been eollated and summarized by Mag system in this section.
The four major grour"gs are:
Avionics System Functional Interface Requirements, pages 2 -84 through 2-94
Fluid Systems Functional Interface Requirements, pages 2 -95 through 2-99
Structure System. Functional. Interface Requirements, pages 2 -100 through 2-103
Procedural Functional Interface Requirements, pages 2-104 through 2-112 	 r :;'.
All mechanism functional interface requirements have been included within their asso-
ciated primary system functional interface requi•remeats tabulation. For example,
	
s
fluid umbilical panels are listed under the fluid system and structural latching/releas-
ing devices are listed under the structure s stem..
r
I
V ithin each system/procedural area, functional interface requirements are arranged
in Tug mission operational sequence: post -landing operations (Block 4. 0), Tug/Space-
craft/Orbiter mate and checkout (Block 2. 0), launch operations (Block 1. 0), flight op-
erati.ons (Blocks 11.0 and 12. 0), and flight operations abort (Black 13.0). Safety and	 : 3
reliability c? iteila based on the safely requirements summarized in Sermon 2.2 have
been added to provide a complete composite matrix of all functional interface and safety
requirements for Tug systerr!s. The function flow diagram reference block number
will permit ready identification and evaluation of the potential systems impact of	 -
changes in Tug operations plans or sequences.
	 --_
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AVIONICS	 Sheet	 of
SUBSYSTEM:
-4
Reference
Function
Slock Ito.
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETYIRELIABILITY CRITERIA
GROUND OPERA.T1ONs
5.1. Provide imtrumen#ation, datamnnagem-en a Incorporate purge gas minctors with
capability to collect and display power capability to measure safe c o 	 entra
and purge gas data at the MSS/PSS. This tions of H2, 02 and 1,T2H4.
will. require hardwire link between Tug- a Incorporate Tag tank pressure monitors.
deployment adapter and Orbiter at bulls- e Incorporate insulation purge gas moni-
head panel to MSS/PSS. May require tors for HZ&02 main tanks.
interface thru Orbiter to ground position a Monitoring instrumentation & wiring to
for ground power/gas supply be dual redundant and fail safe (i.e.,
failure of the moui*3r system, in itself,
will not cause a hazardous condition.
a Safety critical data, displays & controls
shall be capable of being verified
functionally.
e Electrical umbilical disconnects small be
separated from hazardous £uid dis-
connects.
5.1.A Provide same capabillity as above, plus *Provide capability to complete LH2
(RTLS) additional capability to control and dump prior to SS TE burnout.
monitor ACPS drain and propellant a Provide capability to purge LHZ damp
purge operations lmludiug interface line with helium after dump is
thru Orbiter to ground control station. completed.
5.1A Provide same capabilities as in 5.1 and a Same as 5. 1 and 5.1A
b
i
a
sheet --L of it 1
Reference
Fariainn
Block No.
FUNCTIONAL INTERFAGE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
5 1 2 Provide same basic capability as in S. i s lEterface receptacles/connectors to be
above, to monitor tank and purge bag unpowered at time of disconnect.
condition at MS/PSS dur}ng Tug remaV s Interface receptacles/conneotors to be
from Orbiter. connected only with Tug in a complrtely
Also provide interface receptacles/ tsafedt state; i.e.,
	
propellants zr
com actors to facilitate Ong or rea.ctaAs on board, all pyrckeduAu
breaking avionics interfaces for Tug safed.
removal (installatim) operations. 	 I,ocat
panels for ease of access in either hori-
zontal or vertical install-remove
operations.
5.3 Provide hardwire interface from Tug All safety crltioal fuwflons to be mmni-
thru deployment adapter to Orbiter Cored/controlled by harMra interface.
MSS/PSS to iword and store Tug flight Monitor/control to be dual redundant
performance data and a means to readily & fail safe.
remove (physically or electronically)
this stored data with the Tug in the
Orbiter payload bay following landing
and safing operations.
1
a
S
it
f
H
k
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AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM:
4 SYSTEM:
SYSTEM,
AVIONICS	 Sliest _L of L7'
SUBSYSTEM:
.^ I
Reference
Function
Block Nr.
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETYIR ELIABI LITY CRITERIA
2.1, 2.2 Provide interface panels/receptacles for a Provide intercomecting ground between
(2.1. B and all Tug-Orbiter avionics interface oomec work platforms, Tug/Spacecraft &
on) tuns. Hardwire will ran from Tug thru. Orbiter.
the deployment adapter to pmiel locatioazs a Provide capability to ensure ground/
on Orbiter payload bay aft bulkhead, Orbiter power off before connecting
thence to ground disconnect panels on the Tug/Spacecraft disconnects.
Orbiter mold line and/or to MSS/PSS
panels as maybe required for C&W
display. Interface panels must be located
for vase of access during borizontal
installation/removal at OPF (Fiala taeis)
and vertical installation/removal (Ref.
Task 1.3.5) at launch pad.
2.3 Provide interface panels as in 2.1 & 2.2 Instrumentation & data management
plus required instrumentation and data capability to include capacity for process-
mamgement capability to collect and dis- ing data to permit safe "backout" from an
play critical Tug/SC caution & warning emergency condition.
parameters at a poW external, to Tug duri ig
Shuttle buildup and transfer to launch pad.
Location should probably be in one of the
MLP rooms with available access during
these operations. Instrumentation and
data management should be limited to nor-
mal flight capability and not require
additional non flight hardware. Provide
necessary software for condition raa.onitor
and display tasks.
1.1 Contime to provide interface panels, is Establish clear sequence control trans-
instrumentation and data management for between ground & Orbiter control,
capability as in 2.1 -- 2,3. 	 'In addition, plus gronxad control master override
provide instrumentation and data manage- in case Orbiter crew evacuation is
rnent capability to woni.tor and verify' required.
status of Tug/SC propudsion and avionics
systems duri: S Shuttle pad operations.
Data display should be at MSS/PStiS and
ground vxtrol stations. Provide necesoafy
sof iwa a to interface with launch pad LFS.
t^
y
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SYSTEM:
AVIOWCS	 Sliest 4 of 111
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Frmction FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
1.2 Continue to provide interface panels, line ,^ Propellant leak sensors to be provided
instruitentation and data management iu payload bay & in purge vent outlets
capability as in 2.1 -» 2.3 and 1.1 above (containment membrane purge &
to support Tug propellant loading during fluid interface p anel purge).
final. countdown. Ilust monitor and
control L029 LH2, He, and ALPS
reactant tank fluid levels, pressures,
venting and topping and display data at
ground control stations. Provide soft-
ware required to interface with LPS.
1.3 Continue to provide all interface capabi- include umbilical disengagemeit backout
lities listed in 2. 1, 2. 2, 1.1 and L.2 puts sating capability.
added capability to control, monitor @ Provide capability to automatically
and display required data at ground control sequencing of any safety critical
stations for initiating backout procedures operations which are sensitive to their
including payload changeout. Depending order of initiation.
upon time backout is initiated, it may be o Safety critical Ametions monitor &
necessary to display data at &IS,S`/ control shall be fail operationa?-fail
PSS locations. safe for all grouted & airborne inter-
1.3A Provide ail avionics interface capability face equipment.
listed or referenced in Task 1. 3, plus
additional capability to control and
m 3nitor toted propellant and p ressurant
drain, purge and/or vent. Display and
control will be from remote ground
control Iocation and require LPS softvnare
interface.
1.4 Continue to provide avionics interface
capability established in 2.1, 2.2, 1.1
and 1.2 during Orbiter task of closing
cargo bay doors to monitor Tug status
during this and othF r Orbiter tasks at laui ch
pad. incorporate LPS interface and soft-
ware as required.
1.5 Continue to provide avionics interface
capabilities established in 2.1, 2.2, 1.1
and 1,2. Provide capability to contrbl,
monitor and verify all Tang system status
data on both MSSIPSS and grand control
launch center, including aecessary LPS Rev.
hardware/software Interface. A
2-8
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Provide control & moritoring capability
to automatically perform the following at
main engine ignition or Shuttle first
movement:
e Close LH2&L02 tank vent valves
a Terminate He purge
* Open purge bag vent valves
a Provide necessary software to
accomplish these functions.
* Provide power to Trig during ascent
flight. (Note: Adtexuative is to
operate Trig fael cells during
ascent and provide required cooling
capability - see fluid system).
During powered bight, automaticaLy:
a Open L02 &LH2 vent valves at 200 sec
or z 300, 000 ft alt.
(Provide manual override at C&W
pa3iel}.
During Shuttle orbit
0 Transmit Tug status to ground station
Baseline assuines TDR,5 for NASA
missions which provides 907o coverage
at 160 Sun orbit and SGLS 11 RTS for DOI
which provide 155'a orbit coverage.
Activate zerowg vent system and
close positive G vent valves.
a Tank containment membrane helium
purge to be "on,' during all atmos-
pheric flight profile wi h overboard
vent from the Orbiter.
* Provide manual override capability
from Orbiter crew compartment
C&W panel. liequires interface lines,
panels, disconnects from SC/Tug thru
deployment adapter to payload bay aft
bulkhead to crew compartment. G&W
monitor & control panel in crew
compartment will be iter connected
with Orbiter fli& crew displays &
controls, aural alarm & illuminated
Mall: back. In addition., these data
must be fed tlwa Orbiter conun sunica-
tioa system and relayed to ground
station.
AVIONICS	 Shoat ? of 11
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function
	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETYJRELIABILI i Y CRITERIA
Black No.
i
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SYSTEM-
AVIONICS	 Sheet 6 of 11 J
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function
	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
11112 Continue to provide Tag/SC status data t(
& receive commands from ground contro:
via Orbiter com;nnnication system inter-
face. Provide software capability to
accomplish predeployment activation and
checkout. Receive Tag go-no go signal
from ground stations.
crew compartment.
11.3	 Contime to provide avionics interface
identified in 11.1 & 11.2 with additional
capability to:
a Provide controls to initiate, ope3ratc
monitor and stop deployment adapte
rotation drive mechanism.
e Provide status of same to ground
stations thru Orbiter communica-
tion system.
a Provide controls to release Tug for
ward attachment latches.
a Provide lights & CCTV to inspect
Tug/SC prior to deployment.
a Provide electrical power to
accomplish the above.
11.4 & 11.5 Coxtin ue to provide avionics interface
identified in 11..1. 71.3 with additional
capability to-
* Provide controls & data mana.gemer,
system to open non-thrust H2 &02
vents.
a Disable zero-G vents.
a Activate fuel. cell '%u not already on)
and change over to internal power.
* Provide data link: to update G&N
state vector.
4	 * Gofbhme to provide RF data/
command link to/from ground sta.
* Provide additional state vector upda
data.
a
capability on safety critical items.
a Tug deploy/release/> etTact -mechanisms
shall be designed such that they will net
generate a hazard, even after a failure
has been experienced with that system,
a Capability of Tug jettison via EVA shall.
be designed into the deploy/release/
retract mechanisms.
a Controls used in operation of H2&02
vents shall be hardwired & shall be
designed ach that control of the vent
function 3s fail operational-fail, safe.
Rev.
A
2-$9
r_
s	 -
Az
R
s `^
ii
i
S -
tF
Reference
Function FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
11.6 Continue to provide '2Ug/SC avionics o Umbilical disconnects to be capable of
interface capability identified in 11.1 being manually disengaged via EVA in
- 11.5 and: the event of disconnect malfunction.
s Initiate fluid umbilical disconnect
retraction. & display status at
MSS/PSS and relay to ground sta.
® Release deployment adapter latches a Deployment adapter latches to be cap-
& display status at MSS/PSS & able of being manually disengaged in
relay to ground station. event r f leach malfunction.
11.7 Continue to provide avionics interface
capability identified in 11.1 - 11.6 and:
e Initiate withdraw Tug from deploy- • Safety critict3 monitor & control nuic..
ment adapter, monitor status, Lions that are normally hardwired shall
and risplay at MSS/PSS & relay to be capable of being shifted to RF link
ground station. just prior to withdrawing Tug from
s Disconnect electrical umbilical adapter.
& switch to RF lWc.
o Provide data link to enable ACS.
11.8 Continue to provide avionics interface
identified in 11.1 - 11.'7, and:
Provide controls, communication
& DMS to signal ACS operation once
TuWOOrbiter at a safe separation
distance.	 (Rr Hai, from Tug to
Orbiter).
12.1 Re-establish FX, link between Vg/SC a Provide capability to determine status
Orbiter for transfer of control from of safety critical systems.
Ground to Orbiter. Provide: • ACS fall operational/fail safe status
* Communication system compatible A Electrical power faii operational/
with STDN & AFSCF networks & feu safe Status.
compatible with Orbiter and a Communication/control
ground stations.
* Provide Tug/SC with capability to
receive 2.4 Knps information rata
total 8 Kbps encoded command
data. with BER of 10'"5 ; capability
to transmit 16 Rbps TM data to
Orbiter.
SYSTEM:
AVIONICS	 Sheet 7 of 11 1	
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SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETYIRELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
12.2 Maintain. RF Iink from 12.1 and:
is Provide transponder compatible
with Orbiter rendezvous radar.
e Capability to receive commands
and compute signals for ACS.
* Transmit ststa.3/C &W data to
Orbiter.
i
* Provide st atus data relay to ground
statioli.
12.3 Maintain Tug-Orbiter RF link from 12.1, a Verify safety status of Tug (S/C) &
and: transmit to Orl^ter.
e: Provide G&N, DMS & flight control
to maintain commanded orientation
& position.
w Provide controls to deactivate
transponder on Orbiter command.
a Tranaxnit/receive & implement.
commands for positioning Tag in
preferred docking attitude.
12.4 Maintain RF link from 12. 1, ands
A Command ACS to stabilize Tug-S/C
for RMS end effector mating.
• Deactivate ACS, G&N & flight
control. system.
12.5 Provide controls, instrumentation to	 I
check and/or perform deployment	 r
adapter readiness inactions & rotate
to remate position. if regtured. Includes::
* Umbilical panels in retracted
position.
0 Tag-adapter latches in retracted
position,
a Power available to drive mechanism
if r3quired
& Adapter position monitor. Rena.
0 Relay status to ground control eta. A
112.8
12.9
SYSTEM:	
.^
AVIONICS
SUBSYSTEM:
Refaronce
Fanctlon
Block No.
,
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETYIP9LIABII.ITY CRITERIA
Shoot 9 of 1-1 1
112.9-12.73
f 12.10
Provide controls in Oribter to adivnte
adapter latches & monitor latching action.
Provide control to remate electrical
umbilical/discoaret acts & monitor atatna.
Relay status to ground stations. Provide
electrical power as reqy'dred.
Using remated electrical umbilicals:
a Provide switch for power transfer
from Tug power to Orbiter power.
o Provide for deactivation of fuel
cell power system.
* Continue to monitor Tug/SC sys-
tem  status & determine that it is
safe to rotate Tug into cargo bay.
e Relay status to grouW stations.
io Provide controls to operate & moni-
tor adapter rotation drive mechanic:
e Provide electrical power for drive
mechanism.
9 Provide lights & CCTV to visually
monitor retraction operation.
e Verify all latches in proper position
before retraction & properly latchec
after Tug is rotated into cargo bay.
* Relay status of operation to ground
control stations.
To configure Tug/SC for entry fUgltt:
* Prow-do controls to remate fluid
disconnects.
a Activate purge bag He flow and
maintain 0.5 to fns psiapressure
in purge bag.
* Mabxtain 16 psla in main propellant
tanks.
* Display all Tug/SC system status
at MSS/P5S panels & relay to
ground stations,
• Provide instrumentation & communica-
tioa to monitor & control Tug/SC
safety & sutras. Relay sta tus to
ground control. stations.
* Tug/adapter latches & li terface panels
shall be capable of being remal<ed
manually via TIVA in the event of comp
Dent malfunction.
a Provide capability to continuously
monitor status of Tug/SC safety
critical functions during rotation
into payload bay.
* Ref. 1,1.3/11..4 - Provide capability
to jettleon Tug/spacecraft if remate
& checkout not possible.
@ Reverify hardwire safety control/
monitor lines are operable for e3try.
s Reinitiate tank containment membrane
l-"se purge with Orbiter overboard vent.
Rev.
A
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Reference
Funcf1an FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Black Na.
12,11 12,12 Continue to monitor status, display on Provide cap
	
ty to ve ' y- Tuug
C&W panels & relay to ground control status for mitryflight, using hardwire
stations during entry flight & for landing ?Interface path:
& landing rollout. • Provide instrumentation and readout
for C&W monitor & control for Orbiter
crew at MSS/IBS & pilot C&W panel.
a Relay status to ground control station.
13.1 To initiate Tug propellant dump for RTLS * Provide capability to monitor dump
abort mode: operation & display status at MSS/PS,S
a Provide software and avionics inter- &Orbiter pilot C&W panels and relay
face lines & disconnects to automati,- status to ground stations.
cally sequence LO2 and LHL dump In addition to above, use same interface
after initiation by Orbiter crew. & programs to:
e Provide program in Tug DAIS & a Provide for chimp operation safe
backup program in Orbiter to accomp- shutdown.
lish propellant dump. m Display status on Orbiter C&W panels
& relay to ground stations.
In addition to above= use same interface
& programs to safe Tug propulzion
system for landing by-
* Providing instrumentation & cesit-rols
to inert LO2
 and LH2 system..
* Display status on Orbiter C&W
panels and relay to around station.
13.2.1 thrtz To deactivate Tug, return to s afe status
13.2.4	 & complete Tug propellant dump-associa
ted with predeployment abort (Abort-
Once-Around or Abort to Orbit) AOA /t§
R ev.
A
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SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function
Block No.
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
[&.-2. 1 thrar a Provide data link (hardwire) to a Provi. a cap	 to reER El sys ems
13.2.4 Orbiter & relay to ground station to to safe (passive) status.
(cort'd.) receive ground control orders to a Display system status at Orbiter C&W
terminate activation & checkout panels and relay to ground stations.
procedures.
* Transfer propellant tack vent from a Provide program capability to safely
zero-g to normal vent valves. terminate propellant dump after tank
m Initiate pressurization of main fluid level sensors indicate tanks are
propellant 'tanks to Z 20 psia. empty.
m Initiate propellant dump by opening a Provide program to config73re Tag for
valves in dump lines. safe entry and landing.
13.3.1 To deactivate Tug/SC & verify that it is Status of safety critical fawtions shall be
safe for retrieval af ,`ex deployment & verified by redund mt communication
releases but prior to main engine burn: system.
a Pinvide RF link between Tug &.
Orbiter & relay frown Orbiter to
ground stations.
a Stabilize & orient Tug.
a Display Tug/5C status at Orbiter
C &W panels and relay to ground
control.
Note: This step is in preparation for
retrieval in accordance vAth tasks 12.2
thru,12.2, then propellant dump in
f accordance v th task 13.2 for an AOA/
ATO abort termihation of the mission.
. 
d
5.1 o	 Provide interface panels and lines fro3
LH2 & L02 main tank veal: valves
through deployment adapter & Orbiter
aft bulkhead to dump ports/lines on
Orbiter.
sa	 Provide interface panels & lines from
L112
 & LO  main tank purge bag vents
through deployment adapter & Orbiter
aft bulkhead to purge bag vent part/
line.
5.1A Provide interface pawls & lines from
(TLS) main LH2 & L02
 tanks and ALPS reac-
tant tanks to permit the following tasks
after an RTLS abort landing:
a Vent and purge main LH2 tank.
e Purge main L02 tank.
a Drain: & purge ACPS fuel tanks.
is Purge fuel cells
® Vent helium bottles to safe working
pressure.
a Vent purge bags.
5.1A Provide interface panels & lines from
(AOA/ATO) main LOS & LH2 tanks and ACPS
reactant tanks to permit following
tasks after an AOA or ATO abort
® Vent & purge main LH2 tEMk.
® Purge main L02 tank.
to 'dent purge bags.
e Drain. & purge ACPS fuel tank.
a Purge fuel cells
o Vert helium storage battles to safe
working pressure.
.
SYSTEM:
FLUIDS
	
Sheet 
1 
of 5
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
0Y
e Incorporate purge gas monitors with
capability to measure safe concenatra~
bons of H2 , 02 & N2H4 in fluid lines,
disconnects, purge exhaust & purge ve i
a incorporate pressure sensors in all
pressure lines to ensure venting before
disconnect.
o Duct H2&02 vents to Orbiter overboard
vent ports.
a Vent Tug batteries into Orbiter over-
board vent ports.
a Incorporate purge connections as inte-
gral part of fill, drain & abort dwnp
equipment.
a Purge all propellant lines w ith helium
after drain operations.
a del & oxidizer interconnect panels
shall be separated to majdnnun extent
possible.
a Vent valves on L112&LO2 tanks shall be
backed up by redundant vent valves on
adapter.
a ACPS tank to incorporate safety vent
that will vent N2H4 external to Orbiter
in event of inadvertent N2H4 decompose.
Lion.
a Flexible sections of hose disconnects
shall be restrained.
A Propellant vent system shall permit
vent with Orbiter horizontal/vertical
& payload bay doors open or closed.
f3 ev
A
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SYSTEM:
FLUMS Sheet	 of	 5
SUBSYSTEM:
Refsrence
Function FUNCTIGNAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block Na.
5.2, 2.1 Provide interface disconnect panels/ Same as 5.1.
& 2.2 receptacles/devices at deployment adn#ei ar Provide capability to pressure test all
and Orbiter aft payload bay bulkhead to fluid fittings with inert gas prior to
permit ready removal. (installation) and filling with normal fluids.
verification of all Tug fluid systems lines
and connections between Tug-Orbiter-
ground for:
Main L02 & L112 fill, drain, vent
and purge.
o AC P5 fill, drain, vent and purge.
Fad cell purge.
Helium fil l  and vent.
Purge bag vents
2.3 Continue to provide all fluid systems Provide tolerance band warning system to
interface lines and panels installed in 2.1 alert personnel to potertial/incipial t
above to support monitoring any Tug fluid safety critical condition.	 Provide over-
system parameters (n conjunction with ride response system to respond to
Avionics) during Orbiter/Shuttle buildup warning.
and move to launch pad.
L I & 1.2 Continue to provide all fluid system inter- M Same as 2.3.
face lines & panels installed & verffled * Establish definite sequence limits,
in 2.1 & 2.2 to enable: safe hold positions & hold time limits.
o Verification of fluid system status 9 Provide interlocks to preclude inadver-
in preparation for loading. tent dropout of disconnects during load -
a Pre-cool, load, monitor and top as ing through final eourtdam.
required the main LH2 & L02 tacks.
s Load and monitor AOPS fuel (N2H4)
tank.
a Pressurize on-board Helium sys-
tems and monitor.
a Provide main tank purge bag gas
and vent lines.
lia.
A
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SYSTEM:
FLUIDS Sheet 3 of 5 1
SUBSYSTEM:
Referenee
Function
Black No.
1.3
1.3A;
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
Provide salve basic interface panels &
lines as installed in Task 2. 1, but conflgu
& locate for ease of access & removal/
reinstallation with Orbiter & Tug in
vertical attitude to facilitate either Back-
out-Payload changeout or routine payload
installation at the launch pad. Payload
changeout at launch pad will not normally
entail propellant drain. For those instan,
where it does, see 1 .3A (Pad. Abort)
below.
Use established fluid interface panels/
lines, provide additional capacity and
capability to:
* Safely terminate propellant Fnd/or
pressurant loading/topping operatic
® Drain all loaded propellants (main
and ACPS) and vent or depressurim
helium system.
e Purge propellant tanlm as required
to attain safe condition for Tug
(payload) changeoLt or return to
standby.
SAFETYIREI.IABILITY CRITERIA
e Assure that entire changeout can, be
safely accomplished in the presence
of any single failure of an interface
component.
a Provide purge capability to reduce all
potentially hazardous fluids to safe
concentrations. Provide means of
verifying safe concentration.
c
* Provide capability of assuring that all
safety critical venting, pressures,
voltages, controls and monitors are
continuously operative throughout
changeout operation.
* Provide means of assuring that all
disconnects are non-pressurized, non-
energized, and/or do not contain
hazardous fluids at time of disconnect.
* Provide disconnect covers to prevent
contamination.
* All seals at fluid disconnects shall be
at least dual redundant.
purge/vent operation.
1.4 & 1.5 Use basic fluid interface lines and panels Same as 1. 1, 1.2 & 1.3
installed in 2.1 or 1.3 to monitor, 'top, a Provide fi2 , 02 and N2H4 detectors in
vent or purge Auld systems as required payload bay.	 1<luid iderface panels to
during payload bay door closing &;final be continuously purged with He during
prelaunch and countdown operations. t. tran fer.propellanla normal pad sequence, propellant F aid
^ Fluad. interfaces to be capable of beinginterfloading (Task 1.2) is accomplished leak tested with He prior to fueling/ 
I during the first hour of the final pressurizing Tug systems.2 hour couddown (Task 1 .5). Orly
topping and status monitoring are
required during Task 1.5.
yi;	 a
t
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SUBSYSTEM
Reference
Fanetion	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block loo.
11.1 & 1.1.2 1Use fluid system interface lines and panel
installed in Task 2.1 or 1.3 to-
* Provide LH2 & LO  tank overboard
vent capability.	 Closed at Orbiter
main engine start or Shuttle first
movement and reopened at Z 200
seconds or z 300,000 ft.
* Provide for bc:sh normal & zero-g
vent.
* Provide for termination of helium
purge on Orbiter main engine start
or first movement and opening of
purge bag vent valves.
11.3 Use same fluid interface panels, provide
for disconnect separation prior to Tug
rotation for deployment. On normal
flight, no further Tug-Orbiter fluid inter-
faces until Tug retrieval & rotation back
into payload bay in Fasks 12.9/32.10.
12.10 w Use same fluid system Tug-Orbiter inter.
12.12 face panels & remate all lines following
Tug rotation back into Orbiter cargo bay
to enable-
* Helium supply for main propellant
tank purge bags.
s Vent for purge bag
* Pressurize and vent main propellant
tanks
Maintain these interface capabilities duria
Orbiter entry flight and landing operation
13.1 Use basic fluid interface panels & lines
in Tas;;, 2. i or 1.3 to provide
capability to support an RTLS apart flight
,
installed
termination.
0 Provide capability to dump F:dSO, 000
lb LO2 and LH2 within 300 seconds.
Provide required pressurizatlon gas
for maintaining flight pressure head
to expedite propellant dump.
A
2.98
Vent system for both LH2 & 102
 to be
M safe.
Fluid interface to provide emergency
vent for N2H4 tank.
Vent lines on N2H4 and LH2 tanks to be
equipped with flame arrestors at vent
outlets
He purge on tank containment membranes
"on" during all atmospheric flight pro 
with Orbiter overboard vent.
o Provide means to jettison entire Tug/
SC in the event of deployment system
failure.
Disconnect panels to be capable of
being manually disengaged via EVA.
Provide sensors on interface panels to
provide evidence of satisfactory conn-
ection to crew. Panels to be capable of
being manually reengaged via EVA.
Provide capability of purgingand re-
pressurizing Tug main propellant lines
prior to entry
P
For all return or abort conditions, all
interconnecting ducting shall be purged
& repressurized with He prior to entry.
Rev.
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Reference
Function
	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETYIRELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
113.2
d)
s Provide L02 & LH2 tank vent capa-
bility on completion of dump.
* Provide helium for L02 & LH2
purge bags.
* Maintain 16 psia in both L02 & LH2
main propellant tanks using vent/
pressurization.
® Provide helium purge for panels &
linos.
Using basic fluid interface panels & lines
installed in Task 2.3 or 1.3 to provide
capability to support a pre-deployment
abort (results in Orbiter AOA/ATO) flight
termination. Provide
* Switch from zero-g vent to positive
vent for main propellant tank®.
* Provide abort pressurization systen
for both main propellant tanks.
e Provide dump lines for moth main
propellants which exit at aft end
of Orbiter and are oriented to
provide positive axial thrust.
* Control dump flow from initial
trickle flow for line chilldown to
full flow condition. Terminate dum
upon sensing propellant depletion
and purge dump lines & panels.
Provide sufficient redundancy in vent/
purge/pressurization systems to ensure
continued performance of these functions
after failure of any single component.
Propellant valves that control dump
shall be fail safe.
Propellant tank pressurization systems
to contain sufficient redundancy to
ensure capability of repressuriz3ng
tanks after sustaining a failure of any
pressurization component.
^m
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SYSTEM.,
STRUCTURE
	 Sleet i of
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE 	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
	
5.1	 Provide primary structural support: of Tu; * Tug payload bay support points that
in Orbiter daring Tow to Safing Area (SA)	 transmit Tug/space-craft loads into
or Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) 	 Shuttle structure shall be designed
following landing rollout and to acconimo- 	 with a 25% margin of safety under the
date Tug/SC safing & purging operations. 	 most adverse Shuttle design loads,
Support muA be compatible with Orbiter 	 excluding crash landing.
support Iocations, interface surface 	 e Tug/SC structure shall be grounded to
details and loads/strength.	 Orbiter structure.
	
5,1A	 Provide same primary support as in 5. 1, Same as 5. 1, except added weight of
(RTLS)	 but capable of supporting added weight of ALPS propellant onboard.
ALPS propellant on-board following
Return to Launch Site (RTLS) aborted
flight termination.
	
5.1A	 Provide same primary support as in 5,.1, Same as 5.1A (RTLS)
(AOA/A.TO) but capable of supporting added weight: of
ACPS propellant on--board following
Abort Once Around (AOA) or Abort io
Orbit (ATO) flight termination.
15.2
15. 3
Continue to provide primary support of
Tug/SC (& deployment adapter) as in 5.i.
In addition, provide access for installatic
removal of cargo Tway work platforms &
support for same which is compatible wit
Orbiter clearance requirements,
Provide for handling equipment
pickup points compatible with Tug--
Orbiter support system and Orbiter clea3
ante requirements for horizontal remova
(or iustaltation) of Tug & deployment
adapter with or without attached space-
craft.
Continue to provide primary zupport of
Tug/SC (& deployment adapter) as in 5.1
for that part of Task 5.3 accomplished
white Tug/SC remains in Orbiter pay?oai
bay.
Same as 5.1
a) Provide Tug attach points to en-
able life equipment lockup before
unlatching Orbiter Tug support.
b) Ensure lift egdpment interlocked or
load limited to preclude Tug liftout
while still attached to Orbiter.
c) Ensure spring rate deflection d.ffer-
ence between empty Tug & Tug/
heavy spacecraft do not create
clearance problem,
2-100
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2.2
2.3
12.4 & 2.5
11 1.1, 1.2,
1.4 & 1.5
SYSTEM:
STRUCTURE
Fil'NCTIOMAL INTERFACE
Provide attach fittings for Tag/Adapter/
Spacecraft handling equipment for hori-
zontal load operations which are com-
patible with Orbiter payload bay support
points, interface surface details, loads
and clearance requirements. Provide
structural mounting for mechanism and
fluid/avionlos subsystem elements which
interface with Orbiter and provide for in-
stallatioa of necessary work platforms to
install & verify these subsystem elements,
Continue to provide Tag/Deployment
Adapter/Spacecraft, work platform &
subsystem interface panel support as in
2.1. during any required extended interface
verification tasks.
Continue to provide primary support
latching for Tug/Deployment Adapter/
Spacecraft within Orbiter payload bay as
in 2.1. In addition, support
devices must be capable of maintaining
Tug in pamper position within payload bay
during Shuttle buildup which will entail
Orbiter rotation to vertical attitude and
mating to SRM & ET. Support must also
be maintained during Shuttle roll out and
transport to launch pad aboard mobile
launch platform.
Structures functional interface require-
ments for launch pad installation and
verification are covered in Task 1..3.5.
Provide primary support for Tug/Deploy-
ment Adapter/Spacecraft within Orbiter
payload bay with Orbiter in vertical atti-
tude at launch pad. Support system, must
be capable of maintaining Tug in proper
position during empty status checks, pro-
pellant loading, and fully loaded condition,
of terminal. countdown.. Support system
-must be compatible with Orbiter support
locations, interface surface details &
load/streng-kh capability.
Shoat	 of	 1
SAFE IRI ELIASILITY CRITERIA
e , Incorporate guides to help position
Tug/5C during loading.
e Provide personnel, safety rails and
bumpers to protect Ofniter.
e Same as 5, Z (c)
a Provide hard point mounting & pins for
work platforms.
s Provide gm€zrdrails/belts in dangerous
locations.
e Design support fittings with sufficient
safety margins to reduce failure
probability to negligible level.
e Orbiter/adapter latches should incorpo
rate positive locking devices. Latches
to be designed to 25% safety margin
under most adverse Shuttle design
loads, excluding crash landing.
e Provide redundant structural Hookup
of Orbiter disconnect pansls.
e Provide positive indication of dis-
connect panel status.
R1W.
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Releronce
	Function	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block No.
e wo= stansts -- we a. z
* Orbiter/deployment disconnect to have
double sequenced locks to prevent dis-
connect with pressure or toxic fluid
in lines.
* Provide safety pull pin attachment
between Tug & changeout unit.
e Design to ensure 3- is deflections &
clearance changes during load transfer
from,, changeout unit to Orbiter will neat
cause Orbiter-Tug contact.
® Vor interface connections that can't be
visually verified, provide positive
status indicator devices.
1.s.1 rroviae pninary support as m i..i, i.z,
1.3.7 1.4 & 1. 5, above.
1.3.2 thru Continue to provide primary support for
1.3.6 Tug/Deployment Adapter/Spacecraft as in:
1. 1, 1. 2, 1.4 & 1.6 above.	 In addition,
provide payload changeout unit pickup/
attach points which are compatible with tbi
Orbiter support system. & payload bay
clearance requirements and permit payloa
(Tug/Deployment Adapter/Spacecraft)
removal & installation at launch pact in
vertical using payload changeout device.
In addition, provide for access to ir ter-
face panel locations for connection, dis-
connect & Verification requirements.
1.3A Continue to provide primary support as i.r
1. 1, 1. 2, 1,4 & 1, S above during Pad
Abort backout procedures including
propellant drain operations
FTJGHT OPERATIONS
11.1 & 11.2 Provide primary structural support of Tu;
Deployment Adapter/Spacecraft in Orbite7
during Iiitoff and Shuttle ascent Right for
Fully loaded Tug. Must be compatible wit
Orbiter support locations, interface sulfa
detail & load/strengths
 including all flight
in&..iced loads (Ref. dSC 67700, Val, IX,
11.3 & 11.4
Rev. C).
Contittme to provide primary support as
above until start of rotation out of payload
bay. During rotation and in fully rotated
position provide support through
deployment adapter mounting fixture.
1.1.5, 11.6 Provide support in fully rotated position
1.1.7 thm deployment adapter mourning fixture,
Provide end effector receptacle(,)
compatible with 1MS attachment for Tang
det3loyment operations.
9 Erasure dynamic conditions do not
'T ug/spaceoraft & Orbiter bterfe:
* Pro-Ado structural capability to 3ettiso:
entire Tug/SC in the event Tug hangs--
up in payload bay.
e End effector receptat la to be provided
with shield t: prevzit damage from a
missed RM connection attempt.
ts.
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STRUCTURE
I SUBSY.3TEM:
R::terence
	
Function
	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
	
Black No.	 ;1"
	
12.4 thru
	 Provide end effector receptacles compat-- Same as for 11. 1-11.7
12.8
	 ible with EMS attachment for Tug retriev-
al including RMS docking, deployment
adapter prepa-vdioa, maneuver into de-
ployment adapter and adapter latching
operations. in addition, provide Tug
support thru the deployment adapter
mounting fLxture during electrical umbil-
ical reconnect and subsequent safing
operations. Permit release of EMS after
Tug is latched to deployment adapter
(Task 12.7).
12.9 thru
3.2.11
ail
112.32
1 13.1 &
3.3.2
Continuo to provide end effector recep-
tacles) and support thru the deployment
adapter support fittings during rotation
back into payload bay. In addition, rein-
state remaining primary support and
latches once Tug is fishy rotated to the
stowed position as they were in Tasks
3.1.1 & 11.2.
Provide primary structural support
(as in 11.1 & 11. 2) for return flight
which is capable of supporting all flight
induced (re-entry maneuvers) and landing
loads.
Provide primary structural support for
Tug/Deployment Adapter/Spacecraft
within Orbiter payload bay during RTLS
& predepioynment AOA. abort maneuvers.
Same basic support requirements as in
Task 11.1/11.2.
Ref. 11.3/11.4, provide ability to
jettison Tug/SC if rotation and
restowage i8 not possible.
a) Provide manual backup for closing
Tug/adapter latches.
b) .Latches to withstand all. flight loads,
including crash landing, with any
latch failed open.
C) Orbiter/adapter to be capable of
jettison in event Med adapter pre-
vents closing payload bay doors.
Design to ensure that Tug/deployment
adapter/SC deflections will not result
in interference vdth Orbiter.
R sir.
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SUBSYSTEM:
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FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
Provide instructions in MSS/PSS opera-
tions checklist to accomplish the following
prior to egress:
* Verify power & purge gas availabilit
* Set all controls to safe position.
Provide instructions in ground crew opera
tions checklist to accomplish the following
after ingress:
a Verify propellant tank pressure-vent
cycling.
* Malm fluid system vent & purge
connections.
a Verify all systems status at MSS/
PSS station.
e Monitor tank purge operations.
For an R IS abort flight termination,
provide instructions in VMS/PSS opera-
tions checklist to accomplish the following
prior to egress:
a Verify propellant tank pressure--
vent cycling.
a Verify availability of power & purge
gas.
e Set all controls to safe position.
Provide instructions in ground orevi
operations checklist to accomplish the
following after rollout and tow to safing
area:
m Verify propellant tank status.
$ Position & connect propellant
& reactant drain & purge equipment,
# Drain ACPS propellant
reactants.
* Purge tantcs as required.
* Disconnect drain & purge equipment
For an AOA/A'l'fa abort flight termination
provide instructions in VMS/PSS opera-
tions checklist to accomplish the following
prior to egress:
a Verify tank condition/status.
* Verify availability of pourer & purge
SAFETYIRELIABILITY CRITERIA
a Provide overview ea ety priority check-
list & badkod procedures to correct
non-safe or incipient failure conditions
a Provide procedures to verify readines
of safety critical Tug/SC systems
prior to activation or deactivation.
A Pressure lines & vessels to be clearly
coded to identify capacity & operating
pressure.
Provide procedures for assessing safe
condition of Tug. Procedures to
include requirements for retaining
Orbiter in safe area until LFl2 &
L02 tanks have been purged to safe
concentrations.
a 1`ecvide procedures for ensuring that
residual gases in propellant tanks have
been purged to safe concentrations
before conU.rning operations.
! Same as 5.1A (RTT.S)
Reference
Function
Block No.
5.1
s. lA
(RTES)
S. 1A:
(AOAIATO)
F
1
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PROCE DURES	 Sheet 2 of9
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function
Block No.
5,1A
(Cont i d. )
5.2
^ 5.3
2.1 &2.2
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE
o Set an eontrois to sate position.
Provide instructions in ground crew opera
tions cliec list to accomplish the followin g
after tow to safmg area.:
e Position & connect ACPS
reactant drain & purge equipmert.
• Drain & purge ACPS
reactant tanks.
Connect main tank purge equipment.
Purge main propellant tanks.
a Disconnect all drain & purge equip-
ment.
Provide instructions in the ground crew
operations checklist to accomplish the
following during Tug/SC removal from
Orbiter:
o Monitor Tag status from MSS/PSS
station during preparation for
removal.
e Attachment of Tug (SC) handling
equipment.
a Disconnect all Tug/Orbiter and
Deployment Adapter/Orbiter inter-
face lines & panels.
Lift Tug (plus D/A & SC) from
Orbiter.
Provide instructions in the ground opera-
tions checklist to:
e Remove (tight data by electrical
connection to access stored data.
It is assumed Tug flight data will be
stored in a mag-bubble or CCD type
memory which can be accessed via
avionics interface unit & dumped
to ground station. No physical data
removal nor access is required.
Provide instructions in the ground crew
operations clieckliat to assist/accomplish
following tasks duxixg Tug installation
(Horizontal at OPF):
e Verify payload bay down open &
in
SAFETYIRELIABILITY CRITERIA
Provide procedures for emergency
handling of ACPS propellant spills,
including evacuation of persoimel, use
of SCAPE suits and neutralization of
spilled propellant.
Provide ground crew instructions for
verifying that all interconnects, latches,
etc. , are in safe status prior to &a-
connecting, i.e., no voltage across
interface, no residual propellants in line
no lines under pressure, etc.
Procedures to be sequenced to progres-
sively checkout safety critical items
before proceeding to major action steps.
Rev.
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Reference
Function
EIock PIn.
FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
2.1 & 2.2 a Verify Tug accommodations in place 9 PrDWE16 emergency a Out or status
(Cont Td.) x Support beam fittings. bold procedures for safety critical steps
x Interface panel receptacles. a Procedures should include tolerance
x MSS/PSS panels & interconnect band warning to alert personnel to
cables. pcatentia,l/incipient safety critical
x Lines from P/L bay panels to conditions.
Orbiter mold line panels
Lilt & install Tug/SC into Orbiter
Connect & verify interface lines &
pals,
x l• laid
x Avionics
e Verify Tug support/retention latche s
closed & secure.
2.3 Provide instructions in ground crew oiler
tions checklist to monitor Tug/SC status
during Shuttle/Orbiter buildup & transpo rt
to launch pad. Can be accomplished by
Orbiter crew, or provide access for Tug
crew to accomplish. Access either to
MSS/PSS or to data display in MLP roam. Provide procedures to verify that all
Orbiter crew provide access for-or assist , d1sconnacts are safe to connect/dis-
connecting Tug rise-off disconnect panels connect.
between Orbiter and ground (vis MLP). Establish procedural sequence to checkout1.1 Provide instructions in ground
safely associated equipment before status 
operations checklist for Orbiter
verification is started. 
crew to accomplish or assist Tug
crew in verifying Tug system status
during pad operations & countdown
p.eparation.
a Provide LPS sof€^Hare as required
for data display at appropriate
ground station consoles.
1.2 'Provide ins ructicns in ground, operations Provide clear pad procedures for prop-
checklist for Orbiter crew to acoomplish/ a llant loading operations, and provide
assist Tug Brew in'i'ag propellant loading baekaut procedures for defueling and
during final countdown and any ral Bred p=ging the Tug in the event of launol;pad
LPS software for- abort {Ref. 1.8A).	 i
* Purge propellant system
0 VerHypropellant system ready for Rev.
loading. F. ^'
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Reference
Function
Block No.
FUNCTRINAL INTERFACE SAFET ".'IRELIABILITY CRITERIA
1.2 (Cont'd.) *	 main tanks.
Load T
L
r
H
^
2
2 main f..®  10	 SfiJl s p	 r^*1n P. VP1
® Load ACPS propellant.*
a Charge helium system.
a Top/replenish cryogens as re-
quired during final countdown.
1.3 Provide instructions in the Orbiter
ground crew operations cheoldist to Ensure the pressure bottles are reduced
provide access for, assist with, or to standby pressure before Tug removal.
accomplish following tasks for Tug/SC
changeout at launch pad.	 Also, within
this task are required actions to .
routinely install Tug/SC at launch pad.
o Provide access, open payload bay
doors, provide work platforms.
e Safe T:ag/SC.
® Disconnect all avionic & fluid inter-
face panels.
a Attach payload changeout unit and
remove Tug/SC.
a Install replacement (new) Tug/5C
a Connect avionic & fluid interface
panels and verify connections.
e Verify all Tug supports/latches
positioned and secure.
iv Initiate purges and return to standby
condition.
1.3A Provide instructioas in ground crew Establish safe hold position during which
operations checklist to paxform or assist satisfactory execution of a completed
Tug crew in the following tasks associated operation can be verifted before pmceedin
with Ia»tnch pad abort: to the next operation.
® Safely terminate propellant loading
or topping operations.
s Ileturn. Tug/SC to safe status.
* ACLomplish7propellait drain
x^^
3{ 102
ALPS
r, Purge propell.amt systems
0 Vent & safe pressurization system. Re
0 Secure zM systems ha safe conditiio A
t
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Reference
Function	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block Pao.
t
1.4 .-rovicte instructions m the grounu crew
operations checklist to accomplish or
assist in monitoring Tug status during
Orbiter final prelaunch operations to
secure from payload changeout or pad
installation.
1.5 Provide instructions in the ground chew a Establish precarnares for backout to a
operations checklist to accomplish or safe hold position.
assist with the following tasks during
f inal co ltdown:
v Verify Tug/SC status and ready
for launch.
a Monitor all Tag/SC systems
during final countdown.
l: LTCHT O PE RATIONS
11..1. Provide instructions in flight crew a Provide emergency procedures that will
operations checklists for pilot & MSS/PSS allow Orbiter crew to override any
to execute appropriate control and/or potentially catastrophic events resulting
override functions based on signals from Tug/SC equipment failures.
displayed on C&W panels. Functions
should include-
* Monitor C&W panel.
s Verify recording of flight data &
relay of flight data to ground contro
stations.
11.2 Provide instructions in MSS/PSS opara- a Provide 0-,biter crew emergency
tions checklist to accomplish the following procedures/training for safing Tug/SC.
during Tug/SC predeployment cheelcout:
* Transfer control to ground station.
* Monitor Tug activation & C/O
procedure.
* Provide assistance as requssued
by ground control.
e Monitor SC predeployment activatio
& C/O.
Provide visual monitor via CCTV &
report to ground control.
11, 3 - 13.II Provide instructions in MSS/P.SS & pilot o Provide procedures for backup opera-
operations checklist to accomplish the Von to be used if primary deployment
following during Tug/SC rotation, de- system fails. Procedure to include
mployea^t & separation- instructions for emergency	 Rte'
A
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SYSTEM:
PROCEDURE Sheet	 G	 of
SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Block I D.
11.8-11.8 a Activate deployment adapter drive Tug jettison via. EVA in event Tag camot
(Cont'd.) & monitor rotation with CCTV. be normally deployed or restowed.
a Maintain re quired Orbiter attitude
throughout the operation.
e Monitor & confirm fully rotated
position.
a Monitor final Tug/SC activation and
verify status to ground station.
X Power changeover
x Change Tug vent system by clos-
ing thru Orbiter vents & open
non-thrust H2
 8.02 vents.
• Maneuver & attach RMS to Tug.
a Disconnect electrical umbilicals
& switch to RF Tug-Orbiter comm-
link.
a Release deployment adapter latches.
* Position Tag for final separation
& monitor on CCTV.
a Release MdS & perform Orbiter
separation maneuvers.
a Monitor & relay Tug/SC status
during iaitLfd Tag ACS operations.
e Transfer full. Tug/SC control to
ground station after attaining spe-
cified separation distance.
12.1 - 12.9 During Tug/SC retrieval operations, Provide safety critical eheckliat to
provide instructions in the pilot & MSS/ verify Tkg/SC safe condition prior to
PSS flight operations checklists to arcom retrieval. Procedure to include veri-
push (or assist with) the following: ficat'ion of Tug/SC safety prior to
a Upau attaining required Tug-Orbiter approaching Tag and a final verification
retrieval locations, transfer prime of Tug/SC safety just prior to position.-
control to arbiter for final rendez- b g Tag in, payload bay.
vous & do&4ng operations.
a Contimually relay Tug status to
ground s. ations.
0 Tssue commands to position Tug/SC
for rendezvous & docking.
a Stabilize Tug positions.
s Perform TPf & TPF rendezvous gay.
maneuvers. A
f
l
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Reference
Furction FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFE-YlRBL1ABILITY CRITERIA
Block Flo.
12.1 . 12.9 a Verify Tug systems safe for docking
(Cont'd.) * Visually inspect Tug /SC in pre-
paration for docking.
a Attach RMS to Tug.
a Perform final Ting/SC safiug Provide procedural sequence to Jettison
operation. Tag/SC in orbit. Procedure to rdlect
a Ready deployment adapter for dock- differences in backout/Tug jettison
ing. operations as a function of Tag/Orbiter
e Maneuver Tug into deployment configuration; i.e., Tug stowed, Tug
adapter, partially rotated, etc.
a Mane and verify reconnection of
avionics interface umbilicals.
o Verify closing deployment adapter
latches to secure Tug
e Safe Tug/SC for stowage in payload
bay.
Note: Sequence of operations will be
controlled by Tug DMS with moxAtor
& override capability in Orbiter.
• Deactivate Ting fuel cells.
• Retract Tug into Orbiter
payload bay and secure. Monitor
on CCTV.
12.10-12.12 During preparation for entry flit and
landing, provide instructions in MSS/PSS
operations checklists to accomplish the
* Activate purge bag helium flow.
a Activate main propellant tank
pressurization and maintain
(or verify) 16 Asia in main propell
tanks,
a Monitor & relay status to grotmd
stations.
a Verh-y Tug/SC safe for entry flit]
m Monitor C&W panels for Tug/3C
status during entry fEight, landing
& rollout.
113.1
	 During RTLS abort provides instnictlons
in MSS/PSS operations checklists to
accomplish the following:
r Provide procedures for venting, purging!,
& saf ng $2 & 02 Mes between tangs &
sbut of valves thru engines before
locking W lines for entry.
a Provide similar procedures fear saftg
fuel cell system.
e Provide proeedares to reverify 1aaxd-
wire safety control & monitor lines
prior to entry.	 j
Rev.
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SYSTEM:
PROCEDURE Sliest R S	 of
SUBSYSTEM:
Referenca
Function FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE SAFETY/H E LIAO I LITY CRITERIA
Stock Igo.
Configure Tug for and initiate L02 Provide procedures to reinitiate helium.(Cont'd.) and LH2
 dump. pressurizaticn, of lines & panaIs for entry.
• Monitor dump operation & relay
status to ground control.
• Request ground control assistance
as required.
• Complete L02/LH2 dump operation
and return Tug to safe condition.
x Maintain purge bag helium flow,
x Maintain flanks at rr 16 psis.
x Purge panels and lines.
13.2 During AOA/ATO aborts initiated prior Provide checklist to verify Tug/SC safety
to Tug deployment, provide instructions prior to entry. Procedure to include
in MSS/PS5 operations checklists to: provisions for Tug jettison prior to de-
* Receive from Mission Control: orbit if Tug indicates unsafe status.
•	 Determination of requirement to Procedure to also include operations
abort. associated with safe dumping of main
• Commands to Orbiter & Tug to propellants prior to deorlAt.
abort & return Tug to We status
• Transfer of Tag control from graL nd
station (Miss-On Control) to O rbitr r.
e Monitor C&W panels to cbtermine
Tug/SC status & relay to ground
station.
a Accomplish required Orbiter manes or
to settle propellants In preparation
for dump.
a Iuitiate tank pressurization and
start L02
 & LH2 propellant dump.
e When propellant dump reaches full
flow, torm3mte OMS or ACS
trusters firing. (Assumes chimp
action provides adequate thrust for
contirued.propellant orientation.)
0 Continue to relay Tug status to
Mission Control.
11 Complete propell=t dump & return.
T'ug/SC to safe status us. grepara.- R^r.
Liofor noormY^a
xl^
 entry &landing
^.
n	 ^ A
.1 2(See.	 . 10 ^- 32. 12)a
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SUBSYSTEM:
Reference
Function	 FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE	 SAFETY/RELIABILITY CRITERIA
Black No.
13.3
	 DuringAOA/A.TO aborts initiated after 	 Provide procedures & checklists that
Tug deployment, provide instructions in determine Tug safety status. Procedures
Orbiter flight crew (pilot & MSS/PSS) to include alternative operations approachc s
operations checklist to: for both ground and Bight crews in the
* Receive notification from mission, event of a hazardous condition generated
control of requirement to abort by an in ffil& malf motion.
Tug (SC) mission.
* Establish RF link to Tug.
0 Monitor mission control action to
return Tug/SC to retrieval configu
tion.
a Accept transfer of Tug control from
mission control to Orbiter.
e Verify Tug status as safe for retrie l
& relay status to ground.
0 Retrieve Tug & stow in payload bay
as in Tasks 12.2 w 12.7.
9 Configure for and monitor Tug
status during entry and landing as
in Tasks 12. 10 - 12.12.
^a
2.4 REFERENCES
The data presented in this section is based upon ground and flight operations and on
safety requirements contained in the references listed. In addition, Wormation was
extracted from results of a number of prior Tug and `Zug- relat ed studies, 'Which are
included in the list of reference documents.
1. Baseline Space Tug Ground Operations: Verification, Analysis, and Processing,
YTSFC 68M00039-4, dated 15 July 1974, Marshall Space Flight Center.
2. Baseline Space Tug Flight Operations, M.SFC 68M00039-3, dated 15 July 1974,
Marshall Space Flight Center.
3. Tug Operations and Payload Support Study, Vol. 3, Part 1 - Mission & Operations
Analysis, SD73-BA-006--3, Contract NAS8--28876 Finial Report, dated 5 March 1973.
4. Baseline Space Tug System Requirements & Guidelines, IVISFC68 M00039-1, dated
July 15, 1974, Marshall Spaae Flight Center.	
fa
5. Space Tug Systems Study (Cryogenic) Final Report, General Dynamics Convair
Division report CAST]'-NAS7- 3432, dated January 1974. 	 F ^
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Figure 3-1. Payload Services
Accommodating
Choices
SECTION 3
PAYLOAD FUNC'T'IONAL INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
AND SERVICES ACCOMMODAUONS TRADE
Because Tag payloads compete with the Tug for Orbiter-supplied services such as
power and data processing, an early study task during Task 2 was analysis and identi-
fication of the accommodations/support services required by Tag payloads and the
determination of their safety requirements. This effort started with an analysis of the
requirements of aU. Tug payloads as specified in c=urrent reports by NASA and Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD). Primary source of NASA/commercial spacecraft interface
requirements with Space Tug was the NASA Payload Descriptions document for Auto-
mated Payloads. Analysis of available data on DOD payloads identified few unique
requirements. Data from the Space Shuttle Payload Descriptions (SSPD) was there-
fore used for this task since it encompassed most of the requirements of all Tug
payloads.
k
In addition to the SSPD data used to estab-
lish levels of support, two other sources
were used to obtain detailed interface
data. Interface requirements based on
composite spacecraft needs were obtained
from the McDonnell Douglas (MDAC) Pay-
load Utilization for Tug (PUT) study and
the exchange of preliminary data from
their interim upper stage (IUS)/Ttag Pay-
load Requirements Compatibility study.
Specific interface requirements obtained
from Viking were used as a typical com-
plex spacecraft requirements for com-
parison purposes with the PUT data..
Once the service requirements were defined, analyses were made to determine the
best method of accommodating these services. Figure 3-1 shows the four possible
implementation techniques. Important considerations used during this evaluation
were:
Who does it?
	
Is the service satisfied by the Tug or the Orbiter? 1E the
Orbiter potentially provides the service, the Tug must be
considered primarily for its service yransmi,ssion
acceptability.
3-1
EHow is it trans--	 Do all functions have to be individually routed, or may some
rutted?
	
be combined? -- i. e., data interleaved and multiplexed,
fluids use common ducting.
Where are services	 Should they go completely through. the Tug, partially through
! routed?
	
Tug, or direct from payload to Orbiter?
The approach used and resolution of these three questions is contained in Sections 3.1
l through 3.4, which 11sousa the development of payload service requirements, fluid
services accommodations trade, avionics services accommodations trade, and the
payload trade study summary, respectively.
The Payload/Orbiter Services Accommodations trade study was accomplished early in
_..._
'the study, so that results could be fed into Task 2 subsystems analyses along with Tug
functional requirements identified in Task 1.
The combined Tug and payload requirements were used in Task 2 to assess the impact
on Orbiter equipment allocation., service panel and raceway space reg7tdrements, MSS/
t PSS panel requirements, power and RF transmission requirements, and crew tasks
requirements/allocation. The initial services accommodation trade results were also
R 
-	 - -
provided to MDAC for use in. -the Tang Payload Requirements study then in progress. -
Data generated by MDAC contributed in turn to update results of the payload/Orbiter 3
services accommodation trade.
a
The initial and complete documentation, of the Interface Study services trade is con-
— A
tained as Appendix A in this final report volume. This section summarizes and up--
y
dates the methodology employed, conclusions reached, and service implementation
recommendations.
_
3.1 PAYLOAD INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS `.i
The first step in the Payload Accommodations trade was to determine what Tug payload
requirements were. To obtain this information, an analysis of the requirements of AR
Tug payloads as specified in current reports by NASA and DOD was performed. Data
from the current MSFC/GDC study, Space Shuttle Payload Descriptions (SSPD), was
used since it encompassed most of the requirements of all Tug payloads.
The level of support demanded by the payloads was compared with the level of support
provided by Orbiter and Tug as given in JSC 07700, Vol. HIV, for Orbiter, and in
MSFC 68M 00039 for Tug. Trade studies were performed to define a reasonable
support service level for Tug payload use. :.
The payload services investigated during this study included only those needed when
Tug plus payload were aft ached or inclose proximity to the Shuttle Orbiters Service
requirements during other emission phases were addressed by the appropriate
i parallel MSFC sponsored study.	 (See Volume 1, Section. 3.)
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Table 3-1. Payload Interface Requirements Source Documents
TUG REQUIREMENTS DOD SPACECRAFT NASA/NON•NASASPACECRAFT
1.	 BASELINE SPACE TUG 3.	 DOD MISSION MODEL FOR B.	 SUMMARIZED NASA PAYLOA X
SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS STS (REV 3) DESCRIPTIONS, AUTOMATED P/L
N GUIDELINES LEVELS A&B DATA (SSPD DATA)(MSFC69M00039.1) 4.	 PAYLOAD INTERFACE
STUDY (MDC G 4801) 9.	 A STUDY OF PAYLOAD UTILIZATIONZ.	 BASELINE SPACE TUG OF TUG (MDC G 5358)FLIGHT OPERATIONS 5.	 INTERIM UPPER STAGE
(MSFCEBMODD39-3) SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS
7.	 PAYLOAD-SHUTTLE INTERFACE6.	 AFSLF SPACE/GRD INTERFACE DATA BOOK (MSFC•PD•73.1)(TOR-005 (6110.00.3,
REF 1)
7.	 PAYLOADSHUTTLEINTERFACE
DATA BOOK (MSFC•PD 73•-1)
3.1.1 RERUUMMENTS SOURCE DATA. Payload data sources used to define Tug
payload service requirements are shown in Table 3-1. A variety of sources providing
data on Tug requirements, DOD spacecraft, and NASA/Commercial spacecraft we e
utilized.
Primary source of NASA/Commercial spacecraft interface requirements wi.th ,Space Tug
was the NASA Payload Descriptions document for Automated Payloads. These require-
ments are defined to two levels. Level A is a summary of the NASA payload descrip-
tions for aL7 automated payloads to be flown with the Shuttle only and Shuttle plus apace
Tug/IUS. Detailed definitions of automated payloads are contained in Level. B Data
Book. Payloads to be launched during the IUS operational period from 1980 through
1984 are contained in the Level B Data Book in more detail. than Tug payloads, which
are in an earlier conceptual. phase. Level B data, in many cases preliminary or incom-
plete, is available for 28 of the 50 IUS/Tug payloads identified.
Primary source of DOD spacecraft interface requirements was the DOD Space Trans-
portation System Payload Interface study performed by MDAC. in this study the con-
tractor analyzed in depth three existing DOD satellites: Defense Satellite Communica-
tion System 11 (DSCS II), Defense Support Programs (DSP), and Fleet Satellite Com-
munication (FLTSAT-COM)« These satellites are similar to the majority of the
satellites that Brill be advanced into the Shuttle era. The objective of this study was to
define the interface concepts required to achieve compatibility with Shuttle and Tag
vehicles.
Available data on DOD payloads does not include detailed descriptive information Simi-
lar to that in the Level A or B NASA payload data due to the classified nature of DOD
payloads. A total of 17 payloads was identified for post-1984 missions. From a re-
view of the documents available, few requirements unique to DOD payloads were
identified. As a result, payloads listed in the Judy 1974 "Summarized NASA Payload
3-3
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Descriptions," Levels A and B, are assumed to be representative of DOi, payloads
and were used as guidelines for the payload interface study.
Specific service needs and levels of support were developed for each potential Tug'/
Orbiter interface. Fluid service requirements were generally straightforward:
Quantity two Q. 5 inch (1.27 cm) water lines, one 1. 5 inch (3.81 cm) propellant vent
line, etc. Electrical service levels were more difficult to standardize due to the
large variation of payload desires for any one electrical. service.
The electrical power summary data chart (Figure 3-2) is a typical reproduction of
applicable data from the Space Shuttle payload Description Activity for Automated
Spacecraft, Level. A document. Generally, Level .A. data includes both Tug space-
craft and those flown withc!ut Tug for all mission phases. The data evaluated has
been limited to payload re quirements only for those mission phases while Shuttle
attached. Tug spacecraft are identified by a bullet following the payload number.
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Figure 3-2. Typical SSP:) Data (Blecirieal Power)
Figure 3-3 illustrates the approach used to evaluate the baseline values established
for payload support requirements. The number of SSPD Tug payloads and missions
accommodated by a given. Trig or Orbiter capablUty was determined. Figure 3-3
displays the sensitivity of accommodated missions to a change in capability. In this
example, a 600 watt capability accommodates 940/0 of the missions reviewed. To
1.:.j
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Figure 3-3. Power Required by Payload During Ascent
capture the final 6% the capability would have to be nearly doubled. Similar evalua-
tions were performed for 12 parameters in the avionics area: power, data transfer
and data management. Details of these trades are included in Appendix A.
3:1,2 1+LUiDS REQUIREMENTS. SUM ARY. Based on a compilation of payload re-
quirements from the various sources available, a. tabulation was made of payload
inte--rface service needs for each payload requirement identi fied in the general cate-
gories of liquids and gases.
Table 3-2 indicates the types of fluid services needed. Because the interface reg T.dre-
ments (sine diameter flow rates, operational, time period, etc.) of these services were
very dependent on the service implementation method (line routing), the level of ser-
vice description was determined during the accommodations trade.
3.1.3 AVIONICS REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY. 'Fable 3-3 lists the general com-
posite avroni.c interface service requirements obtained from SSPDA data.
Ii
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Table 3-2. Payload Fluid Service Requirements
-q
PAYLOAD REQUIREMENT'S (FROM SSPD DATA) INTERFACE SERVICES REQUIRED
LIQUIDS:	 PROPELLANTS ( N2H4, MMH, N204,
CESIUM) FILL, DRAIN, VENT, DUMP
COOLANTS ( HZO, FREON) C I RCULATE TO HEAT S I NK
CRYOGEN ( We) FILL, DRAIN, VENT, DUMP
GASES:	 PRESSURANTS ( GHe, GN2) FILL, VENT,
BATTERY VENT
SHROUDS MAINTAIN PURGE PRESSURE
Table 3-3. Payload Electrical. Service Requirements
Payload Requirements (From SSPD Data)
	
Interface Services Required
Data: Communication	 Transmit, Receive, Store
Status & Control
	 Condition., Override, Confirmation
^i
	 Caution & Warning	 Condition, Control.
Electrical Power	 Transmit/Supply
As described in Section 3,1.1, the evaluation of the SSPD data resulted in recom-
mended baseline values for the level of support from Orbiter or Tug. Table 3-4 lists
the worst case support required by any payloa.'_p Interface Study recommended level
ox support, and the percent of payloads accommodated by that level of support for
each of the support functions.
Since some payload requirements (or desired values) were not met by the support
levels recommended, these payloads were identified,
The payloads that require more support than the recommended levels are shown in
Table 3-8 along with their requirements. The net accommodation is 78% when all
levels of support are unposed simultaneously. As noted, only average and peak power
requirements impact the Tug design, which can accommodate 92% of the payloads
studied.
The arbiter percentage was obtained directly from the 12 baseline parameters with
the exception of rapid access storage capability, -which was increased from 10 to 12TH
words, The greater Tug accommodation percentage was obtained by not precluding
transmittal of Orbiter to payload services, even though payload demands exceed
planned Orbiter capabilities. The resulting requirements (shown in Table 3-4) for
these 12 areas are briefly discussed here:
1
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1Table 3-1. Recommended Avionics Support for Tug Payloads
Maximum Level of Recommended Level Payloads
Support as Given of Support From
	
Accommodated
Support Function in SSPD Data Grbiter/'Aig %}
Average Power 5,OOOW 600W 85
l
Peak Power 8, 000W 900W 86
.Ascent Power 1,100W 60OW 94
Uplink Rate 2 Kgs 2 Kbs 100	 r
DownUnk Rate 430 Kips 16 Kbs 92
Stored Data Rate 430 IOs 4 Kbs 96
Total Stored Data 11,682 Mb 100 Mb 95
Computer Nord 32 bits 32 bits 100
Rapid Access Storage 32K words 12K words 94
Mass Storage 250K words 20K words 94
Computer Speed 1, OOOK adds/sec 18K adds/sec 96
Cleanliness Class 100 Class 10,000 96
Table 3-5. Payload Requirements not Accommodated
;a
ORBITER LIMITATIONS
(1) CAN BE ACCOMMODATED WITH PROPOSED (5) ORBITERITUG LIMITATION; PROVIDE
TUG INTERFACES	 MISSION KIT
(2) CAN BE ACCOMMODATED WITH PROPOSED (6) S14UTTL E GSE LIMITATION: ACCOMMODATEDTUG INTERFACES (C500W THROUGH TUG)	 PROVIDE MISSION FLIT 	 ?78% ORBITER
(3) INDEPENDENT OF TUG INTERFACES 	 9296 TUG
(4) REr1UIREMENTS APPEAR SUSPECT
1
RECOM-
MENDED
PAYLOAD DESIGNATION (NO. OF MISSIONS)
AP-41, AP-08, AP-08 	 AS-02	 AS-05 AS-16 I CN-58 CP!-69 LU-01 I LU-02
LEVEL OF -02,-03,	 •07	 -03,-04
SUPPORT -05 (9)
	
(4)	 (1)	 {4}	 (2)	 (1)	 (3)	 (3)	 (2)	 (4)
AVERAG
E
 POWER 60EW 404	 71S	 (4j
PEAK POWER 900W N^7 400	 W2,520
ASCENT POWER 600W I51	 (11
DOWNLINK SIT RATF- 16 KBS (2)	 A3	 102	 200
STORED DATA 131T RATE 4 KBS 43	 48
TOTAL STORED DATA (ORB)
RAPID ACCESS STORED (ORB)
100 MB
12K WORDS
11,682-11 682 1 592
{31 32
MASSSTORAGE(ORBITER) 20K WORDS 250	 0	 250
COMPUTER SPEED (ORBITER) 18K ADDS/SEC ,000	 500	 I61
CLEANLINESS 10K CLASS 5K	 lEL	 aI.1K
a. Average Power — The MSFC baseline Tug documentation allocated 600 watts
of Tug supplied power for delivery to Tug/spacecraft after deployment from the
Orbiter. The results show that a 600 watt accommodation satisfies 85% of the
spacecraft for Tug missions; 11 OF 43 PAYLOADS EXCEED THIS VALUE and
21 OF 139 MISSIONS EXCEED THIS 'VALUE. Some information concerning
the split between spacecraft and monitor and control power is contained in the
level B SSPDA data for a limited number of the 43 payloads. For those identified,
more power is generally required for the control equipment than for the space-
craft vehicle.
b. Peak Power --- Peak power requirements are not specifically included in the Tug
baseline data. Typically, however, peak power is assumed to be 1.5 times the
average power. The 900 watt reference shown results in a similar percentage
of acceptable payload accommodations, with generally the same group of space-
craft as in on-orbit average power exceeding the reference capability. That is:
i 86% OF NASA TUG/ORBITER MISSIONS REQUIRE 900 WATTS OR LESS, 20 OF
139 MISSIONS EXCEED THIS VALUE, AND 10 OF 43 PAYLOADS EXCEED THIS
VALUE.
c. Ascent Phase — During ascent, the payload plus its Orbiter-mounted and control
equipment generally requires less power than during on orbit pre-deployment
operations. This enables the 600 watt baseline Tug reference capability to satisfy
94% of the missions. Since 1100 watts (almost double the reference value) is
needed to pick up the four remaining payloads, the 600 watt power requirement
appears reasonable.
d. Total Energy — Total Orbiter energy available for total payload use (Tug, Tug
deployment adapter, Tug monitor and control equipment, spacecraft, and space-
craft monitor and control equipment) is 50 kilowatt hours. Estimates of the energy
needs of Tug and its peripheral equipment indicate the 50 kwh available should
satisfy at least 90% of the Tug/spacecraft missions, and that the baseline appears
adequate.
e. Uplink Rate The Orbiter uplink capability of receiving and relaying 2048 bits
per second to spacecraft satisfies 100% of the identified payload requirements and
is therefore adequate.
f. Downlink Rate — The Orbiter baseline provides for transmission of 16 thousand
bits per second of spacecraft to ground data. Ninety-two percent of the mission
model is satisfied by this capability; therefore, the Orbiter baseline appears to
be reasonable. SIX OF 43 PAYLOADS REQUIRE HIGHER BIT RATES AND 11 OF
139 MISSIONS REQUIRE HIGHER BIT RATES.
g. Stored Data Rate — Although no specific Tug or orbiter provisions have been
identified for storage of spacecraft data., data storage would probably be accom-
odated by the Orbiter for spacecraft-attached mission modes. As indicated by
f
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Table 3-4, a four -thousand bit per second data stream for storage purposes would
satisfy 96% of the identified spacecraft requirements. Since as order of magnitude
increase would be necessary Co include the six excluded missions, the 4 kbps
storage data bit rate should be acceptable.
h. Total Data Storage Capability --- As previously stated, storage capacity for Shuttle-	 0
attached spacecraft is assumed to be an Orbiter-supplied accommodation. .EA
capability to store 100 megabits of data would satisfy 95% of the spacecraft require-
ments currently identified. One hundred percent accommodation requires a stor-
age capacity two orders of magnitude greater. One hundred megabits appears to 	 1
be a realistic baseline accommodation.
L Computer uTord Size — The 32 bit computer word length provided by the Orbiter
accommodates 100% of the NASA Tug payloads.
js Rapid Access Memory -- Rapid access memory requirements for SSPDA payloads
have been analyzed to show the percentage of total mission payloads that can be
accommodated by a given memory size. The Orbiter baseline is currently sized
for 10K words. It is recommended that this be increased to 12K words because
there are 15 payloads (EO-09, EO-59, and HO-62) that require 12K words, which
if included in the Orbiter capability increase mission accomplishment from 83% to
94%.
k. Mass Storage — Mass storage requirements for SSPDA payloads have been com-
piled to show the percentage of payloads that can be accommodated with a given
Orbiter bulls memory. The Orbiter baseline currently identified 20K words
allocated for payload use, which will accommodate 94% of the payloads. Seven
payloads (AS-02, AS-05, and AS-16) require 250K words. A baseline capability
of 20K wards appears to be reasonable.
1. Computer Speed -- Computational, speed requirements for SSPDA payloads have
been identified. The chart shows the percentage of total mission payloads that
can be accommodated by a given level of computational, speed. The Orbiter
baseline of 18, 000 computations/second will accommodate 96% of the payloads.
Payloads AP-06 and AP-07 require 1, 000, 000 computations/second and payload
AP-08 regv" es 500 1,000 computations/second. There are five total missions
with these high computer speed requirements. The Orbiter capability of 18K
appears to be reasonable for the Tug payloads, although that is the total Orbiter
capability to satisfy both Tag and Payload requirements.
Specific requirements of SSPD payloads that cannot be attained with the recommended
levels of Orbiter/Tug support are identified in Table 3-5. SSPD payload designations
are shown across the top of the Table and recommended support levels that should be
Orbiter/Tog provided are shown in the left hand column. The Level of support de-
sired by the payload is shown In the tab'. , In most cases a single payload is deficient
in more than one parameter. The footn:-)tes show that most of the deficiencies are
either dine to limitations in the basic capability of the Orbiter, or to payload require-
ments that appear to be suspect.
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Spacecraft requirements associated with downlink and stored data bit rates can easily
be satisfied by Tug since these are Orbiter services which only require Tug trans-
mission.
Four service categories, total data stored, rapid access storage, mass storage, and
computer speed are assumed to be Orbiter-peculiar services provided to payloads
while in the attached mode, which have no effect on Tug interface requirements.
Some average and ascent power requirements are assumed to lie within the 600 watt
baseline Tug capability since Level B SSPD data indicates that over 50% of this power
	 t
is required by Orbiter-mounted monitor and control equipment rather than the space-
craft vehicle.
The remaining deficiencies were used to obtain the 92% Tug accommodation listed.
If Orbiter capability is increased to satist these requirements, accommodation should
probably be achieved by direct spacecraft-to-Orbiter mission peculiar kits.
These recommended service levels were used to evaluate umbilical services routing
trades (Section 3.3) and to develop the resulting accommodations definition. Subse-
quent changes in some service levels resulted from the parallel Tug Payload Require-
ments Compatibility study performed by McDonnell Douglas Corporation under Con-
tract MASS-31013. The summary (Section 3.4) includes this updated data.
3,1.4 SAFETY REQMREMENTS. Tug payload safety requirements were obtained
and documented in a similar manner as for Tug safety requirements (Section 2.2).
The NASA Tug requirements document (MSFC 68M00039--1) was reviewed to identify
the payload safety requirements that are applicable to the Interface study. Except
for the addition of reference to hazards to the public and the ecology, the principal
safety requirement remains essentially unchanged from those used in previous Tug-
related studies. That is, "No single Tag payload failure shall result in a hazard that
jeopardizes the flight or ground crews of the Shuttle, general public, public/private
property, and the ecology." It is, of course, of paramount importance that this par-
ticular criterion be complied with. In any instance where compliance with this
criterion cannot be achieved, the non-compliance and the rationale for non-compliance,
must be 'identified.
Additional. safety requirements that are deemed to be specifically applicable to the
Interface study have been extracted from the requirements document and included in
Table 3-6. The "Reference Paragraph' s column in this table provides a cross refer-
ence between the table and MSFC 68M00039-1. Mere two or more criteria are
grouped into a single requirement, this grouping is so noted by the addition of a para-
graph reference(s) in parenthesis. The safety requirements have been further
categorized in the following manner:
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R - indicates a safety requirement that must be specifically addressed during
the study. We must either show how the requirement is reflected in our
recommended interface designs or show specific rationale for any non-
compliance.
^,	 ! D - Indicates a safety requirement that can only be satisfied during detail de-
s sign.	 The designs developed during the study should, however, contain
no feature 'chat would preclude attainment of the requirement during detail
design.
I	 - Indicates a joint safety requirement betyreen the interface subsystems and
other Tag/Orbiter/payload systems. We must show how our designs are
$ consistent with the related Tug/orbiter/payload safety requirements.
Table 3-6. Tug/Payload Safety Requirements
Reference
Tugs Sp acecraft Requirements 	 Paragraph
	 Category
-	 1. Spacecraft shall provide caution and warning data to the Orbiter and
	
3.2.6.2.3
crew for safety critical functions while aboard or in the near vicinity
	
a (2)	 I
of the Orbiter.
W	
_	
2. Provisions shall be made to confirm that aH safety critical Spacecra ft/	 a (9)	 ITug and Spacecraft/Orbiter interfaces are securely connected.
-	 3. Any Spacecraft subsystem operation which impacts safety
	
3.2.6.2.3
during, the launch and entry phases shall be monitored via C&w 	a (12)	 I
(caution and warning) and controlled from the Orbiter flight station.
'	 d. A means shall be provided for controlling the venting of Spacecraft
	 a (15 )	 I
fluids while in the Orbiter payload bay.
'	 b. Provisions shall be made for verifying critical Spacecraft
systems readiness before activation. 	 a (16)	 1
6. All electrical, mechanical and fluid connections between the
	
a (17)	 I
Spacecraft and Tug and/or Orbiter shall be designed to be fail safe.
7. Systems containing fluids that are subject to decomposition through
	
a (23)	 I
contamination or loss of passivatica (such as monopropellants)
shall be safed by appropriately sized and located vents for the
worst case decomposition rate.
S. A redundant relief capability shall. be provided for Spacecraft 	 b (2).	 l
tanks which automatically limits the maximum pressure. Relief
shall be through the Orbiter vent system overboard. Overpressure
relief capacity shall be redundant to vent capacity.
	 (When vent
capability is provided, relief capability need not be redundant.)
N. Spacecraft propellant drain, and vent interface with the Orbiter
	
b (4)	 I
shall permit Spacecraft main propulsion system propellant venting,
and emergency detanking (whether Orbiter is in horizontal or
vertical attitude) until launch commit, with the Orbiter payload bay
doors closed or open.
3.11
10. Spacecraft fluid fill, drain, and vent umbilical disconnects shall have b (6)
	 1
positive sealing at disconnect, whether the action is intentional or
accidental.	 Provisions shall be made to prevent pressure buildup
in the system. Dual valving shall be provided to ensure emergency
drain if one valve should fail.
11. Spacecraft cryogen tank thermal protection systems shall be designed b (17)
	 I
to minimize (below ignition regimes) accumulatiEn of flammable fluids
resulting from propellant system leakage.
12. Propulsion system safety critical data, start sequence logic status 3.2.6.2.3
and valve positions shall be monitored and signals provided to the c (1)	 1i Orbiter for corrective action to be talten.
13. Provisions shall be made to verify completion of main engine propulsion c (8)	 1
system safing prior to retrieval.
14. Message signals from Spacecraft systems shall be provided at the d (1)	 I
Shuttle Data Management System Interface. Measurements shall
Include at least Spacecraft latched/released indication, deploy
mechanism position indications, discrete pyrotechnic evert
indications, sequence logic status, velve positions, temperature
, I and pressure measurements, and failure indications.
15. Spacecraft critical command and control circuitry shall be designed d (3)	 I
to be fail-operational/fail safe as a minimum.
16. Automatic event sequencing programs and automatic controls whose d (4)	 1
actuation could affect flight personnel safety shall be operative
only by the arbiter, or by ground control enabling switches
(command over-ride), e.g., pyrotechnic sequences, automatic deploy-
ment sequences, etc.
17. Commands affecting safety critical equipment status must have d (6)	 1
associated data transmission to provide a positive functional
N verification.
( .,
4
Table 3-6. Tug/Payload Safety Requirements (Contd)
Reference
Tug/Spacecraft Rec^uirements	 Paragraph	 Category
18. Spacecraft propulsion system start sequence logic status, and valve	 d (7)	 I
positions shall be monitored and message signals shall be provided
at the Shuttle Data Management System Interface. The transmission
'l
shall be through Tug hardware while within the payload bay but 	 i
once out side it may be transmitted either directly from the Spacecraft
or via the Tug telemetry system.
19. Spacecraft shall have a means of shutting off their electrical power 	 a (4) 	 s
under emergency conditions. )
20. Safety critical control circuits shall be capable of being verified. 	 a (14)	 I
Table 3-6. Tug/Payload Safety Requirements (Contd)
Reference
TuglSpacecraft Requirements	 Paragraph
 Category
21• Provisions shall be included for Spacecraft caution and warning	 a (16)	 I
functions which will provide both audible and visual warning
to Orbiter crew of hazardous situations while the Spacecraft
is aboard the Orbiter or being deployed.
22. Fuel cells are to be activated only after TBD distance from the Orbiter. 	 a (18)	 I
23. Means shall be provided to control toxic, flammable, explosive and 	 h (1)	 I
corrosive substances aboard Spacecraft and to preclude their accumulation
in or venting into the Orbiter payload bay. The maximum operating
temperature shall be taken into consideration as a generative source
of hazardous fluids.
-	
24. Integrated checkout and testing of safety critical Spacecraft systems	 3.2.6.2.4
shall be conducted prior to installation on the Tug and verified 	 d	 I
'	 after installation into the Orbiter.
25. Spacecraft shall have capability for the Orbiter crew to dump hazardous	 i	 I
1	
fluids and vent pressurants overboard within TBD seconds in an abort
situation.
26. Electrical umbilical disconnects between the Orbiter and the Spacecraft 	 j	 I
and/or Tug shall not have power applied during disconnect.
3.2 FLUID SERVICES ACCOMMODATIONS TRADE
This interface service routing implementation trade study used the approach depicted
in Figure 3-4 to describe fluid service requirements.
To determine the answer for "Where Fto services go ?T4 an understanding of Orbiter
umbilical panel and routing provisions is needed.
Based on data from JSC 07700, Space Shuttle System Payload Accommodations, Vol.
MV, Rev. C, interface panel locations for Tug and payloads are as shown in Figure
3-5.
The primary panel for direct payload interfaces, which is terminated at T-4 hours, ys
located on the Orbiter left side at Station 835. Both fluid and electrical services
are available at this location. Subsequent to T-4 hours, the panel is covered by a
door that remains closed during flight. An infli,ght disconnect within the payload nay
will be required between the Tug/payload and service lines routed to it from T-4
panel.
Internal to the cargo bay is a payloar electrical service panel on the right sidewall at
Station 695. ills panel is primar!13 for direct connection to the Orbiter fuel cell
power supply.
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Aft panels are located at Station 1307 on the cargo bay aft bulkhead. included are
Tag fuel, oxidizer, and electrical panels on the lower half of the bullhead and OMS/
storable propellant fluid and electrical panels near the top of the bulkhead.
RTG coolant interfaces are Located at Station 1307 for ground cooling and near the
cargo bay forward bulkhead for infli.ght cooling.
3.2.1 REQUIREMENTS EV'AL TJX17ON/SCREENING. Ten payload fluid accommoda-
tions were assessed to determine the best operational. and physical technique for
satisfying the interface. Details of these investigations are contained in Appendix A
of this volume. Three of the more interesting evaluations are contained in this sub-
section as examples.
i
GROUND RULES: 6 ONE HOUR FOR FILL OR DRAIN
e MULTISTAGE TANKS ARE MANI FOLDED WITHIN PAYLOAD
s PAYLOADS INSTALLED IN VERTICAL POSITION AT PAD
m•MONOPROPELLANT REQUIRES 1 LINE, SIPROPELLANT 2 LINES
OPTIONS; FILL/DRAIN MODE LINE DIA INST II'JT ADDED INTERFACES
IN.1Cm1 LB/LINE
(kg1LINE1
ACTIVE PASSIVE
GROUND FLIGHT GROUND FLIGHT
3.	 VIA T-4 PANEL DIRECT 0.375
T
TO PAYLOAD (D.051 12.7}
2.	 THRU TUG VIA 0.5 21 1 3 1
AFT UMBILICALS (1.271
	 ' 19.51
3.	 IN PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT 40.375 2 1
ROOM K0.95) (as' —7
i
.3
,:	 r
:a
2i
RECOMMENDATION: FILL & DRAIN IN PAYLOAD CHANGEOUT ROOM
a MINIMUM WEIGHT & COMPLEXITY
m NO ACTIVE INFLIGHT DISCONNECTS
NO STORABILITY OR SAFETY PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED
® NO TUG OR ORBITER INTERFACES
Figure 3-6. Payload Propellant Fill. and Drain
3.2.3..1 Propellant Fill and Drains. Liquid propellant filn and drain ercn be accom-
plished in any of the three modes shown in Figure 3--6, with payloads assumed to be
ver
-facal and one hour available for fall.. Payloads with multiple stages are assumed
to manifold fill./draiu lines within the payload adapter or payload to minimize number
of interfaces with the Tug or Orbiter.
Of the three modes identified, fill and drain of propellants in the payload Changecut
Room (PCR.) is the recommended method. Evaluation of safety aspects indicate that
the storable propellants identified are stable in nature and win not create a safety
problem due to loading ahead of installation into the Orbiter. Experience t0 date with
satellites and manned vehicles has shown no instances where propellant reactions
occurred subsequent to propellant loading that would have resulted in a hazard under
equivalent conditions for Tug/orbiter payloads,
3--3.5
Loading of propellants in the PCR results In n2inimum payload/Tug weight and com-
pleity with only a single manual disconnect required for each propellant source.
Manifolding on multistage payloads is also avoided.
Propellant ice./drain via the Orbiter i egidres the addition of two to three inflight
disconnects, T-0 or T-4 hour umbilical disconnects, and associated plumbing for
each fluid.
Line diameter, estimated installation weight, and number of added interfaces, both
active and passive, for each fill/drain. mode are indicated.
3.2.1.2 Payload Cooling (R'1'G). Eleven NASA planetary payloads and one DUD pay-
load contain radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) that require cooling prior
to launch and in flight prior to Tug deployment. Coordi nation with Rockwell./Space
:Ordsion indicated that baseline RTG cooling provisions are as outlined under the
Requirements and Ground Rules/Assumptions following:
a. Requirement — Reject up to 50 , 000 Btu/hr (14,640 watt)
1. Prior to Launch --- ground source.
2. During boost.
3. On orbit prior to Tug deployment.
4. During entry and flyback for aborts.
b. Ground Mutes/Assumptions
1. Demin.eraliz,ed, deionized water supplied for ground cooling.
a) Required until. T-0.
b) Interface at Station 1307.
2. Use water boiler on orbit, size supply for three orbits plus entry/flyback
plus 30 minutes post landing.
3. Use water supply heat capacity for boost cooling.
4. Orbiter ATCS not available for RTG cooling (< 21, 000 Btu/hr (6150 watts)
available for Tug plus payload requirements).
To absorb the 50, 000 Btu/hr (14,640 watt) RTG cooling load, a separate RTG coolant
kit is required since the Orbiter ATCS is capable of absorbing only 21, 000 Btu/hr
(6150 watts) from the combined Tug and payload. The kit consists of a water boiler,
a steam vent line appro^rimately three inches (7.6 cm.) in diameter, pumps, isolation
valving, appmdmately 325 pounds (147 kg) of water and distrilration lines between the
payload, airborne cooling kit, and- ground prelaunch water supply. Total Idt weight is
appro,-daaately 000 pounds (408 kg),
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* ADEQUATE SPACE EXISTS EITHER FWD OR AFT FOR KIT INSTL
NO APPRECIABLE ORBITER CG IMPACT WITH BASELINE TUG
(CG MOVES APPROX 8 IN. (20 cm) AFI', WELLWITHIN ALLOWABLE ENVELOPE)
a FWD VS AFT LOCATION HAS NO EFFECT ON TUG OR PAYLOAD
* SUPPORTS REQUIRED FOR KIT
® AFT LOCATION MINIMIZES STEAM VENT LINE LENGTH, WEIGHT & INTERFACE IMPACT
RECOMMENDATION
a LOCATE KIT AT AFT END OF CARGO BAY - 12 PAYLOADS. MOUNT ON DIA
a USE LINES FROM KIT TO PAYLOAD FOR BOTH GROUND & AIRBORNE
COOLANT FLOW (PROVIDE ISOLATION VALVING)
® VENT WATER BOILER STEAM AFT THROUGH NOZZLE ON ORBITER F1 REWALL
Figure 3-7. Payload RTG Cooling Concepts
The airborne waiver supply is sized to provide cooling for three orbits, during entry
and flyback, and for 30 minutes post landing. During boost, the heat sink capacity
of the water supply will be utilized, without water boiler operation, with a resultant
increase in bulk water temperature of apprwdmately I0F (6C).
The RTG cooling Idt can be located either forward or aft in the cargo bay. Adequate
space exists at either location although added structural support points may be re-
quired. Basic system schematics are shown in Figure 3-7 for each location. Ground
coolant lines interface with lines from the kit and isolation valving aLows selection
of the desired cooling mode. The kit interfaces with the Orbiter at the Station. 1307
bulkhead for the two ground coolant lines and the steam vent line,
On considering the effect of lit location on the Orbiter, an aft location minimizes
length of the three-inch (7 . 6 cm) diameter steam vent line while the remaining water
supply line lengths and number of components are not significantly affected by Idt
location. The Orbiter center of gravity is shifted aft by approximately eight Inches
(20 am), assuming an empty Tug after a deployment mission, with an aft mounted RTG
Idt weighing 900 pounds (408 kg). The resulting CG remains within the required envel-
ope fnr Orbiter entry tbrough landing. No relative effect on Tug or payload could be
established for aft versus forward location of the kit.
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GROUNDRULES: s DUMP THROUGH TUG VIA AFT UMBILICAL TO AVOID ORBITER CONTAMINATION
• SEQUENTIAL DUMP OF B[PROPELLANTS IN 150 SEC EACH
• MONOPROPELLANT DUMP IN 300 SEC
• MULTISTAGE TANKS ARE MANI FOLDED WITHIN PAYLOAD
OPTIONS: DUMPOPTIONS LINE DIA INST WT ADDED INTERFACES
ACTIVE PASSIVEIN. LB
{cm) (kg) GROUND FLIGHT GROUND FLIGHT
1.	 ALL PAYLOADS 1 75 2 6 2
(2.54) 136)
2.	 -r95%OF PAYLOADS 1Z0.5 21 1 3 1(C400 LS (181 kg) MDNO (41.27) (9.5)
PROP)
.^ f
.I
RECOMMENDATION: NO PROPELLANT ABORT DUMP
e 95% OF PAYLOADS HAVE LESS THAN 400 LB 11431 kg) OF MONDPROPELLANT
® NO SAFETY PROBLEM OTHER THAN STRUCTURAL FAILURE IDENTIFIED
e DESIGN TANKS & ATTACHMENT FOR 9g CRASH
m PL-01 -A HAS APPROX 4,000 LB (1,810 kg) BIPROP. IN MULTISTAGES, PROVIDE
KIT TO DUMP VIA AFT BULKHEAD UMBILICALS& ROUTE DUMP LINES DIRECT
FROM PAYLOAD TO STA 1307 (IF DUMP IS DESIRED)
Figure 3-8. Payload Propellant Abort Dump
It is recommended that the kit be located aft to minimize steam vent line length and
that the steam be vented through a nozzle mounted on the arbiter firewall. If the kit
--	 )	 grows substantially in. weight, the aft cg shift/ may dictate mounting of the lit forward
l^	 to stay within the required axial eg envelope.
3.2.1.3 Propellant Abort lump. The options considered for this evaluation are
shown in Figure 3-8 in conjunction with assumed grount_ rules and the resulting
recommendation.
In sizing lines for payload propellant dump, it was assumed that dump would be aft
directed to minimize Orbiter contamination potential.. Nlonopropellants were assumed
to dump in 30 seconds and bipropellants in 150 seconds sequentially. GN2 can be
dumped into the cargo bay with no hazard to the Orbiter.
Vie maximum propellant load for PL-0 !-A can be dumped in the required time with
a one-inch (2.54 cm) line while the majority of payloads, utilizing N 2 H 4 , require only
a 0.5-inch (1.2'7 em) line.
Evaluation of the safety aspects, w hich are the controlling criteria for whether dump
i. required at all, disclosed no safety hazards other than propellant tarok/supports
structural failure under crash load conditions. The mere presence of storable pro-
pellants in an abort situation does not present an identifiable hazard and the quantities
do not appreciably affect the Orbiter abort og location.
It is recommended that Tug payloads, which in most cases carry less than 400 pounds
(182 kg) of propellant, be designed to sustain crash loading conditions. It is possible
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Table 3-7. Payload Fluids Interface Recommendations
PAYLOAD FUNCTION RECOMMENDATION INTERFACES COMMENTS
TUG ORBITER
PROPELLANT FILL& DRAIN ACCOMPLISH IN PAYLOAD NO NO NO SAFETY CONCERN
CHANGEOUT ROOM IDENTIFIED
PROPELLANT VENT NZHQ V IA TUG; KIT OTHER YES EXISTING CONNECT INTO EXISTING TUG
PROPELLANTS DIRECT TO RCS VENT LINE
ORBITER
PROPELLANT ABORT DUMP NO DUMP NO NO DESIGN TANKAGE TO CRAS14
LOADS (MAYBE ADD DIRECT=
TO-ORBITER KIT FOR LARGE
TANKAGE)
PRESSURANT FILL ACCOMPLISH IN PAYLOAD NO NO MINIMUM INTERFACES
CHANGEOUT ROOM
PRESSURANT VENT VENT DIRECTLY INTO NO NO MINIMUM INTERFACES
PAYLOAD BAY
BATTERY VENT THROUGH TUG YES EXISTING CONNECT INTO TUG BATTERY
VENT LINE
LIQUID HELIUM FILL & DRAIN DIRECT TO ORBITER PANEL NO YES TOP UNTIL T-4 HR
AT STA 835 (FILL IN PCR) (NO) (NO)
LIQUID (-HELIUM VENTIDUMP NO DUMP. VENT DIRECTLY NO NO MINIMUM INTERFACES
INTO PAYLOAD BAY
COOLING (RTG) MATER BOILER IN NO YES REMOVESSTEAM
AFT CARGO SAY VENT LINE FROM SAY
CLEANLINESS DIRECT TO ORBITER VIA ND YES ALSO REOD FOR NON TUG
STA 835 PANEL PAYLOADS
- tom r
(_}1
that a relatively small percentage of payloads, such as PL-01-A, will incur una.cceptable\
weight penalties by designing for crash loads. For those payloads, it is recommended
that a ldt be provided to route dump lines from the payload, through an might dis-
connect at the payload or adapter, and aft through the cargo bay to Station 1307 pro-
pulsive payload panels,
3.2.2 FLUID SERVICE RECOMMENDATIONS. A fasting of payload interface re-
commendations for fluids anO
	 is included in Table 3-7 fQr each identified func-
tional requirement. This table summarizes recommendations and rationale from the
previous detailed charts and the additional information contained in Appendix A.
Figure 3-9 shows the recommended routing for the fluid umbilical kits identified in
Table 3-7.
3.3 AVIONIC SERVICES ACCOMMODATIONS TRADE
The avionics service implementation trade study employed the approach shown. in
Figure 3-10 to obtain detailed routing recommendations,
In addition to the SSPD data used to establish levels of support, two other sources
were used to obtain detailed avionic interface data. Interface requirements based
on ".composite" spacecraft needs were obtained from the MDAC Payload Utilization
r`
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Figure 3-9a Payload Fluid Services Routing Recommendations
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for Tug (PUT) study (Reference 3-1) and the exchange of preliminary data from their
IUS/Tug Payload Requirements Compatibility study (Reference 3-2). Specific inter-
-
	
	 face requirements obtained from Viking were used as typical complex spacecraft re-
quirements for comparison purposes with the PUT data.
Once the service requirements were defined, analyses were conducted to determine
- 1	 a	 the best method of accommodating these services. Important considerations used
!*	 during this evaluation were:
Who does it?	 Is the service satisfied by the Tug or the Orbiter? If the Orbiter
4
	
	 potentially provides the service, the Tug must be considered only
for its service transmission acceptability.
How is it trans-	 Do all functions have to be individually hardwired, or may some
mitted?	 data be interleaved and multiplexed?
Where are wires Should they go completely through the Tug, paztial?y through
routed?	 Tug, or direct from payload to Orbiter?
Resulting interface requirements were then investigated for reasonable methods of
implementation.
3.3,1 SERVICE ALLOCATION RECOMMENDATION. Payload service functions
may be allocated either to the Orbiter or to the Tug for implementation. The
decision logic used to determine this allocation for this trade study is shown in
Figure 3-11. If the Tag is required to provide a service to the spacecraft during
both: 1) Orbiter ascent through deployment, and 2) after Tug/spacecraft deploy-
ment from the Orbiter, then this service was allocated to the Tug. If this service
is only required during Orbiter ascent through the Tug/spacecraft deployment phase,
it is allocated to the Orbiter for implementation.
Application of this logic to the Tug class of payloads indicates that:
a. Spacecraft requirements involving data storage and computer support (data
management) are best satisfied by Orbiter capabilities, and
b. Spacecraft requirements involving power and data transfermay be implemented
via Tug capability. Daring Tug/spacecraft pre-deployment from the Orbiter
phases, for example, the Tug may receive power from the Orbiter and would
transfer part of this power on to the spacecraft using the same Tug/spacecraft
interface employed during Tug flight operation.
3.3.2 IMPLEMENTATION CONSIDERATIONS AND ANALYSIS. To factor in current
payload interface approaches two additional sources were used to obtain detailed
avionle interface data. Interface requirements based on "composite" spacecraft
needs were obtained from the' MDAC Payload Utilization- for Tug (PUT) study (Refer-
a
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r' Figure 3--11.	 Payload Service Allocation to Tug or Orbiter
ence 3-1) and the exchange of preliminary data from their FUS/Tug Payload Require-
ments Compatibility study (Reference 3-2). Additionally, specific interface require-
ments obtained from Viking were used as typical complex spacecraft requirements for
comparison purposes with the PUT data.
Resulting interface requirements were then investigated for reasonable methods of
implementation. Performance considerations and the resulting effects on alternative
interface implementation techniques that were takers, into account are:
Considerations	 I lementation
Safety	 C&W Philosophy, redundancy
Status
	 Routing, data processing
EMI	 Coax, TSP, grounding
Weight	 Multiplex versus direct wired
Simplicity
	 Service panel size, wire count
Power
	 Noise, routing, capability
Reliability	 Redundancy. Tug/Orbiter equipment allocation
Table 3-8. Tug Payload Interface Requirements
Function	 To Tug	 To Orbiter	 To GSE
Commands 86
Monitors 343 318 316
Power and Excitation 40 16 20
Communication Links
t .	 Uplink 4 4 4
Downlink 2 2 2
Video 2 2 2
TrYtal Interface Pins Required 497 342 344
(All signals hardwired)
A review of the results of the P"JT study plus an update by MDAC personnel at a data
exchange meeting between MDAC and GDC resulted in the data shown in Table 3-8.
This shows that approximately 500 pins are required across the Tug/payload interface
if direct wire techniques (no multiplexing) are used. This data contains no distinction
between safety functions and mission status signals, and shield wires are not con-
sidered.
Table 3-6 shows the spacecraft interfaces to Tug, Orbiter, and GSE. Approximately
340 interface pins are required to throughput analog, power, video, downlink, uplink,
and caution and warning data to GSE via Tug/Orbiter/GSE interfaces. During ascent,
downlink, uplink, and caution and warning data are transxr°tted via 340 Tug and
Orbiter Interfaces. During Tug/spacecraft flight outside of the Orbiter approximately
120 pins , , -e required across theTug/spacecraft interface.
To confirm the type of data that must be transmitted across the payload interface and
provide a valid data point for comparison with the PUT data, several current payloads
were investigated. These included Viking, MVM, Intelsat, Helios, and MJO. The
number of pans and functions provided were determined from interface drawings of
these payloads. The data was modified to reflect the difference between operating
these payloads on an expendable launch vehicle and in the Shuttle payload bay. The
following data identifies the discretes required from payload to Tug/Shuttle but with-
out the redundancy that the Shuttle system will. demand:
Payload:	 Viking	 MVM	 Intelsat
	 Helios	 MJO
No. of Pins:	 102
	
59	 20	 16	 76
From these data the Viking was selected as the worst case since it has the most com-
plex interface.	 5--23
Table 3-9. Estimated Interface For a Viking Type Payload
Function	 To Tug	 To Orbiter	 To ME
Commands	 6	 7	 15
L Monitors	 6	 30	 45
Power and Excitation	 21	 9	 24
Communication links
Uplink
Downlink	 2	 2	 2
Video
Total Interface Pins Required 	 35	 48	 86
The 1	 functionsPins for the Viking Payload have various 	 , and destinations as shown
in Table 3-9, i.e., 35 to Tag, 48 to Orbiter and 86 to GSE .	 Some wires go to more
than one destination. This data showed good agreement with the (non-redundant)
number of Pius given in the PUT study for Shuttle payloads. It was concluded from
this comparison that the number of pins and interface functions assumed in Table 3-8
r! were realistic for this interface study.
Because the preceding data indicate that a significant interface (in terms of size
and weight) results from Tug/payload/Orbiter integration using hardwires for space-
craft', interfaces, the effect of multiplexing and umbilical routing variations was in-
vestigated.	 It was determined that significant payload weight savings could be
achieved by employing multiplex techniques for both uplink and downlink signals.
nlese results are indicated in Table 3-10 for two routing configurations: Tug for-
ward disconnect (method 2), and via Tug deployment adapter (method 1), and with
and without multiplexing of 75% of the compatible signals. These routing techniques
.are shown in Figure 3-12. 	 The power, excitation, a d high frequency signals are
not compatible with the multiplexing scheme under consideration.
Table 3-10. Payload Penalty vs Routing/Signal Multiplexing
Multiplex Via Deployment Via Tug Forward Payload Penalty
Method (75% TSP) Adapter Disconnect (pounds)
2 M Yes No Yes 0
2 D No No Yes 76
I M Yes Yes No 151	
7
1 D No Yes No 373
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3. Payload structural deployment functions (solar panels etc.).
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Using the foregoing models of cabling methods, with and without multiplexing, cable
weights for the major cable segments were calculated. For these weights, equiva-
lent Tug performance penalty was obtained using -2.62 and -0.36 as the payload
weight partials for the Tug and Orbiter respectively. For this analysis only the No.
22 twisted shielded pair and the No. 6 power cable weights were calculated since they
account for about 97% of the total weights. The net penalties were:
Method	 Penalty, pounds (11,9)
1D	 442	 200
2D	 145	 66
1M	 220	 100
2M	 69	 31
This data normalizes to the penalty of method 2M (Tug forward disconnect/multl-
plexed) to show the net penalty incurred by selection of other methods.
In conclusion, it is seer, that due to redundancy requirements and multiple payload
requirements, a relatively small number of payload service functions (including data
links, monitor and control discretes, analog data, and power) may require the im-
plementation of a relatively large interface umbilical to Tug, Orbiter, and GSE.
Several recommendations that could reduce the size of this interface, and result in
Tug/Orbiter weight savings and smaller more compact umbilical interface Meehan-
ism requirements are:
a. Differentiate between safety critical and mission critical functions.
b. Multiplex nonsafety critical functions, for example:
1. Tape recorder status.
2. Battery charge command.
3. TV C/O command.
c. Wire direct and multiplex (back-up) safety critical funot .ons, for example:
1. Pressure vessels temperatures/pressures.
2. RTG unit temperatures.
3. Aran/safe function status.
d. Disable groups of payload safety functions while in Orbiter payload bay by power	
f
bus arm/safe technique, for example:
1. Tug/payload deployment/separation commands.
2. Propellant valves/control commands.
9'r
These recommendations were transmitted through MSFC to the MDAC payloads study
for their consideration in simplifyingp 'Eying the Tug/payload and Tug/Orbiter interfaces.
Subsequent scrutiny of payload requirements by the payloads study resulted in several
recommendations for service level provisions and routing needs.
!	 a. Multiple^dng can be used to advantage by Tug payloads to reduce direct hardwire
requirements to 35 caution and warning signals. This represents a multiple
Tug/payload requirement.
b. ;.t is desirable for most payloads to route uplink, downlink, and caution and warn-
ing hardwires through Tug and deployment adapter. This routing implementation
allows early integration and verification of avionzc in.tarfaces, and potentially
reduces payload/peculiar integration tasks.
c. Forward panel rowing is still a viable and desirable option for scientific payloads
'requiring significant ground prelaunch or in flight Orbiter support.
The accommodation implementations of avionics and fluids requirements contained in
the following summary reflect these payload recommendations.
3.4 PAYLOAD INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS SUMMARY
	
_ ......j	 The results of the payload services accommodations trade are graphically displayed
in Figure 3-13 and shown in greater detail in Table 3-11. Power and caution and
warning signals are routed through (or supplied by) Tug, while fluid services are
generally routed direct to the Orbiter through a forward-mounted Tug umbilical
	
i	 panel. The Tug-mounted panel was selected to standardize this interface, since
direct Orbiter-to-payload umbilicals would be nonstandard due to payload geometry
	
}	 variations.
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Table 3- 11. Payload Service Accommodatlons
Payload
Function Service Level Accommodation
In terface
Tug orbiter
Prop. F&D 0. 5 in. (1. 27 cm ^ dia. each prop. Remote	 No No
Abort Damp < 500 lb (227 kg) Self contain	 No No
> > 500 1 b (227 kg) Overboard dump kit	 No* Yes
Vent
—0. 5 in. (L 27 cm) dia N li	 prop. integrate w/Tug RCS vent	 Yes WstLng
2 4
— 0. 5 In. (1. 27 cm) dia each other prop. Overboard vent kit	 No* Yes
Press Fill —0. 25 in. (0. (34 cm) dia Remote	 No No
Vent —0. 25 in. (0. 64 cm) dia. into cargo bay	 No No
Battery Vent —0. 5 In.	 (1. 27 cm) dia Integrate w,/Tug bat. vent 	 Yes 0asting
or self contain
LHe F&D —1. 0 In. dia (2. 54 cm) Direct to 835 T-4 panel	 No* Yes
Vent —1. 0 in. dia (2. 54 cm) Into cargo bay 	 No No
RTG Cooling —0. 5 in. (1. 27 cm) dim H20 inlet/outlet Tfiermal control unit 	 No Yes
~ 3. 0 in. (7. 62 cm) dia steam vent (water boiler) Idt	 No Yes
Shroud Repress No known Payload autonomous	 No No
Conditioning —3.0 " (7.62 cm) dia class < 5000 GN Direct to Orbiter	 No* Yes
2
Communication 2 ICBS up 51 KBS down Via Tug avionics	 yes Yes
Caution & lVarning 35 signals Through Tug	 Yes Yes
Data Processing Storage &, Computation orbiter supplied	 No Yes
Power 700 W ground & on—orbit orbiter 695 panel via Tug	 Yes Yes
GOD W ascent From Tug fuel cell	 yes No
TUG PROVIDED
*ASCENT&
ON-ORBIT POWER
*'COMMUNICATION
TRANSMITTAL
57A 835 T-4 PANEL
le L112UID HELIUMw
FILL & DRAIN
ORBITER CREW COMPARTMENT
MITOR & CONTROL
C.MMUNICATION (AF)
CAUTION & WARNING
*DATA PROCESSING
4,19
A695P WER NEOSERVICI!S ROUTED
THRU TUG FORWARD	 PGROUNDPOWER
UMBILICAL PANEL
Figure 3-13. Recommended Service implementation
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SECTION 4
TUG INTERFACE ANALYSES AND TRADE STUDIES
The Tug subsystem interface analyses task provided the technical data, trade studies,
and screening process to translate fimctional interface requirements Into firm, real-
istic Space Tug/Orbiter detailed interface requirements. Typical Shuttle interfaces
used for Space Ting accommodation are identified in Figure 4-1. These interfaces are
primarily involved with supporting and servicing the Tug daring launch countdown and
in flight, deploying and retrieving the Trig on orbit, and maintaining control over the
Tug when it is in or near the Orbiter. Each of these interface areas is investigated in
this section to determine the best method of accom plishing the functions required, with
an overriding goal of establishing simple flexible Orbiter interface requirements suit-
able for Tug, Tug payloads, and other Orbiter payloads.
STRUCTURAL
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T-4 PAY LOAD
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Figt4re 4-1. Tug-Related Orbiter Interface Provisions
Combined Tag/Payload Ametional. interface requirements obtained from Sections 2 and
S were Investigated on a subsystem basis to fully understand the functions of each de•-
vice or operational action and thereby determine its detail interface requirements. In
addition to interface analyses for the 1WSF0 baseline Tug. alternative interface
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concepts were investigated. The subsystem interfaces were grouped into six cate-
gories by technical discipline as shown in Figure 4-2. A detailed description of these
fi	 six disciplines is contained in Section 4-2 through 4--7 of this report.
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CONDITIONINGENVIRONMENTAL & PURGES
ANIONIC
MONITOR &
CONTROL
SAFETY CAUTION &WARNING
Figure 4-2. Interface Subsystem Categories
Section 4.1 provides initial visibilit r of the alternative interface system concepts con-
sidered and their importance to the independent subsystem trades. Evaluation criteria
used in the trades are also discussed.
4.1 INTERFACE CONCEPT DEFINITION AND EVALUATION
The approach employed to perform the Tug plus Tug payload--to-orbiter interface anal -
sis is described as follows.
Starting with the full range of functional/operational requirements that must be satis-
fied by each Tug/Payload/Orbiter interface element obtained in Sections 2 and u
(structural, attachment, fluid Line), the objectives of this task are to;
a. Identitr alternative interface concepts capable of satisfying the established fune-
tional/operational requirements.
b. Exmluate the options via trade studies to determ ine which best accomplish sub-	 r
system functional requirements.
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4. 1. 1 S-UPPORTZIE PLOYMENT CONCEPTS. Alternative interface concepts in-
vestigated include direct Tug/Orbiter structural support and corresponding deletion of
the deployment adapter. While identified as a structural trade, a support philosophy
revision of this magnitude also affects other interface subsystems. The interface con-
cept chaxt shomm in Table 4-1 indicates the range of structuxal support concepts to be
considered and their influence on other viable subsystem options.
'14
Table 4-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Concepts Subsystem Effect
f)'
The Deployment Adapter concept includes a support/deployment adapter. It disti4butes
Orbiter attach fitting point loads into the Tug shell and provides positive positioning;
during initial deployment, alignment for docking, and is a convenient mounting place
for Tug peripheral equipment (avionics, abort helium supply). Use of this adapter re-
sults in a clean Tug-to-Orbiter interface and maximizes Tug performance capability.
The Nonrrotating concept eliminates the support adapter and its attendant load distribu-
tion and relatively complex deployment, retrieval, rotation, and latching functions.
Orbiter attachment fitting point loads are taken directly intr the Tug shell, requiring
frame beefup and resulting in a general Tug weight increase. Rotation is eliminated:
deployment/recovery is accomplished linearly with the manipulator, or other Orbiter-
supplied aid as similarly proposed for the Large Space Telescope. Support equipment
previously located in the deployment adapter is mounted to the payload bay in racks.
Payload loss due to increase in Tug structural weight is partially compensated by addi-
tion of Tug propellant. This takes advantage of the greater Tug allowable weight (bas-
ed on 65, 000-lb (29,250 kg) Orbiter capability) due to adapter deletion, and helps de-
fray the decrease in Tug performance capability.
The Rotation Aid concept is a compromise configuration. Orbiter fitting loads are
taken directly by the Tug structure as in Nonrotating but a nor flight-loadcarxying
rotation yoke is incorporated to aid in deployment, docking, and retrieval..
Each subsystem effect listed for the alternative support/deployment concepts must be
considered in sufficient depth during the subsystem evaluation (Sections 4.2 t'.rough
4.7) to provide adequate information for subsequent system concept evaluation.
4.1.2 TRADE EVALUATION CRITERIA. Evaluation of alternative interface con-
cepts will be accomplished by trade and optimization studies to determine Tug/Payload
detailed subsystem interface requirements. Trade studies will evaluate subsystem
interface options using several criteria. Table 4-2 identifies these trades and evalu-
ation criteria. Cost, weight, performance, and reliability were evaluated quantitative-
ly. Safety, risk, and interface simplicity were evaluated qualitatively. Safety was an
absolute criterion. In most areas, interface simplicity and reliability were the more
significant criteria. Interface cost (DDT&E) and performance effects were less sigai-
ficaant since, in most cases, their contribution to total system cost and performance
was relatively small.. Evaluation criteria methodology is contained in the following
paragraphs.
Cost Analysis. Cost methodology involved the use of carefully screened cost data to
build estimates at the detail task level and grouping task elements to provide major
functional level costs. Each level of cost buildup was compared with analogous or
parametric data as a check, to ensure that the detail estimates properly include the
total task. Accurate and comprehensive cost data was generated and used as an inter-
face option evaluation criterion. Cost details are included in Volume VI of this final
reports
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Table 4-2. Trade and Optimization Studies
EVALUATION CRITERIA
r COST
e WEI GHT
® RISK
* SAFETYIRELIABILITY
* PERFORMANCE
* INTERFACE SIMPLICITY
• MANNED COMPATIBILITY
SUBSYSTEM & OPTIMIZATION TRADES
STRUCTURAL INTERFACE
OPTIMIZE STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMENT
FITTING ARRANGEMENT COMPARISON
DETERMINATE VS. REDUNDANT
TUG SUPPORT METHOD COMPARISON
(FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT ARRANGEMENTS)
MECHANICALINTERFACE
DEPLOYMENT ROTATION OPTIMIZATION
UMBILICAL PANEL ACTUATION
RMS SOCKET LOCATION
DOCKING ALIGNMENT
FLUID INTERFACE
ORBITER VS. TUG-MOUNTED FLUID
CONTROLS
DISCONNECT BEFORE OR AFTER ROTATION
RTLS ABORT DUMP LINE SIZING
ON-ORBIT PROPELLANT DUMP METHOD
HYDROGEN DUMP VS. NO HYDROGEN DUMP
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFACE
GROUND CONDITIONING SPECS
PAYLOAD SAY CONDITIONING CON'T'ROL
AVIONICS INTERFACE
MACS ALLOCATION (TUG/ORBITER)
CREW STATION ALLOCATION
(EQUIPMENTIFUNCTION)
MAN-MACHINE INTERFACE EFFECTIVITY
-- x	 Weight. The main output of the mass properties effort consisted of delta weights for
interface design. trades. This data was used primarily to generate performance
capability changes. Center-of--gravity effects were also determined for those tirades
that have a significant impact on Tug and Shuttle Orbiter longitudinal centers of
gravity.
Risk. Relative risk among options was determined. Since risk included areas of
potential failure, the risk assessment identified both the probability of failure and
i and consequences of failure (e.g. , mission abort, schedule delay, cost overrrun,hazard to crew). The potential risk of one option versus another was judged by delta
cost, delta schedule, and delta reliability.
Safety/Reliability. Criteria was established in Sections 2 and 3 for Tug and payloads,
respectively, and interface options assessed as discussed in Section 4.7.
Performance. Payload partials with respect to Tug burnout weight and Shuttle inter-
face accommodations were calculated for the baseline Tug and used to obtain perform-
ance differences.
Interface Simplicity. This criterion was evaluated in terms of number of interface ele-
ments, ease of operation during installation and f€metional operation, and mechanical
coinplezity.
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4. 2 STRUCTURAL SUPPORT a!ITER.FACE
The structural support system consists of structural elements connecting the Tug or
any of its associated subsystems to the Orbiter or its associated AGE during any phase
of ground and/or flight operations. The major structural elements are the interface 	 ;-
fittings (at points of primary structural support), any "position control" structure
	
t4
;.
	
	 (such as the support/deployment adapter or rotation aid discussed in Section 4. 1. 1),
and any dedicated umbilical support provisions. Other structural elements include
'	 I fittings for Orbiter RMS attachment, additional primary supports for ground handling
	 j
and transportation (if required), and local supports for interface elements and periph-
eralequipment in the mechanisms, avionics, fluids, and environmental subsystems.
	 y
Tn the study the configuration and interface requirements of each element had to be
defined in sufficient detail to describe accurately an integrated structural support sys-
tem satisfying two related objectives:
a. To ensure Tug/ arbiter physical and functional compatibility.
-	 '	 b. To minimize the impact, in terms of weight, performance, dynamic response,
schedule, cost, reliability, safety, and complexity, on the Tug and Orbiter
vehicles and on all associated ground and flight operations.
These objectives were met by addressing the following key issues:.4
}	 a. In addition to the baseline Tug, what other structural arrange ,.cents offer potential
interface benefits?
b. Which ones merit detail design and comparison with the baseline Tug?
c. What structural arrangement is preferred? To what extent must the baseline be
revised?
d. What are Its interface requirements? To what extent are they incompatible with
the current baseline Orbiter?
To define ultimately a specific set of structural interface requirements in detail, a
preferred structural arrangement first had to be selected. This was accomplished
through a process of identifying, evaluating, comparing, and deleting candidates until
r!	 a single arrangement could be selected. Since attachment fitting locations vary with
! <	 the support concept, a systematic approach was needed to assess suitably matched
u/fitting s ort system arrangements.m:entsting pp
	 Y	 g
The major tasks in this process are identified in the flow chart of Figure 4.2-1. input
consisted of customer-supplied baseline data, preliminary subsystem data, and the
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Figure 4.2-1. Task Flow, Structural Support Interface Analysis
Functional Requirements of Task 1. Individual fitting and support concept options were
initially established, properly matched for system compatibility, and finally subjected
to a two-stage assessment, including iterative update based on a series of special
emphasis tasks, to obtain a recommended interface solution. Output consisted of
detailed interface requirements for the recommended arrangement, supported by de-
sign data and the associated analyses (weight, stress, performance, dynamics).
This data in turn served as input to Tasks 3 and 4.
Functional Requirements. As implied in Figure 4.2-1, the characteristics of each
subsystem element represent design solutions satisfying one or more top-level func-
tional requirement(s). In view of the baseline Orbiter discrete-point cargo support
concept illustrated in Figure 4.2--2, the requirement to provide Tug primary struc-
tural support defined the need for a set of interface: fittings at the discrete points of
attachment between the Tug (anal/or any adjoining load-carrying structure) and the
Orbiter.
The requirement to accommodate Tug insertion into and extraction from the Orbiter
defined the need for compatibility of the vehicle external configuration, the type
and arrangement and location of structural elements, and the detail interface char-
acteristics with the equipment and operations used for programmed Tug motion relative
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with the installation, servicing, and
r functional requirements of the various
subsystem components and peripheral
equipment, which are carried within
the Orbiter cargo bay but not attached to
the Tug flight vehicle.
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to the Orbiter both at the launch site and
	 jDISCRETE	 on-orbit. The requirement to provideSTRUCTURAL SUPPORTS
OSIDEWALL LATCHES
	 subsystem support/access defined the
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need for structural elements compatible
1
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f	 Orbiter Attachment Fittings. An analy-
sis was conducted to identify candidate
support fitting locations and arrange-
Figure 4.2-2. Orbiter Cargo Support
	 ments. In addition to the NASA baseline
Concept	 Tug 6-point interface fitting arrange-
ment and the 4-point arrangement
selected during the STSS, , .'hars that offered potential reduction in reactions, dynamic
response, complexity, or ti ,jeight/configuration impacts were investigated.
Tug Support Adapter. The baseline concept employed a load--distributing structural
shell and provided both position c , atrol during deployment and retrieval and convenient
support for mechanical, fluid, and avionics peripheral subsystems. Preliminary
structural design and analysis of the adapter was prepared. "Rotation aid" options
eliminated the support adapter in favor of direct payload bay mounting but retained a
non-load carrying position control structural element for alignment during deployment
and retrieval.
Alternative Tug Support Concepts. Nonrotational deploy options were identified, which
r-	 also employed direct payload bay mounting but eliminated dedicated position control
elements entirely in favor of lateral deploy/'retrieval using the Orbiter RMS only.
5 Compatible Structural Arrangement Candidates. The attachment fitting arrangements
and Tug support concepts generated in the preceding tasks were integrated into plays--
ically and functionally compatible structural support systems. The resulting candi-
date support locations and arrangements are discussed in Section 4.2.2,1.
i
Preliminary Assessment/Screening. This task reduced the number of structural
s.
arrangements subjected to subsequent detail design investigation. The method and
results are discussed in detail in Section 4, 2.2.
Detailed Assessment. Preliminary design and analysis of the major structural inter-
face elements (fittings, position control, subsystem support, and local Tug structure)
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of each selected structural arrangement were conducted in this task, which is discussed
in Section 4.2.3.
Special Emphasis Tasks. These tasks were conducted in response to items of concern
resulting either from problems identified in the course of the study or from changes in
requirements. Output was used to update results of earlier preliminary screening and
detailed assessment tasks. This is reported in conjunction with the individual affected
tasks in Sections 4.2.2 and 4, 2. S.
Recommended Structural Interface. This task consisted of selecting the preferred Tug
structural support concept and documenting its interface requirements. It is pre-
sented in Section 4. 2.4.
4.2.1 GUIDELINES AND GROUND RULES. Performance of the structural support
interface design/analysis tasks required the establishment of ground rules for the
description of each vehicle element and for the definition of the pertinent imposed
environmental conditions involved in the various investigations. Figure 4.2-3 identi-
fies the primary ground rule categories and provides reference to the subsequent sec-
tions % which each is discussed in detail. * International System (SI) units are included
on all data generated in this study but have not been added to NASA data Initially sup-
plied without them..
REFERENCETUG
Q NASA BASELINE (MSFC 68FA00039-2)
7 CONVAIR UPDATE
®SEE 421.1
MASS PROPERTIES
e WEIGHT
sCG
a INERTIA
+SEE 42-1.5
REFERENCESPACECRAFT
s DERIVED FROM 1984.91 PRELIMINARY
MISSION MODEL
a SEE 4.21.4
BASELINE ORBITER&JSC 07704, VOL XIV, REV C
*SEE 4.21.2
CARGO BAY ACCELERATIONS
BALL EXCEPT CRASH
(1) MSFC 69M00039.1
(2) JSC 07700. VOL XIV, REV C
(3) MSFC PF•02.75-31
•CRASH
)1), (2), (3) JSC 07700, VOL XIV, REV C
*SEE 4.Z 1.3
Figure 4.2-3. primary Grou>: drule Categories
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4. 2. 1. 1 Reference Tug. The reference Tug vehicle structure was derived from the
NASA baseline Tug defined in MSFC 68M00039--2 and shown c._, NASA drawing
10M23300. Overall dimensional characteristics (length, diameter, propellant tank
volumes) of the Tug itself were retained but several revisions were made to the body
structure. In addition the bifurcated shell deploy adapter (NASA drawing 10M13349)
was replaced with a cylind-Acal shell similar to that developed during the Convair
STSS, figure 4. 2--4 shows the NASA baseline and updated study reference Tugs and
r	 ^z
identifies the differences. Figures 4.2-5 and 4.2-6 further define the basic sandwich
sidewall and solid laminate p, incorporated in the reference configuration body
l= structure to simplify longeron L '-achment and to aid load 'introduction and distributioninto the thin sidewall facings. Tc decrease weight yet provide increased stiffness the
t"	 all-composite major frame concept shown in Figure 4.2-7 was adopted.
4`s	 The reference Tug shell configuration shown in. Figure 4.2-4 was used for structural
I; arrangements employing the baseline rotational deploy concept with support adapter.
In structural arrangements employing the rotation-aid and non-rotational deploy con-
cepts, the load-carrying support adapter was deleted; consequently all interface fittings
is had to be located on the Tug flight vehicle body. But the aft end of the reference Tug
was located at Xo 1172.9 (Figure 4.2-4) and the Orbiter cargo retention point nearest
and forward of that location (X o 3128, Figure 4.2-8) had insufficient capability to with-
'=	 stand the anticipated maximum longitudinal support reactions during the ascent phase
(+X MAX > 100 k lb, whereas, per Table 4. 2-1, Xo 1128 +•X capability is 68 k lb).
However, the next X-retention p_'nt aft of Xo 1172.9 (Xo 1187, Figure 4.2-8) provides
=X capability of 120 k lb (54 x IC - leg) (Table 4.2-1 and Figure 4.2--9). Consequently
the Tug body shell was extended from Xo 1172.9 to Xo A& `o accommodate Tug/
Orbiter interface fittings at that location for structural arr: ?meats employing
rotation aid and non-rotational deploy concepts. Figure 4. _1 illustrates the refer-
ence Tug configuration for deploy concepts without a load ca ":z_­ying support adapter.
4.2.1.2 Baseline Orbiter. The Shuttle Orbiter description and payload accommoda-
tions specified in JSC 07700, Vol MV, Rev C, were used to define the coordinate sys-
tem, the cargo bay envelope, and the locations of structural support provisions, which
are summarized in Figure 4.2-8, €.gad to define limit support reaction capabilities, 	 =
which are summarized in Table 4.2-1 and Figure 4.2-9. Where noticeable allowable
support reaction capability discrepancies existed within, this document, the lesser
value was used as shown by the circled values iu Table 4.2--1.
Late in the stud	 ryna Orbiter mid-fuselage design ly: prep ry	 goad and relative deflec-..
tion data was received. This data is presented and used in the redundant t;upport
analysis (Section 4. 2, 3.9).
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• REFERENCE TUG
REVISION SUMMARY
ITEM	 1 DESCRIPTION BASIS
i REPLACE BIFURCATED ADAPTER WITH LIGHTER; HIGHER tY STIFFNESS
CYLINDRICAL ADAPTER
2 RELOCATE X•SUPPORTIPIVOT ORBITER HAS SUPPORTS AT X 1246, 1363 ONLY;
ENGINE VIOLATES ENVELOPE^ISING X01393PIVOT
3 ADD LATCH LONGERONS TO TUG &
ADAP CER
4 ADD ' XIOIZER TANK SUPPORT LONGERONS
TO TU-' INTRODUCE CONCENTRATED LOADS TO SHELL
5 ADD FUEL TANKSUPPORT LONGERONS TO TUG
6 ADD SPACECRAFT SUPPORT LONGERONS TO TUG
7 REPLACE FUELTANK FWD SUPPORT ROLLERS LIGHTER; STIFFER; CONTINUALLY
WITH TANGENTIAL STRUTS; REV ISEIR ELI] CATE LOAD — CARRYING
LOAD RING
B REVISE BASIC SANDWICH SIDEWALL CONVAIR IRAO POINT DESIGN
(FIGURE4.25)
9 PROVIDE SOLID LAMINATE "PANS" IN SIDEWALL SIMPLIFY ATTACHMENT; DISTRIBUTE
AT LONGERONS & INTERFACE FRAMES, FITTINGS LOADS INTO SIDEWALL ( FIGURE 4.2.6)
10 CLOCK ACPS ARRAY 45 DEG AVOID IMPINGEMENT ON X1128 FITTINGS
11 REPLACE MAJOR FRAMES WITH ALL — LIGHTER;STIFFER (FIGURE 4.2.7)
COMPOSITES CONCEPT
Figure 4.2-, *.	 Update of MSFC Baseline Tug to Study
'Deference Configuration
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Figure 4.2-6. Solid Laminate Pan
Concept
(REF(
_ _	 ^"-,I	 FACINGS
	
l	 HI-M4OULUS GRAPHITE EPDXY
0 5 PLIES MINIMUM 1031145}
SCRIM REINFORCED ADHESIVE
O^ s 5 IN.
1	 ^	 1''SS
HRP CORE /
BASIC PANEL UNITWEIGHT-. 0.454 LBIFT2
(2.22 KGIM2)
Figure 4.2-5. Basic Sandwich
	
_.^	 Sidewall
Figure 4.2-7. Major Frame Concept
936.0	 985.0	 1061.7	 1128.0 117M.	 1296.0
Figure 4.2-7A.. Reference Tug for Deploy
Concepts Without Support
Adapter
j 4.2.1.3 Orbiter Cargo Bay Accelerations, In the course of the study, three distinct
sets of Orbiter cargo-bay accelerations were specified for use in support reaction
analysis. These are presented in Table 4.2-2 in the same sequence in which they
?	 were us	 Sections 2 2 2 and 4 2 3	 each seta provide d compareed.4.
	
. 8 discuss  c
	
and pro a an	 ap
the results of the analyses using them.
4.2.1.4 Reference Spacecraft. A deployment spacecraft weighing 11,000 pounds
(4990 kg) with its center of gravity 145 in. (368 cm) forward of the Tug interface was
selected as the reference configuration for all support reaction and body loads
I
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CARGO RETENTION	 619	 716	 833	 951	 1059	 ti87	 1303
POINTS	 _. Xp
+Y0, ay, RY 	049	 774	 892	 1010	 1128	 1246
YO 94
O
	
RX 
ax DIAN 	 — I'._ 4—+ —	 T —4-4 	 — Y.00
CARGO BAY
ENVELOPE	
5B2	 1302RZ	
720 IN.
	
+X O, ax, Rx	 X, Z, X1Z SUPPORTS
20 414
	
_o a^ —^—^ — _	 —	 —° — 1 =	 zo 4B6
Zo 409	
Z^ 305
308.4
Y SUPPORTS
Figure 4.2-8. Baseline Orbiter Coordinates, Cargo Envelope,
and Cargo Retention Locations
	
AT X01187
	
AT Xo 1296
REF. JSC 07700, FIGURE 7 ry 	 REF. JSC 07700, FIGURE 7.20
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60	 Ht.O BOOST CUTOFF
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49	 ^	 •- 40
	
Z9 	 29
	
0	 +X, 10O0 LO9	 +X, 1000 LB
•80 •60 .40 •20	 29 40 69 60 100 129
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AO	 -40
	
•2D	 •60
	
•BO	 •89
•100
-100
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'ter Limit	 is Reaction Capability^
	
Figure 4.2-9. Orba	 sn>. Support	 p	
Envelopes for X, Z Interaction
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Table 4.2-•1. Orbiter Individual Limit Support Reaction Capabilities
i
Reaction Capability at Cargo Retention Locations (10 3 lb)
Ref 951 1010 1069 1128 1187/1181 1246/1249 1303Support JSC 07700
HI--Q Other HT-Q Other HI-Q Other HI-Q Other HI-Q Other HI Q Other HI--Q OtherReaction i rgure
+X only 7-7 36 54 42 56 52 69 56 68 76/ 120/ 76/ '11/ 76 113
7--15 36 54 43 56 52 70 56 68 76/ 120/ 75/ 110/ ? ?
thru -20
Use 36 54 42 56 52 69 56 68 76/ 120/ 75/ 110/ 76 113
-X czaly 7-7 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
7-15 20 20 20 20 27 27 25 25 50/ 50/ 32/ 32/ ? ?
thru. --20
Use 20 20 20 20 27 27 25 25 T 50/ 50/ 32/ 32/ ? ?
f 7-8 ....• 70 -- 80 --- 78 — 72 = /67 -- /56 —Y
H Use 70 70 80 80 78 78 72 72 /67 /67 /56 /56 - -
+Z only 7-9 ? 67 ? 65 ? 72 ? 71 ? 107/ ? 97/ ? 67
7-15 52 52 58 58 57 57 51 51 93/ 93/ 92/ 92/ ? ?
than -20
Use 52 52 58 58 57 57 51 51 93/ 9S 92/ 92 67 67
--Z only 7-9 ? 67 ? 65 ? 72 ? 71 ? 107/ ? 97/ ? 67
7-15 68 68 61 61 68 68 65 65 70/ 70/ 65/ 65/ ? ?
thru -20
Use 67 67 61 61 GS 68 65 65 70/ 70 65/ fi5 67 67
O= Lesser value used in cases of noticeable discrepancy witbin JSC 07700.
r.
y^	 .
MSFG 68MO0039-1 %g' (7)
ax
ay az ax1338i6n
Max Min I Max Min Max Min Max MinPhase Load Condition
Ascent(') Liftoff --0.1 -2.9 +11.
Thrust buildup/rebound -0.5 -1.5 +0.3 --0.3 +0.3 --0.3
Launch release +0.4 -3.4 +0.8 •0.8 +3.0 -3.0
Tug only
Spacecraft only
HT-Q boost -1.7 -2.3 +0.9 -0.9 +1.1 -1.1 -1.6 -2.0 f0
Max g with SRM -2.7 -3.3 +0.5 -0.5 +0.6 -0.6 --2.7 --3.3 +0:
SRM cutoff/separation +2.0 -4.0 +0.4 -0.4 +0.8 -0.8
Max g, orbiter only -2.7 --3.3 +0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.8 -2.7 -3.3 +0,.
Orbiter cutoff/separation +1.9 -2.1 +0.4 -0.4 x•0.6 -0.2
ti
On-orbit(') Payload deployment +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2
Descent(l) Entry and +1.4 +0.6 +0.7 -0.7 +4.0 +2.0
Flyback +0.6 -0.6 +0.3 -0.3 +1.4 +0.6
+ Pitch maneuvers +1.06 -0.02
- Pitch maneuvers +1.06 -0.02 0
Yaw maneuvers +0.75 +0.75 +1"
Roll. maneuvers
Landing +1.3 +0.7 +0.3 -0.3 +3.0 +1.0 +1.0 -0.8 +0,?
's
Tug only
Spacecraft only
Crash(2) Longitudinal (+3q' +9.0 -1.5 0 0 0 0 +9.0 -1.5 Q
Lateral (-+ Y) 0 0 +1.5 -1.5 0 0 0 0 +I. i
Vertical (:6 Z) 0 0 0 0 +4.5 -2.0 0 0 0.
Notes: (1) Ascent, on ,)rbit, and descent accelerations are limit values.
(2) Crash accelerations are ultimate. Resulting loads shall be applied to the Tug/Orbiter
support fittings and their attachment fasteners only. Supporting structure shall be
designed to withstand the fastener loads locally.
(3) The longitudinal (:L X) crash accelerations may occur in any direction within a cone of
20 degrees (semi-vertex angle) about the X-axis.
?) JSC 07700, Vol. XW, Rev. C(5) (7)
az ax ay as ax try az ax ai
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max
-0.1 -2.9 +1.0 -110 +1.5 -1.5 +0.10 -0.10 +0.15 -0.15 +0.15 -0.15 -0.3 -2.9 +0.7
3 -0.3
0 -3.0
' -0.3 -2.9 +0.8
-0.3 -2.9 +1.0
;,1 -1.1 -1.6 -2.0 +0.5 -0.5 +0.6 -0.6 +0.10 -0.10 +0.15 -0.15 +0.15 -0.15 -1.6 -2.0 +0.5
A -0.6 -2.7 -3.3 +0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 +0.20 -0.20 +0.25 -0.25 +0.25 --0.25 -2.85 --3.15 +0.2
,'8 -0.8
4 -0.8 -2.7 -3.3 +0.2 -0.2 -0.75 -0.75 +0.20 -0.20 +0.25 --0.25 +0.25 -0.25 -2.85 -3.15 +0.2
.6 -0.2
:2 -0.2
. 1
 0 +2.0
i
,. 4 +0.6
+1.06 -0.02 0 0 +2.5 +2.5 +0.25 --0.25 +0. "5 -0.75 +0.30 -0.30 + 1.1 +1. 1 0
+1.06 -0.02 0 0
-1.0 0 +0.25 -0,.25 +0.75 -0.75 +0.30 -0.30 +0.6 +0.6 0
+0.75 +0.75 :1.25 -L,25 +1.0 +1.0 +0.25 -0.25 +0.30 -0.30 +0.75 -0.75 +1.0 =1.0 +1.25..
+0.9 +0.9 +0.2
. 0 +1. u +1.0 -0.8 +0.5 -0.5 +2.8 +2.2 +0.25 -0.25 +1.25 -0.75 +0.30 -0.30 +1.1 -1.5 +0.7
+1.1 -1.5 +0.8
+1.4
I. 0 +9.0 -1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +9.0
-1.5 0
! 0 0 0 +1.5 -11 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 +1.5
5
-2.0 0 0 0 0 +4.5 -2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s
() MSFC 68M00039- -1 accelerations include Orbiter dynamic transient and cargo dynamic response effectse
id to the Tug/Orbiter	 (5) JSC 07700 ascent and landing accelerations include Orbiter dynamic transient effects but do not include a
structure shall be	 cargo dynamic response erects. y
(6) MSFC P>! 02-75-31 accelerations apparently include Orbiter dynamic transient and cargo dynamic respvn
ticn within a cone of (7) Linear acceleratiens are in g; angular accelerations are in radians/sect.
	 a
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Table 4.2-2. Orbiter Cargo Bay Accelerations
MSFC PF 02-75-31(6) (7)
ax ay a% cax ay az
Ain Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min
C.15 -0.3 -2.9 +0.7 -0.7 +0.9 -1.1 -+0.15 -0.15 +0.10 -0.10 +0.10 -0.10
-0.3 -2.9 +0.8 -0.8 +0.9 -1.1 +0.15 -0.15 +0.10 --0.10 +0.10 -0.10
-0.3 -2.9 +1.0 -1.0 +1.4 -1.6 +0.15 -0.15 +0.15 -0.15 +0.15 -0.15
0.15 -1.6 -2.0 +0.5 -0.5 +0.6 -0.6 1-0.15 -0.15 +0.10 -0.10 +0.10 ••0.10
D.25 -2.85 -3.15 +0.2 -0.2 n0.3 -0.3 +11.1`) -0.10 +0.10 -0.10 +0.10 -0.10
0.25 -2.85 -3.15 +0.2 -0.2 -0.75 -0.75 +0.10 -0.10 +0.10 -0.10 +0.10 -0.10
-0.30 +1.1 +1.1 0 0 +2.5 +2.5 0 0 -0.1 -0.1 0 0
b.30 +0.6 +0.6 0 0 -1.0 -1.0 0 0 +0.7 +0.7 0 0
-0.75 +1.0 +1.0 +1.25 --1.25 +1.0 +1.0 0 0 0 0 +0.2 -0.2
+0.9 +0.9 +0.2 -0.2 +1.5 +1.5 +2.6 -2.6 +0.3 +0.3 +0.2 -0.2
;0.30 +1.1 -1.5 +0.7 -0.7 +3.3 +0.7 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2 +0.1 -0.1
+1.1 -1.5 +0.8 -0.8 +4.0 0 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2 +0.1 -0.1
+1.1 -1.5 +1.4 -1.4 +7.0 -3.0 +0.2 -0.2 +0.4 -0.4 +0.2 -0.2
0 +9.0
-1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 +115 -1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 +4.5 -2.0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.axgo dynamic response effects.
scent effects but do not include	
f fv"
sient and cargo dynamic response effects.
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Figure 4.2-10. MSFC Baseline Tug
Performance
analyses. The selection process is
illustrated in Figures 4.2-10, 4.2-11,
and 4. 2-12 and is based on the following
rationale
a. Tugs flown in an expendable mode
can, if necessary, be modified for
their final flight (i.e., can incor-
porate mission peculiar structural
reenforcement if required).
b. Conversely, reusable Tugs are
structurally standardized (i.e., are
designed for a single set of condi-
tions which, presumably, envelope
all spacecraft within the Tug
reusable-mode performance
capability) .
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Figure 4.2-11. Spacecraft Weight/CG
Distribution
c. From Figure 4.2-10 the heaviest
S/C in the 1984-91 preliminary
mission model that can be deployed
in a reusable-Tug mode is PL-01-A,
which weighs 10571 lb (4795 kg).
From Figure 4.2-11, the 1 g mo-
ment it produces at the Tug/space-
craft interface is approximately
1.5 x 106 in-1b. (1.7 x 105
 Nm).
d. Insufficient kick stage length exists
for moving most heavier spacecraft
into a reusable Tug's capability
range.
e. From Figure 4.2-10 and 4.2-11 an
7.1k lb (5 x 108 kg) S/C lying on the
performance boundary and having a 145 in. (368 cm) arm to its cg produces 1.6 x 106
in lb (1.8 x 105 Nm) interface moment, which envelops virtually an of the mission
model. This is furthe r  illustrated in Figure 4.2-12 in which this S/C is located on
weight and moment h Ftogram.s. Only four of the 182 identified flights (two flights each
of two future spacecraft dF,sigas) lie beyond 'the design point. Options for support of
these spacecraft are discussed in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 4.2-12. Spacecraft Weight, Moment Histograms
4.2.1.6 Mass Properties. Weight, center of gravity, and Oater in the study) mass
moment of inertia data were developed for those elements suspended from the primary
Tug/Orbiter structural attachments, for use in the initial support reaction and weight/
performance (Sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3) evaluations and in subsequent updates
(Sections 4-.2.3.8 and 4.2.3.10). The data presented in this Section was compiled and
was used as input to those tasks noted above and does not reflect the implied new Tug
baseline configuration resulting from incorporation of the subsystem changes recom-
mended in this study. Sufficient data was initially developed to permit definition of all
possible mass configurations considering both vehicle deployment concepts (with and
without adapter), both mission types (deployment of the reference spacecraft and re-
trieval of the heaviest retrievable spacecraft), ad all mission phases (ascent, nominal
descent, abort descent, and crash). The number of mission type and phase combina-
tions actually investigated was subsequently limited to those corresponding to the criti-
cal load conditions identified in Section 4.2.2.2.
Specific ground ruses and assumptions used in developing mass properties included:
a. Tug length (station location of forward interface, Xo 936) and tank volumes were
held constant in all support arrangement candidates (i. e. , no length or propellant
volume vaxiation to offset performance As between candidates).
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b. Propellants were loaded to the mwdmum permissible level (i.e., either to tank
capacity for the retrieval mission, or to a quantity resulting in 65, 000 lb (29510
kg) >otal mission chargeable weight in the Orbiter for the deployment mission),
c. Oxidizer was dumped during abort (i. e. , the oxidizer tank was empty during abort
descent and crash mission phases).
d. Initially, fuel was not dumped during abort (i. e. , the fuel tank was full during abort
r	 descent and crash mission phases). Data generated in tasks 4.2.2.2 . and 4.2.2.3
were based on this ground rule. During the study this ground rule was reversed, 	 E
and fuel abort dump was adopted in the MSFC baseline Tug. Consequently, data
generated) thereafter in the support reaction and weight/performance update tasks
(4.2.3.8 and 4.2.3.10) reflected an emptyfuel tank for abort descent and crash.
Mass property data in support of the re--
action and "conventional theory" loads_
NASA BASELINE
I
	
REVIEW	 I	 f	 W	 I calculations in Sections 4.2. 2.2 andf15FC68M000392^ I ABORT
FUEL 4. 2. 2 .3 was developed as shoe, in Figure
UPDATE TO
USE 	 I
I	 JSCG77UU	
DUMP
I	 I 4. 2-12A. The NASA baseline Tug weight
REFERENCE
CONFIGURATION
ACCELSL _ J L_ _ J data per MSFC 68M00039-2 was initially
- -
	
aGOC ADAPTER+ GGC assumed to apply to the reference:; config-
uration despite the configuration differ-
-	 DERIVE &PLOT
WEIGHT ences discussed in Section 4.2.1. 1 .	 The
mSTRl9UTIDNS
-	 c MAINTAIN NASA DETERMINE	 DETERMINE wei ht char es associated with the base-g	 g
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- -	 TUG CG'S
PIN	 PROP,
TOTAL VEHICLE	 TOTAL VE HICLE
WEIGHT, CG
	 INERTIAS line/reference configuration differences
F OR REF
FOR REF SIC there not initially incorporated for twoy	 p
reasons: 1) the support reactions and
PREPARE
ACCUMULATED
#body loads tasks required mass proper-
4VT,XCGPLOTS
—
ties data as input but were scheduled be-
_ _	 _
x4223
`1^4.2zz	 ^ 14222
	
r423R
SUPPORT	 I	 (SUPPORT	 I	 I SUPPORT fore the various design tasks is which
"CONVENTIONAL I
I
I {MSFC IONS I	 I IlSC 07 00 5 	IA45F^Ti0NS detailed weight data was to be developed;
I IIDDY LOADS	 E SshlQQQ39.1 	 I PFO2.7&S: consequently, the baseline data was the
L— _ _^ _J LCCELS.) 	 J LACCELS.r	 J L ACCELS.!	 J best data available at that time, and 2)
Figure 4.2-12A,.	 Development of '11a,ss the net weight change due to the total ef-
Properties Data ; ect of the various baseline/reference
configuration differences was expected to
be small enough that its resulting effect on reactions and body loads would be neglibible.
Similarly, the mass property variations (e. g.', support fitting quantity and/or location,
sidewall reinforcement, body A L) between the various support arrangement candidates
were also ignored in support reaction and body loads computations.
Weights of those elements that vary as a function of deployment concept or support
arrangement were developed during weight/performance evaluations (Sections
4.2.2.3, 4.2.3.10) and are reported there.
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To support the "conventional theory" body loads analyses in Section 4.2.2.3, it was
necessary to know the weight and CG of all elements forward of certain selected
stations. To provide this data, it was necessary to first derive weight distributions
for the Tug, its expendables, and the support adapter. This was accomplished by
further definiti.zing the updated configuration and assigning locations and lengths to
major items wi.tbin the various subsystems.
The MSFC baseline Tug mass properties tables and subsystems description, augment-
ed by STSS data,where applicable, formed the basis for the weight and location alloca-
tions. For the Tug itself, center--of-gravity locations specified in hiSFC 08M00039-2
were maintained.
Figure 4.2-12B shows the resulting weight intensity versus station "skylines" for the
Tug plus adapter at burnout (Le., less expendables). The dashed curve represents
the simple distribution of weight versus shell station. Since the propellant tanks and
those systems components attached to them are supported from the body at discrete
points, the effective weight versus shell station differs from the simple distribution
and is shown by the solid curve.
The variation in fill level and CG versus propellant quantity is shown in Figures
4.2-12C and 4.2-12D for the fuel and oxidizer tanks respectively. Figures 4.2-12E,
4.2-12F, and 4.2--12G show the accumulated weight and CG versus body station data
177.2131.6!
50r-
(B)
^i
WEIGHT	 CGSTA.
ITEM	 LB KG	 Xo
DRY WEIGHT	 51502338 1098.25
RESIDUALS	 605 275 1128,94
BURNOUTWEIGHT 	 5755 2613 1094.33
DEPL ADAPTER_	 708_321 1218.31
TOTAL SUPPORTED	 6463 2934 1107.91
7
	
l^rt	 ----- SIMPLE GISTRIBUT.'^N
	
i	 ^-°--- . EFFECTIVE" DISTRIBOTION
FOR BODY LOADS ANA .YSIS
Y_J
i	 I	 l	 I	 ^	 l	 l	 f	 l	 l!{	 j	 1
936 956	 976 896 1016 1036 1056 1076 1698 1116 1136 1156 1175 1196 1216 1236 1256 1276 1298
STATION. (Xd
Figure 4.2-12B, Tug Plus Adapter Weight Distribution as
	 3`
a Function of Station Nmnber at Burnout
4--19
Figure 4.2--12C. Fuel Fill Level and CG	 Figure 4.2-12D. Oxidizer Fill Level and
versus Weight	 CG versus Weight
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derived from the preceding figures and used for conventional. theory body loads com-
putationin.Sectiou4.2.2.3. Total vehicle weight and CG data was developed from the
preceding data for each mass configuration. Figure 4.2--12H shows a typical tabu-
lation and the resulting weight, CG schematics.
Configuration = All with Adapter
Mission = Deployment
Spacecraft = 11, 060 lb (4994 kg), CG at Xo 791
Item Weight C. G. (Xo) WXo
Tug (Burnout) 5,755.0 1,094.33 6,297, 869
ACPS, F.C. Fluids 463.0 1,108.00 51.3, 00.
Adapter 708.0 1,21-8.33- 862,563
Spacecraft 11, 000.0 791.00 8,701,00
F (Normal Descent, 17, 926.0 913.45. 16, 374, 43
Crash)
+ Fuel 6,694.0 1,034.05 6, 921. -
B(Abort Descent, 24, 620.0 948.24 23,296,3
Crash)
+ O s idizer 39,188.4 1.,17'8.50 46,183, o
L(Ascent) 63, 808.0 1, 088.88 69,479,
3 ii .0
'" 
010
797
	
VARIES
Figure 4.2-12H. Typical height. CG Determination.
Mass moments of inertia were developed during the study to support the NASA-request-
ed analysis of support reactions using accelerations per JSC 07700, Vol. MV, Rev. C
(which contain angular acceleration terms about all three coordinate axes). Tner-da
computations were based on the following ground rules and assumptions:
a. ly T^.
b. Tug inertia at burnout is based on the 100% main stage burn condition specified
in MSFC 68M00039-2 except that iy
 = TZ = 0.1.5191E 05 slug-ft^.
c. ALPS and fuel cell fluids were assumed to be distributed as shown in Figure
4.2»12T.
d. , The deployment adapter was assumed to consist of two adjoining thin; cylinders
of approximately imiform densit_►•
 as shwa. in Figure 4.2-121.
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ae. The reference spacecraft was assumed to consist of a solid cylinder of uniform.
density as shown In Figure 4.2-121.
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Figure 4.2-121. Mass Moments of Inertia
►!	 f. Propellant roll inertia (Ix) was assumed to be zero in both. to-zks. Yaw and pitch
inertias (Iy, 1z) were based on reduced (effective) masses derived From existing
	 _,
`	 Centaur data. Resultiug inertias for the retrieval. (fun tanks) and deployment
(off-loaded tanks) missions are given in Table 4.2-3.
Table 4.2-3a
 Propellant Mass Moments of Inertia
Mission Type Tank
Iy, Iz
Slug ft2 	 kg x172 CC Sta.Xo
Retrieval Fnel 4, 245.2 5,756.5 1, 828.00
(Full Tanks)	 It Oxidizer 8,696.2 1.1, 792.4 1,174.32
Deploymeaat (Ref S/C) Fuel 3,567.1 4,837.0 1,034.0 5
(Off-loaded Tanks) Oxidizeai 7,552.2 10, 240.8 11178.50
4.2.2 SUPPORT CANDYDATE DEFINITION AND PRELIIVMINARY SCREENING. The
support candidate definition and preliminary screening tasks were conducted in the
sequence illustrated in Figure 4.2-13. Presentation of data in this section is divided
into the subsections noted in the task sequence blocks.
4.2.2.1 Structural Arrangement Candidates. Support locations included in the candi-
date evaluation analysis were limited to those compatible with both the baseline Orbiter
provisions and the reference Tug configuration. Primary Orbiter structural attach-
ment locations on the payload bay longerous and keel were obtained from dSC 07700,
Vol MV, Rev C, (reference Figure 4.2-8). Tug geometry considerations were used to
further screen potential support fitting locations. All Orbiter identified support sta-
tions between X. 951 and 3249, except Xo
 1010 and 1069, were found to be acceptable.
Stations 1010 and 1069 are located adjacent to the Tug hydrogen tank, which allows
insufficient space for moment carrying Tug support frames. Figure 4.2-14 illustrates
candidate Orbiter support stations and defines the support reaction designations used
in all analyses. (Note that support designations do not agree with those on MSFC
drawing 1OM23300 since the selection and preliminary analysis of candidate support
concepts was in work before receipt of the drawing.) X-supports were limited to
Xo 1187 and 1246 due to insufficient Orbiter capability at Xo 1128 and forward. Y-
and Z- supports were permitted at all appropriate locations. The illustrated support
arrangement is that of the MSFC baseline Tug, except ft;r (Y2) and (Z4), which re-
present support locations used in. some arrangements in addition to the minimum re-
quired for statically determinate configurations. For the screening analyses, 21 can-
didate Tug/Orbiter structural support arrangements were generated. These were
divided into three categories:
a. Statically determine systems.
b. Singly redundant (or load-balanced) systems.
C.	 Doubly redundant (or Load balanced) systems.
Within each category, similar support arrangement candidates Nvere collected into
families. The -1 and -3 options in each configuration family placed the aftmost sup-
ports at 
o 1246 on a support adapter for compatibility with the baseline Tug support/
rotational deployment concept. The -2 option in each family placed the aftmost sup-
ports at Xo
 1187 on an extension of the reference Tug flight vehicle body for compati-
bility with the rotation aid and non-rotational support/deployment concepts. The
detail description of each candidate is presented in Figures 4.2-15A, B, and C.
Statically Determinate Systems. The three statically determinate configuration
families were similar in that each employed a total of six supports: two X, one Y,
and three Z. In Family 1 the six supports were provided using only four Tug/Orbiter
interface points by combining two Z supports with the two X supports at the aft end of
i
a
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Figure 4. 2--13. Task Sequence and Corresponding Report Sections
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1181	 1246	 the vehicle. The third Z support was
SUPPORTS AT xo 951
	
1010 IC69	 1.1^2Z1 i1e7	
1
-.x1	 then located on one side of the vehicle
near the forward end. It is the preferred
'NGT Wml	 `	 cargo retention system shown in JSC
I iv2E ^-
	
'
g
irl	 ,	 07700, Vol. MV. It was also selected
TUG LH2 TANK 	 Lot TANK !^	 J
	 from among those arrangements investi-
gated earlier in the GDC STSS as the rec-
cornmended system. at that time. Family
VIEW LOOKING DOWN R)	
x2	 6 was a six--point system that provided
two Z supports and the single Y support
	
Figure 4.2--14. Candidate Support Loca- 	 in a common plane at an intermediate
tions and Support	 station within the vehicle CG excursion.
Reaction Designations
	 band. It was the arrangement used for
the NASA baseline Tug as presented in
MSFC drawing 10M23300. Family 7 was a five-p oint system providing two Z supports
plus the single Y support in a common plane near the forward end of the vehicle. The
third Z support was then combined with one of the two a''t X supports. It was one of the
arrangements investigated earlier in the GDC STSS and Nvas found to provide perform-
ance similar to the recommended Family I system and was designated as an alter-
native system at that time.
Redundant/Load Balanced Systems. These systems incorporated supports in addition
to the minimum number required in the statically determinate systems. Families 2, 0'
and 8 each added one additional support ( a fourth Z in 2 and 8 and a second Y in 3).
Families 4 and 5 each added both a fourth Z and a second Y support. Normally the
evaluation of these systems would have required an elastic analysis to account for the
effects of the redundant support(s). However, Orbiter stiffness and relative deflection
data were not available upon study commencement. Furthermore, it was not at all
clear in advance that redundant attachment would result in tolerable suppol.°t reactions.
Nevertheless, the quad-Z and dual -Y systems offered potential reaction, deflection,
and dynamic response benefits. Consequently various hydralle load balancing systems,
(based on a concept presented by MDAC in the SOAR, study) were developed, which pre-
cluded indeterminacy by elininating antisymmetric support reaction components at
specified locations. For example, Family 2 is essentially Family 1 with a fourth Z
support. Balancing the forward Z supports consists of float ing the supports on hydrau-
lie cylinders, which permits the two supports to share the reaction previously carried
by the single forward Z alone (in Family 1), but prevents antisymmetric Orbiter re-
lative twist from inducing additional reactions.
4-26
0r	 -'
r
k
CONFIGURATION SUPPORT LOCATIONS
NO. DESCRIPTION ARRANGEMENT OPTION ADAPTED ? x1, X 2 Y 1 Y2 Z 1 22 Z3 24
r
1 G€JG STSS -1 YES 1246 1249 — 1246 1246 951 —
PREFERRED -2 NO 1187 1181 — 1187 1187 951 --
6 MSFG -1 YES 1246 1128 — 1128 1128 951 —
BASELINE -2 NO 1187 1128 — 1128 1128 951 —
7 GDG STSS *	 „^ -T YES 1246 951 951 951 1246
ALTERNATIVE -2 NO 1187 951
_
951 951 1187
1	
`
Figure 4.2--15A, Statically Determinate Support Arrangements
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Figure 4.2-15B. Singly Redundant Load Balanced Support Arrangements
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CONFIGURATION SUPPORT LOCATIONS
NO. DESCRIPTION ARRANGEMENT OPTION ADAPTER? X 1 ,X 2 Y 1 Y2 Z 1 Z2 Z3 Z4
DUAL FWD Z
& I)llAL Y
I
-1 YES 1246 1249 951 1246 1246 951 9514
-j NO 1187 1181 951 1187 1187 951 951
X & FWD Z `	 `
-3 YES 1246 1128 951 1128 1128 951 951
BALANCED
DUAL FWD Z
<& DUAL Y -1 YES 1246 1249 951 951 951 1 246 1246
5 .2 NO 1187 1181 951 951 951 1147 1187
X & AFT Z 1
-3 YES 1245 1128 951 951 951 1128 1128
BALANCED
j
rigure 4.2-15C. Doubly Redundant Load Balanced Support Arrangements
Figure 4.2-16 illustrates the redundant fluid system schematically and shows a bridge
beam installation concept for balancing two forward Z supports.
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Figure 4.2--16. Load Balancing System Concept
4.2.2.2 Support Reaction Evaluation. The initial support reaction evaluation pre-
sented here was employed in the preliminary assessment and screening of the 21 sup-
port arrangement candidates developed in Section 4.2.2. 1. (A special emphasis
update task was conducted later for selected support arrangements and is discussed
in Section 4.2.3. S. ) This task was conducted in the sequence shorn in Figure 4.2-17.
Each of the 21 candidate support arrangements was analyzed using an existing com-
puter program to determine its maximum support reactions. The limit payload bay
accelerations specified in AISFC 68M00039--1 were used in determining critical load
conditions and the associated support reactions. To limit the number of computer
runs for each support arrangement, the mass configurations (Tug + propellant +
spacecraft versus mission type and phase) that were likely to produce maximum
support reactions were identified. To obtain a measure of goodness for candidate
screening, the computed reactions were compared with Orbiter capability as defined
in JSC 07700, Vol. XIV, Rev. C and the resulting ranking of candidates was used in
the caaadidate selection discussed in Section 4.2.2.4. Unfortunately the specified
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Orbiter capability was exceeded by every candidate support system for most or all of
its reactions. Upon presentation of this data at the First Data Exchange meeting,
direction was given to repeat the entire analysis using the Orbiter cargo bay accelera-
tions spc-cified in JSC 07700, Vol XIV, Rev. C, and to compare the two sets of support
reactions. This redirection necessitated a substantial revision of the support reaction
computer program to accept mass moment of inertia inputs and to incorporate the dSC
angular acceleration components into the support reaction equations. Upon recompu--
tatioa of the support reactions for all candidates a comparisora with previous data was
conducted, and the candidate selection was reviewed for possible revision,
Computer Program. A simplified logic flow and sample output from the support re-
action computer program are shown in Figure 4.2-18. For a given support arrange-
ment and mission type and phase (i.e., mass configuration) the program computed
each support reaction for each acceleration case in the subset of accelerations cor-
responding, to the given mission ;:node. As a given acceleration case was processed,
each reaction was computed and compared with previously stored maximum (+) and
minimum. (--) values for that reaction, and, if greater, was stored in place of the
previous value. The acceleration case number associated with a stored reaction
value c.,as also stored to permit identification of specific critical cases. Final print-
out consisted of the maximum numerical values (Y and -) and the corresponding accel-
eration case for each reaction component in the selected support arrangement.
Comparison of similar output for other mission modes (using other mass configura-
tions and/or acceleration case subsets) permitted definition of the maximum reaction
magnitudes for a given support arrangement when subjected to all perturbations and
combinations of accelerations within the complete set used.
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Figure 4.2-18, Support Reaction Program Logic and Sample Output
In the sample shown in Figure 4.2-18 the input data and maximum reactions are shown
for support arrangement 1--1 (statically determinate family with rotational deployment
using a load-carrying support adapter) for the ascent phase of a deployment mission
(reference spacecraft and corresponding propellant off-load), when subjected to all
acceleration cases specified in MSFC 68M00039-1. The reactions shown are those
applied to the '-•ug (since the program was originally written to assist Tug structural
analysis) and hence the signs must be reversed for loads applied to the Orbiter.
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Critical Klass Configurations. As mentioned above, the number of mass configurations
investigated for each support arrangement was limited by identifying critical mass
configurations using the mass properties data from Section 4.2.1. 5. The following;
ground rules and assumptions were adopted for this task:
a. Both propellant tanks are filled as full as possible (within the Orbiter weight limit)
for each mission.
b. Tn abort, all main impulse oxidizer is dumped before descent.
c. In abort, main impulse fuel is not dumped.
d. In normal return to the Orbiter, all usable main impulse, ACPS, and fuel cell
fluids are expended and/or dumped before descent.
i	 e. Orbiter maximum cargo capability is 65, 000 lb (29510 kg).
1	 f. The reference Tug installation includes 1192 lb (541 kg) of Shuttle accommodation
provisions not supported by the Orbiter primary payload support fittings.
g. The reference Tug installation, fully loaded, without spacecraft weighs 58, 679 lb
(26640 kg).
h. The heaviest retrieval spacecraft is EO-12 (Tiros O): 4740 lb (2152 kg).
i. The heaviest deploy spacecraft is the reference spacecraft (Secti.c:n 4.2. 1.4):
11, 000 lb (4994 kg).
j. The heaviest multiple deploy-only spacecraft combinations are: CN-51 or CN-53
(3246 lb (1474 kg)) plus EO-09 or EG-59 or EO-62 (3376 lb (1533 kg)) for a. total
of 6622 lb (3007 kg).
k. The heaviest round-trip deploy spacecrafts are: CN-53 (3246 lb (1474 kg)) plus
EO-57 (566 lb (257 kg)) for a total of 3812 lb (1,73: kg).
j
1. The heaviest round-trip retrieval spacecraft is: CN-59 (2108 lb (951 kg)).
m. Crash after abort descent is a valid condition.
All resulting potentially critical mass configurations are shown in Table 4.2--4, and
critical configurations are selected based on the .able data and the following observa-
tions and conclusions.
t
,J
Weights
Expendables (lb) Total*Mission Critical
Configuration?
ACPS+ Spacecraft CG
Type Phase Oxid Fuel. P. C, (lb) lb leg Xo Yea No Basis
Deploy Ascent 39, 188 6694 463 -11,000 63,808 28,869 1088. 88 X 10
only Descent 0 0 0 0 6,463 2,934 1107.91 X 9
Crash	 Nora'
^
0 0 0 0 6,463 2,934 1107.91 X 12
Descent 0 6694 463 -11,000 24,620 11,177 946.24 X 13
Crash	 Abort 0 6694 463 -11,000 24,620 11,177 946.24 X 12
Retrieve Ascent 43,199 7362 463 0 .57, 487 26,099 1147. 58 X 11
only Descent 0 0 0 4,740 11,203 5,086 1001.41 X 13Nora.Crash 0 0 0 4,740 11,203 5,086 1001.41 X 12
Descent 0 7362 463 0 14,288 6,487 1066.74 X 13
Crash	 Abort 0 7362 463 0 14,288 6,487 1066.74 X 12
Round Ascent 43,199 7362 463 3,812 61,299 27,830 1131.02 X 7,10
trip Descent 0 0 0 2,108 8,571 3,891 10;36. 56 X 8,13Rom.Crash 0 0 0 2,108 8,571 3,891 1036.56 X 8,12
Descent ?1 0 7362 463 3,812 18,100 8,217 1027.70 X 13Abort
Crasu 0 7362 463 3,812 18,100 8,217 1027.70 X 12
..S
1. From f, g: Maximum supported weight in the Orbiter for ascent without spacecraft 	 E
(retrieval--only mission) = 58, 679 - 1192 = 57,487 lb (26099 kg)
2. From 1, a: Supported weight in the Orbiter for ascent phase of all retrieval-only
missions is 57 9 487 lb (26, 099 kg).
3. From e, f: Maximum supported weight in the Orbiter for ascent with spacecraft
(deploy-only or round-trip missions) = 65,000 - 1192 = 63,808 lb (28,969 kg).
4. From .;, 3: r'ug Laa car sy spacecraft s 6321 lb (2870 kg) without propellant
off-load.
5. From 3, a: Supported weight in Orbiter for ascent phase of all deploy--only or
round-trip missions exceeds 57, 487 lb (26, 099 kg), the upper limit being 63, 808
lb (28, 969 kg) (i. e., deploy-ascent weight > retrieve-ascent weight).
6. From 2, 5 and reference Tug + spacecraft physics I relationship (spacecraft forward
of Tug): CG of total supported weight is further Forward for deploy-ascent than for
retrieve--ascent.
7. From i, j, k: Reference spacecraft in i exceeds all other deploy spacecraft.
8. From h,1: Maximum retrieval spacecraft weighs 4740 lb (2152 kg).
9. From d: Normal descent after any nonretrieval mission is noncritical for reac-
tions (empty Tug only).
10. From. 5, 6: Deploy-ascent probably critical for forward reactions (forward CG +
maximum weight).
11. From 2, 3, 6: Retrieve-ascent probably critical for aft reactions (aft CG + some-
what less weight).
12. From a, b, c, h, i, m: Crash after abort from deploy mission probably envelops all
other crash cases.
13. From b, c, h, 1, 7, 8, 9: Abort descent after deploy mission envelops all other
descent cases (except possibly abort descent after retrieve ascent) and may be
critical for all reactions (highest descent weight, most forward descent CG).
The resulting critical mass configurations are illustrated in Figure 4.2-19.
Reaction Computations, Compari.s mot, any! Evaluation. Support reactions were com-
puted and maximum values determined using the computer program and mass
MISSION MISSION WEIGHT 103 L6, (103 Kg) & CG (xo1 WEIGHT 103 LB, (103 Kul & CG (X,)
TYPE PHASE WITH ADAPTER WITHOUTADAPTER
11.0	 63X(24 0)
(5;0)	 (29.0)
11 .0	 63.107)
(5,01
	
(28.6)
DEPLOY ASCENT TA=  I
i.OBB	 f
___	
1,067.41	 f
7,Za0,9
11.0	 24.5	 13.6
7,750.0
11.0	 23.9	 12.9
(5;01
	
{11 21
	
{6.21 (5.01	 (i .91
	
5.9)
ABORT
DEPLOY DESCENT
(WITH FUEL)
9416.2
	
7,071.6 938`2
	 1,063.6
57.5 66.8( ,26.1)
ff
(26 8
RETRIEVE ASCENT
1,F 47.6 1,1463
791	 951	 VARIES 1,246 797	 S51	 VARIE5I7,187
Figure 4.2-19. Critical Mass Configurations
configurations discussed above. To determine the relative unacceptability of the can-
didates, a technique was developed in which the excessive reaction magnitude was
accumulated for each arrangement. This process is shown in Figure 4.2-20 for the
same arrangement and acceleration set used for the sample in Figure 4.2-18.
Computed maximum candidate reactions were tabulated versus Orbiter capability and,
in the case of Y and Z reactions at a single support point, were also plotted on a graph
containing the allowable X/Z interaction envelope (reference Figure 4, 2-9). The value
by which the computed reaction magnitude exceeded the allowable capability was deter-
mined for each reaction, and the summation (accumulation) of all elements of reaction
exceedance was determined as shown. Repeating this process for each support
arrangement candidate using the M.SFC 68M00039-1 accelerations resulted in the
accumulated exceedance summations and ranking shown.
For purposes of comparative assessment, configurations exhibiting the lowest exceed-
ance were judged best from the standpoint of Orbiter compatibility, since they tended
to imply least potential Orbiter impact. However, it was recognized that an absolute
correlation between ranking and Orbiter weight and/or cost impact could not be justi-
fied since the various elements of exceedance occurred in different proportions among
the 21 configurations and the nature and extent of the weight and cost impact associated
with each was unique.
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COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT
CONFIG. I	 E	 RANKING
1-i 344.9 15
1.2 243.4 6
2.1 193.4 2
2 .2 213.0 3
2.3 287.6 12
!ll^^^ a-1
._1.4 15
3.2 262A 1i
3.3 4095 18
4 .1 265.0 9
4.2 239.0 4
4.3 266.4 10
5.1 250.6 7
5.2 164.0 1
5.3 242.6 5
6.1 430.7 19
6.2 365.7 17
7-7 578.0 20
7.2 617.2 21
8•i 338.0 14
8.2 255.0 8
8 .3 317.4 13
a
4
REACTIONS 11,000 LO)
X1 &X2
	
Y1	 Z1	 Z2	 Z3CONFIG
MAG 1s2.0 85.5 57.4 120.6 60.4 52.2 1632 112.37•i OR8
1111.6
CAP k S6 ^r k 52 67
• XIZ INTERACTIONSAX	 ME BELOW)
Z
+Z1 IQZ 100K
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1
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Figure 4.2-20. Determination of Support Reaction Accumulated Exceedance
The exceedance ranking was used inSection 4.2.2.4, in conjunction with other evalua-
tion criteria, to select four recommended support arrangements for further detailed
study. (For reference in the following discussion, the selected arrangements were
1-1, 1-2, 2_. ", and 2-2. )
Since all support configurations exhibited substantial exceedance (M Min = 1.84.0X) using
accelerations per MSFC 68MO0039-1 to compute Reactions, the comparison with re-
actions computed using accelerations per JSC 07700, Vol. MV, Rev. C, was conducted.
The resulting comparison is summarized in Table 4.2-5. Backup data for the support
reaction computations is included in Appendix B.
The accumulated exceedance using JaC accelerations is less in all 21 support configu-
rations with substantial reductions in most.
Two configurations (4-1, 4-2) exhibit zero exceedance using JSC accelerations and
2: < 50TH for sever. others. The five best configurations, however, are either doubly
redundant or require dual hydraulic 'goad balancing systems to decouple the redundant	 a
supports and provide statical determinacy. Consequently, they tend to be heavier,
more costly, and lower performing than the four previously recommended systems.
The four recommended systems all slipped in the overall rankings, and in each case
the exceedauce is determined almost entirely by high X reactions (which are nonethe-
less lower than those due to MSFC accelerations).
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Table 4.2-5. Support Reaction Exceedance Comparisons
Om
Exceedance Comparisons
WFC* JSC* 1128YConfiguration
No. Redundancy E Ranking 2: Ranking MSFC* jSC*
1-1 344.9 16 218.1 18 352.7 61.7
1-2
0
243.4 6 41.6 9 279.9 13.9
2-1 193.4 2 184.8 17 311.0 66.4
2-2 1 213.0 3 29.2 8 259.4 11.4
2-3 287.6 12 143.8 14
3-1 341.5 15 17.3 7
3-2 1 282.4 11 16.5 6
3-3 409.5 18 121.3 11
4-1 266.0 9 0 1
4-2 2 239.0 4 0 1
4--3 266.4 10 92.4 10
5-1 250.6 7 14.6 5
5-2 2 184.0 1 3.2 3
5-3 242,6 5 8.2 4
6-1 430.7 19 772.7 16
6-2
0
365.7 17 125.7 12
7-1 578.0 20 242.9 20
7-2
0
61.7.2 21 250.9 21
8-1 338.6 14 229.7 19
8-2 1 256.0 8 160.6 15
8-3 317.4	 j 13 130.6 13
-*Ref: MSFC 68M00039-1, Figure 6
JSC 07700, 'Vol. XIV, Rev. C, Table 7.6
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To minimize X reactions in the selected configurations, new derivative arrangements
were investigated. In each of these the only change was relocation of the Y support
to an Orbiter support location within the CG excursion band for heavy (,4 e., deploy
ascent and retrieve ascent) mass configurations. The only support location satisfying
this requirement is at Xo 1128. The resulting accumulated exceedances are also
shown in Table 4.2-8. For the MSFC accelerations, the exceedance worsened in all
four configurations in spite of reductions in f Xmax. This resulted from increases in
the X reactions interacting with the maximum aft Z reactions. For the JSC accelera-
tions, all four configurations improved substantially.
The selection of a preferred Tug support arrangement and the extent of the associated
Orbiter modification, if any, depended upon the adoption of a realistic set of cargo bay
accelerations for subsequent structural interface analyses. However, it was not clear
that either of the above acceleration sets was appropriate. For example, the JSC
accelerations did not include any allowance for dynamic response of the cargo (Tug +
spacecraft',, yet infinite rigidity is unattainable and hence some dynamic response will
occur and allowance must be made for it. Conversely, the MSFC accelerations included
allowance for cargo dynamic response, but these same data had been specified for both
R	 LST and the Tug, whose response characteristics are probably quite different, and
!	 their applicability to Tug was therefore uncertain, It was therefore recommended that
the appropriate acceleration values be determined for an envelope of combined Orbiter/
Tug/spacecraft combinations.
It was decided that until such analyses were completed the MSFC data should be
assumed to represent the best available data and that Tug support reactions (and the
resulting exceedance) should continue to be based upon it. However, it was also feat
that the (TBD) correct accelerations probably lay between the JSC and MSFC values
(since certain MSFC cases with high pitch accelerations produce intolerable condi-
tions, such as lateral load on the full oxidizer tank equivalent to landing full., which
might require Shuttle system changes to provide alleviation), and the resulting reac-
tions would probably include some exceedance of current Orbiter capability (since
only two of the configurations have 0 exceedance with current JSC accelerations).
Consequently the following recommendations were spade:
a. The four selected configurations should be retained,
b. The Y support should not be moved to Xo 1128 at this time, but the b weight and
6 performance impacts of doing so should be determined.
c. JSC and Rockwell International should investigate (parametrically, as a function
of reaction magnitude) the impact of providing the capability to accommodate
support reactions beyond current Orbiter capability at those locations potentially
usable by Tug. Maximum reactions at each location should at least equal, and
preferably exceed, somewhat, those computed using MSFC accelerations in the
four recommended configurations.
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d. Prediction of Tug/spacecraft dynamic response should be undertaken as soon as
possible so that a suitable set of cargo bay accelerations could be determined,
permitting selection of a preferred support arrangement based on further assess-
ment of Tug and Orbiter impacts.
x.2.2.3 Weight/Performance Evaluation. Weight/performance evaluations were
conducted for each candidate support arrangement using the method shown in
Figure 4.2-21. The itemized weight tabulation shown includes all items exTected to
vary in weight or location as a function of support arrangement and/or Tug/adapter
configuration. Support arrangement 6-1 was assumed as a baseline for the A weight
and A performance computations.
Detailed analyses of the Tug sidewall and major frames were conducted. Initial body
loads were developed by computer using conventional engineering theory. These were
then modified to account for axial force and shear flow peaking near the support reac-
tions and for frame moment damping due to shell support. E-si.sting Tug finite element
model data generated in the STSS provided the 'basis for the load modification.
The reference configuration for both the support adapter sidewall (reference Section
4.2.3.5) and the additional length required to extend the Tug to the XO 1137 support
station (in configurations without support adapter) (reference Figure 4.2-7A) were
TUG BODY
A LENGTH
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Figure 4.2--21. Weight/Performance Evaluation Method
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based on extension of the reference Tug sidewall sandwich (reference Figure 4.2-5)
with appropriate allowance for nonoptimum weight items. Weights of interface fittings,
adapter mechanisms, and Orbiter bridge beams were taker from STSS and Rockwell
International data, Latch longerons were sized to carry the appropriate tensile loads
resulting from the modified body loads data. The X and Z load balancing systems
consisted of hydraulic systems including cylinders, accumulators, lines, fluid, and
various fittings (reference Figure 4.2-1.6) plus A weight allowances in the Orbiter
bridge beams to accommodate system installation. Partial derivatives used for A
performance computations were taken from MSFC 68M00039-2.
Tug Body © Length. The Tug body aft extension was incorporated in the -2 configura-
tion option in all support arrangement families to accommodate Tug/Orbiter interface
provisions at Xo 1187 (X/Z supports) and Xo 1181 (Y-support) (reference Section
4.2. 1. 1, Figure 4.2-7A). The reference configuration for the sidewall extension is
shown in Figure 4.2--21A. Region 2 is an 8.4 in. (21.3 cm) span of basic sandwich
sidewall whose cross section is identical to that
shown. in Figure 4, 2-5 for the reference Tug body.
Regions 1 and 3 are transition sections identical
to the solid laminate pan concept shown in Fig-
ure 4.2-A. Table 4.2-6 presents the weight
summary for the reference configuration body
extension (excluding reinforcement for load
peaking).
Figure 4.2-21A, Tug Body Aft
Extension	 Sidewall, Reinforcement Correction Factors for
Load Peaking. Because of the method of Tug sup-
port in the Orbiter, "conventional" engineering theory (P/A + Mc/I and VQ/1 + T/2A)
does not give the proper stress distribution in the Tug structural shell. For pre-
liminary sizing a rational method of modifying the conventional theory internal loading
Table 4.2-6. Weight Summary for Aft Body Extension
Item
Weight
Commentlb kg
1 11.57 5.25 lacludes 20% allowance for non-
2 M 53 7.96 optimum weight items (potting,
3 16.03 7.28 tolerances, etc.)
4 20.00 9.08 Allowance for local provisions for
Y-reaction introduction
2; 65,15 29.57
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distribution to more closely agree with actual distribution was required. Results from
the STSS computer analysis of Tug internal loads were therefore used to generate cor-
rection factors that could be applied to the conventional theory shell loads.
Axial line loading in the Tug structure is generated by side bending (Mz), vertical
bending (My), and axial loading (Px). Since the Tug configurations and loading cor:R-
tions introduce variations in the combination of My, Mz, and Px, each of the loads had
to be corrected individually, then superimposed to obtain a total corrected shell line
loading (N). The following procedure was employed to accomplish this correction.
a. Calculated conventional theory line loading distributions at stations of interest.
b. Applied a correction factor to N such that:
NTRUE r K NTHEORY
using curves for K versus ® at stations of interest.
Axial Loading (Px)
The peaking due to the two X reactions is a maximum at the X supports and drops off to
conventional theory distribution approximately 280 in. (711 cm) from the X supports,
as shown for KNPX in Figure 4.2-22. Distribution around the circumference at any
station was obtained by using the equation shown.
Vertical
 
Bending (My)
The peaking due to t1ly is due to the single (offset) forward vertical support, which
causes peaking on the shell structure adjacent to the support. Based on the STSS
computer analysis, this peaking carries on for a considerable distance from the
single vertical support. Therefore, KNMy from Figure 4.2-22 was used for half the
	 -.
distance from a single vertical support to the symmetrical vertical supports. Con-
ventional theory was used for the remainder of the shell. Note the peaking effect
applies only in configurations with a single vertical support. Conventional theory was
used in configurations with symmetrical vertical supports.	 !i
Side Bending (Mz)
j
Because of the vertical offset between the side (Y support) reaction and vehicle axis,
torsion occurs in the structure in addition to bending for side loading. This torsion
is not reacted entirely by T/2A shear but also is reacted by differential bending of
the shell. This differential bending modifies the conventional theory bending stress
distribution. Figure. 2-22 was used to modify the theoretical distribution. Based
on STSS computer loads, this peaking effect extends a significant distance from the
k
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side support. For preliminary sizing, the fouti peaking effect ;vas used for 280 in.
(711 cm) from the side support and conventional theory was used beyond.
c. Calculated the combined corrected N at points of interest:
NTRUE Z (K. NTHEORY)
Shear flow correction was accomplished in a manner similar to the above axial load
correction. The coefficients used were KQPX, KQMy, and KQMZ, and their distribu-
tions are also given in Figure 4.2-22. Combined, corrected q was calculated at points
of interest by:
gTRUE ^ E (K ' gTHEORY)
T 'Conventional Theory" Body Loads. A Hewlett-Packard computer program was written
to compute and plot nx and q at 15-degree increments around the Tug circumference at
any selected station for any support configuration. Mass properties input consisted
of the weight and CG forward of the selected station and was rased on the weight and
CG accumulations shown in Figures 4.2=-12E, -12F, and -12G.
The program contained a mode select option, permitting individual acceleration cases
to be input from. the keyboard or multiple -case subsets to be loaded directly into stor-
age as the program was loaded (as in the support reaction program previously dis-
cussed in Section 4.2.2.2). In the latter mode only the -r- and - maxima of a. and q,
at each point, considering all acceleration cases in the subset, were retained for
plotter output (i. e., the resulting plots were envelopes of :E nX and t q ma dma consid-
ering all cases). This was accomplished using the same max/min storage logic illus-
trated in Figure 4.2-18 for support reaction computation.
By first plotting the envelopes at a given station, them overplotting the probable re-
sponsible individual load cases, the envelopes were readily mapped and the critical
cases (and the areas they govern) defined. Support arrangement 6-1 was used as the
baseline for identffication of critical acceleration cases, which were then assumed to
apply to all support arrangements.
Table 4.2-7 summarizes the critical cases (within the MSFC 68M00039-1 acceleration
set) and Identifies the areas governed. Parenthetical terms indicate a local portion
of the circumference governed by the noted condition.
Using the acceleration case subsets within the critical load conditions, body load
envelopes were generated for all 21 support arrangements at Stations X0 952, 1063,
1127, 1172, and either 1186 or 1246. These were then modified to better approximate
the actual load distributions by using the appropriate peaking factor(s) from Fig-
ure 4.2-22. Figure 4.2-23 shows the initial "conventional theory" axial force and
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Table 4.2--7. Critical Conditions for Booty Loads
Regions Governed(x)
Axial Force Shear FlowMission
Load ConditionType Phase +n, -nx +q -q
Deploy Ascent Launch Release F F F F
M m (M) M
Max Q
SRM Cutoff A, (M) A (M)
Deploy Abort Reentry F (F) F F
Desceat (M) M
A
Retrieve Ascent Launch Release (M) (M) M, A F, M, A
Max Q
SRM Cutoff (A) (A)
(1')F = Fwd, Body (936-1062); M - Wd Body (1062-1173); A = Aft Body, Incl Adapter
(1173-1249)
{
i
1
0
z {101	 G
N.°	 4
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CONVENTIONALTHEORY\`\o--- MODIFIED PER STSS DATA
e SUPPORT ARRANGEMENT 1•1
'`_""^_ 
\ a X'952
\	 MSFC GBM00030.2
ACCELERATIONS
shear flow envelopes and the corresponding modified distributions at Station X o
 852 for
support arrangement 1-1 using accelerations from MSFC 68M00039-1.
--
	
	 Resizing. Determination of the facing thickness increases and their region of effec-
tivity on the Tug body surface was accomplished by the following method:
a. Used the conventional theory H. P. computer plots modified by appropriate peaking
factors to obtain axial (N) and shear (q) loading for sizing shell.
b. Used maximum shear and a^dal envelopes for combined allowables. Used inter-
action equation
M. S. =
	
	 2 1
	
- 1 to size body shell for combined loading
RA + RS2
c. Used reference configuration sandwich sidewall (Figure 4.2-5) as baseline.
d. Added plies at selective locations as required in two ply increments (one ply/face).
Added plies at +45 or 0 degrees, depending on whether shear or axial load was
critical..
e. Selected appropriate facing jayup using limit allowables (Table 4.2-8).
f. Mapped regions of A thickness onto Tug body flat pattern and smoothed step
boundaries to allow for probable manufacturing simplification. Figure 4.2--24
shows the resulting body reinforcement pattern for support arrangement 1-1.
In addition to the reinforcement mentioned above, the --2 options in each support
arrangement family required further reinforcement along the X-support longerons
between. Xo 1128 and 1187. An additional reinforcement of twelve plies per face was
required to accommodate the added limit shear flow along the longerons. This was
assumed to step taper to the previously computed facing thicknesses f22. 5 degrees
from each longeron, as shown in Figure 4.2-25.
Reinforcement Weights. The total weight of all sidewall reinforcement for the 21
support arrangements is shown in Table 4.2-9. The A-weight relative to lv'S"
baseline arrangement 6-1 is also tabulated.
Frames. In a manner similar to that used for body load correction factors, Tug frame
bending moment and shear coefficients were derived from the STSS finite element
computer solutions. Figure 4.2-26 illustrates the moment and shear coefficients.
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Table 4.2-8. Sandwich Limit Allowables for In-Plane Loads
e	 .I
Limit Allowables(2)
l	 1
Facing Configuration (1) Axial Force (nx)
Shear Flow (a)
' Tension compression
' Layup Orientation Plies lb/in. N/cm Win. N/cm lb/in. N/can
Baseline (3) 03/:.45 5 1157 2025 723 1265 321 562
Baseline + 1 @ 0° 04/+45 6 1.478 2587 918 1607 305 534
Baseline + 2 @ 0° 05/45 7 1845 3229 1147 2007 360 630
Baseline + 1 @ 45° 03/+452/-45 6 1196 2093 809 1416 444 777k
kr
:°. Baseline + 2 @ 45° 50 3 /:L4 2 7
1.237 2165 765 1339 596 1043
.^
`	 l
u Baseline + 3 @ 45 0 03/+453/- 452 8 1234
2160 734 1285 733 1283
G Baseline + 1 @ 0° 04x.4/52 8 1594 2790 909 1591 604 1057
+ 2 @ 45a
F
(2)
r	 r:	 (3)
I
e.
I
F
Per individual facing; facings symmetrical abort sandwich center line.
Per pair of facings.
Per Section 4.2.1..1, Figure 4.2-5.
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Figure 4.2-24. Body Reinforcement Pattern
X-LONGERON, REF Tug frame bending moment distributions were
1 2 PLI ES
then obtained by multiplying these moment
by thecoefficients	 maximum support reactions
PLIES
7.5°	 4PL)ES on each frame in each support arrangement.
The resulting moment distribution at .., 951
1
1s
22s
	
/ in support arrangement 1-2 is shown in
1
Figure 4. 2-27.
Review of the preceding frame moments after  4
smoothing versus those for a free ring sub-
Figure 4.2-25.	 Local Reinforce-» jected to the same loads indicated both a sub-
ment Linder stanti.al reduction of peak moments and a
X Support narrowing of the affected arc, as shown in
Longeroas Figure 4.2-28. This was mainly due to
sidewall shear restraint and indicated that
lighter frames than those previously selected
V
would be adequate for resisting the moments induced by Orbiter support reactions.
If dame weights were reduced, however, the analogy with the STSS cordiguration (on
which the moment reductions were predicated) would no longer have been valid unless
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Table 4.2--9. Tug Sidexmall Reinforcement Weight
^i
e
k
F
Support
Arrange-
ment
Reinforcement a-Weight (lb) Total A From 6--1
Feud Skirt Fuel Tank Intertank Aft AL lb kg lb kg
6-1 8.82 9.28 20.06 0 38.16 17.32 0 0
6-2 8.82 9.28 27.03 6.41 51.54 23.40 +13.38 + 6.07
1-1 8.82 9.28 19.30 0 37.40 16.98 - 0.76 - 0.35
1-2 8.82 9.28 26.91 7.01 52.02 23.62 +13.86 + 6.29
7-1 8.08 9.28 21.94 0 39.30 17.84 + 1.14 + 0.52
7-2 8.08 9.28 27.03 7.09 51.48 23.37 +13.32 + 6.05
2-1 2.20 2.32 13.30 0 17.82 8.09 -20.34 - 9.23
2-2 2.20 2.32 19.43 6.67 30.62 13.00 - 7.54 3.42
2-3 2.20 2.32 11.14 0 15.66 7.11 -22.50 -10.22
8-1 6.60 5.96 15.80 0 24.36 12.88 - 9.80 -- 4.45
8-2 6.60 5.96 21.01 6.67 40.24 18.27 + 2.08 + 0.94
8--3 6.60 5.96 13.64 0 26.20 11.89 -11.96 - 5.43
3-1 8.82 9.28 16.62 0 34.68 15.74 - 3.48 - 1.58
3-2 8.82 9.28 26.13 5.49 49.72 22.57 +11.56 + 5.25
3-3 8.82 9.28 19.52 0 37.62 17.08 - 0.59 - 0.25
4-1 2.20 2.32 12.42 0 16.94 7.69 -21.22 - 9.63
4-2 2.20 2.32 17.89 5.83 28.24 12.82 - 9.92 - 4.50
4-3 2.20 2.32 9.18 0 13.70 6.22 -24.46 -11.10
5-1 6.60 5.96 14.48 0 27.04 12.28 -11.111' - 5.05
5-2 6.60 5.96 19.13 5.45 37.18 16.88 -- 0.98 - 0.44
5-3 6.60 5.96 9.64 0 22.20 10.08 -15.96 - 7.25
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Figure 4.2-27. Tug Frame Fending
Moment Distribution
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a ratio of frame bending stiffness to shell
shear stifness was maintained similar to
that in the STSS. Since the current side-
wall material and construction was similar
to the STSS, frame El had to approximate
that used in STSS. However, since frame
weight reduction was accompanied with
depth reduction to maintain balanced
proportions, the moment of inertia also
decreased. To maintain EI, an increase
in E was therefore necessary. Since the
STSS frames were aluminum, the required
modulus increase could be achieved by
using high-modulus graphite/epoxy for
the current frames. Accordingly, the
frame concept shown in Figure 4.2-29
was incorporated at all major load loca-
tions in the Tug and adapter. Code num-
bers shown refer to corresponding items
in the following assumptions and method
used for frame sizing.
1• Used high-modulus graphite/epoxy
(HMS/X-904 or equivalent) for all
solid laminate elements.
2. Used sandwich construction_ for the
web with Hexcel HRD core.
Used a scrim reinforced adhesive for the
the web channel/core bond.
4• introduced radial loads into the
frames using back-to-back aluminum
fittings. For the portion of web be-
tween the fittings used solid laminate
to permit mechanical attachment.
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Figure 4.2-28. Effect of Shell Support
on Frame Moments
hQ Introduced taugential loads into the
frames through the outboard cap +
effective material in as assumed "pawl in the body sidewa.0 sandwich. Provided back-
to-back reinforcing channel doublers.
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6. Provided web reinforcement to
accommodate high shear flows in the
web adjacent to the load introduction
points. Determined the are extent of
this material from the frame shear
coefficient plot in Figure 4.2-26.
ata
SANOWICH WEB Y41
CHANNEL FACINGS
1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 7, 9, 10
RADIAL LOAD
INTRODUCTION
FITTINGS
4
CHANNEL DOUBLERS
UNDER RADIAL FITTINGS
1.5
7. Assumed the web channel facings were
limited to a minimum thickness of
0.009 in.. (0.0225 can) (4 plies), with
100 percent X45--degree ply orienta-
tion.
^-	 8. Used 100 percent unidirectional ply
INNER
 R Aiz	
orientation in the caps except for the1.	
web channel plies (which should be
Figure 4.2-29. Major Frame Concept 	 conservatively omitted in flange
thickness determination).
9. Used F. S. ULT = 1.4 and M. S. = x-0.25 in determining the allowable operating
stresses for both flange and web material.
10. From item 9, the shear flow capability of the nominal web (item 7) was 443 lb/in.
(775 N/cm), and the item 6 reinforcement was sized to carry shear flows in excess
of this value.
11. Proportioned frame inner caps to achieve fully effective flange material per
Roark, p. 139.
12• Used equal area in inner and outer caps, and held outer cap width constant at
3.00 in. (7. 5 cm).
Since support reactions, and therefore moments, varied with both support location and
arrangement, basic frame weights were developed parametrically. Figure 4.2-30
presents frame weight versus moment and includes allowances for potting and thick-
ness tolerance. Similarly, the weight of local load introduction provisions on a given
frame depended on the number and magnitude of support reactions carried by that
frame. Figure 4.2-31 provides the weight of the local provisions parametrically for
both Y and Z reactions for two frame depths.
Based in part on the parametric (moment) data and in part on the cap proportions 	 =;'4
versus depth, a baseline frame depth of 6.0 in. (15.2 cm) was selected. Flange areas
wer,e based on this depth in all frames. At locations with single Z reactions, the
frame depth was increased to 8 in. (20.3 cm), with cap areas still based on 6 in.
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(15 cm.) depth, to provide an increase in I
of approximately 80 percent mil these
frames tend to be stiffness cri, 	 per the
STSS data. The added increment of web
weight was 2.64 lb (1, 20 kg).
The total frame weight at any location was
determined as follows.
a. Divided the moment envelope caves
into regions of constant moment.
b. Determined the weight of each region
on the basis of 0/360 x the total frame
weight for that moment from
Figure 4.2-30.
Figure 4.2-30. Frame Weight versus
Moment
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c. Added the weight of local load intro-
duction provisions for each reaction
location.
d. Added Eb + Ec to obtain the total
weight and increased by 10 percent
for contingency.
e. Added the A web weight if appropriate.
The resulting Tug frame weights at Sta
tions Xo 951, 1128, and 1187 are shown
in Tables 4.2-10, -11 and -12 respectively.
Tug Fittings. From Figure 4.2-21, three
Figure 4.2-31. Weight of Fram Local	 types of fiftings are mounted on the Tug
Load Introduction	 body-. 1) the primary support fittings at
Provisions versus	 the Tug/Orbiter interface, 2) the longerons
Support Reaction 	 backing tip the latches at the Tub;/adapter
separation plane (including any docking
alignment provisions on the Tug side), and 3) a receptacle for the end effector on the
Orbiter RMS.
Interface Fittings. Support fitting design was not conducted until the detailed assess-
ment phase of the study (Section 4.2.3.3). In the interim, support fitting weights were
taken from existing data. The two available sources were the NASA baseline Tug per
MEFC 68M00039-2 and the Program 2 Tug per the Convair STSS. Table 4.2-Z3
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Table 4.2-10. Frame Weights at X o 951
Support
Arrange-
Weights Totals
Basic A For A at Z3 A at Z4 lZ at ,Y'
anent Frame Stiffness Support Support Support lb kg
6-1 25.71 2.64 5.10 - - 33.45 15.19
6-2 25.81 2.64 5.20 - -- 33.65 15.28
1-1 25.86 2.64 5.50 - -- 34.00 15.44
1--2 25.50 2.64 5.30 -- - 33.44 15.18
7-1 34.30 - 5.00 3.20 3.30 45.60 20.70
7-2 38.75 - 5.00 4.10 3.30 51.15 23.22
2-1 21.70 - 3.00 3.00 -- 27.70 12.58
2-2 21.70 - 2.70 2.70 - 26.40 11.99
2-3 21.70 - 2.70 2.70 - 26.40 11.99
8-1 32.00 - 3.80 3.80 3.30 42.90 19.48
8-2 29.40 - 3.50 3.50 3.30 39.70 18.02
8-3 25.70 - 3.10 3.10 3.30 35.20 15.98
3-1 25.42 2.64 5.5 - 2.90 36.46 16.55
3-2 25.21 2.64 5.3 -- 2.50 35.65 16.19
3-3 25.21 2.64 5.3 -- 2.50 35.65 16.19
4-1 21.9 - 3.0 3.00 2.3 30.2 13.71
4-2 21.7 - 2.8 2.80 2.0 29.30 13.30
4-3 21.7 - 2.8 2.80 2.0 29.30 13.30
5-1 28.56 - 3.8 3.80 2.5 38.66 17.55
5--2 26.56 - 3.5 3.50 2.2 35.76 16.24
5-3 23.16 - 3.1 3.10 2.0 31.36 14.24
e
compares the weights for the four types of fittings occurring in the various support 	
;3
arrangements. The STSS data was adopted since it included weights for all four
fatting types, whereas the NASA data was limited to only those fitting types r:iounted
on the baseline Tug body.
Latch 1aongerons and Docking Guides. Longerons are required in 36 places in config-
urations using a load-carrying support adapter to collect and transmit Tug inertia
NIPPON M'-
e
Table 4.2-11. Prase Weights at Xo 1128
Support
Arrange-
Weights Totals
Basic A at Z 1 A at Z 2 A at Y
went Frame Support Support Support Ib kg
6-1 41.60 5.75 5.0 3.30 55.65 25.27
6-2 41.00 5.6 4.9 3.30 54.80 24.88
2-3 37.60 5.2 5.2 3.30 51.30 23.29
3-3 41.6 5.25 5.0 3.30 55.65 25.27
4-3 37.6 5.2 5.2 3.30 51.30 23.29
5-3 26.70 4.5 4.5 3.30 39.00 17.71
8-3 26.46 4.5 4.5 - 35.46 16.10
Table 4.2-1.2. Frame Weights at Xo 1187
Support
Arrange-
Weights Totals
A For A at 2 1 A at Z 2 A at Y
Ment Frame Stiffness Support Support Support lb kg
1-2 31.35 - 5.0 4.1 2.2 42.65 19.36
2-2 21.70 - 3.7 3.7 2.2 40.70 18.48
3-2 31.35 - 5.0 4.1 2.2 42.65 19.36
4-2 25.60 - 4.8 4.8 2.1 37.30 16.93
5-2 22.71 - 3.8 3.8 2.2 32.51 14.76
7-2 30.85 2.64 6.95 - - 40.44 18.36
8-2 22.71 - 3.8 3.8 2.2 32.51 14.76
6-2 42.65 19.36
Table 4. 2-13. Support FittingrWeights
Type
NASA
Baseline
Convair
STSS
X only 7 21.6
Y only 10.0 21.8
Z only 20.0 21.8
Combined X/Z r 43.2
^- wax ::
loads across the Tug/adapter interface. The companion longerons on the support
adapter were sized during the adapter preliminary design and are discussed in
Section 4.2.3. 5.
Weight allocations for the Tug longeron installations were based on the following
assumptions:
a. Cross-section areas at loaded end and opposite end are the same as on the
adapter and the area varies linearly between the ends.
b. End pads are the same as on the adapter.
c. Longerons extend forward from Xo 1172.9 Lo Xo 1127.
d. Tug sandwich sidewall is "panned" under longerons (reference Figure 4.2-6).
e. Docking guides (configuration TBD) are integral with longerons and add 0.5 lb
(0.23 kg) per longeron.
f. A frame is used at Xo 1128. If a major frame is already there, it was used; if
not, a light frame was added (same as the adapter stability frame).
g. Allowed 10 percent on longeron weights for fillet and tolerances.
The resulting weight allowance for the complete longeron installation (excluding any
added frame at Xo 1128) was 50. 1 Ib (22.7 kg).
RMS Fitting. The study of candidate EMS attachment locations resulted in the choice
of a single fitting located at Xo 1140 on the Tug sidewall at Yo -94; Z o 400, as show
in Figure 4.2--32. Since this fitting is Tug-mounted no weight difference occurs as a
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function.  of support arrangement. The
l?..XiS fitting was therefore deleted from
further consideration in the weight/per-
formance evaluations.
Orbiter Retained (Non-Tug) lb,,ms. The
non-Tug items consist of the support/
deployment adapter structure and mech-
anisms, the Orbiter bridge beams (in
excess of the three sidewall beams and
one keel fitting supplied by the Orbiter),
and any configuration-dependent subsystems
.a
Figure 4.2-32. RMS Fitting Location
0)
	 the hydraulic load-balancing system(s),
support structure.
Adapter. The support adapter details are presented in Section 4.2.3.5. Among those
support arrangements using an adapter, the mechanism weights are constant, and the
structure weights vary only as a function of the number of Y and Z support reactions
at the aft end. Table 4.2-14 summarizes the adapter weights as a function of support
arrangement family.
Table 4.2-I.4. Adapter Weight Summary
Arrangement
Family
Aft Supports Weights Total
Y z Structure Mechanisms lb IC9
6 0 0 497.4 291.0 788.4 357.9
7 1 1 571.9 291.0 862.9 391.8
All others 1 2 593.7 291.0 884.7 401.7
Orbiter Bridge Beams. The configurations and weights of the various Orbiter sidewall
and keel support fittings were based on data supplied by Rockwell International. Con-
figurations were given by RI layouts VL 70-004166 (sidewall beams) and V7L 70-004167
(keel fittings). Weights were based on the then current RI allocations and are shown in
Table 4.2-15.
Table 4.2-15. Orbiter Bridge Beano. Weights
Unit Weights Total
Location Fitting Mechanism lb 1cg
Sidewall 124.0 15.0 139.0 63.1
Keel 78.0 0 78.0 35.4
Load Balancing Systems. Load balancing systems provide a means of reducing sup-
port reactions by introducing symmetrical supports without adding redundancy. Later
in the study when Orbiter relative deflection data was available, a comparison of
redundant and load-balanced concepts was conducted and is discussed in Section 4.2.3.9.
The load balancing system concept as discussed briefly in Section. 4.2.2.1 and illus-
trated in Figure 4.2-16, provides a means of decoupling antisymmetric load compo-
nents from a selected pair of supports. In the case of the Tug it consists of floating
two like; supports (two Xs, two forward Zs, or two aft Zs) on an incompressible fluid.
The cylinders that provide "float' s are plumbed in such a manner that symmetric loads
on the support pair (Tug axial inertia on the Xs for example) are reacted from Tug to
cylinder to fluid to Orbiter. Antisymmetrie loads (yaw bending in support families
3, 4, and 5 for example) are not reacted since the cylinder pistons are free to move in
opposite directions on opposite sides of the cargo bay. Yaw bending is then reacted
by the dual. Y supports without rendering the support system redundant.
Table 4.2-16. Total Required Bridge Beam Quantities
Support Arrangement
Z Y`Pe 6-1, L-1, 7-1, 2-1 2-3 8-1 8-3 3-1, 3-3 4-1, 4-3 5-1. 5-3
-2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2 -2
Side 5 3 4 4 6 4 6 3 5 4 6 4 6
Keel 1 1
1 - i
1
1 _.
1
..._2
2 2 2 2 2
Of the 21 support arrangements candidates, fifteen use at least one load balancing
system. Of these, six (families 4 and 5) were doubly balanced (X and Z).
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To obtain an estimate of total system weight all identifiable elements in the schematic 	 `.
system were included. To do this, the balancing system configuration variations as a
function of support system configuration were investigated. Five different balance
system concepts were required to satisfy the 15 support arrangements.
Because of variation in support station between arrangements, the extent of the modi-
fication of the current bridge beams to incorporate the balance system installations 	
f^
also varied. Delta weights to bridge beams were estimated, and an example of the 	 i
modification at Xo 951 was illustrated in Figure 4.2-16. Furthermore, since the 	 3 =
magnitudes of support reactions to be carried by the cylinders varied, the cylinder
configuration, quantity and unit weight differed._
Cylinders were sized for nominal 3000 psi (20.7 MPa) preload and 6000 psi (41.3 MPa)
burst. Radial deflection was found to be excessive in strength designs, so initial wall
thielmesses were increased as necessary to limit deflections, and cylinder weights
were based on the revised designs.
Plumbing weights were based on CRES tubing (two lines per system) routed along the
Orbiter frame nearest the cylinders in question, plus a 25 percent length allowance for,
local bends, etc.
Accumulators were sized using the same criteria as for the cylinders, assuming a
fluid volume of 25 percent of total system volume. Miscellaneous system elements
were also estima?- J.
Weights were accuir.;Alak e' t for each affected support arrangement, as illustrated in
Figure 4.2-33 and the resulting totals are as shown.
^I
I
	
	 Subsystem Support Structure. For those deploy concepts without a load-carrying
adapter, an Orbiter-mounted support structure was required to perform the following
functions.
a. Support ,non-Tug subsystem items located in the cargo bay (avionics packages,
helium bottles for abort dump, purge, tank repressurization).
b. Support the active side of the Tug/Orbiter umbilical panels and their associated
mechanisms.
c. Provide rotation aid.
The configuration of this element was highly dependent on the number and location of
the major subsystem elements (and the plumbing/wiring associated with them), as well
as on the deploy concept. Since weight differences as a function of specific configura-
tion were not expected to be large, a weight of 125 lb (57 kg) was assumed for all
configurations.
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Item 2-1
BRIDGE BEAM A
X (2) -
Z (2) 20.0
X/Z (2) -
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Cylinders
X Tandem -
Z Single 47.2
Z Tandem --
Accumulators
^- X (2) -
Z (2) 16.0
Fittings, etc.
Hydraulic Fill 1.2Gas Charge
Filters 0.8
Check 'Valves 1.2
Transducers 0.8
Plumbing 9.2
Fluid 10.3
Brackets, etc. 5.0
1111.7
Support
Arrangement
Total Weight
lb	 kg
2-1 111.7 50.7
--2 111.7 50.7
	
1
-3 111.7 50.7
3-1 207.1 94.0
--2 207.1 94.0
-3 207.1 94.0
4-1 P13.8 142.5
-2 313.8 142.5
-3 313.•8 142.5
5-1 385.2 174.9
-2 385.2 174.9
-3 269.2 167.6
8-1 183.1 83.1
-»2 183.1 83.1
--3 367.1 75.9
Figure 4.2--33: Load Balancing System Weights
aT
,f
ii
Summary. Weights were computed as discussed above and accumulated in the format 	 I
illustrated in Figure 4.2-21 for the 21 support arrangements. Arrangement 6-1 was
then selected as a baseline (i. e. , AW = 0), and the A weights of all other arrangements
were calculated relative to the baseline. The performance partials given in Fig- 	 I
ure 4.2-21 for synchronous deployment and retrieval missions were then applied to the
relative A weights to determine the relative A performance of each arrangement. The 	 a
resulting A-weight and A-performance data is summarized in Table 4.2-17.
I
4.2.2.4 Selection. Selection. of the recommended support arrangements was based on 	 I
evaluation of the 21 candidates defined in Section 4.2.2. 1 with respect to several cri-
teria. ria. In addition to the support reaction evaluation (Section 4.2.2.2) and weight/per-
	
` {	 formance evaluation (Section 4.2.2.3), candidates were also evaluated qualitatively in
	
i	
terms of cost, rel ility, and dyn4-:.ic response. The complete evaluation matrix and
the resulting configuration selections are shown in Figure 4.2-34. The reaction
exceedance and weight performance data were taken from summaries in the appropriate
sections noted above. The cost/reliability evaluation indicated that those arrangements
without a support adapter (all -2 options) should be less expensive (due to elimination of
the adapter structure and the associated mechanisms) and should experience a slight
increase in reliability (again due to mechAnism elimination).
The d,smamic response evaluation indicated that all redundant (or load-balanced)
arrangements were expected to be considerably stiffer than the determinate arrange-
ments. Since the cargo dynamic response portion of the MSFC 68M00039-1 accelera-
tions was more severe in the pitch plane in the critical flight condition (launch release),
arrangements with pitch--plane support symmetry (four Z-supports) were ranked better
than arrangements with dual-Y supports only (family 3).
The four recommended configurations exhibit the following features:
1-1 Determinate; uses a deployment adapter, penalized by high support reactions, but
has the best payload performance.
1-2 Determinate; has no adapter, medium reactions and has the best performance of
any adapterless (-2) configuration,
2-1 Singly load balanced (forward Z); has a deployment adapter, shows low reactions
and high performance.
2-2 Singly load balanced (f: ►ryvard Z); without adapter, has low support reactions and
medium performance.
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f. Location D Weight
Tug Non-Tug
a A W A PL (lb) A W 11 PL (lb)
ri (lb) Dep Ret (lb) Dept Ret lb icg
1-1 -111 +292 +154 -182 + 69 0 -293 -133 8
1-2 + 92 -242 --127 -941 +358 0 -849 -385 1
2-1 -116 +303 +159 + 69 - 26 0 - 47 - 21 11
2-2 75 -195 -103 -691 +263 0 -616 -280 3
2-3 -- 12 + 32 + 17 +251 - 95 0 +239 +109 15
rl^ 3-1 - 90 +236 +124 +103 - 39 0 + 13 +	 6 13
3-2 +114 -299 -158 -656 +249 0 -541 -246 4
3-3 + 23 - 62 - 32 +285 -108 0 +308 +140 18
4-1 - 92 +241 +127 +349 -133 0 +257 +117 16
4-2 +103 -270 -142 -411 +156 0 -308 -140 7
4-3 + 11 - 28 - 15 +531 --202 0 +542 +246 20
5-1 - 77 +202 +106 +420 -160 0 +343 +156 19
5-2 +114 -297 -157 -339 +129 0 -225 --102 9
5-3 +	 9 - 23 - 12 +586 -223 0 +595 +270 21
6-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
6-2 +124 -326 -172 -663 +252 0 -539 -245 5
7-1 - 54 +142 + 75 - 65 + 25 0 -119 - 54 10
17-2 +108 -282 -149 -802 +305 0 -694 -315 2
8-1 - 68 +178 + 94 +140 - 53 0 + 72 + 33 14
8-2 + 99 -259 -136 -619 +235 0 -520 -236 6
8-3 -	 9 + 23 + 12 +306 -116 0 +297 +1.35 17
Wit...	 -	 ^^^s::^..,^:..a.,•_,^u^,d^LL^._.^,. ^ 	 ....^,:^^_,,_. ^ .^,...,. ^.L
A Payload
Deploy	 I Retrieve
lb	 kg I 1 1  lb	 kg
+361 +164 1 +154 + 70 2
+116 + 53 6 -127 - 58 15
+277 +126 2 +159 + 72 1
+ 68 + 31 8 -103 - 47 14
- 63 - 29 1 14 + 17 . +	 8 8
+197 + 89 3 +124 + 56 4
- 50 - 23 - 13 -158 - 72 20
-170 - 77 1$ - 32 - 15 13
+108 49 6 +127 + 58 3
-114 - 52 17 -142 - 64 17
-230 -104 20 - 15 -	 7 12
+ 42 + 19 ..9 +106 + 48 5
-168 - 76 18 -157 - 71 19
-246 -112 21 - 12 -	 5 11
0 0 11 0 0 10
- 74 - 34 15 -172 - 78 21
+167 + 76 4 + 75 + 34 7
+ 23 + 10 10 -14.9 - 68 18
+125 + 57 5 + 94 + 43 6
1 6 1
- 93 - 42 16 + .2 +	 5 9
Table 4.2-17. Weight/ Performance ]Evaluation Summary
i
FVAI 11ATI nw
CONFIG F-XCEEDANCE OUANTITATIVE
CRITERIA
QUALITATIVE
CRITERIA
SELECTNQ REDUN MSFC 15C
OWT APL
COST& DYNAFdICDANCY
RELIA13 RESPON SE
1-1 0 344.9 218.1 -293 +361 0 0 X1.2 243,4 41.6 -042 +103 + 0 X
2.1 193.4 184.8 47 +277 0 ++ X
2.2 1 213,0 29.2 -609 +59 + ++ X
23 287.6 143.8 +239 •63 0 ++
3-1 341.5 17.3 +13 +197 0 +
3 .2 1 282.4 16.5 .535 -58 + +
33 409.5 121.3 +308 -170 0 +
4-1 266.0 . 0 +257 +108 0 ++
4 .2 2 239.0 0 1300 •122 + +.
4-3 266.4 92A +542 -230 0 ++
5-1 250.6 14.6 +343 +42 0 ++
5 .2 2 184.0 3.2 -219 -177 + -t+
5.3 242.6 8.2 +595 -246 0 ++
6. 1 0 430.7 172.7 0 0 0 06.2 355.7 125.7 -532 -83 + 0
7.1 0 578.0 242.9 .119 +167 0 07.2 617.2 250.9 -688 +14 + 0
8 .1 338.6 229.7 +72 +125 0 ++
8 .2 1 256.0 160.6 .514 -32 + ++
8 .3 317.4 13016 +297 -93 0 ++
RECOMMENDED CONFI GURATI0NS
1-1	 '
1 .2	 -	 -
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Figure 4.2--34. Support Arrangement Evaluation and Select-ion
The following rationale was used for selection of the recommended arrangements:
a. Load balancing of X-supports is heavy (207 lb, (94 kg)) and complicated for the
amount of reaction reduction achieved (151.9 x 10 3 lb (68.9 x 10 3 kg) ma^dmum to
127.6 x 103 lb (5'7.8 x 103 kg), which still exceeds Orbiter capability). It is prob-
ably better to revise the Orbiter loagerons.
b. Load balancing of Z-supports is also heavy - 112 lb (51 kg) and complicated but
reduces reactions substantially and provides a reduction in dynamic response by
providing symmetry and eliminating torsion.
c. Forward Z balancing (families 2, 4) is better than aft Z balancing (families 5, 8)
in terms of reactions, weight, and performance.
d. From a, b, c: Eliminated families 5 and 8 and considered eliminating families 3
and 4.
e. x.11 -3 configurations rank poorly in weight, performance and reactions; there-
fore eliminated all --3s.
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f. All determinate systems (families 1, 6, 7) are poor in reactions except 1-2.
Among determinate systems: family 1 is better than 6 or 7 in weight, perform-
ance, and reactions. Therefore eliminated families 6, 7.
1
g. Among singly balanced families (2, 3), family 2 is better in weight, performance,
and reactions; also it provides the reduction in dynamic response noted in item b;
therefore, eliminated family 3.
h. Comparing families 4 and 2, family 2 is better in weight, performance, and
reactions except for 4-2, which is the best system of all for reactions using JSC
accelerations. Comparing 4-2 with 2-2, the only difference in reactions (other
than in the X direction) is an Y (4-2 is well inside capability, but 2-2 is also
within Y capability), so the implied Orbiter impact between the two is limited to
item a. Reactions in 2-1 and 2-2 are similar and permit good comparison of with/
without adapter concepts. 2-1 has high X reactions but X/Z combinations at ZMAX
are within Orbiter capability. Therefore, only X reinforcement A required in the
Orbiter, which eliminated 4--1, 4-2.
L Summary: Retained 1-1, 1-2, 2-1, and 2-2. This permits comparison between
determinate and load-balanced systems and further permits an adapter/no-adapter
comparison in each system.
4.2.3 DETAILED ASSESSMENT AND SPECIAL EMPHASIS TASKS. The detailed
assessment tasks were conducted to expose differences among the four support
arrangements recommended in the screening analysis to select a preferred structural
interface and define its requirements in detail. A finite element analysis of the Tug
and adapter was conducted to 1) validate/update the shell load peaking and frame load
dissipation derived in the screening analysis and thus more accurately define the
sidewall reinforcement and major framing requirements of the reference vehicle,
2) assess deflections versus the Orbiter cargo bay envelope, and 3) aid i n determining
stiffnesses for use in the dynamic response analysis.
Support fitting designs were prepared to 1) update the corresponding weight, 2) accom-
modate the Orbiter trunnion and keel fitting configurations, and 3) accommodate verti-
cal payload changeout at the launch site. In addition, the impact of bearing/shaft
friction in the -+Y direction at the Z and X/Z supports was also investigated in response
to specific customer request.
The dynamic analysis identified the lower frequencies and their mode shapes for four
support arrangements and subsequently investigated the response of one of the
arrangements to forcing functions representing the Shuttle liftoff transient.
The special emphasis structures tasks were conducted in response to several items of
concern resulting either from problems identified during the detailed assessment tasks
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or from changes in requirements. Figure 4.2-35 identifies the areas of concern and
the task flow used to address each while converging to selection of a recommended
structural support system.
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Figure 4.2-35. Special Emphasis Tasks
New support reactions for all flight conditions, including crash, were computed using
the latest accelerations per MSFC PF--02-75-31. These were compared with the pre-
vious data, and the extent of any exceedance of Orbiter capability was determined.
Redundant support systems could not be investigated Initially for lack of Orbiter stiff-
ness and/or deflection data. Later, preliminary Orbiter deflection data was received
and used to assess the feasibility of redundant support systems in terms of both support
reactions and Tug body loads.
initial dynamic analyses indicated uniformly low first mode frequencies coupled with
excessive acceleration and cLsplacem.ent response in the yaw direction. As a result
additional modal and forced response analyses were conducted for systems offering
increased yaw stiffness. The station location of the Y-support significantly affects
reactions and dynamic displacement response in all single-Y systems. Accordingly a
study of the effect of Y-support location was conducted using data from the reactions,
redundant support, and dynamics tasks.
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Initially, only Y-direction friction at Z and X/ Z supports was investigated for impacts
on Tug weight and performance. This effort was expanded to consider friction forces
in both the X and Z direction, at all support locations. weight and performance penal-
ties were determined as were any support fitting impacts due to new hardware require-
ments. The original Z and X/Z support fittings designs included ground handling
.provisions that are no Longer compatible with the KSC AGE concept. Consequently
the original concept was compared with the current KSC, JSC, and MSFC fitting design
concepts, and updated support fitting designs were prepared.
During the preliminary screening analysis 21 support systems were evaluated in sev-
eral categories including weight and performance. At that time only preliminary
weight data was available. Detailed finite element analyses were later conducted, and
the resulting load distribution and deflection data were used to more accurately identify
Tug weight impacts and the resulting performance differences between candidate sup-
port systems. Candidate support systems were then compared on the basis of weight,
performance, support reactions, and dynamic response and a recommended Tug
structural support system was selected.
4.2.3.1 Finite Element Analysis. One of the major structural tasks performed dur-
ing the Tug interface study was a finite element computer analysis of the complete
Tug/deployment adapter structure.
Objectives. Tug structural weight was one of the major parameters used in the pre-
limina.3my screening of alternative support concepts. For the preliminary screening
analysis, Tug structure weight was estimated from simple sizing relationship based
on data extracted from the Tug finite element model generated dung the Convair
STS study. One of the significant points developed during the earlier STS study was
that the internal loading distribution in the Tug does not correspond to conventional
engineering beam theory. Because the Tug body is a short, large-diameter shell, that
is point loaded, internal axial and shear loading is highly peaked.
Internal loads and member sizes thus cannot be estimated accurately using conven-
tional theory. Since there are significant differences between the STSS Tug and the
current baseline Tug configurations, it was difficult to assess the accuracy of apply-
ing STSS data to the current configuration. Therefore, one of the primary objectives
of the Tug finite element analysis was to validate the methods used to size major Tug
support frames and body shell reinforcement in the preliminary screening of alter-
native support concepts.
Tug and payload deflections and clearance loss were identified as potentially signifi-
cant screening criteria for alternative support concepts. However, because accurate
stiffness models of the various Tug configurations were not available during the
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preliminary screening assessment deflections and clearance loss could be evaluated
only in a qualitative manner. A second major objective of the Tug finite element
analysis was thus to evaluate Tug and payload deflections and loss of clearance for
those support configurations selected for detailed assessment.
To obtain accurate relative wei&t information, it was necessary to size many of the
major Tug structural elements. This provided a means for updating the baseline Tug
structure. The third objective of the Tug finite element analysis was therefore to
further update the baseline Tug by resizing major structural elements as required for
strength and stiffness compatibility.
Changing requirements during future Tug studies may require modification to the base-
line Tug and its support configuration. A fourth objective of the Tug finite element
analysis was to create a versatile Tug model that could be easily modified to accommo-
date all candidate support configurations, permit selective loading, and provide flexi-
bility for future use.
Methodology. The baseline four-point (single eccentric forward Z) and the five-point
(load-balanced dual. forward Z) support concepts were selected, as a result of the pre-
liminary screening analysis, for further detailed assessment. To permit more detailed
evaluation it was decided that, rather than try to evaluate all the candidate support
configurations, only these two configurations could be evaluated :nitialiy using the
finite element model.
An existing Convair structural analysis program (SOLID SAP) was used to perform the
Tug finite element analysis. SOLID SAP is a large capacity computer program for the
linear elastic analysis of three-dimensional structural systems. The structural sys-
tems to be analyzed may be composed of combinations of any of the structural element
types:
a. Three-dimensional truss.
b. Three-dimensional beam.
c. Plane stress and plane strain.
d. Two-dimensional axisymmetric solid.
e. Three-dimensional solid.
f. Plate and shell.
g. Boundary.
h. Thick shell element.
J
The size of the structural system is not inherently limited and is restricted in practice
only by considerations of time and cost. While the solution scheme is bandwidth
oriented there is no restriction (save cost) on the size of the bandwidth. However,
there is an internal module that can be used to internally resequence the grid points
to reduce the bandwidth. The program is coded in standard Fortran. IV and is opera-
tional on the Convair CDC Cyber 70 computer.
The Tug finite element model (shown schematically in Figure 4.2-35A) is a full 360-
degree model that can accommodate both unsymmetric Tug geometry and loading. The
TUG SHELL H = d9.0 [N. 11,600 LB PAYLOAD GG FwD Z SUPPORTS
	
LH2	 Lop	 AFT XJZ SUPPORT
(224 M) (4,990 K G } /TANK
	 TANK
SUPPORT
L0 2
 & LH 2 TANKS
Figure 4.2-3 5A. Tug Finite Element Model
model includes a 176-inch (440 cm) diameter shell representing the payload, Tug
structural shell, and deployment adapter. The shelf, grid consists of 15-degree air-
cumferen:ti.al increments (23 inches; 57.5 cm) with longitudinal grid spacing varying
from a minimum of 15 inches (37. 5 cm) at the forward end of the Tug to a maximum
of 43 inches (120.0 cm) in the payload area.
LO2 and LH2 inertia loads were introduced into the Tug shell by axial truss elements
representing the tank support struts. The L0 2 tank model used 24 struts (in pairs),
and the LH2 tank model used 12 struts (in pairs). In addition. the L112 tank model
incorporated a forward lateral support consisting of six tangential struts between the
tank and shell at Station 997.2. The tanks were represented by truncated shell struc-
tures, which permitted introduction of propellant inertia loads at the CG ox each tank.
The Tug structural shell was attached to the deploy adapter model by means of 14
short stiff beam elements to approximate the 11 latches. Support fittings were
modeled as combinations of truss and beam elements. The model was generated
with five support points with an option of either rising or not using the second forward Z
— -j4-+
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fitting so that both the load balanced 5-point (2-1) and baseline 4-point (1-1) configur-
ations could be evaluated using the same basic model.
Results of the preliminary screening analysis were used to estimate initial member
sizing. After the initial computer run, member sizes were updated to eliminate areas
of obvious overstress. The major frames at Stations 951.0, 997.2, 1061.7, 1172.9,
and 1246.0 were all sized using criteria established for the initial screening analysis.
Frames were modeled as beams with their centroid offset from the shell.
The graphite epoxy sandwich used for the Tug structural shell was represented as
pseudo-isotropic membrane panels in the model. Because of the wide variation in
possible ply layups, it was decided that pseudo isotropic properties would best fit our
requirements for these early analyses. it should be noted that, in the future, the
model can be modified to include orthotropic properties for the structure. A basic
effective thickness of 0.027 inch (0.07 cm) with a modulus E = 16 x 10 6 psi (11 x 1.06
N/cant) was used„
Two unit case runs were made. The first preliminary run was used to check out the
model and provide data to ensure member sizes were reasonable. The second run
incorporating updated member properties and geometry was used for final member
sizing and deflection analysis. The finite element analysis was performed using the
initial set of MSFC 68M00039--1 load factors provided at the start of the study. Late
in the study (after the finite element analysis was essentially complete) a new set of
load factors (MSFC PF02-75-31) was supplied to replace the earlier values.
Schedule and budget constraints prohibited the incarporatT: Nn of these new load factors
in the finite element analysis. Load factors used in the finite element analysis are
summarized in Table 4.2-17A. In general, these load factors are much more con-
servative than the later MSFC PF02-75-31 values.
Unless otherwise noted all finite element results presented reflect the load factors in
Table 4.2-17A. During the Weight/Performance Evaluation Update (Section 4.2.3.10)
some of the finite element analysis results were modified to reflect the latest load
factors. In general, this was accomplished by reducing the internal loads by the
ratios of appropriate load factors and resulting support reactions. Tug missions
analyzed and the mass properties assumed for each mission phase in the finite element
analysis are summarized in Table 4.2-1.7B.
For the descent mission phase, the finite element analysis configuration was based on
the original study ground rule of no LH2 dump before abort descent. This ground rule
had changed late in the study to dump both L02 and LH2 before abort descent.
Schedule constraints did not permit rerunning the finite element analysis without LH2
for the abort descent loading conditions. Since most of the Tug structure was critical
for ascent loading conditions, this change in ground rules slid not significantly impact
the finite element analysis conclusions.
ii
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Table 4.2--17A. Load Factors Used for Finite Element Analysis
MSFC 68M00039-1
Cond Mission
a	 a	 ax	 y	 a
No. Phase Load Condition Max	 Min	 Max	 Min	 Max	 Min
Al Liftoff
A2 Thrust -0.5 -1.5 +0.3 -0.3 +0.3 -0.3
Buildup/
Rebound
Launch Release 4•0.4 -3.4 +0.8 -0.8 +3.0 -3.0
A3 Hi-Q Boost -1.7 --2.3 +0.9 -0.9 +1.1 -1.1
A4 Ascent (l) Max G with -2.7 -3.3 I +0.5 -0.5 +0.6 -0.6
SRMs
A5 SIAM Cutoff/ +2.0 -4.0 +0.4 -0.4 +0.8 -0.8
Separation
A6 Max Orbiter -2.7 -3.3 +0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -»0.3
Only
A7 Orbiter Cutoff/ +1.9 -2.1 +0.4 -0.4 +0.6 -0.2
Separation
01 On-Orbit( l) Payload +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2 +0.2 -0.2
Deployment
Dl Entry +1.4 +0.6 +0.7 -0.7 +4.0 +2.0
D2 Descent(') Flyback +0.6 -0.6 +0.3 -0.3 +1.4 +0.6
D3 Lanaing +1.3 +0.7 +0.3 -0.3 +3.0 +1.0
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Table 4.2-17B. Tug Mass Properties Used for Finite Element Analysis
P
*Includes tank and propellants.
1	 **Includes tank, engine, and propellants
Payload
Body and
Deploy Adapter LH2 Tank* LO2 Tank** Total
wt CG wt. CG Wt CG wt CG Wt CG
Mission Phase lb/(kg) Sta lb/(kg) Sta lb/(kg) Sta lb/(kg) Sta lb/(kg) Sta
Deploy Ascent 11,000 791.0 4672 1093.3 7820 1037.2 40,316 1179.6 63,808 1088.8
(4990) (2119) (3547 (18, 287) (28, 943)
Descent 11,000 791.0 4672 1093.3 7820 1037.2 1131 1214.6 24,623 946.0
(4.990) (2119) (3547) (513) (11, 169)
Retrieve Ascent 0 - 4672
(2119)
1093.3 8488
(3850)
1031.7 44,330
(20,108)
1175.5 57,490
1 (26,077) 1
1147.6
1
Results. Critical deflections and major frame, body shell, tank support start, and
latch loads were extracted from the computer output and are nmarized below.
Shear, axial load, and bending moments in the forward Z support frame at station 951
are shown in Figure 4.2-355 for both the baseline four- point (1-1) and five-point load
balanced forward Z (2-1) configurations. Load condition A2 (liftoff launch release)
from Table 4.2-17A produces maximum loading in the frame. As shown, the use of
dual forward Z supports significantly reduces peak loads in the station frame.
shear, axial load, and beading moments in the aft Y/Z support frame at station 1246
are shown in Figure 4.2-35C for the baseline four-point (1-1) configuration. Loads
for both the maximum Z reaction condition (A2) and the maximum Y reaction condition
(A3) from Table 4.2-17A are presented.
Since several loading conditions are critical for different segments of the body. shell,
it was convenient for Tug shell sizing to develop magnum load envelopes instead of
plotting load distributions for individual load conditions. Envelope plots of maximum
Tug body shell load intensities (axial load intensity, No , and shear flow, q) are pre-
sented in Figures 4.2-35D for configuration 1-1 and in Figure 4.2-35E for
configuration 2-1.
Maximum loads in the 24 L02 tank support struts are presented in Table 4.2--17C for
both the baseline (1-1) and dual load balanced forward Z (2--1) configurations. Maxi-
mum loads in the LH2 tank aft 12 support struts are presented in 'sable 4.2-17D, and
the maximum loads in the six forward lateral support struts for the LH 2 tank are pre-
sentedin Table 4.2-17E.
Discrete latches were represented in the computer model by 14 short beam segment
links between the Tug and deploy adapter at the locations shown in Figure 4.2--35F.
Maximum latch loads for configurations 1-1 and 2-1 are tabulated in Table 4.2-17F.
The finite element analysis output. was used to evaluate critical Tug deflections. One
of the major deflection considerations was compatibility of the 176-inch (440 cm)-
diameter Tug with the available 180-inch (450 cm)-diameter payload envelope in the
Orbiter cargo bay. Tug maximum clearance loss occurs at the forward Z support
(station 951). Maximum deflections at station 951 for both configurations 1-1 and 2-1
are shown in Figure 4.2-35G. Conditions A2 (Table 4.2-17A) is critical.
For the baseline single forward Z support (configuration 1-1) maximum clearance
loss was 6.77 inches (37.20 cm), which indicates the shell would project a maximum
of 4.77 inches (12.12 cm) outside the available envelope. Of'the total clearance loss,
approximately 4. 16 inches (10. 57 cm) was due to motion of the Tug centerline and
2.61 inches (6.63 cm) was due to local frame deflection. With a dual load balanced
forward support (configuration 2-1), the maximum clearance loss for the same loading
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Figure 4.2-35E.	 Tug Body Load Envelopes (Configuration 2-1)
Table 4.2-17C. Tug L02 Tank Maximum Support Strut: Loads
Strut
ConRBurntlon 1-I
Comp. Load,	 Tens. Load.
lb (N)	 Cond.	 lb (N)	 Cand.
Coaf
	
urotlon 2-1
Camp. Load,	 Tuns, Load.
)b (N)	 Caad.	 1b (N)	 Conti.
I - - 162118 (67640) A3/1etrieve - - 15963 (71907) A3/Retrieve
2 - 13501- 6032) A'-'/Deploy 19297 (85937) A2/Rotrieve -	 507 (- 2255) A21Deploy 1H6,7H (83084) A2'Rctrlove
3 -16660 4-74109) A2/Retrlere 35628 (158481) A2/Retrleve -15305 (— 68347) A2/Retrieve 34691 (154327) A2 'Retrieve
4 -23003 (-IO2322) A2/Retr)oVe 41477 (184499) AZ/Ratrlavc 43871 (-100183) A2/Retrieve 42681 (189854) AVItetrieve
G -34942 (-IS5430) A2/Retrieve 52573 (233866) A2/Retrieve -35469 (-157774) A2/Retrieve 52953 (235617) A2/Rotrieve
0 —1271S (-199019) A2/Retr1eve 565671251720) A2/Ratrlave -44119 (-196251) A2/Rctrleva 5953E (26035•,1) A21ROtrleve
7 -41936 (-319987) A2/Retrlevu 02832 (279-191) A2/Rotrleve -4.024 (-195828) A2 1 Retrieve 64330 (286194) A2'Retrieve
8 -44291 (-197016) A211toLdeve 64873 (288569) A2/Rotrleve —14839 (-199451) AVRotrfeva 65633 (291950) A2/Rutrtov0
9 43198 (-1751!961) A'JRetrleve 68901 (202771) A2/Retrieve -40923 (-1X2035) A2/Retrlavo 59089 (206844) A2/Itetrluva
10 -34934 (-155394) A2/Rctrlevo 56855 (253037) A2/Rotrteve -341X5 (-I52OG2) A2/Retrleve 53846 (248415) A2/Retrieve
11 -29883 4-132926) A2/Rotrleve 43H65 (195121) A2/letrieve -29249 (-130106) A2 ,11etrieve 43407 (193089) A2'Retr)eve
12 -21426 (-95308) A2/RotrieVe 30233 (174517) A2/Rotrleve -19695 (-197608) A21hetrieve 36834 (153846) A2/Rctrleve
13 -36663 (-73076) ANAtetrleve 22350 (10390") A2/Daploy -15036 (-69662i A3/Retrieve 20928 (93892) A2/Retrieve
14 304-133) AVNploy 14232 (83397) A2/Retrteve - 1091 (-4853) A2/Deploy 14688 (653319) A2/Ratrfava
15 - 8633 (-3840L) A2114etrleve 30006 (1334731 A2/Retrieve - 9302 (-41733) A3i Retrlevu 31043 (13HOSS) A2/Retrieve
18 -29972 (-I3332".) A2'Rutrleve 48646 PIOUS) A- 'Retrieve -2.4710 (-120979) A2/Retrieve 47018 (211815) A2/Rctrleva
17 -34471 (-1(x&41) A2/Retrieve 5747r,, (2550(j6) A2/Retri"v -35920 (-169780{ A2.'Retrieve 5(712 (252267) A2/Retrieve
IB -49176 (-21874X) A2/Retrieve 438916 (360654) A2/Retrleve -47091 (-209471) A2/Italrleve 1.7412 (2098G3) A2/Ratriove
19 -6,:801 (-243767) A2; Retrleve 119747 (3102501 A2/Retrieve -U401 (-237539) A2 1Relrleve 67807 (301620) A2/Retriova
20 -49735 (-22123 1 1 A2.'Retrlavc 0079 (2983031 A2/Rotrleve —19207 1-21HHH4) A2 'Retrieve 60094 (296607) A2/Retrleva
21 -47151 (-20973s1 A2/11etrieve 1WH0 (294"55) A2/Retrieve -46285 (-205886) A'-/Rctrlcve n5a83 (289512) A2/Retriaw
22 -32033 (-1424901 A2/Retrieve 51715 (230040) A2111eirlevc -33323 (44H224) A2: ttetrteve 52646 (239163) A2/Retriove
23 -24029 (-10688'0 A2/Retrieve 42231 (187853) A2/Retrieve -,4475 (-108870) A2/Rctrleva 4ZH48 1180699) A2111etrteve
24 -11193 (-40789) A3/Retrieve -noel (115,1X0) A2/Rotrleve - 1105 (-5316) A3/Retrlave 27370 (121788) A2/Rctrleva
Notes: L See TWO 4.2-17A for load factors.
2. Strut locations are as shown.
f
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Table 4.2-171?. Tug LH2 Tank Maximum Aft Support Strut Loads
Configuration 1-1 Configuration 2-1
Comp. Load, Tens. Load, Comp, Load, Tens. Load,
Strut lb (N) Cond. lb (N) Cond. ib (N) Cond.	 lb (N) Cond.
1 -464 (-2064) A2/Deploy 6909 (30753) A2/Deploy - -	 4339 (19301) A2/Retrieve
2 - - 6247 (27788) A2/Retrieve - 6383 (28393) A2/Retrieve
3 - 6201 (11570) A2/Retrieve -	 2707 (12041) A2/Retrieve
4 -149(-663) A2/Deploy 4153 (18473) A2/1-letrieve -238 (-1059) A2/Deploy	 4218 (18763) A2/Retrieve
5 _ - 7678 (34153) A2/Retrieve - -	 7973 (35466) A2/Deploy
6 »956 (-9252) A2/Deploy 5979 (26596) A2/Deploy - -	 3487 (15511) A2/Retrieve
7 4533 (20164) A2/Deploy - -	 4025 (17904) A2/Retrieve
8 _ - 6629 (29487) A2/Retrieve - -	 6615 (29425) A2/Retrieve
9 _ - 2629 (1104) A2/Retrieve - -	 2650 (11788) A2/Retrieve
hb.
	
IO -643 (-2860) AS/Deploy 4432 (19715) A2/Retrieve -522 (-2322) A3/Deploy	 4295 (19105) A2/Retrieve
Go	 11 - 7970 (35452) A2/Deploy - -	 7537 (33526) A2/Deploy
19. - - 5042 !224281 A2/Deploy - -	 3676 (16352) A2/R.etrieve
Table 4.2-17E. Tug LH2 Tank Maximum Forward Support Strut Loads
Configuration 1-1 Configuration 2-1
Camp. Load, Tens. Load, Comp. Load, 'pens. Load,
Strut lb (N) Cond. I (N) Cond. Ib (N) Cond. lb (N) Cond.
1 -4264 (-18967) A2/Retrieve 4545 (20217) A2/Deploy -3782 (-16823) AVRetrieve 3829 (17032) A2/Retrieve
2 --6535 (-29069) A2/Retrieve 6782 (30168) A2/Retrieve -5912 (-26298) A2/Retrieve 5919 (26329) A2/Retrieve
3 -2193 (-9755) A2/Retrieve 2226 (9902) A2/Retrieve -1875 (--8340) A2/Retrieve 1786 (7945) A2/Retrieve
4 -3215 (-14301) A2/Retrieve 3142 (13976) A2/Retrieve -3956 (-17597) A2/Retrieve 3676 (16352) A2/Retrieve
5 -5095 (-22646) A2/Retrieve 5141 (22868) A2/Retrieve -5872 (-26120) A2/Retrieve 5704 (25373) A2/Retrieve
6 -1522 (-6770) A2/Retrieve 1446 (6432) A2/Retrieve -2003 (-8910) A2/Retrieve 1793 (7976) A2/Retrieve
Notes: 1.	 See Table 4.2-17A for local factors.
2.	 Strut locations are as shown.
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condition was only 2.13 inches (5.41 cm),
`4,	 which indicates the shell would project
only 0. 13 inch (0.33 cm) beyond the
7'1, s 	 D oEFEaraoA"ER	 available envelope. These results indi--
X Lnl4GEBON 17YP1
cate that if some type of dual forward Z
support were not used, either relocation
of the Y support fitting, a decrease in
the Tug diameter, or a significant stiff-
— - -	 ness increase would be required to
®	 maintain the Tug within the available
cargo bay payload envelope.
®	 4.2.3.2 Friction at Supports. The
initial friction effect investigation was
p	
o o	
limited to consideration, of the Tug
weight/performance impact of :I:Y-
direction friction forces occurring be--
	
Figure 4.2-35F. Tug Computer Model 	 tween the Tug fitting shaft and bearing
Latch Locations	 at the support points on the Orbiter sill
longeron (Z and X/Z supports). The
impact assessment was limited to the NASA baseline arrangement (6-1) and the four
selected arrangements. Friction forces were computed using a coefficient of friction
of 0.10 applied to the appropriate support reactions on the Tug at Xo 951, 1128, and/or
1187 in the above arrangements. Data from the Convair STSS analysis was used to
generate a Tug support frame moment coefficient distribution due to Y direction
friction forces, as shown in Figure 4.2-36. Moments (including friction effects based
on the coefficient distribution) were then overplotted on existing moment curves. The
resulting moment comparisons for the Xo 951 and 1128 frames in arrangement 6-1
are shown in Figure 4.2-37. The friction force increased pear frame moments sig-
nificantly, but the maximum effect was limited to a relatively small segment of the
circumference.
Frame weights, including allowance for friction, were then co:tnputed using the
methods of Section, 4.2.2.3. Table 4.2-18 shows the Tug frame weight comparison,
with and without friction allowance, for the .five support arrangements investigated.
Finally, performance impacts for synchronous deploy and retrieve missions were
determined, using these weights and the performance partials previously used in
Section 4.2.2.3, and are shown in Table 4.2-19. The subsequent fr?rtion investiga-
tion was directed both at updating the previous tY friction effect data and at assessing
the impacts of the following friction forces at various support locations that are
nominally "free" in the friction foz ,;e direction:
a. :I:Z Friction at Y Supports. Results either from inflight relative motion due to
structural deflection or during programmed motion of the Tug relative to the
Orbiter either at ground installation or on-orbit deployment/berthing.
4-80
^-	 -xr
Configuration 1-1
Load, lb (I) Cond.
19125 (85072) A2/Retrieve
10244 (45568) A3/Deploy
2694	 (11984) A3/DepbNy
Configuration 2-1
Load, lb (N)	 Cond.
24710 (92123)	 A2/Retrieve
11676 (51937)	 A2/Deploy
Table 4.2-17F. Tug Separation Latch Maximum Tension Loads
Latch
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
}
=s
7560 (33629)
20867 (92821)
24508 (109017)
30326 (134897)
21038 (93582)
A2/Deploy
A2/Deploy
A2/ Deploy
A2/Deploy
A2/Retrieve
15100 (67168)
25123 (11-1753)
20633 (91780)
20633 (91780)
25123 (111753)
15100 (67168)
A2/Retrieve
A2/Retrieve
A2/Deploy
A2/Deploy
A2/Retrieve
A2/Retrieve
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Figure 4.2-35G. Tug Shell Envelope at Forward Z Support
(Station 951)
b. d:X Friction at Z-Only Supports.
B
6
4
2
Cm 0
•2
a
Arises from the motion of the Orbiter
trunnion in guides provided in the
supporting bridge beam.
c. +.X Friction at Y Supports. Causes
are the same as a.
i
To aid the friction assessment, the finite
°	 element analysis included load conditions
IR121	 I)	 (3x12)	 I20
THETA - DEGREES (RADIANS)
	
Consisting solely of unit fY friction forces
at Z and X/Z supports and of unit +-Z
	 :!
Figure 4.2-38. Frame Moment	 friction forces at Y supports. Figure
Coefficient for Radial
	
4.2-38 shows the resulting frame loads
Friction Load
	 at two selected frame locations for sup-
port arrangement 1-1. Since frame
sizing is largely controlled by bending moments, moments including frict i on effects
	 j r
were again overplotted on existing moment curves to determine the relative effect of	 4
friction. The upper half of Figure 4.2-39 illustrates the source and orientation of
the friction forces that lie in-plane with the support frames. The resulting moment
comparisons are also shown, and a relatively small moment increase due to friction 	 }
is indicated in both c .:
'i
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Figure 4.2-37. Effect of Friction on Frame Bending Moments
Table 4.2-18. Friction Effect on Frame Weights
I	 . _ 1
Table 4.2-19. Performance Impact Due to Friction
A W
A PL
Dep. Ret.
Config. lb (kg) lb (kg) lb (kg)
1-1 6.8 ( 3.1) --17.8 ( 8.1) - 9.4 (- 4.3)
1-2 34.0 (15.4) -89.1 (-40.4) -46.9 (-21.3)
2-1 4.6 (	 2.9) -12.1 (--	 5.5) - 6.3 (- 2.9)
2-2 33.9 (15.4) -88.8 (-40.3) -46.8 (-21.2)
6-1 21.7 ( 9.8) -56.9 (-25.8) -29.9 (-1.3.6)
Further comparison of the tY fraction moment data with that shown in Figure 4.2-37
indicates a considerably lesser friction A moment with the later data. Consequently
the frame A weight and Tug A performance impacts were assumed to be reduced from
the already low values shown in Tables 4.2-18 and 4.2-19, and no further weight/
performance computations were conducted.
The lower half of Figure 4.2-39 illustrates the cause and effect of friction forces
directed normal to the support frame planes. In both cases the effect is to produce
an overturning moment on the Tug fittings, which neither the basic sidewall nor the
support frames are designed to withstand. Consequently a new lightweight stabilizing
brace is required to distribute the friction force, as shown, as a pair of low-magnitude
in--plane "kick" loads, K, at the support frame and an existing adjacent ring.
The summary conclusion of the friction evaluation is, therefore, that although friction
forces are real and their effects must be included in Tug design, their overall impact
is small and they do not act as significant discriminators between candidate support
systems.
4.2.3.3 Support Fitting Designs. Design of the Tug/ Orbiter support fittings was
conducted in two steps. The initial designs were based on loads using NASA baseline
Tug accelerations and on Orbiter trunnion and keel receptacle details (and the cor-
responding implied Tug fitting details) from existing RI layouts. At that time there
were no handling concept constraints nor friction load considerations. The updated
designs were based on new loads using the accelerations in MSFC PF02-75-31, on
compatibility with the latest KSC handling concept, on assumed Orbiter keel fitting
revision to accommodate rotational deployment, and on reduced shaft and bearing
diameters for the Z and X/Z fittings. In addition, the updated designs incorporated
the friction stabilization brackets identified in Section 4.2.3.2. Both the initial and
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Figure 4.2-38. Frame Loads Due to Unit Friction Forces
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updated fitting designs included allowance for -upropriate safety factors and margin of
safety. Table 4.2-20 compares the criteria, ground rules, and assumptions used in
the two cycles of support fitting design.
The initial and updated configurations of a typi,!al Z fitting and X longeron are shown in
Figures 4.2-40 and 4.2-41 respectively. In the initial concept, all primary (X/ *Z) and
stabilizing qZ-only) supports incorporated the same concept of load introduction and
each support installation consisted of three subassemblies: bearing, shaft, and fiftin.g.
Table 4.2-20. Support Fitting Design Criteria
Item Initial Update Basis
Shaft Dia. 3.75 RI L/O: VL 70-544105
in. (cm) (9.52) JSC Chart: NASA-5-75-10004
3.25 MSFC Dwg.: 30A90707
(8.75) KSC Dwg: PRC-0538-6
Bearing f
Width 2.00 (5.08) 2.00 (5.08) RI L/O: (same)
Dia. 4.70
in. (em) (11.93) 4.00 (10.16) JSC chart: (same)
Y-Motion
Outbd. 2.00 (5.08) 2.00 (5.08) RI L/O: (same) + 0.50 Tug motion
Inbd 2.00 (5.08)
in. (ern) 1.50 (3.81) JSC chart: (same)
Loads
Accelerations MSFC B. L. MSFC 68M00039-1
New MSFC MSFC PF 02-75-31
Safety Factors 1.4/1.1 1.4/1.1 MSFC--HDBK-505
Margin +0.25 -0.25 MSFC 68M00039-1
Friction
tY Yes Yes NASA request
(u = 0.1) (A = 0.1)
:bx, -+Z No Yes Section 4.2.3.2
(A = 0. 1) (Gt = 0.1)
AGE Config. Unspecified New KSC KSC dwg: (same)
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The bearing subassembly, com-
prised of spherical segment,
outer race, and inner liner, was
assumed to be covered by
Rockwell specification to assure
compatibility with the Orbiter
cargo retention system.
°INITIAL CONCEPT
l SHAFT & BEARING SUBASSEMBLY
	
- Yo 04 .o	 CODY MEN	 The shaft subassembly consisted
	
--	 SHEAR PIN [21
	 f 1!
	
—. ---^	 of a turned shaft plus threaded
	
SIOEWALL SHEAR SPLICE II	 99 BR	 caps at each end. The shaft'TRUE
!	 \ONE-PIECE TITANIUM BEAM
	 required steel or other alloy of
MACHINED FROM 9ALAV FORGING
ES WELDED TO HUB
	 260-300 ksi (1790--2070 MAa)
Figure 4.2-41. Typical X Support Longeron	 tensile strength to provide the
required +25 percent margin of
safety under maximum loads.
Load transfer from shaft to fitting was accomplished entirely in bearing to eliminate
a shaft/fitting binding radius and thereby both minimize the effective overhang of the
applied load and maximize fatigue life. Incorporation of matching shallow ta pers on
the shaft and its support bushings also permitted ease of installation and removal and
provided a reaction for any inboard thrust due to Y-direction friction between the
bearing subassembly and the shaft. Any outboard friction was resisted by the inner
cap.
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The fitting subassembly was comprised of a titanium weldment and the two shaft sup-
port bushings. The weldment consisted of two Z beams machined in detail then
electron-beam welded to a central hub. After heat treatment and aging, surface.-
interfacing with the shell structure were finish-machined to contour. Loads were
sheared from the fitting beams into the outer surface of the composite shell structure
through fully bonded plus mechanically fastened joints. Tangs welded to the fitting hub
provided similar introduction, of Z loads into the shell frame inner cap. Residual kick
loads at t:ie ends of the Z-load beams were introduced to the shell frame web by back-
to-back al%iminum tees, which also provided web stiffening and shear redistribution.
The beam/tee tension bolts were installed through oversize holes to avoid high localized
bearing stresses in the composite frame cap.
As a result of the update, the Z-only and X/Z fittings were resized to reflect the sup-
port reactions resulting from the latest MSFC accelerations and to provide compatibil- 	 3
ity with the latest NASA-KSC ground handling concept and shaft/bearing diameter 	 k
reductions. The initial concept transferred reactions into the Tug through a high-
strength shaft supported by discrete bushings in a titanium fitting. This approach was
retained but the titanium fitting was reconfigured to eliminate the gussets outside the
body skin line and to provide a flanged cylindrical hu ts instead. The hub O. D. provides
a grip surface for the KSC AGE system yet minimizes total fitting weight by providing
a support at the farthest permissible outboard location on the smaller diameter shaft,
thereby minimizing shaft bending moment. The technique for introducing loads into
the outboard frame cap was revised by substituting a pair of tapered tangs (similar to
the previous inboard splice technique) for the Z beams. The forward Z fitting was
further revised to incorporate a stabilizing bxa.cket to react the overturning moment
caused by tX-direction friction.
In addition to the longitudinal load it must carry, major kick loads also occur at both
ends of the X longeron. In the initial concept the aft kick load was sheared into the
shell frame web from splice blades welded to the fitting hub and the forward lack load
was transferred by shear pins across the adapter/Tug separation plane to a radial
fitting in the oxidizer tank support frame at Xo 11.72.9. The longitudinal load was
transmitted into the graphite/epoxy sidewali through a shear splice lying between the
primary bending caps and extending the full length of the longeron. The e_tire longeron
was machined in one piece from a 6Al-4V Titanium forging and was electron beam
welded to the hub portion of the Z fitting. In the updated configuration, the longeron
was revised to delete the external ramp to expose the full hub cylinder for AGE
attachment. In addition, the forward lack load reaction was relocated to station Xo
1181 on the aft Y support frame. This eliminated the former shear pin load transfer
across the Tug/adapter separation plane, thereby reducing the Tug/adapter interface
complexity somewhat by eliminating the precision alignment required for the radially
loaded pins.
The material and method of longeron manufacture were unchanged, but the depth de-
creased due to elimination of the external ramp, which resulted in increased cap thick-
nesses, although the penalty was largely offset by elimination of a separate sidewall
shear splice.
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The initial and updated Y fitting configurations for the X o 1181 location are shown in
Figure 4.2-42. The Y-load fitting installations at other locations were similar in
concept but differed in detail as a function of support: station. Each installation con-
sisted of a steel cap mounted on a machined titanium beam, in turn supported by the
composite shell and, where necessary due to offset from a major frame, by longitud-
inal machined aluminum beams.
} INITIAL CONCEPT	 I -PIECETITANIDMBEAM
(MACHINED FROM GAL-4V
FO RGING)
- BB.OR
e	 GRIEPDXYADAPTFR1 (REF)
ORBITER ^°	 BACK-TO-BACK
ry Z 305 .0 AW-AiNUM FITTINGSRECEPTACLE	 0	 Q PL)
1REF)	
CAP - MATERIAL SAME AS
Y0a ORBITER RFCEPTACLE
e UPDATED DESIGN BACK-TO-BACK
GRAPHIT£IEPDXY ALUMINUM
ADAPTER {REF )) FITTINGS ( 3 PL) X0 1181
—^^^^ L .	 X01202.67
PATH OF
1	 DEPLOYMENT
ROTATION
,^	 Z 3B5ALUMINUM STABILIZING0
FITTING
ORBITER
BRACXETFOR
X FRICTION
Y 0 D RECEPTACLE STEEL CAP
Figure 4.2-42. Typical Y Support Fitting
The steel cap provided surfaces that contacted the Orbiter bridge beams during instal-
lation, removal and load transfer, and was attached to the beam by mechanical fasteners
to accommodate replacement. The beam was machined in one piece from a tit, :um
forging. At Station 1181, sufficient depth was available to permit the beam to mount
on the shell outer surface. In the Z- support arrangements, in-plane kick loads at
each end of the beam were reacted by a pair of identical machined aluminum beams
spanning longitudinally between the major shell frames at Xo 1172.9 and 1187. Insuf-
ficient depth was available at Xo 1249 for outer surface mounttig, but proximity of the
aft-most adapter frame (X o
 1246) permitted the beam to scab onto the frame web for
the full frame depth. In-plane loads were applied directly to the frame web. Yaw-
bending kick loads resulting from the 3-inch (7.62 cm) e--centricity were reacted at the
ends of the beam by machined aluminum l.ongerons, ivhi,ch extended forward apprwd-
mately 24 inches (61 cm) to the first adapter stabilizing frame.
In each location, the corresponding Orbiter bridge beam, as then configured, precluded
rotational deployment. Modifying the bridge beam concepts at X o
 1181 and 1249 was
necessary to permit rotational deployment. For example, this was accomplished at
Xo
 1181 by lowering the central portion of the basic beam and reinforcing the sides to
carry local twisting as shown in Figure 4.2-43. The frame interface provisions in
the Orbiter were unaffected. The steel interface plate retained the same cross-section,
but «rk entrance guide was required at the forward end to correct misalignment during
ro., atian into the support.
In the update task, the Y-fitting designs were revised to align the interface cap with
the path of motion defined by rotation about the deployment pivot axis (:o
 1246, Z  414)
;.l
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Figure 4.2-43. Modified arbiter Keel Fitting Concept to
Accommodate Rotational, Deployment
and to revise the choice of material from titanium to aluminum. The X o 1181 Y-fitting
design is shown illustrating both the reoriented cap and an added stabilizing bracket,
which reacts overturning due to =I:X friction. A third pair of back-to-back fittings was
required on the Xo I IS I frame web to react the stabilizing bracket kick load, and a
similar pair was requi.ed to introduce the opposite kick into the Xo 1202.67 frame.
Support fitting weights were developed parametrically as a function of applied reaction
at each support location to assist the weight/performance evaluation of candidate sup-
port systems. Figure 4.2-44 provides the parametric curves and Table 4.2--21
summarizes the fitting weights for the candidate support arrangements under consider-
ation before final selection.
4.2.3.4 Handling Provisions. The initial handling investigation was performed to de-
termine a suitable technique for both horizontal and vertical, installation and removal
of Tug plus spacecraft from the arbiter cargo bay.
Dandling loads could be minimized for vertical installation by using attachment points
close to the Tug longitudinal axis. However, handling equipment clearances, nominally
3.0 in. (7a6 cm) (per j5C 07700) 9 had to be maintained between both the Orbiter (fitting
guides and sill longeron) and Tug body structure, and the AGE handling frame. Fittinge
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Table 4, 2-21. Support Fitting Weights for Final Candidate Support Arrangements
Fitting Locations and Weights
Tug Non--Tug
Support:
Arrangement 1 Y2 Z 3 Z4 x(103 lb) Z(103 kg) X 1Z 1 X2 Z2 Y1 Z(103 lb) 1; (103 kg)
4 Ft, 1249Y (1-1) 32.8 32.8 14.9 85.9 85.9 17.7 189.5 86.0
4 Pt, 112BY (1-IA) 17.7 32.8 50.5 22.9 69.6 69.6 139.2 63.2
5 Pt, Balanced (2-1) 28.3 28.3 56.6 25.7 82.9 82.9 17.7 183.5 83.3
5 Pt, Redundant (2-1R) 28.5 28.5 57.0 25.9 83.1 83.1 17.7 183.9 83.5
6 Pt, Balanced (4-1) 17.5 28.3 28.3 74,1 33.6 64.4 64.4 12.1 140.9 64.0
6 Pt, Redundant (4-1R) 16.9 28.9 28.9 74.7 33.9 64.9 64.9 13.1 142.9 64.9
C ..
placed below the Tug/Orbiter attachment plane (Z o 414) violated clearance restric-
tions. The most obvious choice from a standpoint of reduced loads and Tug weight
penalty was to use the primary Tug support fittings as handling attachment points.
Figure 4.2-45 shows the resulting handling loads, and Figure 4.2•-46 illustrates the
provisions incorporated in the initial support fitting designs (reference Section 4.2.3.3)
to accommodate handling. Installation of a V-block fitting on the Tug deployment
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12) ALL HANDLING INTERFACES ON TUGIADAPTER AT Z. X!Z SUPPORTS
13) INCLUDES JSC SAFETY FACTORS ( LIMIT = 2 x STATIC; ULT = 3 x LIMIT)
Figure 4.2-45. Handling Loads
adapter X/Z fittings allowed the AGE handling frame to be used like a fork lift. Tug
clearance was acceptable since the 'fork' contacted the fitting aft of the deployment
adapter shell, and the fitting interface shown provided suitable shaft clearance for
Orbiter latching and unlatching. A similar forward drag fitting was attached through a
V-block to the Tug station 951 Z-only fitting(s). The Tug clearance was tighter at this
location (since the Tug structural shell extends both forward and aft from the fitting)
but was still acceptable. Induced handling loads, including the large safety factors
required, fall within Tug support sitting flight loads design capability (Figure 4.2-45),
thereby imposing a negligible weight penalty due only to the addition of bearing surface
material.
Horizontal handling was also accommodated by using Tug plus deployment adapter pri-
mary support fittings. The plus-or-minus 2-inch (5 cm.) bearing travel provided on
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Figure 4.2-46. Handling Provisions for Tug/Spacecraft Changeout
Using Initial Support Fitting Concept
the fitting shaft left sufficient space for split ring attachment inboard of the slide bear-
ing. Spreader bar/sling connection to the 3 (or 4) latched s plit rings provided hori-
zontal handling capability.
As mentioned in Section 4.2.3.3, one of the considerations driving the update of the
Tug/Orbiter interface fittings was the KSC handling concept data received during the
study. This resulted in a review of the initial handling provisions plus those pre-
sented in various NASA. concepts. Two conflicting design goals existed, which made
rapid solution of this interface difficult: 1) the Tug (and other Orbiter pwjloads) re-
quire their half of the fitting to impose a minimum vehicle weight penalty. As in the
initial concept, it was therefore very desirable to use the Tug to Orbiter attachment
fittings as pickup points for ground handling since this precluded the need for Tug
special-purpose " achment provisions and thereby avoided any associated weight
penalties, and 2) NASA Kennedy Space Center desired a standard 'interface on all
Orbiter payloads for ground handling purposes. The Tug, since it is the largest
diameter Shuttle payload currently identified,was considered to be a design driver for
configuring this standard attachment,
,The key issues in the update task then were:
a. Can the primary support fittings stiL be adapted for ground handling of the Tug 	
,(with and without a spacecraft attached) in both the vertical and horizontal modes?
t1
b. If so, to what extent is the Tug either penalized or constrain.ted?
The various concepts investigated are compared and the preferreL. concept selected is
shown in Figure 4.2-47.
The initial Convair concept, using the fitting bracket as a "fork lift" attachment, was
unacceptable since it was not compatible with the KSC stanardized handling concept.
Three NASA proposed configurations provided this desired standard AGE interface
through a fitting shaft extension. In each case, however, the Tug was penalized due
to the shaft weight increase needed to carry the higher bending moments at the root of
the shaft, which resulted from incorporating integral handling surfaces on the shaft
itself. A slightly different approach was selected to permit both standard handling and
optimized Tug (and other payload) fitting design. In this concept, the shaft is similar
to the initial Convair concept but an ungusseted larger diameter hub is provided to
more efficiently carry fitting loads and to provide a location for AGE attachment.
Orbiter payloads which are lighter than the Tug would retain a specified hub outer
diameter but could adjust the hub cylinder material thickness and properties as re-
quired for their specific loading conditions.
Specific detail dimensions Do, Yo, and Yi
 in the selected configuration were based on
a consensus of the values shown in the three NASA concepts. The shaft moment
values shown were based on an assumed bearing; reaction load of 103, 7 k lb (461.5 W)
applied at Y o
 94 (representing the maximum X/Z resultant in support arrangement 4-1
using accelerations in MSFC PF02-75-31). The qualitative shaft weight assessment
was based on a comparison of the parameter M/D i2 for each configuration since shaft
line load, and therefore shaft wall thickness, are roughly proportional to it.
4, 2.3.5 Deployment Adapter Structure. The replacement, in the reference vehicle
configuration, of the NASA bifurcated adapter with a cylindrical concept, similar to
the Convair STSS configuration, was discussed in Section 4.2.1.1. To expedite sup-
port reaction and body loads computation in Sections 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3, the NASA
baseline Tug mass properties in MSFC 68M00039-2 were initially assumed to apply
to the cylindrical adapter (Section 4.2.1, 5). .Described in the following text are the
baseline structural characteristics and development of the updated weights for the
reference cylindrical adapter.
The following ground rules were used in the Initial adapter design and analysis:
a. Used the same basic sandwich sidewall as the reference Tug (as in Figure 4.2-5).
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Figure 4 . 2-47. Handling Concept Comparison and Selection
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iA
b. Provided sidewall reinforcement adjacent to the X-longerons based on peaking
factors developed from the Convair STSS.
c. Provided a forward kick frame for X-longeron support at the same station as the
STSS configuration. (Xo 1197.3).
d. Used 16 Tug/adapter latches and used STSS finite element data to govern latch
longeron sizing.
e. Used NASA baseline Tug latch concept and weight.
f. Sized X-longeron Idek frames using coefficients developed from STSS data.
g. Used STSS percentages for potting and facing tolerance allowances.
h. Included subsystems support provisions weight allowance based on STSS data.
1. Used the same support fitting weights as in Section 4.2.2.3.
j. Used the reference frame concept of Figure 4.2-7 at major frame locations.
Sidewall. The sidewall' cross section is shown schematically in Figure 4.2-48; details
of the frame/shell joints are shown in Figure 4.2-49. The solid laminate pans shown
at Xo 3172.9, 1197.3, and 1246 were
based on the concept shown in
Figure 4.2-6. The primary advantages of
LATCH LONGEROM (16)
	 X-LONGERON (2)1246.0
	
Vae pan concept are: 1) elimination of a
XI) 1172.6	 :337.3	 1221.6 ,g y 64	 majority of the potting and inserts other--;	 n
	
—Yo
 as	 wise required to introduce frame loads to
the ultra-thin sandwich facings, and 2)
the solid laminate blade and heavier core
permit transfer of loads into the facings
	
Figure 4.2-48. Adapter Sidewall
	 in shear, thereby precluding tension fail-
Cross Section	 ure of the facing/core bond in the ramp
Schematic
	
areas.
Reinforcement to accommodate axial load peaking adjacent to the X longerons was
based on the same approach as used in Section 4.2.3.3. Facing thickness were in-
creased further still due to the increased X reactions at the X o 1246 support. The
resulting characteristics of the adapter sidewall are shown in the flat pattern, of
Figure 4.2-50. Unit weights were computed for each of the five pan configurations
and summed as shown in Table 4.2-22. Basic (unreiaforced) panel weights were based
on the unit weight specified in Figure 4.2-5 and the net span dimensions remaining
after deducting the pan widths. The resulting weights are given in Table 4.2-23. The
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Figure 4.2--49. Adapter Frame/Shell Joints
facing reinforcement weight was based on the A thicknesses shown (per facing) summed
over the appropriate panel surface areas, as shown in Table 4.2-24.
Latch Longerons. Latch loads were developed by using the peaking factors shown in
Figure 4.2-51 to modify conventional theory body loads at the Tug/adapter separation
plane (Xo 1172.9). The peaking factors were developed from Convair STSS finite
element data, and the body load envelopes were plotted using the computer program
discussed in Section 4.2.2.3. Figure 4.2-52 compares the conventional theory and
modified loads, and illustrates the average load intensity tributary to each latch.
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Figure 4.2-50. Deploy Adapter Flat Pattern
Table 4.2-22. Pan, Weights
0
b w L W
in. cm lb/in.. g/cm in. can lb kgType Qty
A 1.60 4.06 0.0210 3.75 550.97 1399.5 1 11.57 5.25
D 1.60 4.06 0.0210 3.75 550.97 1399.5 2 23.14 10.51
C 3.10 7.87 0.0291 5.20 550.97 1399.5 1 16.03 7.28
D 0.90 2.29 0.0172 3.07 66.7 169.4 32 36.71 26.67
E 1.30 3.30 0.0193 3.45 45.5 115.6 4 3.51 1.59
TOTAL 90.96 41.30
Table 4.2-23. Panel Weights
AX AC A W
Type in. cm in. em in.2 cm2 Qty lb kg
1 18.4 46.7 30.14 76.6 554.58 3577.9 16 27.95 12.69
2 43.0 109.2 30.14 76.6 1296.02 8362.4 14 57.15 25.93
3 43.0 109.1
125.04 63.6 1076.02 6942.1 2 6.78 3.08
4 43.0 109.2
TOTAL 91.88 41.71
Computation of the modified loads at the latch locations is summarized in Table 4.2-25.
Note from the table that the maximum latch tension at four of the nine points investi-
gated resulted from the product of a negative peaking factor and a compressive axial
load. It is clear from Figure 4.2-52 that the latch design loads fall into two rather
distinct sets: 1) a design load of 850 Ib/" (1988 Nlean) is suitable for the latches
located on either side of the X Iongerons plus the latch on the vehicle toll (+Z) center-
line, and 2) all others are enveloped by a 450 lb/in. (788 N/cm) design load. Con-
sequently, although all 16 latches would no doubt be identical, two distinct longeron
designs were permissible and they were sized accordingly. All, Iongerons were
assumed to extend the full length of the adapter and to be machined from aluminum
alloy of FTU = 70 ksi (482 MPa). Allowing f sor an ultimate factor of safety of 1. 4, and
4-1.00
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Figure 4.2--51. Axial Load Peaking
Factors
Table 4.2-24. Facing Reinforcement
Area t(2) W(3)
Panel R,einf. Panel
Type in. 2 CM2 Plies(1) in. cm Qty lb kg
1 554.58 3577.9 8 0.0180 0.0457 4 2.32 1.05
1 554.58 3577.9 18 0.0405 0.1029 2 2.61 1.18
2 1296.02 8361.4 8 0.0180 0.0457 6 8.12 3.69
2 1296.02 8361.4 18 0.0405 0.,1029 4 12.18 5.53
3, 4 1076. 02 6942.1 28 0.0630 0.1600 2 7.86 3.57
TOTAL 33.08 15.02
Notes: (1) Total of two facings.
(2) 0. 0022 5 in. (0.00572 cm) per ply.
(3) 0.058 lb/ia. 3 (1.605 g/cm3). 1000- LONGERON SF6W, C9800 "- THEORY9488 850g00 ° - PEAK
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Figure 4.2-52. Determination of
Separation Latch Load
Distribution
a margin of safety of -0.25 plus providing a latch attach pad at the loaded end, taper-
ing the area uniformly to a minimum area at the opposite end and allowing a 10 percent
penalty for filletb and tolerances resulted in the weights shown. in Table 4.2-26.
Frames. Two load configurations were applied to the adapter frames as shown in
Figure 4.2-53. The type A loading occurred on the kick frame at X. 1197.3 and also
on the aft frame at X. 1246 in those support arrangements with only X supports on the
4.101
a0
Table 4.2-25. Computation of Modified Loads at Latch Locations
Latch Angle	 nXT(1)	 n {1)	 n C( 1)	 n (I)
From	 (Theory)	 (Modified)	 (Theory)	 (Modified)
Kn lb/in. N/cm lb/in. N/cm Kn lb/in. N/cmTop X lb/in. N/cm
90 + 9.15 320 560 2.90 928 1624 -580 -1015 2.90 -1682 -2944
112.5 +31.65 280 490 1.02 286 501 -510 -- 893 1.02 - 520 -- 910
135 +54.15 240 420 -0.43 -103 --180 -430 - 753 0.43 - 186 - 324
157.5 +7 6.65 200 350 -1.25 -248 -434 -360 - 630 -1.24 781
180 +99.15 160 280 -1.31 -210 -368 .-310 - 543 -1.31 + 40 711
67.5 -13.35 340 595 2.53 860 1505 -610 -1068 2.53 -1543 -2700
45 -35.85 350 613 0.71 249 436 -620 -1085 0.71
- 440 - 770
22.5 -58.35 330 578 -0.63 -208 -364 -630 -1103 -0.63 ER 695
0 -80.85 300 525 -1.31 -393 -688 -600 -1050 -1.31
+ 786 1376 
Notes: (D = Maximum tension at each latch location.
(1) Tension = +; compression = -.
^IPI^	 `^	 ^^	 ,.._...^	 .,......^..^..^ ^.^,...,_.d_^.,__._.^,^ L....,._ _...^_^_.....^__.,....s..._...,^^,^._... ^4...._^..J.,....,ta_v....µ.^. 	 s.^..^e.-._a^.,^.a.:.-. ts.....^e.y^i;.,ay...^...^...e.=.^s.^..__.....w 	....i_..._^..►_..m	 ..a._.^^..._.a
iY,C .
I
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Table 4.2-26. Latch Loageron Weights
Type
Design nT Unit "J"t
Qty
Total Wt
lb/in. N/cm lb kg lb kg
A. 850 1488 3.57 1.62 5 17.83 8.09
B 450 788 2.11 0.96 11 23.21 10.54
41.04 18.63
adapter (Family 6 and all -3 options).
Bending moments for the Type A loading
were determined using the appropriate
kick load and the Moment Coefficient
curve of Figure 4.2-36 (Section 4.2.3.2).
Frame weights were computed from the
parametric data in Section 4.2.2.3.
Except in those support arrangements
Figure 4.2-53. Adapter Frame Loading 	 noted above, the Type B loading occurred
Configurations	 at the Y. 1246 frame. Total bending
moments fnr his load case were con-
servatively assumed to consist of the
linear sum of the moment distributions due to the X and Z reactions applied separately.
The X moment distribution was determined as above and the Z moments were com-
puted using the appropriate coefficient distribution in Figure 4.2-?6 (Section 4.2.2.3).
It was assumed that the linear sum of the X+Z moments would envelop the effects of
moments due to the Y reaction, if present. Frame weights were again computed using
the Section 4.2.2.3 parametric data. The resulting weights were: Type A frame,
42.9 lb (19.5 kg); Type B frame: 58.9 lb (26.7 kg).
Weight Summkry. Table 4.2-27 presents the initial weight summary for the two basic
options of the reference configuration adapter (X-only supports and X/Y/Z supports).
A third adapter configuration was required in support arrangement 7-1 only, since
only one Z support was required at Xo 1246. Substitution of an X--onty fitting for an
X/Z fitting in the X/Y/Z configuration resulted in a weight of 862.8 lb (391.7 kg) for
that adapter. The final adapter weight summary, which incorporates any configuration
i- Isions since the initial design,, is presented in Volume IH, section 4.5.
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Table 4.2-27. Adapter Weight Summary
E?'
Weight
X Only X/Y/Z
lb kg lb kgItem
Sidewall
Basic Panels 91.9 41.7 91.9 41.7
Reinforcement 26.5 12.0 33.1 15.0
Pans 91.0 41.3 91.0 41.3
Misc. Potting 9.2 4.2 9.2 4.2
Skin Tolerance 3.8 1.7 3.8 1.7
Latch Longerons 41.0 18.6 41.0 18.6
Frames and Rings
Fwd, Xo 1172.9 13.0 5.9 13.0 5.9
Kick, Xo 1197.3 42.9 19.5 42.9 19.5
Stab., Xo 1221.6 9.8 4.4 9.8 4.4
Aft, Xo 1246 42.9 19.5 58.9 26.7
Orbiter Support Fittings
X (2) 43.2 19.6 -- --
X1  (2) - - 86.3 39.2
Y - - 21.8 9.9
System Supports 37.0 16.8 37.0 16.8
Structure Sub-Total 452.2 205.3 539.7 245.0
Contingency 45.2 20.5 54.0 24.5
Structure Total 'U7.4' 225.8 593.7 269.5
Mechanisms
Latches (16) 170.0 77.2 1704 77.2
Deployment 61.0 27.7 61.0 27.7
Docking 60.0 27.2 60.0 27.2
Adapter Total 788.4 357.9 884.7 401.7
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4.2.3.6 Dynamic Analysis. The dynamic analysis was conducted in two steps: 1) a
modal analysis of four support arrangements plus the forced response analysis of
two of the four, and 2) modal and forced response analyses of two additional arrange-
ments chosen in hopes of eliminating problems encountered in the first analyses.
t
Figure 4.2-54 provides a summary of the method and significant results of all dynamic
analyses performed during the study. The simplified finite element model used mass	
.a
•
INITIAL CONFIGURATIONS	 ,{:
a 4-POINT	 'i;{•
(A) 1249Y(9) 112BY	 ^'1
5-POINT
(C) BALANCED(D) REDUNDANT	 t.. ..
SIMPLE MODEL
• MASS: MSFC TUG
• STIFFNESS: STSS
• MODAL AND FORCED
RESPONSE ANALYSES
• FORCING FUNCTION
ESTIMATED (R.I.
DATA, fFF = 3Hz)
OBSERVATIONS
*MODES ( 1) - YAW
•f (1) UNiFORMLY LOW = —3.4 Ht
• f (1) INSENSITIVE TO YSTATION
e MODE (2) = PITCHIAOLL
• 5-POINT ELIMEMATES MODE (2)
• 1128 Y REDE' _ S DEFLECTION
(CLEARAK	 ES) SIGNIFICANTLY
AT SIC TIP = 2,,. - X 3.3 1N.
AT SIC NF 122._.-1.4 IN.
6 — POINT REDUNDANT SYSTEM PROVIDES:
• HIGHEST fN
• LOWEST ORBITER CLEARANCE LASS
e LEAST WEIGHT, PERFORMANCE IMPACT
Figure 4.2»54. Dynamic Analysis Summary
properties for the MSFC Baseline Tug plus reference spacecraft in the deploy-ascent
mission configuration. Figure 4.2-55 illustrates the geometry of the model and its
mass properties are summarized in Table 4.2-28. The shells of the Tug and deploy
adapter were modeled as a single beam located at the vehicle centerline. Directional
springs representing the attachment structure and any local shell flexibility were
attached to rigid arms w-tending to the outside of the shell at Xo 951 and 1246 (Xo 1128
for the intermediate Y-support case). The engine and the propellant tan=s were con-
sidered rigid, attached to the shell by the proper spring stiffness representing the
support strut system. Tug, adapter, and support stiffnesses were derived from finite
element data generated from a detailed model during the Convair STSS. The stiffness
of *the 11, 000 111 (4994 IT) reference spacecraft was assumed to be the same as the
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Figure 4.2-55. Tug Dynamic Model
forward end of the Tug. The tank weights included 6694 lb (3039 kg) of DH 2 and
39,188 lb (17, 791 kg) of D02.
initially, mode shapes and natural frequencies were determined for the following four
support configurations (A through D in Figure 4.2-54):
a. Four-point determinate system with the Y-support at X0 1249.
b. Four-point determinate system: with the Y-support at 4 1128.
c. Five-point load-balanced system with dual forward Z supports.
d. Five-point redundant system with dual fox ward Z supportp.
All four exhibited a first mode frequency of ^ 3.4 Hz is the yaw plane as shown in
Figure 4, 2--56. Comparing the first two arras ,Rmunts, it was fotmd that moving the
Y-support from station 1249 to station 1128 had little effect on this frequency. The
second mode was a combined roll-pitch anode with a frequency of 4.3 Hz and the 5.4
to 5.6 Hz third mode, seen in all configurations, was a second bending mode in the
X-Y (yaw) plane. It was also noted that only minimal difference in natural frequency
occurred between the load balanced and redundant systems.
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Table 4.2--28. Dynamic Model Mass Properties
Moment of Inertia
Ix Iy, IZWeight
Node lb kg 106 lb-in. 2 10 2 kg m2 10 6 lb-in. 2 102 kg m2
10 643 292 2.40 7.29 0.00 0.00
15 3512 1594 13.60 39.83 0.00 0.00
16 4562 2071 17.70 51.84 0.00 0.00
20 2491 1131 9.71 28.44 0.77 2.26
21 706 321 2.94 8.61 2.61 7.64
22 357 162 1.49 8.36 1.32 3.87
23 371 168 1.54 4.51 1.37 4.01
24 1011 459 4.21 17.33 3.73 10.93
25 580 263 2.90 8.49 2.13 6.24
32 7744 3516 4.37 12.80 6.70 19.62
41 40372 18329 4.93 14.44 21.00 61.51
61 426 193 1.77 5.18 1.57 4.60
51 335 1-52 2.58 7.56 1.21 3.54
52 240 109 1.85 5.42 0.86 2.52
d
The first two modes occurred close to the fundamental driving frequency of the
Orbiter (2 to 3 Hz) and were therefore expected to present problems because of the
large amplification of the response when the vehicle was subjected to the Orbiter in-
terface excitation. By adding a second Z support at X. 951, either with or without
the load balancing system, as shown for the latter two arrangements, the second mode
(roll-pitch) was eliminated. However the low first frequency mode remained. To
determine how much amplification would result because of these two low frequency
modes, a transient response analysis was performed for the four-point 1249Y con--
figuration. This was accomplished by equating the accelerations at the Orbiter sup-
port nodes (nodes 91 through 94) to the acceleration expected during the liftoff
condition, since this condition produced the largest Y and Z loads on the fully tanked
Tug (based on the J'SC 07700 accelerations). All supports in a particular direction
were assumed to receive the same acceleration from the Orbiter.
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Figure 4.2-56. Modal Analysis Summary Systems A-D
The Orbiter time history traces were derived from Rockwell International data (RI/SD
chart 64SSV21628B), as shown in Figure 4.2-57. Time histories at the X and Z sup-
ports were taken directly from the RI data. The Y-support acceleration time history
was created from -the Z-support curve (i. e., was assumed to be in phase with the Z
support acceleration), but the peak value was scaled down by the ratio of the corre-
sponding accelerations for the liftoff condition in the JSC 07700 accelerations (refer-
ence Table 4.2--2).
The forced response analysis of the four-point, 1249Y configuration indicated very
large Y deflections (loss of Orbiter clearance) at the spacecraft tip (24.2 in.; 60.5 cm)
and at the Tug/spacecraft interface (12, 2 in. ; 30.5 can), as shown in Figure 4.2-58 and
Table 4.2-29, which were due primarily to excitation of the fundamental mode of vibra-
tion. Similar analysis of the four-point, 1128Y configuration resulted in significant
reduction in the Y deflections (to 3.3 in. (8, 25 can) and 1. 4 in. (3.5 cm), respectively)
as shown. in T:9ble 4.2-30. However, although these displacements were marginally
acceptable; they represented centerline deflections only and dial not include allowance
for Tug shell noncircularity due to frame distortion, which is particularly significant
at the Tug/spacecraft interface (X o 936, node 20) due to the influence of the nearby
Orbiter support frame. Furthermore, the low first mode frequency provided insuf-
ficient frequency separation from the forcing function since both the frequency content
it	 and amplitude of the current appropriate forcing function are not known.
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Figure 4.2--58. Response at Selected Nodes, System A
Table 4.2-29. Response Analysis Summary, System A
Response Node
Direction
X(1) Y Z
Acceleration, g 10 3.40 25.4 8.5
20 3.40 12.4 3.7
25 3.40 4.9 2.1
52 3.40 2.9 1.6
32 3.40 9.5 3.2
41 3.40 6.0 2.8
91 - 1.0 -
92 3.43 - 1.5
93 3,43 - 1.5
94 -- -- 1.5
Displacement( 2) 10 0.14 (0.36) 24.2 (61.5) 6.4 (16.3)
in. (cm) 20 0.14 (0..36) 12.2 (31.0) 2.3 ( 5.8)
27 2.40 (6.10) 12.0 (30.5) 3.9 ( 9.9)
Notes: (1) X acceleration response includes gravity.
(2) Displacements measured relative to Orbiter.
It was therefore concluded that the best way to obtain acceptable response was to
eliminate or increase the mode at 3.3 Hz to above 5 Hz by providing either additional
stiffness or additional bending constraintfa in the Y direction. Consequently, two addi-
tional support configurations were assessed with the objective of increasing first mode
frequency and thereby further reducing displacement response. System E was geo-
metrically identical to B but incorporated infinite stiffness at all support points, since
examination of previous response data indicated support softness as a major contribu-
tor to response. This implied a substantial weight increase relative to System B,
from which it evolved, to provide increased fitting, frame, and body stiffness. Tug
pem rmance would be penalized as a result. System F was similar to D but added a
second Y-support, at Xo 951. Relative to System B, the delta weight, delta perform-
ance impacts of F were approximately zero due to the need for a major support frame
plus a relocated Y-fitting on the Tug in B, whereas F adds both a Y and a Z fitting to
the Tug but requires only local beef--up of the existing Xo 951 support frame.
Comparison of Systems E and F in Figure 4.2-59 and Tables 4.2-31 and 4.2-32 indi-
cated increased first-mode frequency and reduced displacement responso in each, but
F exhibited a distinct advantage in both categories and was therefore recommended
since it also resulted in the least weight/performance impact.
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TablE 4.2-3,0. Response Analysis Summary, System B
Response Node
Direction
XM Y Z
Acceleration, g 10 3.43 4.79 6.10
20 3.42 2.44 2.57
25 3.42 1.91 2.10
52 3.41 2.01 1.57
32 3.40 2.04 2.42
41 3.43 2.65 2.71
91 - 1.00 -
92 3.43 - 1.50
93 3.43 - 1.50
94 - - 1.50
Displacement(2), 10 0.06 (0.15) 3.27 (8.31) 2.71 (6.88)
in. (cm) 20 0.06 (0..15) 1.39 (3.53) 0.80 (2.03)
21 0.06 (0.15) 1.30 (3.30) 0.71 (1.80)
27 0.35 (0.89) 1.25 (3.20) 1.18 (3.00)
24 0.06 (0.15) 0.50 (1.27) 0.59 (1.50)
52 0.06 (0.15) 0.69 (1.75) 0.11 (0.28)
Notes: (1) X acceleration response includes gravity.
(2) Displacement measured relative to Orbiter.
SUPPORT CONFIGURATION MODAL FREQUENCIES (HOM
X. =582	 981	 1249 T
(E) 4.POINT,112BY	 +'
I K - m AT	 -'. ^'i•
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IF) B-POINT, REDUNDANT •{'..
{"'{• 5.41	 -	 6.54	 5,99
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Figure 4.2-59. Modal Analysis
Summary, Systems
F, and F
4.2.3.7 Alternative X/Z Support. In
Section 4.2.2.2 it was shown that Tug
support reactions exceed Orbiter capa-
bility, using both MSFC 68M00039-1 and
JSC 07700 accelerations in all support
arrangements employing existing Orbiter
provisions. To improve understanding
of the Tug reaction exceadance problem,
a meeting was held at which the Convair
presentation pointed out that the general
payload guidelines (not published require-
ments) used for developing Orbiter support
capability w e not consistent with real-
world TT g- h ical requirements and that
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Table 4.2-31. Response Analysis Summary, System E
(y
Response Node
Direction
X(1) Y Z
Acceleration, g 10 3.50 3.92 4.08
20 3.46 1.90 2.31
25 3.40 1.38 1.84
52 3.40 1.39 1.50
32 3.64 1.45 2.16
41 3.4.5 1.90 2.49
91 - 1.00 --
92 3.43 - 1.50
93 3.43 - 1.50
94 - - 1.50
Displacement (2) , 10 0.10 (0.25) 2.04 (5.18) 1.96 (4.98)
in. (cm) 20 0.08 (0.20) 0.66 (1.68) 0.51 (1.30)
21 0.07 (0.18) 0.60 (1.52) 0.44 (1.12)
27 0.24 (0.61) 0.53 (1.35) 0.89 (2.26)
24 0.05 (0.13) 0.10 (0.25) 0.36 (0.91)
52 0.04 (0.10) 0.23 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00)
Motes: (1) X acceleration response includes gravity.
(2) Displacement measured relative to Orbiter.
l
this was the cause of our reaction exceedance. The proposed solution consisted of
moving the Tug aft X/Z supports to Xo
 1269. 6, where new Orbiter bridge beam and
trunnion were required. Presented here are the features and effects on the Tug of
the alternative X/Z support location. Subsequent analyses using still later accelera-
tion data (Section 4.2.3.8) resulted in acceptable support reactions. Consequently
the alternative X/Z support concept discussed here was not required for the preferred
support arrangement.
Tug/Orbiter Compatibility Assessment. The presence of reaction exceedances ob-
tained for such a wide range of Tug support arrangements raised questions as to the
Orbiter/payload accommodations structural design approach. Therefore an investi-
gation was conducted to determine the apparent characteristics of the payloads used
for developing Orbiter capability and the associated guidelines and constraints
employed.
The structural accommodations in the Orbiter cargo bay had to encompass a very
broad range of potential payloads. Included wYx-e single, large payloads, and as many
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Table 4.2-32. Response Analysis Summary, System F
Response: Node
Direction
1C(1) Y Z
Acceleration, g 10 3.55 2.08 3.44
20 3.53 1.20 1.66
25 3.50 1.78 2.03
52 3.46 1.43 1.59
32 3.65 1.27 2.01
41 3.52 1.83 2.80
91 -- 1.00 -
92 3.43 _ 1.50
93 3.43 - 1.50
94 - - 1.50
95 - - 1.50
96 - 1.00 -
Displacement (2) , 10 0.17 (0.43) 0.52 (1.32) 0.87 (2.21)
in. (cm) 20 0.16 (0.41) 0.20 (0.51) 0.14 (0,36)
21 0.16 (0.41) 0.19 (0.48) 0.10 (0.25)
24 0.12 (0.30) 0.48 (1.22) 0.37 (0.94)
52 0.08 (0.20) 0.31 (0.79) 0.11 (0.28)
Notes: (1) X acceleration response includes gravity.
(2) Displacement measured relative to Orbiter.
as five individually supported multiple payloads. To account for the full spectrum of
possible support combinations, and to design the Orbiter midbody to structurally accept
the resulting reactions, a fairly complex computer program was employed to perform
the parametric analysis. To suitably bound this immense task, ground rules or guide-
lines were developed for use as constraints in the computation. The more significant
of these guidelines are shown in Figure 4.2-60. Unfortunately, the bounding condi-
tions apply to relatively inert cargo rather than to relatively active systems such as
Tug plus spacecraft. The CG constraints and Y fitting placement guideline are excel-
lent examples. I. addition, this Orbiter capability development process was performed
before the long-payload influence on Tug length which resulted in a shorter baseline
Tug configuration. For this reason, the MSFC 30-foot (9.1 m) long baseline Tug,
designed to take full performance advantage of the Orbiter 65k lb cargo limits was
physically limited by available Orbiter support fitting locations to a 24.5-foot (7.47 m)
span between supports and, apparently, to a corresponding 52k lb (23.6 x 10 3
 kg)
gross weight.
4-114
e INITIAL CONCEPT
• REVISED TRUNNION
LOCATION
ORB i TER-IMPOSED GUIDELINES
FOR GENERALIZED PAYLOADS
* PAYLOADS MUST COMPLY WITH ALLOW-
ABLE ORBITER CG LIMITS (PRESUMABLY
AT ALL TIMES)
s PAYLOAD CG WITHIN 50 TO 7076 OF
PAYLOAD LENGTH
PAYLOAD CG NOT CANTLIVERED OUTS DE
SUPPORT POINTS
* KEEL FITTING PLACED AT OR NEAR
PAYLOAD CG
SPACE TUG CHARACTERISTICS
® BASELINE TUG NORMALLY OPERATES WITH ITS
CG AFT OF ORBITER ENVELOPE. L02 DUMP DUR-
ING ABORT PLACES CG BACK WITHIN LIMITS
0 TUG PLUS PAYLOAD CG VARIES FROM 42 TO BE-
YOND 100% OF TUG LENGTH & DEPENDING ON
FLIGHT CONDITION, MAY LIE EITHER BETWEEN
OR CANTILEVERED BEYOND SUPPORTS.
LARGE TUG PLUS PAYLOAD CG SHIFT DOES NOT
SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT FOR ANY SINGLE
Y FITTING r-LACEMENT
®	 30 _ _ _ _ _ _	 ® BASELI NE TUG I S 30 FT LONG OVERALL. MAX I -
	
i
	MUM SEPARATION OF ORBITER FITTINGS
SUPPORT	 20	
- 
	
I I	 SUITABLE FOR TUG ROTATIONAL DEPLOYMENT
POINT	 i	 I	 IS 24.5 FT
SEPARATION
(FT)	 ^0	 i	 I
	
I	 I
20	 40	 60	 80
PAYLOAD WEIG14T (LB)
Figure 4.2-60. Tug/Orbiter Compatibility Assessment
Bridge Beam Concept. It was found that all reaction exceedance due to JSC accelera-
tions could be eliminated by using an alternative five-point (tour-Z) support concept
employing a new bridge beam that provided primary X/Z support aft of X. 1246, A
configuration concept for the new bridge beam and the evolution of the selected trun-
nion location are shown in Figure 4.2-61. Initially the trunnion waE, located at Xo 1260
to minimize the support adapter length increase while maintainba-g ,;riequate engine bell
clearance from the cargo bay aft limit (Xo 1302) during rotation. However, this loca-
tion was found to be unacceptable due to interference with an R.MS latch and a cargo
bay door hinge; consequently the forward most acceptable location, X o 1269. 6, was
chosen.
	
X 01249 X01260
NEW BRIDGE BEAM
	
X01269.8X0 1303	 9,1393	 O FEATURES^
24,414	 X01249	 20A14	 y^` *-,	 • TRUNNION AT X, 1269.6
-	 -	 a USE EXISTING 2I/F AT X, 1249
_ 7	 ,,;r	 rl	 • REACT TWIST AT X. 1249
is i ,	 ^. ^ !k	 I	 I	 ,	 e AFT X12 I I F AT X, 1303
	
SILL LONGERON ( REFI
	
AFT BULKHEAD IMF)"
Figure 4.2-61. Bridge Beane Concept for Alternative Aft Support Location
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The new beam spans from the Xo 1249 mid--fuselage frarne to the longeron/bulkhead
joint region at Xo 1303. The existing beam/frame Z-load and twist restraint inter-
faces at Xo 1249 are unchanged. Drag (X) loads are carried aft by the bridge beam
and introduced to the Orbiter primary structure at Xo 1303, avoiding drag load appli-
cation to the sill longerons.
Support Reactions. The support reactions and resulting exceedance are given in
Figure 4.2-62 for support arrangements 1-1 and 2-1, with the Y support relocated to
SUPPORT REACTIONS III
SUPPORT X1 & X2 Y1 Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4
CONFIG +	 _ + +	 _ +	 _ +	 _ +
1 . 114•POINTI 127A 	65.2 64 .6 81.0	 81.0 49.2	 40 .0 55.3	 75.9 -	 -
2 .115•POINTI 127 A
	65.2 64.6 60.0	 56." 60.0	 56.2 28.2	 38 .0 28.2	 38.0
LOCATION. Xa 1269 .5 1181 1269.6 1269.6 951 951
ORB CAPABIL. TBO	 I	 TBD 1 67 .0 122. D 1 89.9 122 . 0 1 89.9 1 52 .0 1 67.0 1 52.0	 67.0
ACCUMULATED
EXCEEOANCE
SOURCE	 1.1	 21
X ONLY 0 0
X IN X1z TBO TBD
Y 0 0
Z ONLY 13.2 0
z IN X!z 0 0
i 13.2 0
	
JSC 07700,^ +92	
+87.24:^^
	
•65.	 61.6 
TRUNNION	 1246 nl 
/	 y	 409l
FRAME	 1191	 1249	 1249	 1303
Figure 4.2-62. Support Reactions and Orbiter Capability Determination
_ir Xo 1269.6 X/Z Support
Xo 1181, using JSC accelerations. A slight exceedance is noted for configuration 1-1,
whereas configuration 2-1 is entirely within Orbiter capability. See Table 4.2-5 for
previous exceedance using Xo 1246 X/Z supports. Sufficient Orbiter capability was
anticipated at Xo 1303 due to redesign to provide the bridge beam aft interface, and
the apparent capability for Xo 1.269.6 X/Z loading was conservatively derived as shown
by assuming that maximum X and Z reactions occurred simultaneously.
Tug Effects. 'T'ug effects associated with the proposed support concept are shown in
Figure 4.2-63. The deployment adapter had to be lengthened 23.6 in. (59 cm) to align
the aft interface frame with the new trunnion location. No Y-support provisions exist
at Xo 1269. E, but the existing Xo 1249, X o 1181, and Xo 1128 locations were still
candidates. Of the three, Xo 1181 was preferred since a frame at this station could
also react the yaw kick loads in the X fittings and support the Tug/adapter separation
alignment guides. Deletion of the Xo 1249 main Y-support eliminated the X-reaction
1173	 __ 1264.6
' i^ Q7 INCREASE ADAPTER LENGTH 123.61
414 0 RELOCATE Y SUPPORT IX O
 1181)I '	 O3 PROVIDE X REACTION FOR SUPPORT'TRUSS-1	 a REQUIRES BULKHEAD 1/F
e USES EXISTING 1IF AT X,1240
Q ENVELOPE VIOLATION DURING DEPLOYMENT
ADAPTER ROTATION:'
I	 a 1.3IN. BY ENGINE BELL
1240 3 1246
	 a FOSSIBLE ADAPTER AFT FRAME MOD.
for the umbilical panel support truss.
Consequently, a lightweight link was re-
quired, which spanned from the existing
brackets on the Xo 1249 frame to the
cargo bay aft bulkhead where a new
attachment bracket was required. Dur-
ing rotation with the baseline Tug engine
bell exit plane (Xo 1296), the cargo bay
envelope was violated a maximum 1.3 in.
	
Figure 4.2-63. Effects on the Tug of 	 (3,.25 em) by the engine. A suitable
	
Xo 1269 X/Z Support 	 deployment adapter aft frame modification
would have precluded any adapter inter-
ference, but the engine bell encroachment of Orbiter space was expected to be per-
missible since both Tug and Orbiter were unloaded at this time, and therefos !e neither
was deflected from nominal configuration.
4.2.3.8 Support Reaction Agalysis Update. The objectives of the support reaction
analysis update were threefold; 1) to recompute the support reactions for the candidate
systems using the latest MSFC acceleratipns specified "in MSFC PF-02-75-31, _ and to
determine the extent of any Orbiter support capability exceedance, 2) to assess the
effects of crash loads in terms of Orbiter support capability exceedance and Tug im-
pact, and 3) to -upport the assessment of Y-support station location effects. The sup-
port arrangements involved in the update analyses were those shown in Figure 4.2--64.
4-POINT, 1249Y (1- 1)
i
112BY i1-1A)
1
1
5 POINT, LOAD-BALANCED (2.1)
r
da7
e
6-POINT, LOAD-BALANCER (4.1)ilk
Figure 4.2-64. Candidate Support Arrangements
The four-point system with its Y-support at X o 1249 (support arrangement 1-1) and
the five-point load-balanced system were recommended after the initial screening, and
a preference for the latter system was indicated at the major study review. However,
in response to the concern over yaw dynamic softness (Section. 4.2e 3e 6), the six-point
(dual-Y) load balanced system (4-1) and the four-point X o 1128 Y system (1-1A) were
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added. The two initially recommended support arrangements without support adapter
(1-2 and 2-2) were deleted in the meantime due to communications, RMS deployment,
and weight/performance considerations. Table 4.2-33 summarizes the specific sup-
port point locations in the candidate systems.
Table 4.2-33. Support Locations in Candidate Arrangements
System
Support Point Stations, Xo
X1, X2 Y1 Y2 Z 1, Z2 Z3 Z4
4-Point
1249 Y (1-1) 1246 1249 - 1246 951 -
1128 Y (1-1A) 1246 1128 - 1246 951 -
5-Point
Balanced (2-1) 1246 1249 -- 1246 951 951
6-Point
Balanced (4-1) 1246 1249 951 1246 951 951
Support Reaction R.ecomputation. The following ground rules were used in this task:
a. Mass properties for the descent and landing case assumed both propellant tanks
empty. Previous support reaction analyses assumed a full fuel tank since the
MSFC baseline Tug dial not initially have sub-orbital (RTLS abort) LH2 dump.
b. Crash reactions were excluded he7qe and addressed in the following subsection.
c. The Y-support was located at Orbiter Station X. 1249. Variation of Y-support
support station is addressed in a later subsection.
d. Redundant systems are excluded here buP. are addressed in Section 4.2.3.9.4
Support reactions were computed for each load case given in MSFC PF-42-75-31 in-
cluding all possible perturbations and combinations of signs using the computer pro-
gram previously illustrated in Figure 4.2-18. The results are shown in Figure 4.2-65.
The tabular data defines the positive and negative maximum varies at each support
location and the X/Z interaction plots define the envelopes of all X/Z reaction pairs at
the aft supports for each mission phase in each support system. To generate the X/Z
envelopes, the program above was modified to plot each X/Z pair for each individual
acceleration case. The interaction plots indicate that the -four-point and five-point
systems both experience excessive reactions in the X-direction only, whereas all X/Z
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REACTIONS (1,000 LSI
CONFIG X1 & X2 Yt	 Y2	 Z7	 Z2	 Z3	 Z4
4-POINT 133.1 53.0 452 - 57.5 51.1 47.3 29.0 38.1 71.0 - -
8-POINT 733.1 53.8 45.2 - 45.2 :137,0 1 45.2 37.0 79.1 35.5 19.1 35.5
&POINT 100.5 9.9 27.1 28.3 45.9 37.7 45.9 37.7 19.1 35.6 19.1 35.5
CAPABILITY " 58.9 70.0 r r • 52.0 67.0 52.0 57.0
0 EXCEEDANCE COMPARISOM,1)
CONFIG
ACCELEERRATIONS
MSFC MSFC JSC
PF•02. 68M0 07700
I
75.31 0039-1 "C"
4-POINT 93.8 344.9 174.7
6-POINT 89.8 193,4 155.6
B-POINT 0	
1
265.0 0
+7	 r%Ci%=flIT
aC
DSUPPORT REACTIONS
* EXCLUDING CRASH
*BOTH TANKS EMPTY DURING ABORT DESCENT
* Y-SUPP09T AT Xa 1249
+Z	 ASCENT (ALL)
100
e4-POINP	 HI.O	 e'
BOOST
ONLY
1+X
ABORT	 ._ 	
_ J101#
X•Z LIVAIT LOAD
ENVELOPE, STA Xa 1246
(1) EXCEEDANCES PER MSFC 68MOD039-1 AND JSC 07700 °C" RECOMPUTED AS {NECESSARY
TO REFLECT GROUND RULE UPDATE TO DUMP FUEL PRIOR TO ABORT DESCENT
Figuxe -4, 2--65. Support Reaction Recomputation and Exaeudance Comparison
interaction in the six-point system is within Orbiter capability. This is shown uumer-
ically in the exceedance comparison table. The difference between the four and five--
point systems results from a srrall exceedance at the -Z3 reaction in the four-point
system. Reactions in the six-point system are all within Orbiter capability.
The current accelerations result in exceedance significantly lower than that computed
for previous acceleration sets. For this comparison the exceedauce totals using
accelerations per MSFC 68M00039-1 and JSC 07700, Vol. MV, Rev. C were recalcu-
lated as necessary to reflect fuel dump before abort descent.
Crash Load Effects. All previous suppoa r. reaction exceedance assessment has been
based on comparisons of computed support reactions with Orbiter limit capability as
specified in JSC 07788, Vol, MT, R.ev, C. No indication was given there as do whi h
Orbiter structural elements (payload support fittings or Enid-fuselage basic structure)
were critical in defining limit capability. Since crash loads are ultimate and are to
be carried only through the bridge beam/mid-fuselage attachments on the Orbiter side,
the Orbiter capability with respect to crash loads was not apparent. To evaluate the
effect of crash loads within the available capability data, the following approach was
taken:
ar The bridge beam/mid-fuselage interface was r sumied to be critical %or all existing
i
	 limit load capability data.
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b. A. "quasi-limit" crash load case was defined. Accelerations were as specified in
JSC 07700 includ ,ng a 20-degree cone on the 9, 0-g X-accelerations. Mass
properties for th Tug (both propellant tanks empty) plus spacecraft were revised
to reflect are "eff. ctive" weight equal to the true weight reduced by the ultimate
factor of safety (i.4).
The resulting aft X, Z support reactions are shown in the interaction plot in Fig-
ure 4.2-66, while the Y and forward Z reactions are tab^lated. The tabular data
emphasizes those reactions in each support system whose maxima are produced by
the "quasi-limit" crash case. None of these crash reactions exceeded Orbiter
capability,
0 CRASH LOAD EFFECTS
oBOTH TANKS EMPTY
e Y .SUPPORT AT X01249
o "QUASI - LIMIT" LOAD CASE:
• JSC 07700 "C" ACCEL
"EFFECTIVE ° WTOTAL/1.4
5
aY, FWD Z REACTIONS
0XIZ INTERACTION AT X0 1246
E^	 +Z
t2
INT
-POINT
.X
•7'E10K
LIMIT DESIGN LOAD AT
BRIDGE BEAM/FUSELAGE
INTERFACE
X-Z LIMIT LOA:' ENVELOPE
CONFIG INCRASH?
REACTIONS (1.000 LB)
Y1	 Y2 	 Z3	 Z4+	 ±	 +	 -	 +	 -
4-POINT NO 45.2 - 38.1 71.0 - -
YES 45.2 - 49.5 71.0 - -
5-POINT NO 45.2 - 19.1 355 15.1 35.5
YES 45.2 - 4.8 35.5 24.8 35.5
6-POINT NO 27.1 2t3l 19.11 35.5 1	 T 35.5
YES 27.1 44. 24.8 35.5 24, 35.5
ORBITER CAPABILITY 56.0 70.0 =50J-15j .01 52.0 67
EXCEEDANCE COMPARISON
CONFIG INCL CRASH?
NO YES
4-POINT:69.8.8 235.2
5-POINT 	 231.2&POINT
	51.2
II
9TUS IMPACTS
s4-POINT: NONE
015-POINT; NONE
06-1`01NT: DESIGNSFWDY
FITTING, ATTACHMENTS
Figure 4.2-66. Crash Load Effects
The interaction plot exhibits substantial excess in the negative X reactions, particu-
larly in the fours- and five--point systems. However, recent information indicated a
110 klb (489 kN) limit design load at the bridge beam/mid-fuselage interface. As
shown, reactions in the four-- and five-point systems QU4 exceeded this value, but
those for the six-point system were well within. it. The exceedance comparison
numerically illustrates the crash reaction versus Orbiter capability situation. Crash
reactions increased the exceedance in all systems relative to current JSC 07700 capa-
bility, but adoption of the 110k lb (489 kN) capability, if appropriate, eliminated ex-
ceedance in the six-point system.
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Crash load effects on Tug design were negligible. In the four- and five-point systems,
the maximum crash reaction at each point was exceeded by a reaction in another mis-
sion phase, hence there was no impact. In the six-point system, the forward Y fitting
experienced a higher maximum load during crash, resulting in a weight penalty of
approximately five lb (2.25 kg) in the fitting itself. No frame or body weight penalty
occurred since these elements were not required to be designed for crash loads.
Effects of Y-Support Location. The station location of the Y support in single Y (i.e.,
four-point and five-point) systems was of importance since it influenced the interface
impacts to Tug and Orbiter in three ways: reactions, dynamics, and weight. These
are illustrated in Figure 4.2-67.
,
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o INFLUENCES COUPLING OF
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Figure 4.2-67. Effects of Y-Support Location.
From the point of view of support reactions, the best Y-support location was at the
vehicle longitudinal CG, since this eliminated coupling of yaw bending into the K reac-
tions. As illustrated, any offset, L, between the Y-support station and the CG re-
sulted in are incremental X-reaction change, AX, which was a linear function of L.
Unfortunately, the Tug does not have a fixed CG location for all mission types and
phases. During the ascent phase the CG can lie anywhere within a 79-in. (197.5 cm)
bandwidth (Xa 1985-1148), depending on mission type (deploy or retrieve) and deploy
spacecraft weight. In addition, during abort descent with the reference (heaviest
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cantilevered) spacecraft, the CG lies 175 in. (-' . 5 cm) forward of the ascent band
(reference Section 4.2.2.2, ]figure 4.2-19). . ,asequently, there was no optimum CG
location, although station Xo 1128 was the best choice among the three available is^a-
tions as shown in the X/Z interaction. comparison. It provided +X reactions within both
the overall and h?-q boost envelopes and exhibited the least exceedance for -X reactions.
Considering dynamic response (reference Section 4.2.3.6), yaw displacements (Sy)
from the nominal vehicle centerline were reduced as shown by judicious selection of
Y-support station. Again. Xo 1128 provided a substantial decrease in all yaw displace-
ment as indicated in the comparison of forced response data for two otherwise identical
four point systems. The three reference stations presented are the forwardmost
spacecraft tip station (Xo 582), the Tug/spacecraft interface (Xo 936), and the aft
Tug/Orbiter interface (Xo 1245).
The choice of Y-support station was not clearcut, however, since the allocation of
weight between the Tug flight vehicle and its Orbiter-retained deployment adapter
strongly influenced payload deployment capability to synchronous orbit, as shown by
the N7:1 ratio between payload penalty partials. Assuming a vehicle initially lacking a
Y support, the weight and performance penalties to incorporate the support at either of
two possible locations (Xo 1128 or 1249) are shown. The performance advantage
clearly lies with the Xo 1249 location.. Consequently, the final choice of a best Y sup-
port location depended on the relative importance assigned to the various influencing
considerations. It was for this reason that two four-point systems, with different
Y--support locations, were included in the subsequent weight/performance evaluation
of candidate support systems (Section 4.2. x.10).
4.2.3.9 Redundant Support Analysis. Early analyses indicated that Tug support
reactions exceeded Orbiter support point capability for Tug configurations using the
baseline four--point support concept. In addition, large dynamic loads and deflections
were produced in the Tug body for the baseline four--point support system.
To reduce Tug support reactions as well as Tug dynamic loads and deflections, sev-
eral alternate support concepts using additional support points were considered.
Without special load balancing provisions to deeouple the supports these alternate
concepts are all statically indeterminate. For these redundant support concepts,
Orbiter deflections will induce loads is the Tug structure. Misalignment and toler-
ance accumulations between the Tug/Orbiter redundant support points will also pro-
duce loads in tha Tug body.
To establish feasibility of the redundant support concepts it was necessary to evaluate
both of these effects.
Two redundant sul. ,. t concepts were considered. The first was a five-point; system
using, in addition to the Tug baseline four support points, a second forward Z support
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at Station 951 (see Figure 4.2-68). With this concept, the Tug support system is
statically determinate for all loading except torsional bending (Mx). T ii.s support
concept eliminates the high torsional loading and deflection of the Tug body shell due
to the eccentric forward Z support in
STA
	 STA	 the baseline four-point support concept.qR1	 Z VJAM
However, torsional loads and deflections
are induced in the Tug body shell due to
X	 Orbiter twist and out-of-plane tolerance
and mismatch of the four Z supports.
The second redundant support concept
was a silt-point system using a second
forward Z support at Station 951 and a
second Y support, also at Station 951
(see Figure 4.2-68). With this concept,
the Tug support system is statically
X
	
	
determinate for all loading except tor-
sional. beading (Mx) and yaw bending (Mz).
This support concept also eliminates the
high torsional loading and deflection of
the Tug body shell due to the baseline
four-point support concept. In addition,
yaw deflections (f6y) are reduced.
Orbiter Load/Deflection Impact. With a
X
	
	 redundant five- or six-point Tug support
concept, Orbiter loads/deflections will
induce loads in the Tug body structure.
The magnitude of these induced Tug body
loads is a function of the relative roll
Figure 4.2-68. Tug Redundant Support 	 (Mx) and yaw (Mz) flexibility of the Tug
Concepts	 and Orbiter.
ib evaluate the impact of Orbiter loads and deflections on Tug body loads, the simpli-
fied computer finite element model shown in Figure 4.2-69 was generated using equiva-
lent stiffnesses Table 4. 2-34 derived from the detailed Tug finite element model
discussed in Section 4. Z % 1. Stiffnesses of the varic is model elements were adjusted
until deflections matched those from the detailed finite element model. A Convair pro-
_
	
	 duction structural analysis program, SOLD SAP, was used for the analysis. Mass
properties used in the analysis are summarized in Table 4.2-35. Accelerations used
in the analysis were the latest values supplied for the study (reference k4SFC PF-02--
75-31) except that the angular accelerations were not included. Load factors are
summarized in Table 4.2-36. 	 is
Ak.
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Figure 4.2-69. Redundant Support
Analysis Computer
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Specific critical load cases were selected
based on anticipated maximum support
reactions ur maximum Orbiter deflec-
tions. Maximum Orbiter deflections
were obtained from prell. minary runs of
the Rockwell International ASKA pro-
gram analysis of the Orbiter mid-fuselage
structure. Due to structural symmetry
and the limited support redundancy the
only Orbiter deflections that induce loads
in the Tug body are the asymmetric
roll (Mx) and relative yaw (Mz) def ec-
tions between. Stations X. 951 and X. 1246.
Maximum relative twist between the Orbiter cargo bay sill longerons and the relative
yaw deflection at the cargo bay bottom centerline between Station, Xo 951 and Xo 1246
are presented in Table 4.2-37. Relative twist and relative yaw are defined in
Figure 4.2-70. For the yaw conditions and Orbiter !load, support points tend to
deflect asymmetrically to reduce the yaw •fixity. These deflections were conservatively
ignored in the analysis (i . e., the Tug X supports were assumed built in). .
The analysis approach consisted of:
a. initial analysis runs for critical Tug load conditions. These runs were made with
rigid supports for the baseline four-point (1-1), five-point load balanced (2-1),
six-point load balanced (4-1), five-point redundant (2-1R), and six-point redundant
(4--1R.) configurations. These runs established support reactions and internal body
loads due to Tug loading only.
b. Unit support deflection analysis runs were made. Unit twist loading was obtained
by releasing the forward 2 supports (Station 953) and applying a 1000 pound
(4450 N) Z couple load at each support. Unit yaw loading was obtained by releas-
ing the forward Y support (Station 951) and applying a unit 1000 pound (4450 N)
Y load at the support. Unit relative twist and yaw deflections are shown in
Figure 4.2-71.
Maximum Tug support reactions due to Orbiter deflections were obtained by multi-
plying the unit Tug deflection data by the maximum Orbiter deflections in
	 '`=
Table 4.2-37. These maximum support reactions are summarized in Tables 4.2-38,
4.2-39, and 4.2-40. Tug support point locations are shown in Figure 4.2-72.
-	 i
Maximum total Tug support loads for the redundant support concepts are listed in
Tables 4.2-41 and 4.2-42. The total loads include components due to Tug inertia and	 - .4:
:-	 I
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M1
^A
Y
C^
C^
rr
Element
A-B z;
107 lb	 (107 N)
I£AG y
107 lb	 ( 107 N)
KAG z
107 lb
	 (107 N)
JG x
1010 lb/	 (10 10
 N/
W2	 am2)
El y
1014 lb/	 (1010
 N/
in?-	 em2)
El z
10 10
 lb/ 	 ( 10 10 N/
!n2	 =2)
101. 7.36 (32.75) 3.72 (111.55) 3.72 (16.55) 35.37 (24.40) 75.36 (52.00) 75.36 (52.00)
201 7.36 (32.75) 3.72 (16.55) 3.72 (16.55) 35.37 (24.40) 75.36 (52.00) 75.36 (52.00)
301 7.36 (32.75) 3.72 (16.55) 3.72 (16.55) 35.37 (24.40) 75.36 (52.00) 75.36 (52.00)
401 7.36 (32.75) 3.72 (16.55) 3.72 (16.55) 35.37 (24.40) 75.36 (52.00) 75.36 (52.00)
501 5.60 (24.92) 4.58 (20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 35.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 92.48 (63.81)
502 3.0. 50 (46.73) 4.00 (17.80) 4.00 (17.80) 40.00 (27.60) 9.66 ( 6.67) 9.66 ( 6.67)
503 10,50 (46.73) 4.00 (17.80) 4.00 (17.80) 40.00 (27.60) 9.66 ( 6.67) 9.66 ( 6.67)
504 10.50 (46.73) 16.00 (71.20) 16.00 (71.20) -40.00 (27.60) 9.24 ( 6.38) 9.24 ( 6.38)
601 5.60 (24.92) 4.58 ,20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 36.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 87.86 (60.62)
701 5.60 (24.92) 4.58 (20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 35.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 82.31 (56.79)
801 5.60 (24.92) 4.58 (20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 35.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 75.84 (52.33)
901 5.76 (25.63) 4.58 (20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 35.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 69.36 (47.86)
1001 5.76 (25,63) 4.58 (20.38) 7.32 (32.57) 35.37 (24.40) 147.84 (102.01) 64.74 (44.67)
1101 5.76 (25.63) 3.05 (13.57) 9.76 (43.43) 44.52 (30.50) 147.84 (102, 01) 76.46 (52.76)
1201 5.76 (25.63) 3.05 (13.57) 9.76 (43.43) 44.52 (30.50) 197.28 (136.12) 71.52 (49.35)
1401 10.40 (46.28) 3.05 (13.57) 9.76 (43.43) 44.52 (30.50) 197.28 (136.12) 65.36 (45.10)
1501 10.40 (46.28) 3.05 (13.57) 9.76 (43,43) 44.52 (30.50) 197.28 (136.12) 57. 96 (39.99)
1601 10.40 (46.28) 3.05 (13.57) 9.76 (43.43) 44.52 (3e .50) 197.28 (136.12) 51.79 (35.74)
1702 10.50 (46.73) 8.52 (37.91) 8.52 (37.91) 40.00 (27.60) 18.90 (13.04) 32.55 (22.46)
1703 10,50 (46.73) 8.52 (37.91) 8.52 (37.91) 40.00 (27.60) 18.90 (13.04) 32.55 (22.46)
1764 10.50 (46.73) 16.00 (71.20) IG.OU (71.20) 40.00 (27.60) 9.24 ( 6.38) 9.24 { 6.38)
f
I^
^I
Norte: See Fl- re 4 . 2.-69 for element locations.
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y;	 Table 4.2-34. 'dug Redundant Support Analysis Model Stiffn.esses
Table 4.2-35. Tug Redundant Support Analysis Model Mass Propertiea.
Deploy Ascent Phase Deploy Retrieve Phase Retrieve Ascent Phase
Item
sleight cg Weight eg Weight eg
lb	 (kg) sta Ib	 (kg) sta lb	 (kg) sta
Payload 11000	 ( 4990) 791 11000	 (499{0 791 0 0
Tug Structure 3964	 ( 1798) 1071 3964	 (1.798) 1071 3964	 (1798) 1071
Deploy Adapter 708	 (	 321) 1241 708	 ( 321) 1201 708	 (	 321) 1201
LH2 Tank 7820	 ( 3547) 1037 425	 ( 193) 1029 8488	 ( 3850) 1032
1,x}2 Tank 40316	 (18287) 1180 1131	 _ ( 513) 1215 44330	 (20108) 1176
Total 63808	 (28943) 1089 17228	 (7815) 906 57490	 (26077) 1148
•	 ,c
STA
RELATIVF YAW	 1245
i
Table 4.2a-36. Redunaaat Support Analysis Load Factors
C ondition
Nx (W r.)
(+ Aft)
NY (g' s)
(+ Right)
NZ (g1 S)
(+ UP)
Liftoff -1.6 X1.3 4:0. 7 --0.1 X1.0
High-Q Boost -1,.8 zkO.2 *fl. 5 X0.6
Boost Max Load Factor -3.0 X0.15 +-0.2 -0.3
Orbiter Max Load Factor -3.0 :f^0.15 +-0.2 -0.75
Entry
+ Pitch Maneuver 1.1 0 2.5
- Patch Maneuver 0.6 0 -1.0
Yaw Maneuver 1.0 4:1.25 1.0
Roll Maneuver 0.9 X0.2 1.5
Landing -0.2 *-1. 3 ;W. 7 2„ 0 *1. 3r
t
1000 LB
(4450N)
RELATIVE -MIST t
UNIT 8Z
7245
951	 w 94.0 INr^
I	 (2.Qrn) +
1000 La(4450N)
UNIT AZ	 UNIT AY
CONFIG IN.	 (CM)
	
IN.	 (CAS)
2-7R	 0.0236 (0.06051
	 -	 --
4-1R	 0.0216 (0,0549)	 0.0410 (CIACK1I
1000 LP	 STA 1245
(44 N) RELATIVE YAW
UNIT AY
,R.
Fi, e 4.270. Definition of Relative	 Figure 4. 2-71. Tug Unit Twist and
'twist and Relative Yaw	 Yaw Deflections
Table 4.2-37. Maximum Orbiter Deflections
Condition in.
AZ sill
(cm)
AY centerline
in,	 (cm)
Liftoff 0.116 (0.295) 0.048 (0.122)
High-Q Boost 0.200 (0.508) 0,146 (0.371)
Max G 0 (0) 0 (0)
Entry Yaw 0.085 (0.216) 0.110 (0.279)
Entry Boll 0.057 (0.145) 0.022 (0.056)
Landing 0.073 (0.185) 0.043 (0.109)
Orbiter deflections. The Tug inertia loads include a correction, based on data from
the five-- and si_x-point load balanced support reaction analysis update (Section 4.2.3, 8),
for the angular accelerations included in the MSFC PF-02--75-31 load factors. Support
loads due to Orbiter deflections were combined with the Tug inertia loads in the most
conservative manner.
Comparison of the redundant support analysis results with the support reactions calcu-
lated for load balanced support concepts (Table 4.2-4-3) indicates that this approach is
not only feasible, but preferable, with respect to exceeding Orbiter support point
loading capability. -
This comparison of support reactions between the five- and six-point redundant and
load-balanced systems indicates only minor increases due to redundancy and, in the
six-point system a small decrease in the +Z 1, Z 2 reactions. redundancy does not
3	 result in any increase in reaction exceedance since those reactions responsible for
exceedance in the five-point load-banced system (mil, X2) are unaffected by redundancy 	 N,;
and all other reactions which do increase are still well within Orbiter capability.
In addition to support reactions, Tug body loads and deflections were compared for
the redundant and statically determinant support ^oncepts.
The three body load charts in Figure 4.2-73 present comparisons of maximum abso-
lute value envelopes of total load on the vehicle cross-sectiozn versus station for the
candidate support systems. A comparison of transverse shear indicates no major
advantage among the various support systems.
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w	 y
y
Load
Condition
X1
lb	 IN)
X2
lb	 (N)
Yl
lb
	 (N)
Yn
lit
	 (N)
Z1
lb	 (N)
Z2
]b	 A
7.3
)b	 (N)
Z4
lb	 (N)
Unit 1000 IV (23/24) 0 0 I	 0 0 -1004)	 (-44601 1006	 (4450) 1000	 (4450) -1000	 (-4450)
Liftoff a 11 n u -•1-2 (-3M,25) I IH2	 12172:11 -lnn2	 (21725) -44x2	 (-21725)
lllgb-Q Boost 0 0 a 0 -8427
	
(47500) 4427	 (37500) $427
	 (37500) -8427	 (-37500)
Maximum G a 0 It a 0	 (n) 0	 (0) a	 (a) a	 (0)
Entry Ym a 0 0 a -357.1	 (- 15904) 3574	 (16904) 3574	 t15904) -3574	 (-16904)
Entry Roll 0 0 a n -2405	 (-10702) 2405	 (10702) 2405	 (10702) -2105	 (-10702)
Lanaing 0 (1 0 0 -3070	 (-1361$2 3070	 (13062) 3070	 (13662) -3070	 (-I30112)
r
r,
C	 ''
e	 ^.
h'.
h
Y
b
1
44
(" 'r
P
r
i.	 t
4, 2-3°; Configur&-{ion. 4--1R Red-andant Sapporo: Loads - Crblter 'Yaw Deflection (Y)
Load
Condition [h
Xl
(N) lb
X2
IN) lb
YI
(N) lb
Y2
(N ► Ib (N) lb
Z2
(N) )b
Z3
IN) lb
Z4
(N)
Unit I000 1b (Y2) -1895 (-7053) 1585 (7053) -1000 (-1 .150) 1o on (1450) 273 (1214) -273 (1214) -201 (-12951 291 (1295)
Llftof: -1875 (-8344) 1475 (s3441 -1103 (-2G1) [;n3 (5254! f	 122 (1433) -322 (11331 -Sii (-lb3 p) 344 (1530)
Illgh-Q Boost -3925 4-25031) 5625 (2593I) -35.10 (-1.17231 3519 (157031 957 j-1303) -9G7 (4303) -1031. {-45881 1031 (4588)
Atnx G 0 (a) a (G) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Entry Yaw -4260 (-18	 4 42ao (11957) -2rmb f-11902) 211+ • (I' 1021 733 1334)2) -739 (3262) -7nt (-347a) 781 (3475)
Entry Roll -854 (-3800) 8GI (3900) -339 (-3399) 539 (2309) - 147 (r54) -1.17 (Gal) -157 (-G99) 157 (1199)
landing -iGa5 (-73651 IG55 (73115) -1041 1014 140601 2^1 (1268) -295 {12081 -303 (-1346) 3p3 (13481
4$►
i^
IV
4)._.,z . .,
	 Cf^A gLWe&f ^11 4^jPd Redlunelmit $(^,^J^art Loado - O?^iaiter v ist 3^e33e1.` ti lrr e0
Lard
Condition lb
XI
(N) lb
X2
(N) (4
Yl
IN) Ile
Y.
(N)
Zl
Ib	 (N) lb
22
(N1
Z3
1b	 (N) I
Z4
 (N)
Unit !1100 lb (Z3/Z4) 467 (2167) -187 (-2107) :107 (I3110 -307 (-I356) -99(	 (-1423) 994 t-44 23) 1000	 (4459) -1600 (-4450)
Liftoff 2802 (11510) -2009 (-111TIa) i lIWG 1`73251 -14140 (-7325) -5332	 (-23727) •5332 (-2J727) 63 G2	 (23$Gl1 -5762 (-231561)
F[lgh Q Boost .004 (20043) -1504 (-201143) 24.12 1126171 -2042 (- 125471 -020.1	 (-40953) 9204 (- 1414431 9256	 (411x91 -325G f-4ILSD)
Maximum G 0 (0) 0 IN 0 (0) 0 (0) 0	 (0) 0 (0) 0	 (0) 0 (0)
Entry Ymr 1910 (8500) - I91a (-8600) 1205 15302) -1205 (-53021 -3904	 I-17373) 3001 (-17373) 3930	 (170211 -3926 (-17631)
Entry Ruff 1288 (5723) -I28a (-.3723) 411 (3009) -411 (-30091 -2027	 1-11090) 2927 (-11690) 2612	 (117571 -21H2 (-11757)
Iwding 1r41 (7302) -Ia4l (-73031 1436 ( 4a041y -1035 [-] 5061 -33.;3	 (-140_11 41353 (-1402i) 3972	 [1104111 -:4372 I-l•i0u5!
Table 4.2-38. Configuration 2-1R Redundant Sapport Loads - Orbiter Twist Deflection. ( 6^)
SUPPORTS AT Xo 9 IZ1 0 0	 1069 	 1 81	 1187	 1249x1
A
I
OUSED
oNOT USED
I	 I	 _^
!	 1^IY21 	Y 
TUG LH2 TANK	 L02 TANK	
J1	 ;
However, the six-point support systems
exhibit substantially lower bending
moments over virtually the entire vehicle
length --- indicating a potential weight
saving in sidewall reinforcement and a
consequent performance advantage over
the four and five-point systems.
	
­^ -a- 'G_ 'Q'-z, - 
-X2	 Even more dramatic is the comparison
VIEW LOOKING DOWN R
-	
of torsional moment ranging from Zero in
	Figure 4.2-72. Tug Support Point	 the five-paint load-balanced system to
Locations	 somewhat above six-million in-lb in the
four-point system. In this comparison
the first distinction is found between load-balanced and redundant systems with identi-
cal supports. The six-point redundant system is substantially better than the corre-
sponding load-balanced system and further provides an additional potential weight
saving over all systems except the five-point load-balanced system.
The comparison of Tug lateral, (Y) deflection at the forward Z support plane (X0 951)
in Table 4.2-44 illustrates yet another advantage for the six-point redundant system.
On the basis of Tug support reaction exceedance, Tug internal body loads, and Tug
deflections, the redundan, support concepts are not only feasible but are desirable.
In particular. the six-point redundant support concept provides the minimum body
loads and deflections while eliminating any support reaction, exceedance.
Redundant Support Implementation. The preceding analysis has shown not only that
redundant support systems are feasible but that a six-point dual-redundant system is
desirable in view of acceptable reactions and reduced Tug body loads and deflections.
;mplementation of a redundant system involves a consideration of possible misalign-
meat at redundant support locations. The geometric situation is illustrates. In
Figure 4.2--74. These potential LIZ and AY gaps at the redundant supports are due to
assembly tolerances on the Orbiter and Tug, residual stresses in the Tug and [arbiter
structure. and inertia and thermal loads in the structure. To implement a redundant
support system, the Tug systems must provide a capability to eliminate these gaps at
the supports.
For the fourth Z (redundant) support concept, elimination of the AZ gap may be
accomplished bye
a. Providing special Orbiter Z fittings with adjustment capability.
b. Forcing the gap closed by the use of special AGE, Orbiter Z latches, the R.MS, the
Tug forward umbilical panel or the Tug deployment pivot actuator.
4-130
Table 4.2-41. Configuration 2-IR Maximum Support Point Loads
Ang orbiter Orbiter
Tug Accel Twist Yaw Total Loads
Critical Loads Loads Loads Loads
Support Condition (1b) (lb) (lb) (lb) lb	 (N)
Maximum Support Loads (+)
X1 Entry Yaw 48973 4827 0 0 53800	 (239410)
X2 Entry Yaw 48973 4827 0 0 53800	 (239410)
Y1 Liftoff 44664 514 0 0 45178	 (201042)
Y2 -- 0 0 0 0 0	 (0)
Z I Liftoff 32184 528 4882 0 37594	 (167293)
Z2 Liftoff 32184 -528 4882 0 36538	 (162594)
Z3 Landing 34567 1529 3070 0 39166	 (174289)
Z4 Landing 32050 1529 3070 0 36649	 (163088)
Minimum Support Loads {-)
XI Liftoff -130570 -2570 0 0 -133140	 (-592473)
X2 Liftoff -105060 180 0 0 -104880	 (-466716)
Y1 Liftoff -44664 -514 0 0 -45178	 (-201042)
Y2 - 0 0 0 0 0	 0
Z 1 Liftoff -40380 -528 -4882 0 -45790	 (-203765)
Z2 High-Q -24131 -657 -8427 0 -33216	 (-147811)
Boost
Z3 Lifcafff -22980 -816 -4882 0 -28678	 (-127617)
Z4 Liftoff -13504 -816 -4882 0 -19202	 (-85449)
Note: Loads shown are as applied to Tug by Orbiter using standard sign
convention: +X aft, +Y right, +Z up.
ti
3#	 ,
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Table 4.2-42. Configuration 4-1R Maximum Support Point Load
101
Ang arbiter Orbiter
Tug Accel Twist 'haw Total Loads
Critical Loads Lcads Loads Loads
Support Condition (lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) lb	 (N)
Maximum Support Loads (+)
X1 Entry Yaw 14818 0	
I
	
1910 4260 20988	 (93396)
X2 Entry Yaw 14818 0	 1910 4260 20988	 (93396)
Y1 Liftoff 26625 524	 1646 1183 29978	 (133402)
Y2 Entry Yaw 20822 3044	 1205 2688 W759	 (123528)
Z 1 Liftoff 28472 536	 5332 322 34662	 (154246)
Z 2 Liftoff 28472 -536	 5332 322 33590	 (149476)
Z3 Landing 37956 1528	 3372 303 43159	 (192058)
Za Landing 37956 1528	 3372 303 43159	 (192058)
Minimum Support Loads (-)
X 1 Maximum G -101420 0 0 0 -101420 (-451319)
X2 Maximum G -99570 0 0 0 -99570	 (-443086)
Y 1 Liftoff -26625 -524 -1646 -1183 -29978	 (-133402)
Y2 Liftoff -21963 -1621 -1646 -1183 -26413	 (-117538)
Z 1 Liftoff -36668 -528 -5332 --322 -42850	 (-190682)
Z2 High--Q -19856 -657 -9204 -967 -30684	 (-136544)
Boost
Z3 Liftoff -29363 -826 -5362 -344 -35895	 (-159733)
Z4 High-Q -15114 -816 -9256 -1031 -26217	 (-116666)
Boost
4-3.32
yes.
Table 4.243. Support Reaction Comparison (Loads Applie
i
is
co
CIO
5	 '
Reactions 10 3 lb (103 N)
Support
Configuration
Cumulative
Exceedance
103 lb (10`' N)
XI, X2 Y1 Y2 Z1, Z2 Z3, Z4
(9 H M H M H
Five-Point
Balanced (2-1) 133.1 53.8 45.2 -- 45.2 37.0 19. i 35.5 89.8
(592.3) (239.4) (201.1) (201.1) (164.6) (85.0) (:158.0) (399.6)
Redundant (2--1R) 133.1 53.8 45.2 - 45.8 36.5 28.7 39.2 89.8
(592.3) (239.4) (201.1) (203.8) (162.4) (127.7) (174.4) (399.5)
Six-Point
Balanced (4-1) 100.5 9.9 35.1 29.4 43.9 37.7 19.1 35.5 0
- (447.2) (44.1) (156.2) (130.8) (195.4) (167.8) (85.0) (158.0) (0)
Redundant (4- 1R) 101.4 21.0 0 ,y30. 27y. 6 42.9 33.6 3(5^. 9 43.2 0
(451..2) (93.4) (7.33.5) (122.8) ] ►
	 (](1..70..7) (149.5) (7.5.7.8) (192.2) (0)
Orbiter Capability 110.0 32.0 56.0 70.0 50.0 50.4 67.0 52.0
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F inure 4.2-73.	 Tug Body Loads
Comparison
For the second Y (redundant) support
concept, elimination of the AY gap may
be accomplished by:
a. Providing a special Orbil-r Y fitting
receptacle with adjustment capability
b, Forcing
 the gap closed by the use of
special AGE, Orbiter Z latches, the
RMS, the Tug forward umbilical
panel, a mechanized forward Y keel
fitting (either ;hY or IZ force), or
the Tug deployment pivot actuator.
Due to the many options involved, the
complex evaluation required, and the
unknown Tug and Orbiter tolerance and
misalignment requirements, a detailed
analysis of the redundant support imple-
mentation was beyond the scope of this
preliminary study. However,
Table 4.2 . 45 provides a preliminary
assessment of the methods identified
for overcoming misalignment and indi-
cates those that should be studied
further. This preliminary assessment
indicates that implementation of both
the redundant Z and redundant Y support
concepts are feasible. Further study
is needed to identify the best option for
implementation. '
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
4-PT DET£RM
5-PT BALANCED r, --------
5•Pr REDUNDANT
6-PT REDUNDANT	 6•PT
BALANCED
1140 	 tzn0
STATION UNJ
Table 4.2-44. Tug Lateral (Y) Deflection. Comparison at Xo 951
Configuration
Deflection
in.	 (cm)
Four-Point Baseline 1.25 (3.18)
Five-Point Balanced 0.95 (2.41)
Five-Point Redundant 0.93 (2.36)
Six-Point Balanced 9.38 (0.97)
Six-Point Redundant 0.17 (0.43)
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Figure 4.2-'74. Redundant Support
Conclusions. This analysis has demon-
strated that single- or dual-redundant
Tug-support concepts are feasible both
from the aspect or point of view of loads
Induced by Orbiter deflections and toler-
ance and misalignment considerRtions
for support implementation. The dual.-
redundant (Y and Z) support system is
not ors -y feasible but is desirable ire %:aw
of acceptable reactions and reduced Tug
body loads deflections. Further detailed
analysis should be performed for the
six--point dual-redundant support concept,
especially in the areas of tolerance and
..Asalignment requirements and imple-
mentation of the redundant supports.
4.2.3. 1.0 Weight/Performance Evalua-
tion Update. During the preliminary
screening analysis, weight and perform-
ance evaluations were conducted for each
of 21 candidate support arrangements
Tinplementation	 (Section 4.2.2.3). At that time only
preliminary weight data was available
since body and frame load distributions were based on conventional engineering theory
modified using previous Convair STSS data to account for estimated peaking near sup-
port reactions and for shell support effects on frame loads. Since that time detailed
finite element analyses have been conducted, yielding more realistic load distribution
and deflection data (Sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.9). This data forms the basis for the
latest weight/performance update.
Figure 4.2-75 illustrates the method employed in this task. It is essentially identical
to the method previously shown in Figure 4. 2-21 except for incorporating the latest
finite element data. Those items that vary in weight between candidate support sys-
tems are tabulated at left. They are divided into "Tug body" and "Non-Tug" categories
since a different performance partial applies to each.
The inital Tug + adapter body configuration for this task is assumed to be a uniform
composite sandwich sidewall with minimum gage facings, and no Orbiter interface
frames, support fittings or latch longerons. The A-weights tabulated for each candi-
date support system then represent the unique additional material required by that
specific system to withstand its own unique load distributions.
_ ' -le 4.2--45. Tug, Redundant Support Option Assessments
w
ea
c^
Redundant
Suppolt Option to Close Gap
Effectivity
Pad	 Orbit
Out	 in* Comment
Study
Further:
Second Y a Adjust receptacle X O O Removes majority of assy tolerance X
o Force, using: Position	 Force
AGE X O O Good	 High X
Orbiter ZAlatches ? O ? Good	 High	 -+Z Stroke? X
RMS O O O Fair	 Very low
Fwd umbel Panel ? ? ? Fair	 Low	 +Z Stroke?
Mechanize Reel:
e :EY (Op~n/Sheet) X X X Very good	 As read X
o =L-Z (Push/Pull) X X X Very good	 As regd	 Ramp, Friction ?
Pivot Actuator O X X Fair	 High	 Concurrent Loads ?
Fourth Z e Adjust Z-Fitting X N/A O Removes majority of assy tolerance X
6 Force, using: Position	 Force
AGE X NIA. ® Good	 High	 +Z adjust read X
Orbiter Latch X N/A X Very good	 Thigh X
Rbm O N/A O Fair	 Very low
Fwd TUmbil Pnl O N/A O Fair	 Low
Pivot Actuator O N/A O Very poor	 High
*Not mandatory i£ Orbiter X-capability increased: ascend with 6-pt support, descend with 5-point support.
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Figure 4.2-75. Weight/Performance Update Method
Internal body loads data (developed in Section 4.2.3..1) similar to that illustrated was
mapped onto sidewall flat patterns to identify contours of approximately constant load.
Necessary facing ,h1c1mess increases were then determined for those regions where
the minimum gage icings were insufficient to withstand the internal loads. Boundarieo
of regions of constant facing thickness were smoothed to reflect probable manufacturing
ply module steps. Total ply count in each step was chosen to provide the required
strength and to maintain symmetry of facings about the sandwich cente. r . one.
Frame weights were determined from parametric weight versus moment data based an
representative composite designs. Load data similar to that shown was squared-off
into circumferential increments of constant load and each increment weighed from the
parametric data for its proportion of the total circumference. Weights of shear re-
inforcement 9.-d local load introduction provisions at support fittings were also
included.
Support fitting weights were taken from Section 4.2.3.3, Table 4.2-2I.
Latch longeron quantity and weights were based on the distribution of element loads in
the finite element an4ysls output.
4-x.37
tBridge beam and load-balancing system unit weights were the same as used previously
in Section 4.2.2.3 except that in support arrangement 6-0, an additional 10 lb (4. 5 kg)
allowance was included in the forward Y keel fitting for a mechanism to overcome the
potential misalignment discussed in Section .2.3.9 (see Figure 4.2-74 and Table
Table 4.2--45).
Sidewall. Reinforcement. The revised Tug sidewall reinforcement analysis used the
resg1ts of the Tug finite element analysis (Section 4.2.3.1) to generate internal Tug
body loads. The basic analysis procedure was similar to that used in the preliminary
weight/performance evaluation (Section 4.2.2.3) except that only the five selected con-
n _	 .ce __	 a t. 7	 Y	
.^ 2
-111, 	 i	 rfive—point e-di —dent;figRL^i:3.5i0AS (.t— ^. I.U4^.I'—^3C31L1t, n,^—^., ttv^^^^Jt3alli t^u^.d^-bataexu^ ; 	 Div•. ^••s^u
4--1, six-point load-balanced; 4-1R, six-point redundant) Were evaluated. Since, for
configurations 1-1 and 2-1, body load plots were directly available from the finite ele-
ment analysis (see Section 4.2.3.1) a detailed weights analysis was performed for
each of these configurations. Using the finite element analysis loads and the graphite/
epoxy composite sandwich allowables shown in Figure 4-2-76, flat pattern maps of
required Tug body sidewall reinforcement were generated. These body reinforcement
requirements are shown in Figure 4.2-77 for configuration 1-1 and in Figure 4.2-78
for configuration. 2-1.
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Using these body reinforcing plots, reinforcement weights were calculated using a
constant depth sandwich and face sheet density of 0.58 lb/2 (16.1 g/cm 3). The Tug
design load factors used in the finite element analysis were the original MSFC
68M00039-1 values supplied at the start of the program.. Since the final revised set of
Tug design load factors (MSFC PF02-75-31) were sub.,plied late in the study, they could
not be incorporated in the finite element analysis. Therefore, to reflect these latest
loads, a correction was applied to the calculated Tug sidewall reinforcement.
Evaluating the effects of load factor and support reaction changes on body loads, the
calculated weights were multipled by a reduction factor of 0.'79. Corrected weights
for configurations 1-1 and 2-1 are shown in Table 4.2-46.
Table 4.2-46. Tug Sidewall Reinforcing Weight Correction
Configuration
© Wt
(MSFC 69M00039-1)
Corrected A Wt
(MSFC PF02-75-31)
Tug Deploy Adapt Tug Deploy Adapt
lb (kg) lb (kg) lb (kg) lb (kg)
1-1 (Four-Point) 85.9	 (39.0) 46.1	 (20.9) 67.8	 (30.8) 36.4	 (16.5)
2-1 (Five-Point) 46.3	 (21.0) 31.6	 (14.3) 36.6	 (16.6) 25.0	 (11.3)
I
C
i
To calculate sidewall reinforcing weight for the alternate support configurations the
corrected A weights for configurations 1-1 and 2-1 in Table 4.2-46 were adjusted for
the changes in support reactions and overall axial, shear, and bending load distribu-
tions in the Tug body and deploy adapter.
An alternate support configuration included in the evaluation was a modified four-,,oint
support system with the Y fitting moved forward from X. 1249 to Xo 1128.
Tug sidewall reinforcing weights are summarized in Table 4.2-47.
These body reinforcing weights are A weights above the basic graphite/epoxy com-
posite sandwich assumed for the Tug structural shell and reflect the latest MSFC
PF02-75-31. loads.
Frames. In the screening analysts weight/performance evaluation, frames were sized
based on bending moment distribution only. These were derived using existing Convair
STSS data to modify conventional shell-supported frame moment distributiomi. In the
subsequent finite element analysis, data was generated giving frame axial and
A.^
i
F ^
Table 4.2-47. Tug Sidewall Reinforcing Weight
Configuration
A Weight',
lb (k_:
A Weight Deploy Adapter
lb {kg)
1-1 (Four-Point Baseline) 67.8	 (30.8) 36.4	 (16.5)
1-1 (Four-Point-1128Y) 64.8	 (29.4) 28.8	 (13.1)
2-1 (Five-Point Balanced) 36.6	 (36. 6) 25.0	 (11.3)
2-1R (Five-Point Redundant) 39.3	 (17.8) 27.0	 (12.2)
4-1 (Six-Point Balanced) 31.4	 (14.2) 20.9	 ( 9.5)
4-1R (Six-Point Redundant) 33.7
	
(15.3) 21.9	 ( 9.9)
transverse shear force distributions in addition to more representative moment dis-
tributiono. Figures 4.2-35B and C in Section. 4.2.3.1 showed typical frame loads
distilbutions at two major frame locations computed using accelerations per USFC
68M00039-1. In addition, Figure 4.2-79 compares the moment distribution in the
Xo 951 frame based on the finite element, analysis with the preliminary screening data.
This update was based on the application of the later finite element data (modified to
account for the change in reference accelerations from MSFC 68M00039-•1 to MSFC
PF02--75-31) to the major interface frames (at X. 951, 1128, 1182, 1246) in the re-
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was also developed parametrically with frame depth. Figure 4.2-80 presents the basic
frame and shear reinforcement weights and the computational basis for each.
Figure 4.2-80. Basic Frame and Web Reinforcement Weights
versus Frame Loads
Frame weights for each location in each support arrangement were computed using
the following methodology:
a. The appropriate moment and axial force distributions were each "squared-offi1
into a series of regions of constant M and P, and the corresponding cap force
(PCAP) was computed for each M, P pair.
b. The weight of each region, of width 0, was computed based on 0/360 times the
total basic frame weight from Figure 4.2-80 for the appropriate PCAP°
e. The weight of the local load introduction provisions at Y--support locations was
taken from the previous parametric data (Section 4.2.3.3, Figure 4.2-31).
f. The sum of the weights from items b through a was increased by 10 percent for
contingency.
^u
As in the screening evaluation (Section 4.2.2.3), the final choice of frame depth was
based in part on weight optimization and in part on cap proportions. A depth of 8.0 in.
(20.3 cm) was chosen at all locations with the following exceptions:
1. The fraine at Xo 1181 was constrained to a depth of 6.0 in. (15.2 can) and revised
to a J cross section to maintain clearance of the inboard cap from the oxidizer tank
support struts.
2. Frames with single supports (Xo 951 in arrangements 1--1, 1-1.A; X o 1128 in
arrangement 1-1A) were sized for 8.0 in. (20.3 cm) depth then increasd to 10 in.
(25.9 cm.) depth with no cap area decrease, to provide additional stiffness.
The resulting updated frame weights are given in Table 4.2--48.
Latch Longerons. In the screening weight/performance evaluation, 16 equally spaced
latches were provided at the Xo 1172.9 Tug/adapter separation plane. Latch loads
were developed (using STSS-based peaking factors) from which it was found that all
latch loads lay within two distinctly different levels of load intensity and, consequently,
weights foz two longeron configurations were developed. (Section 4.2.2.3).
As a result of the finite element analysis (Section 4.2.3.1.), it was found that the
latclies nearest the X-longeron experience no tension for nova-crash flight conditions
(see locations 3 and 4 in Section 4.2.3.1., Table 4.2r-1.7F) whereas those nearest the
top and bottom centerlines (locations 1, 6, and 7) experience maximum tension. The
values previously shown in Table 4.2-17F were mainly due to the very severe pitch
accelerations in the launch release condition in the original MSFC 681 00039-1 set of
accelerations (Section 4.2. 1.3, Table 4.2-2). Correcting these values for the less
severe peak pitch accelerations in hMFC PF02-75-31 results in ^ reduction in magni-
tude of approximately 50 percent. Presumably, then, deletion of all latches except
those near the top and bottom centerline would have been permissible. However, this
was found unrealistic in view of the requirement that the Tug/adapter structure remain
intact in the crash condition during which the se paration plane (Xo 1172.9) is subjected
to maximum tension loads that are highly concentrated near the X-longerons on the
sides of the vehicle. Consequently, latches were also required near the X longerons
to transmit longitudinal crash reactions.
Initially it was assumed that a full complement of 16 latches would again be requiral.
However, a comparison of the maximum latch tension forces in the 16-latch set with
4-14
Frame Weights
Location/ TotalsSupport Basic A for A for A at Y Sub-
.Arrangement Frame Stiffness Shear Support - Total (Ib)	 (kg)
Xo 951/ 1-1 34.5 2.6 0.4 - 37.5 43.3	 18.8
1-iA 34.5 2.6 0.4 - 37.5 41.3	 18.8
2-1 30.2 - -- - 30.2 33.2	 15.1
2-IR 33.2 - - - 33.2 36.5 	 16. 6
4-1 33.0 - - 2.9 35.9 39.5	 17.9
4-IR 40.2 - - 2.8 43.0 47.3	 21.5
Xo 1128/1-1 9.8 - - - 9.8 10.8	 4.9
i-1A 22.1 2.6 1.0 3.5 29.2 32.1	 14.6
2-1 9.8 - - - 9.8 10.8	 4.9
2-IR 9.8 - -- -- 9.8 10.8	 4.9
4-1 9.8 - - - 9.8 10.8	 4.9
4-IR 9.8 - - - 9.8 10.8	 4.9
Xo 1181/1-1 27.5 - 0.5 - 28.0 30.8	 14.0
I-IA 24.0 - 0.4 - 29.4 26.8	 12.2
2-1 27.5 - 0.5 - 28.0 30.8	 14.0
2-IR 27.5 - 0.5 - 28.0 30.8	 14.0
4-1 23.0 - 0.3 - 23.3 25.6	 11.6
4-1R, 23.5 - 0.3 - 23.8 26.2	 11.9
Xg 1246/1 .1 66:4 -  4.9 3.5 74.8 82.3	 37.4
I-IA 46.0 0 2.0 - 47.0 51.7	 23.5
2-1 57.1 - 3.8 3.5 64.4 70.8	 32.1
2-1R. 57.7 - 3.8 3.5 65.0 71.5	 32.5
4-1 52.5 -- 3.7 3.2 59.3 65.2	 29.6
4-1R. 48.3 - 3.7 2.9 54.9 60.4	 27.4
,j
4
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Table 4.2-48. Updated Frame Weights
16 LATCH SYSTEM
1.
SYM
1	 1	 2
3
4 +2,,414
-{-	 5 -Z 480
6
7
f	 6	 a
11 LATCH SYSTEM
_1
LATCH
LOCATION
LATCH TENSION
16 LATCH SYS	 11 LATCH SYS
113	 1	 N	 Ih	 N
1D 14727 65535 22090 x8301O 5757 25610
O3 12450 55403 12450 55403
® 18675 83108 18676 83108
Q IS676 83108 10676 83108
® 12450 55403 12450 55403
O 4698 20988
® 14934 55456 21353 95021
c7 12839 57134
Table 4.2-49. Updated Latch Longeroa Weights
Arrange-
Weights
Tug Body Non-Tug
meat lb kg lb kg
1-1 21.5 9.8 33.1 15.06
1- IA. 18.5 8.4 28.2 12.8
2-1 21.5 9.8 33.1 15.0
2-1R 21.5 9.8 33.1 15.0
4-1 13. 5 6.1 20.1 9.1
4-IR 14.8 6.7 22.3 10.1
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those conservatively estimated for an 11-latch array resulted in selection of the latter
configuration. Figure 4.2-51 compares the two systems and the latch loads in each.
Selection of the 11-latch system resulted
in the deletion of five latch mechanisms
and then associated lcngerons on both
the Tug and adapter. This was assumed
to result in an improvement in latch
system reliability as well as a cost bene-
fit due to procurement of fewer (albeit
individually heavier) components.
The resulting latch longeroa weights are
presented in Table 4.2-49 for the six
candidate support arrangements.
Summary. The final weight/performance
comparison of the six remaining support
arrangement candidates is shown in
Figure 4.2-82, and the updated detailed
summary is presented in Table 4.2-50.
4.2.4 RECOMMENDED STRUCTURAL
Figure: 4.2-81. Latch System.	 INTERFACE. This section summarizes
Comparison.	 the final selection of recommended
_. s
1
f .
j,
6!
SUPPORT COMPARISON
_	 CONFIGURATION ITEM	 AW IGHT	 ApAYLOAD
L8 kg LB k9I
174.2
372.1
79.1
168.9
-455.4
-1414
-207.2
-642
} (4•POINT_
Y)	 1, i1249
TUG
NON-TUG
E 546.3 248.0 -5973 -2714
14A TUG 207.2 94.1 -592.9 .246.5(4-POINT	 i NON -TUG 274.7 124.7 -104.4 -47.41128 Y)
	 {^`	 `^	 ^^ .1.• 4812 218.8 -6473 -2932
i2-1 TUG 158.7 72.0 -415.8 -188.8
15-POINT	 *	 r NON-TUG 593.9 259.5 -2253 -102.5
BALANCED)	 ^^ ^' 752 .6 341.7 -6412 291A
4
2-1R
(6-POINT
t
TUG
NON-TUG
165.1
485.3
75.0
2203
-432.5
-1844
-196.4
•83.7
REDUNDANT)
	 t	 ^ s.' 650.4 295.3 •617.0 -280,1
4 . 1 TUG 169.3 762 -443.6 -201A
(6-POINT	 +mo	 t- NON-TUG 803.5 364,8 -305.3 -138.6
BALANCED) E 972,8 441 .7 -748 .9 -340.0
4 . 1 R TUG 181.3 82.3 -475.4 •215.7(8-POINT NON-TUG fitf0.7 227.3 -190.3 •86.4
REDUNDANT) W' 682 .0 309 .fi -665 .3 •302.0
Figure 4.2-82. Final Weight Performance Comparison
Orbiter interfaces for the Tug and any associated spacecraft. It is presented in two
parts. 1) the selection, including supporting rationale, of a recommended support
concept for Tug plus any cantilevered spacecraft weighing no more than the 11000 lb
(4994 kg) reference spacecraft (Section 4.2.1.4), and 2) an assessment of support
techniques for any spacecraft weighing more than the reference spacecraft.
4.2.4.1 Tug Support Concept Selection. The structural support arrangement recom-
mended for Tug is the sf:-point configuration depicted in Figure 4.2-83. It is a
doubly redundant arrangement that incorporates additional Y and Z supports (one each)
in excess of the minimum quantity necessary in a statically determinate system.. It
does not require load-balancing provisions to isolate the Tug from the effects of
Orbiter relative deflection and/or stiffness. Three of the six supports are located
on a common frame near the forward end of the Tug body (at Xo 951)g whereas the
remaining three (aft) supports are all located on the Tug deployment adapter (D/A).
`phis adapter is Tug-peculiar peripheral equipment that remains attached to the Orbiter
during Tug deployment. Tug mission performance Is enhaoced by locating heavy items,
such as the three aft support installations, on the D/A, to take advantage of its low
performance penalty partial (approximately one-seventh that of the Tug itself). The
D/A structure also permits partial distribution of the point axial (X) Orbiter support
loads into a cylindrical shell aft of the Tug/adapter separation plan (X o 1172.9),
thereby minimizing peaks in Tug shell load intensity. This results in a reduced
4-14'7
i
d	 W
Table: 4.2-50. Updated Weight/Perform^mce Summary
i>
F
Support Arrangement
Items 1-1 1-1A 2-1 2-1R 4-1 4-1R
Tug Body
Sidewall 67.8 64.8 36.6 39.3 31.4 33.7
Frames 52.1 73.4 44.0 47.3 50.3 58.1
Lon,gerons 21.5 18.5 21.5 21.5 13.5 M.8
I/F Fittings 32.8 50.5 56.6 57.0 74.1 74.2
E Tug, 1b 174.2 207.2 1.58.7 '165.1 169.3 181.3
ft) (79.1) (94.1) (72.0) (75.0) (76.9) (82.3)
A PL, lb -456.4 -542.9 -415.8 -432.6 -443.6 -475.0
(kg) (--207.2) (-245.5) (-188.8) (-196.4) (-»201..4) (-215.7)
Non-Tug
Adapter
Sidewall 36.4 28.8 25.0 27.0 20.9 21.9
Frames 113.1 78.5 101.6 102.3 90.8 86.6
Longerons 33.1 28.2 33.1 33.1 20.1 22.3
I/F Fittings 189.5 139.2 183.5 183.9 140.9 142.9
Orbiter Mounted
Bridge Beams 0 0 139.0 139.0 217.0 227.0
Load Bal Sys. 0 0 111.77 0 313.88 0
lJ Non-Tug, lb 372.1 274.7 593.9 485.3 803.5 500.7
(kg) (168.9) (124.7) (269.6) (220.3) (364.8) (227.3)
A PL, lb «141.4 -104.4 -225.7 -184.4 -305.3 -190.3
(kg) (-64.2) (-47.4) (--102.5) (-83.7) (-138.6) (-86.4)
Totals	 1 A W, lb 546.3 481.9 752.6 650.4 972.8 682.0
(kg) (248.0) (218.8) (341.7) (29..3.3) (441.7) (309.6)
A PL, lb -597.8 -647.3 -641.9 -617.0 -748.9 -•665.3
(kg) (-271.4) (-293.9) (-291.4) (-280.1) (-340.0) (-302. 0)
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Figure 4.2-83. Recommended Structural Interface
requirement for Tug shell local reinforcement, further enhancing performance. In
addition the D/A serves as a convenient mounting location for support/servicing equip-
ment including umbilical panels, dump pressurization, and interface electronics.
Selection of the recommended six-paint redundant support arrangement resulted from
comparative evaluation of the six candidates shown in Figure 4.2-84.
The major evaluation criteria used in the selection process were: Tug A-weight and
A-payload capability, Tug/Orbiter clearance loss due to Tug dynamic response,
natural frequency of Tug plus Spacecraft in the lowest vibration mode, and support
reaction compatibility with Orbiter capabi3ity. The qualitative criteria used initially
in the preliminary screening selection (Section 4.2.2.4) were either quantified (dy-
namic response) or deleted (cost and reliability). The deletion of the latter criteria
was based on prior e ldmination of rotation aid and nonrotating deploy (i.e., non--
adapter) concepts, which were the only ones judged slightly better in these categories
(Section 4.2.2.4, Figure 4.2-34). Among the retained evaluation criteria, dynamics,
reaction exceedance, and A-payload were assumed to be approximately equal in im-
portance with a slight weighting in the sequence given. Delta-weight was judged lower
in importance since its most important effect is the impact of its distribution. (Tug
versus D/A) on A payload, which is evaluated separately. To some extent, however,
4-+x.49 y
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Figure 4.2-84. Support Arrmagement
Candidates
A weight implies a minor cost distinction
between the various candidates and was
retained for that reason.
The comparative evaluation of candidates
is given in Table 4.2--51. Delta-weights
represent the sum of all elements varying
in weight as a function of support arrange-
ment, and are therefore computed rela-
tive to the following Tug/adapter and
Orbiter baselines:
a. The Tug and adapter body consists of
a uniform minimum gage sidewall
(Section 4.2.1.1, Figure 4.2-5)
without local reinforcement, with all
major frames, latch longerons, and
interface fittings omitted.
b. The Orbiter includes the four sup-
ports not charged to the Tug (three
bridge beams and one keel fitting)
but does not include additional bridge
beams or load--balancing systems.
Delta-weight and d-payload (for a deploy-
ment mission to synchronous orbit) data
is taken from Section 4.2.3. 10. Dynamics
data is taken from the modal and forced
response analyses of Secti.oa 4.2. '^E, . 6. In those support arrangements for which
specific dynamic analyses were not conducted (4-1: modes and forced response;
2-1, 2-1R: forced response) values were • assigned based on similarity with arrange-
meats that were analyzed. For example, the displacement response in both five-point
systems (2-1, 2-1R) should be approximately the same as that for 1-1 since it is
measured in a direction in which the first (yaw) mode effect dominates, the frequency
of this mode is essentially identical among the three arrangements, and the Y--support
lies at the same location (Yo 1240) in each.
Support reaction data is taken from Section 4.2.3.8, The quoted values represent
the accumulated exceedance and i p_clude allowance for crash loads (based on the quasi-
limit load condition and Orbiter -X capability of 110 thousand pounds (489 k1i) shown in
Figure 4. 2-88).
Evaluation Criteria
Support
Arrangement
dryry,
a_^ 1CI^da
*
^.+43
c
^
A Weight(') A-Payload(')
Dynamics Reaction
Exceedance
 (2)Displacement (2) 3^)
1b kg rank lb kg rank in. cm rank Hz rank Amt(`l) rank
Four-Point
1249 Y (1-1) 546.3 248.0 2 -597.8 -271.4 1 12.2 31.0 4 3.33 6 122.8 6
1128 Y (1-1.9.) 481.9 218.8 1 -647.3 --293.9 4 1.4 3.6 3 3.46 3 16.2 3
Five-Point
Balanced (2-1) 752.6 341.7 5 -641.9 -291.4 3 Erl . 2 31.0 4 3.36 5 118.8 4
Redundant (2-1E,) 650.4 295.3 3 -617.0 -280.1 2 12.2 31.0 4 3.39 4 118.8 4
Six-point
Balanced (4-1) 972.8 441.7 6 -748.9 -340.0 6 >0.2 >0.5 2 <5.4 2 0 1
Redundant (4- IR) 6F .. 0 309.6 4 -665.3 -302.0 5 0.2 0.5 1 5.41 1 0 1
k
k
is
r:
i	 r
Table 4.2--51. Final Support Arrangement Evaluation and Selection
Notes: 1. Weight and synchronous deployment payload A relative to Tug and Orbiter each lacking a.. elements
varying; as a function of support arrangement.
-2. Displacement in yaw (aX) direction. at Tug/Spacecraft Interface (X o 936)
3. N'aLurrrl frequency of Lowest vibration mode.
4. Accumulated exceedance relative to Orbiter capability. Includes "quasi.-limit' , crash condition
and assumes Orbiter -X capability of 110 klb (489 kN).
-	 -	 -
The following rationale was used in selection of the recommended arrangement:
a. Three of the six systems (1-1, 2-1, 2-1R) were unacceptable in terms of support
reaction exceedance; consequently, they were deleted.
b. Of the three remaining systems 4-1 and 4-1.R exhibited no exceedance and 1-1A
exhibited little enough that it might conceivably have been accommodated with little
or no Orbiter modification. Therefore no further screening was done based on
exceedance.
a. Of these systems, displacement response in all three was acceptable (since the
nominal Tug/Orbiter static radial clearance is 2.0 in. (5.1 cm)). However,
1-1A was again marginal since the stated displacements did not include any Tug
body noncircularity, which would nonetheless occur due to proximity of the Tug
forward support frame (Xo 951) to the displacement location (Xo 930).
d. In terms of A payload, 1-1A and 4-»1R were similar whereas 4-1 exhibited a
greater penalty, primarily due to load-balancing system effects. Consequently,
4-1 was deleted.
e. The four-point system, 1-1A, exhibited a 200 lb (91 kg) weight advantage over
4-1R,, which suggested a potential cost advantage tending to balance the marginal
ratings in Items a and b above. However, review of the ingredients to the A
weight summations (Section 4.2.3.10) indicated that the entire difference was due
to the additional Orbiter bridge and keel beams required by 4-1R. These were
expected to be identical to others already in use (i. e., same as at other Tug loca-
tions, plus used by various other Orbiter cargos), and therefore would represent
a negligible program A-cost.
f. The six-point system (4-1R.) exhibited a distinct advantage in minimum natural
frequency, which was particularly significant since the Orbiter forcing functions
were not yet known and maximum separation (i.e. higher Tug frequency) was
essential to minimize response. Consequently 1-1A was deleted, and 4-3R was
selected as the recommended support a.Lu;angement.
Considerable Interface Study effort was also allocated to evaluating Tug fitting struc-
tural requirements for both in-house generated and NASA agency proposed concepts
(Sections 4.2.3.3 and 4.2.3.4). The recommended sidewall fitting concept, illustrated
previously in Figure 4.2-83, uses an external cylindrical hub to provide maximum
outboard bearing support for the smaller diameter, replaceable primary shaft. This
minimized shaft bending moments and permitted minimum weight of high-density shaft
material. In addition the hub provides a surface for direct pick-up by site AGE for
both horizontal and vertical handling. This approach eliminates the need for special
attachment provisions and is compatible with the latest NASA-XSC handling concept.
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4.2.4.2 Large Spacecraft Support. Section 4.2.1.4 presented the rationale for
selecting an ll., 000 pound (5, 000 kg) reference spacecraft (S/C) for subsequent use in
determining structural support reactions and Tug structural sizing. However, the
then-current mission model included planetary spacecraft whose weights exceeded the
reference S/C and for which support was required. This section compares four candi-
date techniques for supporting these S/C. The largest S/C in the mission model (FL-
02-A, W=18523  l.b or 5409 kg) was used for reference in this comparison. All support
reactions were computed using accelerations per MSFC 68M00039-1.
As shown in Figure 4.2-85, in both cantilever concepts support reactions generally
exceeded those for the 11, 000 pound (5, 000 kg) reference S/C indicating additional
weight penalties to both Tug and orbiter to accommodate heavier S/C. The extent of
exceedance was a function of support arrangement configuration but was largest for
those with a single forward 2 support. This resulted primarily from the more for-
ward eg location, characteristic of heavy S/C during both ascent and abort descent
mission phases, and indicated that a fourth Z support was mandatory for these con-
cepts. Both cantilever concepts were also "softT ° dynamically and were expected to
exhibit significant clearance loss at maximum response, which in turn would impose
a reduction in their permissible static envelope diameter.
COMMENT
® SUPPORT REACTIONS SUBSTANTIALLY EXCEED
ORBITER CAPABILITY, GENERALLY EXCEED THOSE
FOR REFERENCE SIC
* ADDITIONAL ORBITER, TUG A- WEIGHT
+ 4 Z-SUPPORTS MANDATORY
® SIGNIFICANT SIC DYNAMIC CLEARANCE LOSS
® Z-SUPPORT REACTIONS HIGHER THAN BASELINE
* LOAD ON ORBITER FRAME STILL EXCEEDS
CAPAB I LITY
* FURTHER TUG G-W£I GHT
® 4 Z-SUPPORTS MANDATORY
e 7 STANDARD t 2 SECONDARY BRIDGE BEAMS
o SECONDARY BEAMS HEAVY, TRUNNION Or
CAPTURE MECHANISM HARD TO INTEGRATE
* SMALL INCREASE IN PITCH CLEARANCE ROSS
Figure 4.2-85. Cantilever Concepts for Large Spacecraft Support
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The secondary bridge concept attempted to minimize Orbiter impact at the forward
supports by employing dual forward Z supports and distributing their associated trun-
nion loads to three Orbiter mid-fuselage frames through a secondary bridge beam
supported in turn by tv^3 adjacent standard bridge beams. The concept required a total
of sevea standard bridge beams plus two special secondary beams. The Orbiter frame
at Station Xo 979.5 t;9.d to provide support for both adjacent standard bridge beams.
Although significantly reduced by the multi-beam system, the load applied to this
frame still exceeded Orbiter capability. In addytion, the pitch (Z) reactions were in-
creased slightly in comparison with the baseline cantilever concept due to reduction in
fore/aft span between pitch reactions. This span reduction also increased the required
allowance for dynamic clearance loss in the pitch. plane.
Secondary bridge beams were also difficult to integrate without further Tug and Orbiter
impact. If placed above the standard beams in the Y O X94 plane to preclude additional
twist of standard beams, the trunnion elevation had to be increased to provide adequate
secondary beam section depth for both strength and deflection. If kept shallow to min-
imize the elevation change, they became very heavy. Conversely, if placed inboard of
the standard beam to maintain the same trunnion elevation they violated the present
Tug clearance envelope, requiring Tug diameter reduction, and produced additional
loads on Orbiter frames due to increased lateral eccentricity of the trunnion.
Due to penalties associated with cantilever support concepts, the two alternative con-
cepts shown in Figure 4.2-86 were investigated and recommended for further study.
Primary advantages of both alternative concepts were reduced SIC dynamic clearance
loss, reduced support reactions, and potential S/C structural weight reductions.
The first system incorporated auxiliary supports directly between the SIC and Orbiter
to provide additional restraint for the Tug -- SIC combination. These supports could
take either of two forms: attenuators, whose primary function was limiting dynamic
response; or rigid supports, which augmented the basic Tug supports by providing
redundancy. The rigid supports might also have been mechanized in conjunction with
basic Tug supports to permit selective engagement/disengagement for critical mission
phases (e. g., abort descent). As a maximum, eight standard Orbiter bridge beams
(five for Tug, three for SIC) were required for this concept.
The second alternative concept consisted of independent structural support for Tug
and SIC. For a four-point SIC support system, using the support locations shown,
resulting reactions were within Orbiter capability. Furthermore, due to the propellant
off-load for a heavy payload deploy mis =sion, reactions for a four-point Tug support
system were less than those for a Tug with five supports on a retrieval ascent mission,
with one exception (Z 1). However, the X/Z interaction at this location was still within
specified Orbiter capability. It was therefore riRrmissible to install the Tug with four
supports for this mission (even though five were required for other missions). As a
result, eight standard bridge beams were required ,and, no additional Tug or Orbiter
weight penalties were imposed in this concept.
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COMMENT
* SUPPORT REACTIONS REDUCED (MAGNITUDES
DEPEND ON SUPPORT STIFFNESS)
A 7-8 STANDARD BRIDGE BEAMS
• SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN SIC CLEARANCE LOSS
* SIC AFT STRUCTURAL WEIGHT REDUCE D
* RECOMMENDED FOR FURTHER STUDY
* REACTIONS WITHIN ORBITER CAPABILITY FOR 4-PT
SIC SUPPORT
* TIIG SUPPORT REACTIONS LESS THAN RETRIEVAL
ASCENT CONFI G. 4-PT SUPPORT POTENTIALLY
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® NO ADDITIONAL ORBITER, TUG o WEIGHT
	 -
8 STANDARD BRIDGE: BEAMS
MINIMIZES SIC DYNAMIC CLEARANCE LOSS
REDUCES SIC AFT STRUCTURAL WEIGHT
PERMITS USE OF SHROUD AS ORB [TER-RETAINED
STRUCTURAL CRADLE
a REQUIRES ON-ORBIT TUG - SIC MATING PRIOR TO
DEPLOYMENT
® MINIMIZES QTY, STRENGTH OF TUG - SIC LATCHES
MAY PERMIT INDEPENDENT CHANGE-OUT
a
, RECOMMENCED FOR FURTHER STUDY
Figure 4.2-86. Non-Cantilever Concepts for Large Spacecraft
Support
Independent Tug - SIC support required on-orbit structural mating of the two vehicles
prior to deployment. However, Tug-supplied S/C services could be connected at the
time of initial installation in the Orbiter by providing flexibility (if necessary) at the
Tug - S/C forward umbilical panel. Since inertia loads during deployment and Tug
flight were significantly less than those during Orbiter operations, the quantity and
strength of Tug - SIC structural interface latches could be minimized, resulting in
S/C aft structure weight reduction. Independent support could also provide for inde-
pendent change-out of either vehicle. This concept also permitted use of a contamina-
tion shroud (if required) aE^ an Orbiter-mouated structural cradle to minimize SIC
flyaway weight.
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4.3 MECHANICAL INTERFACE
The Space Tug must be supported by Shuttle during launch, atmospheric flight, reentry
and landing, released during deployment, and recaptured at mission completion.
Mechanisms are required to engage/disengage structural latcuas and umbilical panels
as well as accomplish Tug deployment and recapture. Interface mechanisms have
been identified through functional analysis of the various mission phases. By using
the deployment adapter concept, Tug umbilical and deployment mechanisms can be
attached and cheeped out before Tug installation into the Orbiter. The entire Tug,
adapter, and umbilical support are installed as an autononous unit into the Orbiter.
During the course of the study, the installation configuration of the mechanisms changed
as the requirements were refined. A goal of the study was to incorporate all required
functions with minimum impact on the Orbiter. The selected concept, shown in Fig-
ure 4.3-1, requires umbilical panels, pivot actuators, Tug-adapter latches, align-
ment guides, TV cameras, and RMS attachments for interface between the Tug and
the Orbiter. The individual mechanisms do not directly interface with the Orbiter and
are therefore defined by functional requirements only. Detail design of these mech-
anisms remains for the Tug development phase. A description of the selected concept
mechanisms follows.
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Figure 4.3-1. Mechanical Interface
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The mechanisms are mounted on the deployment adapter and two umbilical support
trusses. The support trusses are pivot mounted to the deple , nient adapter, concentri^
with the Station 1245 support. Umbilical separation forces are reacted through the
pivot and also through a strut attached to the Station 1307 fluid interface panels. Um-
bilical misalignments are allowed by limited travel bellows at each disconnect.
The fuel umbilical support incorporates attachments to mount the adapter pivot actua-
tors. Forces exerted on the deployment adapter by the pivot actuators are sufficient
to disconnect and reconnect the umbilicals. The large moment arm to the forward
umbilical panel prevents the pivot actuators from reliably disconnecting the forward
umbilicals hence requiring its separation before rotation.
Tug-,.dapter latches are essentially the same over-center mechanism presented in the
NASA baseline Tug documentation with the exception of a cam face addition to actively
separate the Tug from the adapter. This latch separation force is used to disengage
shear pins and the C&W electrical umbilical.
An Orbiter-supplied TV camera is located in the deployment adapter to provide moni-
toring of alignment during deployment and retrieval. The TV views a target on the
Tug. The Tug umbilical panel supports and the target supports are designed to provide
mechanical centering and guidance of the Tug during retrieval. Progressive terminal
alignment is provided by the latch mechanism and shear pins.
The selected interface concept was derived by comparing several different approaches.
Evaluation of alternative interface concepts was accomplished by trade and optimization
studies to determine baseline Tug/Payload detailed subsystem interface requirements.
Trade studies evaluated subsystem interface options using several criteria. Cost,
weight, performance, and reliability were evaluated quantitatively. Safety, risk, and
interface simplicity were evaluated qualitatively. Safety was an absolute criterion.. In
most mechanism areas, interface simplicity and reliability were the determining
criteria. Interface cost (DDT&E) and performance effects were less significant sinon
their contribution to total system cost and performance was relatively small.
4.3. 1 TUG PERIPHERAL EQUIPMENT MECHANISM REQUIREMENTS. The objet--
tives of this study task were to identify candidates for mechanical interfaces, analyze
their characteristics, and present physical and functional interface requirements for
selection and inclusion in the Orbiter design. An interrelationship exists between the
Tug system support concept and subsystem candidate options. Suitable individual
mechanism selection also depends on the Tug deployment scheme. Two methods were
analyzed -- lateral RMS deployment directly from Orbiter support fittings, and rota-
tional deployment with support adapter or yoke and their corresponding influence upon
Individual mechanical interfaces.
4-157
3
In addition to the analysis of individual mechanism operation, backup actuation provi-
sions must be included in all mechanisms that could endanger the Orbiter capability
for safe reentry and landing. Of significant importance is the requirement to stow the
adapter to permit payload bay door closure. Associated mechanisms must be provided
with RIVIS or EVA actuation backup capability to allow stowage or jettison of the adapter
and/or Tug m. event of malfunction.
The individual mechanisms are packaged as Tug peripheral equipment and do not
directly interface with the Orbiter. Because no Orbiter interface exists, their detail
design remains for the Tug development phase. General requirements for the deploy-1	 ment adapter mechanisms are:
a. Umbilical Panels
Mold disconnects engaged against fluid pressure-loads.
Provide flexibility for flight deflections.
Disconnect fluid lines for deployment.
Align and reconnect following retrieval.
b. Pivot Actuators
Rotate and hold adapter for Tug, deployment/retrieval.
Hold adapter in stoned position after expendable mission.
Power umbilical panel disconnect-reconnect.
c. Tug-Adapter Latches
Latches-unlatches Tug to adapter.
Part Tug from adapter to disengage alignment pins and electrical umbilicals.
Pulls together Tug to adapter for cinchup.
d. Alignment Guides
Guide Tug during deployment and retrieval.
e. TV Camera
Provides Y-Z alignment indication for deployment/retrieval.
4.3.1.1 Aft Umbilical Panels. Fluid and electrical services must be attached to the
Tug through separable connections capable of reengagement to enable deployment and
retrieval for mission achievement. Several umbilical and line options were investi-
gated, terminating in the recommended configuration shown in Figure 4.3-2.
The arrangement is essentially identical, to the NASA baseline Tug (MSFC68M00039-2)
with the -addition of a forward disconnect panel as proposed for Orbiter interface
4-1.58
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revision and the relocation of the aft panels to allow for clearances during adapter
rotation and Tug deployment.
In the initial Convair deployment adapter approach, umbilicals were routed from Sta-
tion 1307 bulkhead through flexible connections concentric with the Tug/adapter pivot
and thence to umbilical disconnect panels at the Tug/adapter interface plane, Fig-
ure 4.3-3. The advantage of the flexible fluid lines is in maintaining the connections
Figure 4.3-3. Initial Umbilical Axrangement
during rotation and continuously enabling propellant tank venting through the Orbiter
vent lines. Reconnection of the vent and pressurization lines can be assured at the
earliest possible time following Tug retrieval. Failure to reconnect the umbilicals
is cause for jettisoning or abandoning the Tug. The umbilical panels require retrac-
tion/separation actuators to disengage disconnect coupling seals, which Will have an
unknown friction due to temperature and dimensional differences. This panel retrac-
tion force will exceed the approximately 15 pounds (66.7 newtons) force capability of
the FE10 available for deployment and retrieval.
An intermediate interface study deployment adapter configuration, Figure 4.3-4, in-
corporated a subsystem support structure. This structure was mounted between
pivots on the deployment adapter (concentric with the pivot centerline) and a modified
Orbiter keel fitting to provide support for the retractable fuel and oxidizer umbilical
paiiels. The need for this support structure arose due to problems in identifying Tug
peripheral equipment mounting locations on the Orbiter midfuselage structure. It
became obvious that the exact locations could not be identified adequately for inclusion
in the Orbiter design, thus use of a structure to bridge between existing orbiter
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Figure 4.3-4. Umbilical Support Structure
support points was selected to provide for mounting umbilical panels and a deployment
actuator reaction point. The disconnect-before--rotation concept can be questioned
from a safety standpoint due to the possi^ility of simultaneous LH 2
 and L02 propellant
venting into the Orbiter cargo bay. As presented in Section 4.4, the pressure is too
low at orbital altitudes (below 0. 10 psia, 0. 069 N/cm 2) to enable oxygen/hydrogen
combustion when mixed in any proportion, therefore eliminating any potential safety
hazard. In any case, propellant lines are inactive and unpressurized during deployment.
The advantage of this umbilical system is elimination of the requirement for fluid
transfer line rotary (or lateral for a gimballed line) motion. This reduces complexity,
eliminates a potential safety hazard (joint leakage) and saves weight. The concept
shown in Figure 4.3-4 exhibits a weight reduction of 180 lb (82 leg) in comparison with
the flexible line approach of Figure 4.3-3. Fluid line weight (length and joints) deleted
250 lb (114 kg), and the support truss added 70 lb (32 kg) to obtain the net reduction
indicated.
With the Tug located in the cargo bay, RF communications for safety monitoring cannot
be established thus requiring that hardwire safety monitoring he maintained through
rotation. The hardwire C &W function electrical umbilicals are routed around the de-
ployment adapter pivot and remain connected until the RF link is established following
rotation. The adapter-mounted electrical umbilicals use the excess force available
from the Tug to deployment adapter structural latches to provide separation and
reengage meat.
The recommended configuration, Figure 4, 3-2, consists of individual supports for
the fuel and oxidizer panels. These supports are pivot mounted from the deployment
adapter support axis, which enables close alignment control of the panels for re-
engagement, independent of Orbiter to Tug deflections/tolerances. The Tug-adapter
interface is precisely aligned through close tolerance shear pans, which will realign
the Tug to the disconnects well. within the recommended d:1. 1S inch (3.0 cm) side
capability of the umbilical panel alignment pins.
Axial position of the umbilical panels is maintained by struts attached to the Orbiter
Station 1307 fluid interface panels. Axial misalignment requirements for the discon-
nects depend on deflection characteristics of the Orbiter bulkhead but are assumed to
be in the order of -i1.47 inch (4.0 cm) and will be absorbed by either bellows or dis-
connect probe engagement, to be determined by detail design. The specific mounting
technique and location chosen provides adequate alignment and acceptable forces to
enable the deployment adapter pivot actuator to disengage and reengage the umbilicals
simultaneously with deployment adapter rotation. This eliminates the requirement to
separately retract the umbilical panels before rotation. This concept has eliminated
the complexity of panel retraction mechani..ams, the retraction actuators and motors,
the electrical wiring, control and command system, and the inherent unreliability
associated with the deleted system. This elimination of support structure and umbili-
cal panel mechanisms resulted in a 104 pound (45.4 kg) weight reduction compared
with the concept shown in Figure 4.3-4.
The hardwire electrical umbilicals pivot with the deployment adapter to provide con-
tinuous monitoring of C&W functions until RF communication is established.
4.3.1.2	 Forward Umbilical Panel.	 Electrical and fluid services are required for
Tug payloads from the Tug and also from the Orbiter/Ground. The Tug to payload
services must be routed through the payload adapter. 	 Payload to Orbiter/Ground
services have three routing options: 	 1)
through the deployment adapter, Tug,
THROUGH
DEPLOYMENT then to payload, 2) direct from Orbiter to
ADAPTER payload, or 3) through a Tug forward
panel to the payload, as illustrated in
Figure 4.3-5.	 Since all payloads must
attach to the Tug at the payload adapter
' interface, a common umbilical interface
can easily be provided.	 For multiple Tug
payloads, and different diameter payloads,
providing umbilicals directly from the
Orbiter would require many unique design
configurations, which would be cost pro-
hibitive and in conflict with the Space
TUG FORWARD UMBILICAL PAYLOAD DIRECTTO ORBITER	 Shuttle System concept general philosophy.
Due to this consideration, direct routing
Figure 4.3-5.	 Payload Umbilical was not considered a candidate and was
Options eliminated from contention.
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The routings seriously considered, both of which are acceptable for Tug operations,
are shown in Figure 4.3--6. Table 4.3-1 summarizes the comparative weight, line
routing, and operational flexibility data for the two payload umbilical panel locations.
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Figure 4. fl -6. Umbilical Routing Comparison for Tug Payloads
In addition to payload use of the forward umbilical panel, the Tug avionics are mostly
located in the Tug forward end and can use the forward panel to advantage,
The following conclusions were reached :z a-•ding the desirability of an Orbiter sup-
plied cargo bay umbilical panel system-,
a. Spacecraft require a unique number and size of fluid and electrical Orbiter
connectors.
b. A forward umbilical panel on Tug can be used with easily accessible spacecraft
unique fluid and wiring kits.
;i
'a
Table 4.3-1. Payload Umbilical Comparison.
	
Forward Umbilical	
I	
Via Tug Aft Umbilical
Consideration	 f Orbiter	 Tug	 I Orbiter	 Tug
Struct/Mech Wt, lb	 100 (45)	 25 (1.1.)^ 10 (4.5)
	 8 (3.6)
(kg)
Fluid Services Wt,	 135 (61)	 20 (0)I 61 (28)	 163(74)
lb (kg)	 (18 active disconnects) 	 (24 active disconnects)
Elect Services Wt,I 37 (17)	 15 (7)	 I 143 (65)	 73 (33)
lb (kg)	 (60 noncritical lines)	 I (60 noncritical lines)
Total p/L Penalty,	 260 (1.1.8)I	 718 (326)
lb (kg)
Line Routing
Small < 1 in.	 Thru cargo bay .raceways	 Between Tug tank and shell
(2. 5 cm) dia.
Large > 1 in
	
Outside cargo bay envelope 	 Not allowed
(2.5 cm) dia.
Operational Simpli- 	 Single forward location sat- Different kit required for
city and Flexibility
	 isfies all Tug payload refit	 non-Tug payloads, possibly
and also accommodates
	
different/added kit for vaxi-
non.-Tug payloads. 	 ous Tug payloads.
Common interface location	 Different kits may require
simplifies Orbiter design,	 different GSE and added
installation and service	 operations tasks.
refit.
d. A, forward Tug mounted Orbiter umbilical is recommended for the majority of
Tug avionics and spacecraft services. 	 .'.
Multiple non-Tug payloads and payloads carried concurrent with 'rug require Orbiter
connections throughout the cargo bay length for caution and warning functions, hax-
ardous fluid tank venting, and RTG coolants, as depicted in Figure 4.3-7.
The design requirements for a forward umbilical are similar to an aft mounted panel,
`kincluding static and dynamic misalignment capability, load capability for pressure 
-
^r
L
^ ` 5
PAYLOAD NO. 2
T -
PAYLOAD NO. 2
SPACE TUG & PAYLOAD
1
ADAPTER
TUG 
PAY LOAD	 f
n
NON-TUG PAYLOADS	
. I y
OMS KIT {13)
^	
Y
PAYLOAD NO. 1	 j7
Figure 4.3-7. Multiple Orbiter Payloads
separation forces, realignment guides to enable remate engagement, and disconnect
motion by an actuator system. The major single difference is the longitudinal Orbiter
Xo position. To accommodate both Tug and non-Tug payloads throughout the cargo
bay, nine locations for intermediate umbilical panels are recommended. These are
positioned 9.83 inches (25 cm) aft of the'support locations as shown in Figure 4.3-8.
Three circumferential locations, shown in Figure 1.3-9, were considered for posi-
tioning the forward umbilical panels in the Orbiter cargo bay. The recommended lo-
cation is a compromise of the factors compared in Table 4.3-2. The significant
advantage of each location is 1) the longeron location is readily visible, 2) the keel
position uses existing support points, and 3) the intermediate position gives good line
PROPOSED PANEL LOCATIONS
	
ORBITER STATION 649
	 774	 892	 1010	 1128	 1246
	
)40	 619	 715	 833 1 951 
1 
1 I9	 1187	 1383
f	 RETENTION POINTS
	
I	 i
I	
--
	 _-	 -- ==-
	
vo^94,
I
_	 PANEL LOCAT16NS
--	 -	 _--- - Y©- 94	 t
	
659	 784	 902
	
1020	 1138
	
`	 72^ 843 961 1079 ^.
Figure 4.3-8. Recommended Panel Locations
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Figure 4.3-9. Forward Umbilical Panel
Table 4.3-2. Panel Location Comparison
Comparison
Factor
'
Longeron Keel
r
Intermediate
Installation New Orbiter support Mounts from morn-- New Orbiter support
points required. fied keel bridge points required
Installation depth beam to existing
questioned Orbiter support
points
Cable/Tube Short route to serv- Routing around Short route to serv-
Routing ice raceway crawl-way is ice raceway
difficult
Access Umbilicals are Visual inspection not Visual inspection not
visible via RMS TAT possible possible
for inspe ction
Disconnect Jammed umbilical Payload will sepa- Payload will separate
Operation panel prevents rate if panel fails to if panel fails to
deployment retract retract
EVA Assist Possible due to Not possible Not possible
location
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routinV without interfering with the crawlway space. The intermediate location at
Orbiter Yo Station-30 inches (-76 cm) was chosen based mainly on the advantages
gained by cable/tube routing and redundant disconnect operation. These factors re-
duced installation complexity and increased the chance of mission success respec-
tively. The weight of the forward umbilical panel would be chargeable to the Tug
peripheral equipment or to each non-Tug payload for which a panel is installed.
4.3.1.3 Pivot Mechanism. The selected deployment adapter structural support con-
figuration requires initial Tug rotation to provide the axial clearance for lateral ex-
traction of Tug and its engine nozzle from the adapter. Functions to be provided by
the pivot mechanism are:
a. Rotate adapter, Tug and spacecraft for deployment.
b. Hold deployment adapter in position during deployment.
c. Rotate deployment adapter less Tug into cargo bay as required fo= Orbiter space
operations.
d. Hold deployment adapter in stowed position for entry and landing following expend-
able Tug mission.
Two power sources are potentially available for the pivot mechanism. The Orbiter' s
remote manipulator system (RMS) can be attached to the front of the Tug and provide
the force for rotation, or a Tug peripheral equipment actuator can be employed. Use
of the RMS would require additional mechanisms to hold the adapter in the up position
so that the RMS can deploy the Tug. A holding device or position lock would also be
needed to hold the deployment adapter in the landing position when there is no Tug
attached. RMS cannot be used at this time since it must be stowed to allow cargo bay
door closure.
A. mechanical actuator system can provide all four of the required rotation functions,
leaving the RMS free for other scheduled and backup tasks. Pivot actuators located
between the umbilical support structure and the deploymen`. adapter, Figure 4.3-10,
are recommended as presented iv Table 4.3-3. The iedursdant actuators, powered
simultaneously to effect rotation, are both located on the fuel side (port) umbilical
support so that the RMS, when equipped with a special end effector, may be used to
disconnect either actuator in the event of failure. In its present configuration RMS
cannot reach the similar position on the right-hand side of the orbiter.
An investigation to determine the optimum pivot locationz for Tug was performed as
part of the pivot mechanism study. .victual pivot location selection was made from
structural support criteria as presented in Section 4.2. The forward end of the base-
line Tug was located at Station 936, which consists of a 360-inch (914.4 cm) Tug plus
6-inch (15.2 cm) clearance to the Station 1302 clearance envelope. The RL 10 engine
j	 nozzle was assumed to be 70 inches (177.8 cm) in diameter.
4-1.67.
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As the Tug and adapter are pivoted, the
i	 engine nozzle swings through an are that
ADAPTER
	
approaches the aft bulkhead envelope atf= 	 p
Stw'ion 1302, then the cargo bay lower
PIVOT AL; 7UA I URS (2)	 envelope at Waterline 310. The Tug was
moved forward or aft until the engine
nozzle was tangent to one or both of the
- - `	 UMBILICAL & envelope clearance lines. The results
ACTUATOR
	l SUPPORT	obtained from varying the pivot station are
presented in Figure 4.3-11. From Sta-
tioa 1206 to 1302 the clearance is con-
trolled by the aft bulkhead envelope, while
at stations forward of 1201", the cargo bay
lower envelope determines the Tug posi-
tion in the bay. The Tug forward station
Figure 4.3-10. Pivot Actuators parameter was obtained geometrically by
calculating the dimension the Tug must be
moved for the engine to be tangent to the
envelope when pivoted for deployment. For example, if a 45--degree (7r /4 radian)
pivot is required about Station 1128, the Tug must be moved 11 inches (27.9 cm) for-
ward from its nominal position to Station ,925 to provide clearance with the cargo bay
Waterline 310 envelope. The indicated forward relocation is undesirable from a pro-
gram standpoint since an equal length must be subtracted from the useful payload.
The effect of Waterline location change is presented in Figure 4.3-12 and is inter-
preted in a similar manner.
The third parameter to be considered is the angle through which the Tug will be ro-
tated for deployment. The minimum angle that provides Tug clearance at the Orbiter
forward bulkhead when extracted from the adapter is approximately 16 degrees
(0. 28 radian). Visibility for RMS operation while reinserting the Tug into the adapter
Table 4.3-3. Pivot Mechanism Selection
Requirement Selected Concept Alternative Concepts
Actuator Tyne Linear Actuator Rotary or RMS
Power Source Electrical Hydraulic/Pneumatic
Number of Actu,, tors Two One
Location Both on Left Side One on Each Side
Position Loch In Actuator Separate Mechanism. or RMS
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Figure 4.3-11. Pivot Support Station
favors about 25 degrees (0.44
radian). The criteria used to
select the pivot angle concerns
the antenna location on the Tug
and Orbiter for RF communica-
tions. At present, RF tra.nsmis-.
sion in the cargo bay is prohibited
and RF is required to asiablish
the safety, command, and noni-
tor link before separating the
hardwire umbilical. Rotation
of 35 degrees (0. 61 radian) will
enable communications between
the Tug and Orbiter, thereby
establishing the pivot angle.
EFFECT OF WL CHANGE
ROTATION ANGLE 45 DEG
WL
400
915
JSC 07740	 414
TUG	 925	
SUPPORTS
FWD 5TA	
LOCATIONS
9S6	
-	 BASELINE TUG
435
1,200 1,220 1,240 1,250 1,280 1,300
PIVOT -STATION
Figure 4.3-12. Pivot Support
Waterline
4.3.1.4 Tug Adapter Latches. Structural latches are required between the Tug
and deployment adapter to carry the loads incurred during ground and flight mission
phases. Initially, 16 latches were evenly spaced at it/8 increments. As a result of
the structural finite element modeling (Section 4. 2), it was shown that 93 percent of
the load transfer between the Tug and adapter occurs through the eight latches adjacent
to the aft Y/Z support fitting longerons. This implied that the majority of the other
eight latches could be eliminated. Three stabilizing latches have been retainer], as
shown. in Figure 4.3-13, one on the top centerline and two stradling the bottom center-
line and the Y support fitting. The 11 support latches are still located at 1r/8
increments.
Detail design and sizing of the latches depends on the final configuration of the Tug and
adapter. General requirements for the latch are outlined below and combined in the
predesign arrangement shown in Figure 4.3-14.
z=
KIZSIIPPORT	 a. In order to distribute loads from the
Y SUPPORT FIT'T'ING
f	 d. The latch must have a positive force
Figure 4. 13. D/A Latch Location 	 capability to push the Tug away from
the adapter. This force must be
applied to disengage the shear pins and electrical umbilical, and act over an
approximate 0.4 inch (1. 0 cm.) stroke.
LONGERGN	 catch to the structural shells of the
Tug and adapter, longeron fittings are
LATCH LOCATION {t1)
	
required at each latch.
WL 414
b. Present estimates are for a limit
latch load of 20 l^ilopounds (89 kilo-
nls	 Newtons) each.
c. Shear pins are required for side load
IL	 transfer between the Tug and adapter.
e. For reconnection following RMS retrieval, a pull together capability of approxi-
mately 0. 8 inch (2.0 cm) is required to provide terminal alignment, engage the
shear pins and electrical umbilicals; and provide latch preload.
f. Structural redundancy for fail operational/fail safe operation is obtained through
multiple latches; i.e., adequate load capability exists if any two latches fail to
carry load.
g. High reliability of operation is obtained by using electrically redundant motor
configurations in each latch actuator.
h. In event of mechanical jammWg that prevents unlatching by the electric motoe,
the motor support arrangf;ment allows manual unlatch by removing a screw
accessible from the exterior of the deployment adapter. Removal of the saute
screw allows latch overtravel to get the separation cam out of the way for remate
and landing in event of actuator failure during retrieval.
4.3.1.5 Docking Alignment Guides. The Tug is reinserted in the deployment adapter
by using the R,MS, which has a position accuracy of approximately 4-3 inches (7. 5 cm).
Since terminal positioning of 1-G. 19 inch (0.5 can) is needed for shear pin engagement,
alignment guides must be provided. The guides also give protection from accidental
interference of equipment during deployment. A staged or progressive alignment
guide is suggested (see Figure 4.3-14).
The Tug umbilical panel supports and the docking aid supports enter the deployment
adapter 80 and 30 inches (150 and 75 cm) respectively before docking and are Located
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Figure 4.3-14. Tug Adapter Latch
to enter with up to 6 inches (15 cm) radial misalignment. The positions :if the sup-
ports cause the Tug to align within +-0.8 inch (2.0 em).
The probe and guide portion of the Tug--adapter latch engage at 3 inches (7.5 crn) from
docking and effect alignment to less than x.19 inch (0. 5 cm) error.
The tapered end of the shear pins engage and, provided with the latch pull-up force,
effect final Tug to adapter alignment.
i
4.3.2 REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM. The remote manipulator system (RMS) is
a standard Orbiter supplied equipment to perform functions of payload deployment, re-
trieval docking, inspection and EVA support. The purpose of this phase of the inter-
face study was to evaluate the adequacy of the RMS in accomplishing the assigned
tasks, to identify Tug and peripheral equipment configurations to complement RMS
use, and to recommend additions or clarification of RMS operational characteristics.
The preliminary description of the RMS given in JSC 07700, Vol XIV covered geo-
metric operation but omitted the control system operation necessary for functional
evaluation. The required control system operation was identified and submitted as a
proposed Orbiter interface change to NASA MSFC for inclusion in the JSC payloads
accommodation. document. The configuration of the RMS used in the study is shown
in Figure 4.3-15. The torque values were assumed to act around each joint hinge
A ;N	 axis. Moments acting around the
61.0MINIMUM	 ,^ ;' V`	 other two axes perpendicular to the
(EXTENDS TOB5.0) 	 ,F^' ^ `	 hinge axis were not evaluated but must
ROLL	 , t.. YANI
DEG 	 be considered by the RMS contractor
(2,40 o IN.•LB)
	
;:^,^'r eft' :u (2.400lN:Le1	 (114t selected at present) in the hard-
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Figure 4. 3-15. Remote Manipulation
System
RMS applicability for Tug involves its
use during deployment, retrieval, and
as backup to Tug and deployment adapter
mechanisms. Considerations for its
use include attachment provisions and
force capability, motion description,
clearances needed for operation, elapsed
time for operation, and its compatibility
with Tug/Orbiter separation and deploy-
ment methods.
4.3.2.1 RMS Operational Description. Use of the RMS for deployment and retrieval
of the Tug is accomplished through a coordinated effort of preprogrammed computer
control with manual trim and override by the arbiter pilot, who mans the payload
handlers station.
For deployment, initial RMS/Tug engagement is performed with the Tug in the 35 de-
gree (0.61. radian) rotated position. An Orbiter crew initiated preloaded computer
program positions the RMS so that its end effector is aligned approximately 3 feet (90
cm) away from the Tug socket. The RMS wrist mounted TV camera gives visual veri-
fication of proper alignment (Figure 4.3•-16). If a lateral or rotational position error
exists, a manual adjustment control is used for nulling. The computer program is
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D OPERATOR DIRECT VIEW
Figure 4.316. Visual Monitoring
continued, with manual jog override,
until RMS attachment is accomplished.
Tug removal from the deployment adapter
is similarly performed. A preloaded
computer program with ' manual adjust-
ment control capability is used, with a
D/A located TV ;amera used for crew
visual monitoring. Office the Tug clears
the adapter, positioning continues
through computer control with direct
visual progress assessment by Orbiter
crew members.
Retrieval of the Tug involves more complexity than deployment in that the RMS must
be attached to the free flying Tug. The retrieval procedure is accomplished with the
Tug safed, oriented and placed in an attitude hold condition before approaching the
Orbiter. Its pre-attachment position is approximated by the orientation shown in
Figure 4.3-16. Visual verification of Tug position through two views; L e. , direct
vision and a TV monitor (Figure 4.3-17) provides assurance of Tug to Orbiter distance
necessary for collision avoidance. For RMS aligaanent, a -visual target paintedonthe Tug
(view C) and oriented to crosshairs on thb TV monitor aids the attachment operation.
With the Tug and Orbiter positioned and stabilized, the RMS is aligned to the attach-
ment fitting using the RMS mounted TV as primary aid. Immediately before active
attachment, both the Tug and Orbiter attitude control systems are turned off so that no
acceleration exists between the RMS and fitting. The RMS control capability enables
end effector velocity matching to the Tug, which is easily accomplished with man-in-
the-loop computer control. Attachment is obtained by extending the end effector until
a switch signals contact to cause grasping of the Tug. The Orbiter attitude control is
reactivated and the Tug ACS is safed for mission termination.
PILOT VISION	 ADAPTER TV	 RMS TV
Figure 4.3-17. Freattachment Viewing
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TARGET
RIBS
For,translating the Tug and insertion into the deployment adapter, direct vision
through the bulkhead window and TAT vision from the deployment adapter camera are
used to ensure proper alignment. A target located on the rear of the Tug is positioned
so that it directly approaches the deployment adapter camera. This provides an accu-
rate vertical and lateral position monitoring view for the pilot. The 6-inch-diameter
(15 cm) target is shown in Figure 4.3-18 as it would be seen by the pilot on the TV
monitor when properly aligned at two distances from docking. Manual trim input to
30 FEET (9.1 M)	 3 FEET (91 cm)
Figure 4.3--18. Tug Docking Target
the computer-controlled docking program using visual docking target assessment
allows correction of position errors in the vertical Z and lateral Y direction at the
target. The significant position error remaining is roll about the Tug center axis.
TUG STRIPE
ADAPTER
STRIPE
3 FEET (91 cm) SEPARATION!
Figure 4.3-19. Adapter-Tug Alignment
Stripe
To assist the pilot in observing and cor-
recting roll error, a stripe is affixed to
the Tug and adapter lower centerlines,
Figure 4.3-19, which can be seen
through the Station 582 bulkhead window.
Terminal alignment is obtained through
the mechanical dooking guide system
described in Section 4.3.1.5. Follow-
ing insertion, the adapter latches are
actuated to complete retrieval, the RMS
is detached, the Tug is rotated into the
cargo bay, and the Orbiter mission
progresses to the next phase.
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4.3.2.2 RMS Control Techniques and Timelines. Use o£ the RMS to deploy and
retrieve Tug requires a total system study to ensure interface compatibility.. Involved
are the Tug and spacecraft, deployment adapter, end effector and receptacle, RMS
geometry, rate and force characteristics, manual and computer control, TV and direct
vision capability, alignment guides, sensors and aids, and the flight crew. Retrieval
i s considered the most difficult operation; specifically attaching the RMS to Tug and
repositioning and inserting the Tug into the deployment adapter. Deploying involves
the same activity but with much less emphasis needed for guiding and alignment since
the Tug will be moving in a direction away from the Orbiter. The required forces are
greater for deployment, however, owing to the larger mass of full propellant tanks.
Where equipment function and design detail were lacIdng, assumptions were made to
allow development of retrieval operations. The basic RMS information has been rec-
ommended through submittal of a proposed aecomm.odations change to MSFC. Since
the design of the RMS system was not a part of this study, the effort was limited to de-
fininga singular method of its use by the Tug, and evaluating the RMS performance
required.
RMS attachment at the Tug center of gravity is desirable; however, due to the varying
payload size, weight, and length and Tug propellant loading, a broad range of eg posi-
tions exists. A chart showing cg station for each Tug plus payload combination plotted
versus combined weight, Figure 4.3-20,' indicates the large excursion obtained.
	 To
minimize moments due to CG offset, the RMS attachment should be located near the
center station of the "with propellant" curve, or approximately Station 1100.
	 The
RMS performance calculations were done
using a CG Station 1087 and an RMS
TU G WEI GHT 	attachment Station 1140, to observe the	 1
39	
60	
.	 ^
WITH PROPELLANT	
effect of a large offset.
	 Detail analysis
of the RMS function will require calcu--
10	 40	 lations using each configuration weight,
YTUGSAFEQlRETURN
• r _..,.^	 inertia and eg to guarantee perform--
20	
29	
.	 NGSPACECRAFT
• r	 ance margins.
°	 BOB	 1 ,090	 1 ,209	 To translate Tug from the adapter to a
	
j
TUG CG STATION position above the pilot's station, the
Figure 4.3-20.	 Tug and Payload CG
	 RMS can be articulated in one of two
	 -	 z
ways.	 Performance limitations exist
	 -`
for both.	 An operational difficulty
exists when the RMS wrist joint is physically located nearly n line with the shoulderY
centerline.	 Figure 4.3-21 illustrates the two motions.
	 As the end of the RMS is
moved from position (A) to (B) the motions are identical.
	 At (B), the wrist is on the
.	 shoulder centerline, and progress toward (C) can be accomplished by holding the
shoulder fixed and continuing the travel with each joint as in (1), or the shoulder can
be rotated through 180 degrees (Tr radians) befors continuing the travel, as in (2).
For the motion described in (1), the wrist must crass precisely through the shoulder
	
t
centerline.
	 For the motion in (2), it is preferred that the wrist not intersect the
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(z)
	
(1)
Figure 4.3-21. RMS Motion
shoulder centerline, because if it does, axial travel at the end of RMS must be stopped
while the shoulder is pivoted through the half revoWt-ion. Over the shoulder articula-
tion (1) was chosen for use in deploying the Tug since a smooth time-distance function
could be used, thus avoiding extremely high rate RMS operation. Addition of an addi-
tional hinge at the shoulder would eliminate the disadvantage of (1).
Evaluation of the RMS function was performed for a maximum weight Tug and payload
with a forward combined eg, using the center of the deployment adapter as the geo-
metric axis. The assumed configuration and axes definition are shown in Figure 4.3-22
with the adapter rotated to 35 degrees (0. 61 radian). The side motion indicated is
required to cause the wrist to travel over the shoulder centerline. The pitch-up angular
motion, e, is the result of payload contamination studies presented in Section 4.5.
Following release of the Tug adapter latches, the Tug is deployed by the RATS through
computer control to preprogrammed position versus time function, Figure 4.3-23,
called for by the pilot. The motion is characterized by a linear axial acceleration out
of the adapter, with Tug maintained on centerline until the engine nozzle clears the
adapter station at a distance of approximately 10 feet (3 meters). Linear travel is
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CONFIGURATION
WEIGHT
CG STATION
RMS STATION
AXIAL MOTION; S
ANGULAR MOTION, 0
SIDE MOTION, C
PITCH INERTIA,
60,000 POUNDS (27,270 kg)
1087
1140
60 FEET (18.3 m)
55 DEGREES ( 0.96 RAD)
44 INCHES (1.1m)
3.97 x 106 LB-SEC2•IN.
Figure 4 . 3-22. Deploy Configuration
1 1S} s0
	
	 120 (2T/3) 	 continued to deployment midpoint (120
AXIAL seconds), at which time a linear axial
MOTION	 q ,	 deceleration commences to arrest mo-
tion. The 44 inch (1. 1 meter) side
(10} s0
	
ANGULAR
 
 so (^r13) ® 	 motion is a linear acceleration/decelera--
tion occurring between times of 60 and
a	 SIDE	 a	 130 seconds. The angu3.ar motion is a
MOTION
	 sinusoidally varying acceleration begin-
O L 00	 120	 240	 ning at 120 seconds and completed at
TIME (SECONDS)	 240 seconds. The equations of motion
used are:
Figure 4.3-23. Motion Definition
Constant acceleration: S = S0 + 1 r- t2	 0 < t < to
Deceleration:	 S = Smax - KO (tmax t)2 to < t < tmax
Sinusoidal:	 0 = 0 0 + K3 (cos K4t-1)	 to < t < tmax
The constants in the equations are obtained as follows:
K3 = -1/2 x angle traveled
K4 = n/tmax
4-177
d-
2
*5 = Distance traveled during acceleration /ta
K6 = Distance traveled during deceleration/(t 
max 
-ta)2
t = Time for linear acceleration
a
As the Tug is being deployed, especially while still in the adapter, the pilot will be
closely monitoring the position and direct-ion of travel, and through the use of the RMS
hand controller, will adjust and correct the RMS deploy functions. Selection of the
specific motion equations is somewhat arbitrary, since the time-distance curves for
constant/sinusoidal input forces nearly coincide, as shown in Figure 4.3-24, with the
initial travel being slower with constant acceleration providing more time and force
available for manual trim/override. A sinusoidal pitch motion was selected to reduce
the peak RMS joint torques, which result from. a summation of the pitch and axial
motion forces.
Qmax
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Finax
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0
^A
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Figure 4.3--24. Time--Motion Comparison
Using the defined time-motion functions, the RMS joint requirements were computed
and results plotted using an RP-98 10A calculator. The RMS configuration and joint
identification used, Figure 4:.:3-25, and the dSC 07700 characteristics are:
Identification	 Name	 Motion	 Max. Torque, in--lb (N. m.)
2400 (271.2)
2400 (271.2)
2400 (271.2)
3600 (406.7)
6000 (677.9)
6000 (677.9)
P	 Wrist Roll.
A	 Wrist Yaw
B	 Wrist Pitch
C	 Elbow Pitch
D	 Shoulder Pitch
E	 Shoulder Yaw
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Figure 4.3-26. RM Joint Angle vs
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_ __ I
Figure 4.3-.25, RMS Joint
Identification
Angles were computed and plotted for
each RMS joint with the wrist extension
length held constant and parallel to the
Y--Y axis of the Orbiter, the wrist seg-
ment between joints A and B held paral-
lel to the X-Y plane, and "aver-the-
shoulder" motion assumed. Discrete
angles were thus obtained. Figure
4.3-26, for each specific time.
Joint angular rates (6) were obtained
by computing and plotting 66/At for each
joint, Figure 4. 3-27.
Using the geometry and inertial data,
Figure 4. 3-22, the torque and forces
acting on the Tug eg necessary to pro-
duce the desired motion were computed,
Figure 4.3-28, assuming a rigid,
infinite mass Orbiter. With the Orbiter
mass equal to about three times the Tug
mass, the forces thus calculated will be
greater by the ratio of 4:3 than actually
needed to produce the defined relative
motion. This tends to be conservative
in that increased force is available for
contingency operation. The joint torques
obtained are within the RMS capability
available as specified in JSC 07700
Vol XIV Rev C.
Combining the.• torque, 2150 in-lb (240
N. m), and maximum rate, 1.27 deg/
sec (0. 022 rad/sec) of joint I'D" at 120
seconds, a required power was
computed:
HP = 2 n T N/550
21r x 2150 x 1.27 /55012	 360
+1.5 (0.028)
LD
JL 1
JOINT
	
4
HATE,
DEC/SEC 0
IRAD/sEC)
LE
LC
-15 f-0.02(5)L
0	 TIME (SEC)	 240
Figure 4.3-27. RMS Joint Rate vs Time 	 0.007 horsepower (5 watts)
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Figure 4.3-28. RMS Joint Torque vs
Time
The individual preliminary joint charac-
teristics, given in document JSC-08997
dated 22 August 1974 and reproduced in
Table 4.3-4, do not define the available
power; however, the rate and torque re-
quired are both less than the maximum
listed. Using the 772 ft-lb stall torque
and the loaded rate of 0.229 deg/sec, a
power of 0.0056 horsepower (4.2 watts) is
obtained, which is in the same magnitude
as that required and is probably acceptable
in lieu of the conservative force
calculations.
Table 4.3-4. R'MIS Joint Capability (Ref Page 6, JSC 08997)
Parameter
Shoulder
Yaw
Shoulder
Pitch
Elbow
Pitch
Wrist
Pitch
Wrist
Yaw
Wrist
Roll
Torque, Stall, ft-lb 772 7721 502 231 213 200
Joint Rate Loaded, 0.004 0.004 0.0057 0.0083 0.0084 0.0105
rad/sec (deg/sec) (0.229) (0.229) (0.327) (0.476) (0.481) (0.602)
Joint Rate Unloaded, 0.0537 0.0537 0.0768 0.1107 0.1130 0.0847
rad/sec (deg/sec) (3.077) (3.077) (4.400) (6.343) (6.474) (4.853)
A more detailed study of the R.^MS system can also reduce the power and rates by
more sophisticated implementation methods, and by tailoring the time-motion equa-
tions. Some changes that would result in decreasing the required power of joint D are:
a. Use sinusoidal acceleration for axial motion.
b. Increase the total deployment time.
c. Use hybrid time-motion equations.
Control of the Tug while attached through the manipulator to the arbiter depends on
the characteristics of the RMS and the individual masses of the two vehicles. To
prevent damage to the relatively flexible RMS when Tug connected, it is necessary to
prevent or damp resonant motion between the vehicles. Damping can be accomplished
through the normal control system if the control response is sufficiently faster (3 or
4 times minimum) than the RMS connected natural frequency.
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i	 A simplified model of the Orbiter, Tug, and RMS was used in the NASTRAN computerI
program to develop an approximate natural frequency. The predominant first mode
frequency produces a period of about twenty seconds, Figure 4.3-29, which can be
detected visually and provides adequate time for reaction through the man--machine
interface. The directions of relative motion are indicated in the figure. A more pre-
cise modeling is recommended to account for the full six degrees of freedom system
using improved estimates of RMS arm stiffness and including torsional characteris-
tics. It is assumed that a more rigorous analysis will produce a lower first mode
frequency due to decreased system spring constant, making this preliminary analysis
conservative.
TUG {NEAR ADAPTER
MODE	 PREQ	 PERIOD
1	 0.0508 Hz	 19.7 SEC
2	 0.171 Hz	 -
3	 0.471 Hz
TUG 3.7 METERS FROM ADAPTER
MODE	 FREQ	 PERIOD
1	 0.0581 Hz	 17.2 SEC
2	 0.177 Hz	 -
3	 0.405 Hz
Figure 4.3-29. Tug-RIDS-Orbiter Natural Frequency
Analysis of the remote manipulator system kinematics is a complex task requiring
full knowledge of its characteristics. 'within the limitations pose-d by the sparse
and preliminary data available, it has been shown that the RMS will be capable of
deploying the Space Tug and payload. With the added capability of RMS tip velocity
control requested through an accommodations changes Tug retrie-val and docking is
the reverse of deployment and can also be successfully accomplished.
The combined remote manipulator system requirements identified for Tug opera-
tional use axe summarized in Fig-are 4.3-3 0%. The interaction of computer control,
manned supervision/adjustment, and the mechanical system is depicted schematically.
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CCTV KEYBOARD INPUT
/-__/ OFF
CONTROL STICK`
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Qc:,,@ ^_
PRE PROGRAMMED
INPUT
INPUT - OUTPUT
RATE LIMITS
GEOMETRY LIMITS
MASS PROPERTIES
Figure 4.3-30. Remote Manipulator System. Interface
Orbiter and other stabilized elements; inspection.; and EVA support requires diverse
capability in the end effector design. Deploying and retrieving a Tug requires an end
effector attachment capable of transmitting loads and motions in six degrees of free-
dom with minimum free play at the attachment interface while also being able to re-
motely connect with up to 10 degrees (0.17 radian) angular misalignment and also to
disconnect with a minimum disturbing force. Either a probe or claw type end effector,
Figure 4.3-31, appears to meet the requirements for Tug deployment and retrieval.
PAYLOAD PROSE LATCH
REQUIREMENTS
o TRANSMIT LOADS
* RELEASE TUG WITH MINIMUM OR REPEATABLE DISTUR€iANCV
* ATTACH TO TUG WITH MINIMUM DISTURBING FORCE
® ATTACH TO TUG WITH SIGNIFICANT INITIAL ANGULAR &
LINEAR MISALIGNMENT
n
PAYLOAD CLAW LATCH
Figure 4.3-31. Tug-RMS End Effector
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m IMPACT WRENCH
*SAWS {ALL KINDS)
o CABLE & TUBE CUTTERS
® FASTENER HANDLERS
o ACTUATOR OVERRIDE DRIVERS
.ATOR END EFFECTORS
INCEPT}
TENSION
ID EFFECTOR
An end effector-mounted proximity switch has been proposed by the interface study
via a proposed accommodations charge to satisfy the minimum attachment disturbing
force requirement. See change 005, Section 5.2, Volume III. 	
c
4.3.3 MECHANISM BACKUP CAPABILITY. Additional tasks assigned to the RMS
include payload servicing, inspection, and EVA support. These tasks imply a dexter-
ity not available with a probe/drogue and effector. Backup tasks may occur due to the
unscheduled activity associated with disconnecting a failed pivot actuator or checking
alignment/engagement of umbilical panels upon loss of position indication.
Both example tasks require an end effector capable of Operating perpendicular to the
Orbiter centerline and aft of Station 1246. The present RMS reach with its end effec-
tor similarly oriented is Station 1219. An extension end effector and/or a movable tip
end, Figure 4.3--32, appears necessary as does on-orbit exchange with the probe type
end effector.
Figure 4.3-32. Exchangable End Effectors
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4.4 FLUID SUPPORT SYSTEM INTERFACES
The design of the Tug and associated deployment adapter-mounted and Orbiter-provided
fluid service equipment must be compatible with all Orbiter operations for both normal
and abor}.ed missions. All Tug fluids with the exception of APS monopropellant are
loaded on--pad after payload bay door closure. Thus service lines with Orbiter inter-
faces for loading, unloading, venting, and relieving are required. All Tug service
lines that require connection to ground pass through panels provided on the Orbiter
aft payload bay bulkhead (1307 par:els) through the Orbiter aft fuselage to separate
fuel and oxidizer disconnect panels on opposite side of the aft fuselage (Figure 4,4-1).
These remain connected until launch and are called the T-0 (time zero) panels. This
section summaries requirements for fluid service equipment, presents trade studies
supporting fluid service equipment and associated interface definition, and defines
final baseline requirements at the Tug/Orbiter interface.
4.4, 1 SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS. Tug and Orbiter system requirements that estab-
lish fluid service equipment requirements are identified in this section.
4.4.1.1 Normal Operation:. Fluid system requirements for normal operation are
summarized in Table 4.4-1. Auxiliary Propulsion System (APS) propellants are
loaded in the payload ch.angeout room before Tug insertion into the Orbiter, therefore
1307 BULKHEAD
os0°
	
1
	 INO ®	 (	 10 12O
	
OXIDIZER
	 FUEL
T•O OXIDIZER PANEL
N2H4 RELIEF + P/L PROP
IN IUS PANELS 535
x
CRYOGENIC TUG PLUS PAYLOAD FLUID SERVICES
MAIN PROPELLANT FILL, DRAIN & DUMP
L02 REPLENISH
PROPELLANT VENT & RELIEF
PROPELLANT TANK INSULATION VENT
APS RELIEF
HELIUM SUPPLY
RTG CUOLANT SUPPLY & VENT
Figure 4.4-1. Fluid Interface
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Table 4.4--1. Tug Fluid Systems Requirements for Normal. Operations
Main Propellants
Max Quantity, lb (kg)
Loading Time, mist
Unloading Time, min
Loading Flowrate, lb/sec (kg/sec)
Unloading Flowrate, lb/sec (kg/sec)
Venting Rate, lb/sec (kg/sec)
Prelaunch
Max steady state
Min steady state
Flight
Topping Rate, lb/sec (kg/sec)
Min steady state
Max steady state
Level adjust
Pressures, psis (N/cm2)
Loading
Unloading
Topping
Propellant Saturation
Leakage/Purge Vent, lb/min (kg/min)
LO2	 LH2
44080 (19994)	 7460 (3384)
30	 30
30	 30
24.5 (11.1)	 4. 144 (1.88)
24.5 (11.1)	 4.144 (1.88)
0.195 (0.0885)	 0.25 (0.113)
0.15 (0.068)	 0.20 (0. 091)
0.144 (0.065)
0. 15 (0.068)	 0.20 (0.091)
0.195 (0.0885)	 0.25 (0. 113)
2.0 (0.91)	 2.0 (0.91)
(Note 1) (Note 1)
>15. 5 (10. 67) >15.5 (10. 67)
(Note 1.) (Note 1)
15.5 (10. 67) 15.5 (10. 67)
Pretanking (5 minutes only) 	 0.06 (0.027)	 0.5 (0.227)
Loading	 0.001 (0.00045)	 0.01 (0.0045)
Ascent	 0.03 (0.0136)	 0.25 (0. 113)
Auxiliary Propulsion System.
Loading/Unloading
	
(Off pad)
Relief Rate, lb/sec (kg/sec) 	 0.05 (0.023)
}
.,	 Table 4.4-1. Tug Fluid Systems Requirements for Normal Operations, Coned
'	 Main Propellants
	
LO	 LH2	 2
Helium ,System	 Vehicle	 Adapter
Quantity, lb (kg)	 20.0 (9.07)	 60.3 (27.35)
Charge Time, hr	 1.0 total Vehicle & Adapter
Max pressure, psia (N/cm2)	 3200 (2200)	 3200 (2200)
the APS has a relief requirement only. All other fluids are loaded on-pad during the
launch preparations. A one-hour charge time is assumed for the helium systems.
This system may be charged at any time compatible with Orbiter operations.
Main propellant loading is assumed to be concurrent with Orbiter main propellant load-
ing, which is as follows:
Time Required
Operation i	 (minutes)
Facility chill.	 7
Orbiter Chilldown	 20
Fill to 2 percent	 14
Orbiter	 Fill to 98 percent 	 30
Crew Ingress Fill to 100 percent	 19
The fill time of 30 minutes from 2 to 98 percent establishes the flowrate requirement 	 3
for the fill system. After loading, propellants are maintained fully loaded until
launch by topping at a rate equal to the boiloff rate. The topping rate may be increased
if required just before launch for final propell.-mt level adjustment. The vent system	 k
vents chill down and boil off gases overboard. R is sized for minimum practicable 	 t
pressure loss to minimize propellant saturation pressures, which affects tank design
pressure. All potential sources of leakage are purged and vented overboard. Major
purged areas are the leakage containment membranes around propellant tanks and
disconnect panel purge compartments, which are vented continuously, and fill, drain,
and topping lines, which are purged 30 seconds before launch. Purge venting regiiire- 	 _ :" A
ments summarized in Table 4.4-1 are detailed in Table 4.4-2. 	 a
At launch, propellant tanks are locked-up (I.e., vents closed) until an altitude of
90, 000 feet (27,432 meters) is reached, after which the tanks are vented back down to
saturation pressure as the vehicle accelerates, keeping propellant settled. Between
Shuttle engine burnout and Tug deployment, zero-g venting at very low rates is en-
abled as required by use of a thermodynamic zero-g vent device. During ascent, all
4-3.86
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RTable 4.4-2. Helium Vented Through T-0 Panels
Helium Vented, lb/min
(kg/min)
Mission Phase	 Time/Duration	 Operation	 LH2 Panels L02 Panels
Pre-Launch
	 During/After
Propellant
Loading
to
Prelaunch	 30 seconds
before launch
Disconnect panel
Purling
Fill, drain, topping
line purging
0.001
(0.00045)
3.5 x 10-5
(0.7 x 10-4) (1.6 x 10-5)
0.01
(0.0045)
-4
1.5 x 10
Pretanking	 5 minutes	 Leakage containment 	 0.5	 0.06
before tanking membrane purging/	 (0.227)	 (0.027)
drying
Launch Ascent	 T-0 to	 Leakage containment 	 0.25	 0.03
T +120 seo	 membrane vent--down	 (0.113)	 (0.0136)
Total helium vented -- 4.84 lb (2.2 kg)
leakage/purge compartments are vented down to pressures very near ambient (higher
only by system AP).
4.4.1.2 Shuttle Abort Operation. The Tug must be designed for compatibility with
all Shuttle aborts that occur before Tug deployment. For these aborts, methods of
safely operating the Tug and subsequently disposing of propellants, either before or
after landing must be devised. For the baseline Tug, all of both propellants are
dumped before entry. Shuttle aborts may be divided iflLo two categories, character-
ized by their impact on Tug propellant dumping design requ=irements:
a. Return-to-Launch-Site (RTLS) Abort. For Shuttle aborts that occur between 125
and 240 seconds after launch, the RTLS mode sway be used. In this mode, the
Orbiter reverses its direction of flight at high altitude by rotating in pitch to
apply retrograde thrust using the main engines. This operation is summarized
x	 ^^
in Figure 4.4-2. After entering the atmosphere, the Orbiter glides back to the
launch site. CG constraints during glide (Figure 4.4--3) dictate a requirement
for L02
 dump before entry. LH2 dump after entry is prohibited because of pos-
sibility of combustion in the Orbiter wake (Ref. 5). Propellants can be dumped
during the retrograde thrusting period where ample acceleration for settling is
provided (1-3g as shown). Minimum time available is 300 seconds for abort at
the last RTLS opportunity. Trajectory data that has significant impact on dump-
ing are shown in Figures 4 .4-2 and 4.4-4.	 `d
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b, Orbital Abort. After the time limit for RTLS (240 seconds from liftoff), one of
three orbital abort modes defined below are used:
`	 1. Abort--Once-Around (AOA) -- 220( l) to 400 seconds after launch. The Orbiter
continues to slightly less than orbital velocity, retrofires using the OMS,
reenters, and lands at the end of the first orbit.
2. Abort-to--Orbit (ATO) — 247 to 306 seconds. The Orbiter proceeds to orbit
from which abort is initiated using OMS retro burns.
3. Abort-from-Orbit (AFO) — Anytime after normal orbital injection.
After 240 seconds, time available during SSME operation is shorter than the 300 sec-
onds minimum for RTLS, ranging down to 106 seconds for the last AOA opportunities.
Thus designing for dump within the SSME powered time would greatly increase dump
system requirements. Both 1) continuing dump through SSME shutdown and external
tank (ET) staging, and 2) interrupting dump during ET staging are of questionable
acceptability from safety and reliability standpoints. The system must be designed
to accommodate AFO, in any case, where no SSME thrusting time is available. Thus
a groundrule assumed for this study was that dump would take place after SSME shut-
down. for all orbital aborts.
	 '
Thrust available for orbital abort ranges from zero to a maximum of 12, 000 lb
(53376N) from OMS plus approximately 5400 lb (24020N) from the RCS (using six
thrusters). Time and thrust availability limits are summarized in Table 4.4-3.
Table 4.4-3. Orbital Dump Thrust and Time Availability Limits
Orbiter System	 Minimum	 Maximum
Operating	 Thrust, lb (N)	 Time, sec	 Time, sec
None	 0	 3720 (AOA)	 over 24, 000
OMS	 12, 000 (53376)
	
120 (AFO)	 440
RCS (4 thrusters) 	 3,600 (24020)	 0	 230
(1) For aborts between approximately 220 and 240 seconds after launch, the Orbiter 	 s
may elect either the RTLS or AOA mode. Dumps for AOA initiated in this
period can be grade using the RTLS technique if desired.
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The minimum OMS/RCS times available assume an abort when only the propellant
required for deorbit and reentry control is remaining. The minimum times dictated
that the dump system be designed so that part of the Tug propellant is dumped without
{	 the use of Orbiter propulsion.
4.4.2 ABORT DUMP DESIGN TRADE STUDIES. Design to accommodate Shuttle
abort has a major impact on Tug and tug service line design. This section summar-
izes the results of trade studies made to aid in selection of optimum subsystem designs
and operational modes for compatibility with all Shuttle abort modes.
4.4.2,1 LH2 Dump Safety. A major abort dump concern was the possibility of com-
bustible H2/02 mixture buildup ir. Orbiter compartments due to infiltration of dumped
propellants. By worst-case analysis, it was found that hazardous mixtures can be
avoided for all Shuttle abort modes. There is a general impression that H2/air mix-
ture between 4 and 95 percent H2 are combustible and very easy to ignite. This is
true at atmospheric pressure but decidedly not true at low pressure. Figure 4.4-5
gives low pressure H2/02 mixture combustibility data used in the analysis. It shows
data from Reference 1 on P&W tests on spark igniters for H2/02 thrust chambers and
from Reference 2 on Convair tests of ignition limits for the Atlas-Centaur interstage
adapter. In both the P&W and Convair tests, the complete boundary of the ignition
zone using spare: igniter was defined for mixtures of 0 to 100 percent 112 in 02 at pres-
sures of 0. 1 psia to 1.0 psia (0. 069 to 0. 69 N/cm 2). Both the Convair and P&W data
were taken using continuously sparking igniters operating at 20 hertz, with gap/energy
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Figure 4.4. a. H2/02 Mixture Ignition Limits
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of x.25 inches (3.17 cm)/8 Joules for Convair and 0.1 inch (0. 254 em)/0.5 Joules
for P&W. In addition, the Convair tests included a hot wire and a 22 in. 2 (142 cm2)
hot surface [ up to 2500F (1389K)] ignition sources at 67 percent H2 by volume, the
easiest mixture to ignite. With the hot surface, ignition was obtained at 0.15 psia
(0. 103 N/cm2) but not at 0.1 psis (0. 69 N/cm2).
The lowest dotted curve was assumed for the Tug hazard analysis. It parallels the
S	 curve Developed by Convair for spark ignition, passing through 0.1 psia (0. 069 N/cm2),
a safe limit for the hot surface, the most energetic ignition source. This curve is i
i	 considered to represent a conservative ignition limit for 0 2/H2 mixtures assuming an
ideal ignition source.
Figure 4.4-6 shows how pressure/ H2 concentration varies in a compartment initially
filled with pure H2 at 40OR (222K) to which 02 at 40OR (222X) is added. This is con-
servatively representative of the situation during reentry after RTLS :sump where
Orbiter compartments may contain some H2 from dump infiltration, to which air is
added. Superimposed on this data is the H 2/02 flamability boundary derived above.
It can be seen that for initial compartment pressures below 0.02 psia (0.0138 N/cm2),
concentration is outside the ignition boundary for all pressure levels.
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Figure 4.4-6. RTLS Abort Hydrogen
Dump Considerations
Since all orbiter compartments are
sealed during the dump period, it is
unlikely that H2 leaking into compart-
ments from outside could build partial
pressure to a substantial fraction of the
ambient pressure. Therefore, the
assumption of pure H2 at end-of-dump
ambient pressure in all compartments
is conservative. Figure 4.4-7 sum-
marizes trajectory data for RTLS abort.
APOGEL
	
41401	 T 75SEC
Pd0
PT 0
(T20I 4BB
u 2055EL
11001 rR O FATE COMPLETE 6 3 %0105 PSI/
TART CWIA3C0 NITI 	 • 0U	 ABORT	 P - 2 . IC6 PSIAa 1601	 2475EC	 T'	 S	 T 2555ECP' 93.10	 P 0001515lg
AFTER	 PT - 002 PSIA
¢ 1601200 LIFTOFF	 ^ SSHE BURNOUT
[EI ll 111SP
	PT • STATIC 4 DYNAMIC 	V	 • 39E(401	 PaESSURE.^'^^^o^5^A
1	 f	 I	 I__ - _--_I---	 1
1200)
	
(300)
	
(4001
	
(5901	 1600)	 (7001
DISTANCE DQVJNRANr.F, n mi. NMI
Figure 4.4-7. RTLS Abort Trajectory
Data
1.0
0.9
08
O7
06
05
114
o]
a
vl
07
onl0
0 009
Y Ono
c 001
005
005
004
n 03
007
001
4-x.91
It can be seen that ambient pressure is below 0.01 psia (0, 0069 N/cm2) through SSMR
burnout. Therefore, H 2 concentration would remain in the safe zone at all times dur-
ing an RTLS abort.
s	 An additional abort dump concern was the wetting and possible overcooling of external
j	 Orbiter surfaces with dumped liquid propellant, possibly leading to damage of the
!	 Orbiter structure. This problem has been investigated in detail, both experimentally
and analytically by Convair under two studies sponsored by NASSA/MSFC during 1966-
a	 1968. The initial study, "NAS8-20165, Development of Analytical Methods for Predict-
;	 ing Residual Cryogenic Propellant Behavior in Orbital Vehicles" developed a computer
oriented two-phase plume flow field and impingement analytical model. The second
study, "NA38-21210, .LI mergency Propulsive Propellant Venting Systems Concepts"
actually performed an extensive series of experiments in which hydrogen with the full
range of fluid quality was dumped through a nozzle to vacuum. conditions. The test
program was designed to specifically simulate the dumping of cryogenic propellants
to a space environment.
!	 The thermodynamic process which occurs in the dumped fluid is shown in simplified
form on the temperature-entropy diagram of Figure 4.4-8. The propellant leaves the
tank at essentially saturated liquid conditions (point A) and flashes to a two--phase
(liquid/gas) mixture as the pressure decreases to the dump exit conditions (point B),
as discussed in Appendix C. Further expansion to the triple point pressure (point C)
of the fluid occurs as the plume forms external to the dump nozzle where all three
s	 phases exist. Further expansion causes the liquid to freeze and a two-phase (solid/
plume to ei.st. The analytical studies verified b the hydrogen dumping a	 -^f	 gas) p	 Y^	 Y	 g	 P^  xPeri
ments showed the two-phase portion of the plume to be essentially conical in nature
kr	
and not spherical as sometimes erroneously assumed. Centaur flight data on dumping
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Figure 4.4-8. LH2 Dump Characteristics
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both H2
 and 02 have confirmed the vacuum chamber data, proving that no wetting
occurs as long as the surfaces are not located directly in the essentially conical two-
phase plume. Gas expansion at the nozzle edge will occur to the angle determined by
the Prandtl-Meyer line for the fluid; however, the thermodynamic effect due to im-
pingement of the rarified gas is insignificant.
4.4.2.2 Dump Pressure/Diameter timization. Propellant dump for the baseline
Tug is accomplished by pressurizing the propellant tanks and dumping both main pro-
pellants through lines that exit the Orbiter through the T--0 panels. Configuration of
the entire dump system, including an assumed routing of the Orbiter-mounted portions
of the lines are shown in Figures 4.4-9 and 4.4-10. The dump pressure and dump line
diameter requirements are mutually dependent; i.e. , the use of higher pressure re-
sults in smaller line diameter requirements. Trade studies were made to determine
the optimum pressure/diameter combinations. Assumptions and data used in the trade
study are summarized ir! Table 4.4--4.
Diameter Requirements. Dump flow as a function of tank pressures and line diameters
was determined using the computer modal discussed in Appendix C. This model cal-
culates the maximum flow for a system with a flow exit to vacuum, assuming sonic
flow (choking) of a two-phase gas/liquid mixture at the exit and no choked flow sections
upstream of the exit. Since both the LH2 and L02 dump lines have a large vertical
drop and are under high acceleration (F/W) during RTLS dump, the total pressures at
the top of the lines are substantially lower than at the exit. This is particularly true
for L02 because of its high density. For this reason, the dump lines were checked
for choking in the vicinity of the tank outlets.
The Orbiter exit was found to be the control section for the LH 2 system (exit chokes
before the tank outlet) allowing use of a constant diameter line from outlet to exit. For
the L02
 system, the tank outlet section was found to ehoke before the Orbiter exit at
low liquid levels near the end of dump. To obtain the required flowrates, the duct
diameter required in the vicinity of the propellant tank outlet is larger than at the exit.
This larger diameter must be maintained down the line to a point where increasing
pressure due to increasing elevation head offsets the frictional pressure loss, allowing
a reduction in diameter, which can be maintained to the exit. For this reason, the
outlet duct design should be as clean (low AP) as possible and should drop at the fastest
possible rate (maximum slope). The cleanest practicable outlet line design was
^ 	 assumed, but the baseline routing with "inverted" pickup and horizontal run to the
vicinity of the disconnect was used for the optimization analysis.
For this configuration, shown in Figure 4.4-11, the larger outlet diameter must be
maintained past the Tug/disconnect, as shown. An alternative configuration without
the inverted pickup, shown in Figure 4.4-12, is recommended.
I
Figure 4.4-13 gives flow capacity versus duct diameter and tank pressure for the
baseline Tug tank outlet line (Figure 4.4-11). The required duct diameter is plotted
versus tank pressure at the nominal dump rate specified in Figure 4.4-14.
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Figure 4.4-9. L02 Fill, Drain, Dump and Vent Line Configurations
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Table 4.4-4. Dump System Optimization Study Data and Assumptions
300
25 (11..3)
147 (66.7)
1.0
3.0
Dump time (seconds)
Average Dump Flowrate, lb/sec (kg/sec)
LH2
L02
Shuttle Acceleration (F/W)
Initial
Final
Propellant Vapor Pressure, psia (N/cm2)
LH2	 15.5 (10.7)
L02	 15.5 (10.7)
Dump Lines
Configuration	 (See Figures 4.4-8 and
4.4--9)
Construction L02	 Aluminum, uninsulated
LH2	 Stainless steel, vacuum
jacketed
Pressurization System
Type	 Ambient helium
System Weight	 10 lb/lb (kg/kg) usable helium
Tug Propellant Tank Weight Sensitivity
LH2
	18 lb/psis (8. 16 kg/N/cm2)
L02
	8 lb/psia (3.65 kg/N/cm 2)
Figure 4.4-15 gives L02 dump system flowrate capacity versus adapter/ Orbiter duct
diameter and tank pressure. The dump duct diameter from tank exit through the dis-
connect areas given in Figure 4.4-14. For the 16.0 (11.03 N(cm 2) psia tank pres-
sure, data is given for both initial (F/W = 1. 0, tank full) and final (F/W = 3. 0, tank
empty) conditions. The final flowrate is 2545 percent higher than the initial, and at
the average F/W of 1. 5, the flow is approximately 13 percent abova the initial. Based
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Figure 4.4-11. Outlet Duet Design
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on this data, the design flowrate at the
1.0 F/W 'initial condition is 130 lb/sec
(145/1.135) (59 kg/sec) as indicated in
Figure 4.4-14. Adapter/Orbiter line
diameter requirements are determined
at this design flowrate.
Figure 4.4-16 gives LH2 system dump
flowrate capacity versus duct diameter
(from tank outlet to exit, in this case)
and tank pressure. Data is given for
vehicle F/W = 0 at tank pressures from
16.2 to 20.0 Asia (11.2 to 13.8 N/cm2)
and for F/W = 2.25 (near final condition)
at 18. 0 (12.4 N/cm2) psia tank pressure,
representing a typical RTLS condition,
The RTLS rate is approximately 10 per-
cent higher than the zero-g rate. Since
the mechanics and expense of running
the RTLS dump cases are much greater
than the zero-g cases, diameter require-
ments are estimated from the zero-g
data at a design flowrate of 23 lb/sec
(10.4 kg/sec) -- 90 percent of the RTLS
design flowrate of 25 lb/sec (11.3 kg/sec)
as shown.
Pressurization System Requirements.
Dump pressurant requirements were de-
nXIMUR TANK REF 	 termined using the Epstein-hand calcula-
tion technique from Reference 3 pro--
Figure 4.4-12. Recommended LO2 Tack grammed for the Hewlett-Packard 9810
Outlet Configuration
	 computer. Film coefficient data used is
given in Figure 4.4-17 (from Refer-
	 }
ence 4). This technique allows calcula-
tion of a collapse factor (CF) which when multiplied by the ideal quantity of helium
	 s .
pressurant required (assuming equal storage and propellant tank temperature) yields
the actual requirement.
4
Data and assumptions used to determine pressurant requirements are summarized in
Table 4.4-5. Values of CF versus tank pressure for both LH 2 and LO2 tanks are
shown in Figure 4.4-18. The resulting helium system weight requirements are given
in Table 4.4-6.
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Damp Line Weights, The dump line model assumed for weight analysis is summarized
in Table 4.4--7. Weights for the ducts were calculated and component weights were
scaled from data for similar .Atlas and Centaur components,
Tank Weight. Tank weight sensitivities to design pressure were assumed to be 18 and
8 lb/psi (8. 16 and 3.63 kg/N/cm2) for LH2 and L02 respectively. These sensitivities
were developed for a similar baseline Tug in the STSS (cryogenic) of Reference 5. It
was not clear that changes in dump pressure requirements would necessarily change
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Table 4.4-5. Data and Assumptions Abort Pressurant Weights
Assumptions:
Both tanks saturated at 15. 5 psia (10.7 N/cm2)
Pressurization with ambient helium T = 520R (T = 289K)
Dump time 200 seconds
Tank material aluminum alloy
Wall gage, in. (cm)
LH2 0.041 (0.104)
L02 0.038 (0.097)
External heat transfer negligible
Helium required
PVWHE - (CF) RT
where P = tank pressure
V = total tank volume
R = 286 (helium gas constant)
T = He supply temp = 520R (289K)
and CF = collapse factor bas--d on Epstein analysis (Ref. 3).
Tank volumes, ft3 (m3)
L02 640 (18.1)
LH2 1748 (50)
tank design pressures, since other pressure requirements (run pressurization, lockup
during ascent and entry) must be consideredo For this reason the trades were made
assuming both a one-to-one and 9. zero effect of dump pressure on tank design
pressure.
3
b. Maximum payload for Tug missions
is obtained at approximately 18 Asia
(12.4 N/cm2) tank pressures for
both L02 and LH2 if tank design
pressure has a one-to-one corre-
spondence to dump pressure. How-
ever, payload variations over the
range of pressures considered is
small.
c. Maximum payload for Tug missions
is obtained at the higher tank pres-
sures if there is no effect on tank
design pressure. This is because
increasing; pressure reduces all
weights except the helium system,
which being Orbiter retained has a
Iow payload sensitivity (d INERT@PL
0.36).
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Figure 4.4-18. Collapse Factor vs
Tank Pressure
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Figure 4.4-17. Film Coefficient vs
Pressurant Inlet
Temperature
Results.	 Results of the trade study are _	 -
summarized in Figures 4.4-19 and
4.4-20.	 The following observations can
be made about this data:
a.	 Minimum weight for Orbiter supplied
and carried hardware (between T-0
and 1307 interface) is obtained at
the highest LH 2 tank pressures
considered.	 If this hardware is
permanently installed in the Orbiter
for all missions rather than as kits .^
for Tug missions only, this may be
of significance.
It can be concluded that the maximum dump pressure that can be used without affecting
tank design pressure should be selected. These pressures were assumed to be the 17
and 18 psia (11.72 and 12 . 4 N/cm2) pressures defined for the baseline L02 and LH2
tanks respectively.
4.4.2.3 Orbital Abort. Abort once around (A.O.A,), abort to orbit (ATO), and abort
froze. orbit (ATO) are termed orbital aborts because propellant dump takes place at
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Table 4.4-6. Helium Requirements for Abort; Pressurization
i
Tank Usable Helium Helium System
Pressure, Required, lb (itg) Weight, Ib (kg)
Asia
(N/cm2 ) LO2 LH2 LO2 LH2
16 (11.03) 13.04 (5.9) 37.15 (16.9) 142 (64.4) 403 (182.8)
17 (11.22) 13.75 (6.2) 38.94 (17.7) 149 (67.6) 423 (191.9)
18 (12.4) 14.47 (6.6) 40.75 (18.5) 157 (71.2) 442 (200.5)
20 (13.8) 15.89 (7.2) 44.3 (20.1) 172 (78) 481 (218.2)
24 (16.5) 18.7 (8.5) 51.23 (23.2) 203 (92.1) 556 (252.2)
Table 4.4-7. Dump Lane Model for Weight Analysis
Item LO2 LH2
Length, in. (cm) 359 (911.9) 488 (1239.5)
Tug 58 (147.3) 195 (495.3)
Adapter/Orbiter 301 (764.5) 293 (744.2)
Insulation bare Vacuum Jacket
Material aluminum CRES
Min wall gage, " (can) 0.040 (0.101) 0.030 (0.076)
No. flex joints
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orbit9, or ,sh htly sub-orbital. velocities. The abort dump operation differs from the
RTLS (1) in the-:° major respects:
a. The F/W is much lower — from zero to a maximum of 0. 055, the latter obtain-
able through operation of the orbit maneuvering system (OMS) with 12, 000 lb
(53376N) thrust.
b. The time available is longer, with minimum available of 3500 seconds for AIDA.
The baseline abort systems designed for the 300 second R.TLS dump will have longer
dump times for orbital aborts, as shown in Table 4.4-8. At the same tank pressures,
flow rates are reduced and dump times extended because of reduction in physical head
pressure~ avE able at the lower F/W. The flowrate reduction and resulting time ex-
tension are L ge for L02 because of the high density and are low for LH 2 because of
the low densit-.. The resulting times of 1070 and 330 seconds for L02 and LH 2 re-
spectively are well below the rninin; _.hn ^ lable time of 3500 seconds.
There is a potential problem of high reE,- -Js attendant to low-g propellant expulsion.
The high residuals are caused by plenomcnaa normally called either pullthrough or
dropout, which at loin F/W cause ingestion of the pressurizing gas and loss of tank
pressure with a relatively high level of liquid in the tanks. L02 and LH2 residuals
were calculated for a range of orbital dump flowrates and acceleration levels appro-
priate for orbital aborts. Assumptions and data used in these calculations are sum-
marized in Tabl 4.4-9. Pullthrough heights were calculated using the lowest value
obtained from the two equations shown.. Equation 1 from Reference 6 is applicable at
the lowest F/W considered (dump thrust settling), while Equation 2 from Reference 7
generally applied in the range of F/W obtainable using RCS or OA0 settling. At the
(1) For aborts between approximately 220 and 240 secclids after launch, the Orbiter
may elect either the RTLS or AOA mode. Dumps for AOA initiated in this period
can be made using the R.TLS technique, if desired.
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Table 4.4-8. Comparison of RTLS and Orbital Abort Dump Flowrates
Item	 L02	 LH2
Design Condition,
Abort Mode	 RTLS	 RTLS
Dump Time, sec	 300	 300
Average Flowrate, lb/sec (kg/sec) 	 147 (66.7)	 25 (11.4)
Tank Pressure, psia (N/cm2)	 17 (11.7)	 18 (12.4)
Orbital Abort Performance
Average Flowrate, lb/sec (kg/sec)	 43 (19.5)	 22.7 (10.3)
Dump Time, sec	 1070	 330
Tank Pressure, lb (kg) 	 17 (11.7)	 18 (12.4)
higher F/W levels pullthrough heights can be reduced by use of a properly designed
sumps. Design of sumps was outside the scope of this study, so anti-pullthrough
(ATPT) plate sumps of the type defined in Reference 7 were assumed. Residual data
was calculated for a range of ATPT plate diameters.
Residuals as function of final thrust (Orbiter thrust at Tug dump completion), dump
time, and ATPT plate diameter are shown in Figures 4.4-21 and 4.4-22. The follow-
ing observations can be made about this data:
i	 a. Residuals for settling thrust levels below approximately 500 lb (227 kg) are pro-
f	 hibitively large and approach the tank capacity asymptotically.
b. Residuals are a strong function of dump time. They are generally excessive for
dump times shorter than 800 seconds but are reduced to the practicablB minimum
at 1200 seconds.
c„ L02 residual is a strong function of ATPT plate diameter below 1.5 feet (0.46 m),
with the practicable minimum obtained at about 2.0 feet (0. 61 m).
These data and observations suggest the use of dump sumps of relatively large diame-
ter, dump times of about 1200 seconds, and a final vehicle settling thrust above 3000
lb (13344N) to obtain minimum practicable residuals. The RCS thrusting time avail-
able in Table 4.4-0 assumes all RCS propellant except that required for reentry
attitude control is available for settling. The OMS time given assumes all thrusting
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Table 4.4--9. Assumptions and Data for Orbital Dump Residual Analysis
Settling Thrust/Time Options
OMS
RCS
LO2 Dump
LH2 Dump
1	 Weights, lb (kg)Orbiter -
Tug
Thrust, lb (N)
12000 (53376)
3600 (16,000)
0 to 260 (1156) max
0 to 300 (1334) max
150, 000 (68038) dry
6,000 (2722) 1/2 of OMS/RCS/etc
156, 000 (70760)
5,755 (2610) burnout
500 (227) 10 sec of propellant (dump)
Time, sec
310 max
250 max
Entire dump
Entire dump
time remaining after orbital circularization, including the deorbit time of 100 seconds,
is available. It can be seen that the maximum total time (sum of OMS and RCS) above
3000 lb (1334 kg) thrust is 560 seconds, less than one--half the desired time of 1200
seconds. The only other settling thrust available is that which could be produced by
proper use of the dumped Tug propellant. This would require redirecting the dump,
which in the baseline would produce near-cancelling yaw thrusts, to an axially aft
direction, if this redirection is made with 100 percent efficiency, maximum thrust
available would be about 360 lb (1600N) (260 lb L0 2 and 100 lb Lilt) for a 1200 second
dump.
Assuming use of the dump thrust of 360 lb (1600 N) maximum for sustaining thrust
during the major portion of dump, thrust would have to be increased before depletion
to avoid the high residuals indicated in Figures 4.4-21 and 4.4-22. Thrust would have
to be increased before initial pullthrough gas ingestion at the low thrust and continued
to depletion at the higher thrust. Time required at the increased thrust is shown in
Figures 4.4-23 and 4.4-24. At the maximum dump thrust of 360 lb (16001) for the
1200 second dump, the time required is approximately 38 seconds. If actual dump
thrust is reduced to 50 percent of the maximum available value due to inefficiency in
the redirection, time required would increase to about 50 seconds. Thrust values
substantially less would probably be unacceptable.
The low g dump flowrate for the baseline L02 system is given in Figure 4.4-25. The
zero-g dump titre of 1090 seconds is very close to the desired 1200 seconds using the
RTLS system and procedures, so no changes are required. The low-g LH2 flowrate
is only 10 percent lower than that for RTLS at the same tank pressure, so modifica-
tions are required to reduce flowrate for the desired dump time. If the LH2 tank is
not pressurized during low-g dump (i.e. , self-pressurization is used), average flow-
rate would decrease to approximately 18 lb/sec (8.2 kg/sec), extending dump time to
460 seconds. The best solution for further extension of time appears to be the
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F .3ommendations based on the foregoing analyses are as follows-
i
a. Use an orbital abort dump time of 1200 seconds.
b. Extend the LH2 dump time to 1200 seconds by 1) nonpressurization of Tug LH2
tank, and 2) restricting the dump exit to tha approximate equivalent of a 2--in. 	 y
(5.1 cm) diameter.
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4.4.3 CONTROL TRADE STUDY. Three of the Tug service lines have possible re-
quirements for alternative routing on the downstream (Orbiter) side of the Tug/deploy-
m.ent adapter disconnects:
a. LH2 Vent. Requires a connection to ground at the T-0 panel for safe disposal
of prelaunch vented H2 , and an alternative path to a vertical tail or wing trailing
edge vent exit for safe flight and post-landing venting.
b. L_02 and LH2 Abort Dump Exits. Propellant dump for AOA, ATO, and AFO re-
quires the use of dump exits that produce axial thrust for propellant settling.
This requirement is generated because the low-g dump time of 1200 seconds is
substantially longer than tH-- time available for settling using the Orbiter RCS
or OMS as discussed in Section. 4.4.2.3. RTLS abort dump is through the side-
facing T-0 panel (common with the fill and drain exits) to minimize interaction
with the Orbiter main engine exhausts, and no axial thrust is produced. Active
controls are required to either 1) direct the dump flow in the aft direction from
the T-0 panels, or 2) reroute the low-g dump through the Orbiter in an aft-facing
location.
The active controls required to select the required flow path for the vent and for the
aft-facing orbital dumps may be mounted in either the Orbiter or Tug deployment
adapter. Adapter mounting avoids the requirement for active controls in the Orbiter,
and Orbiter mounting minimizes the number of adapter/Orbiter interfaces. Figure
4.4--`j8 shows typical line routing and configuration for the two alternative approaches.
Also shown are interface and component counts and weights for all three service lines.
The Orbiter mounted approach is simpler (fewer interfaces and components) and
lighter by 139 lb (63 kg). However, since the weight of the Tug is not affected (all A
weight remains with the Orbiter) the payload effect is small. The final evaluation of
this trade and selection of the solmion should be the responsibility of NASA and RI.
4.4.4 FILL, DRAIN, DUMP AND TOPPING LINE DIAMETER INSULATION
REQUIREMENTS. Flow requirements and approximate diameter and temperature
rise limits for the fill, drain, topping and dump functions are as follows:
Required
	
Minimum Dia.
Flowrate
	
Required,	 Max Desired
Function
	 lb/sec (kg/sec)
	
in (cm)	 AT, ° R (° K)
LO  Fill, Drain 24 .5 (11.1) 2.0 (5.1) 0.6 (0.33)
Damp 147 (66.7) 4.0 (10.2) ---
Topping (min) 0.15 (0.06) 0.75 (1.4) 0.6 (0.33)
LH2 Fill, Drain 4.14(l.9) 2.0 (5.1) 0.2 (0.11)
Dump 25 (11.3) 5.0 (12.7) .^..
Topping (min) 0.2 (0.091) 0.75 (1.9) 0.2(0.11)
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Figure 4.4-28. Alternative Lane Routing Configuration
A study was made to determine if a single common line for each propellant can be used
for all functions or if separate smaller lanes are required to meet the temperature
limits for fill and/or topping. It was assumed that all LH2 lines would be vacuum jack-
eted to prevent ligvi.i air formation regardless of AT requirements, but that L02 line
insulation would be tailored to the AT requirements. Only foam insulation of appro-
priate thickness and vacuum jacketing were considered for the L0 2 lines. After pre-
liminary analysis it was established that AT at fill and drain rates were compatible
with use of the dump line diameter, but that AT at topping rates were higher than
desired.
The final selections were made on the basis of a trade between the following alternatives.
a. Top through vacuum jacketed fill, drain, and dump lines and increase the design
tank saturation pressures for compatibility with high ATsa
b. Add separate topping lines of smaller diameters and use lower tank saturation
pressures, permissible at lower ATs. In this case, no LO 2 F, D&D lime insula-
tion is required, and the L0 2 topping line can be either foam or vacuum insulated.
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Major assumptions and data used in the study are:
a. The topping propellant arrives at the Tag at a temperature equal to or less than
saturation temperature at the design prelaunch tank pressure.
b. The correlary of a above -- the design prelaunch propellant tank and propellant
saturation pressures are equivalent to saturation at the topping temperature.
c. Topping propellant arriving at the Td-0 panel is at a temperature equivalent to
saturation at 15.0 Asia.
d. Heat leak for LH2 and LO2 vacuum jacketed Orbiter lines is 15.2 Btu/hr-ft2
(47.9 W/M2}. This is the unit heat leak for the current Orbiter 5--inch--diameter
(1.3 em) LH2 F, D&D line with three bayonet joints for ease of kit implementation,
assumed to apply to any line diameter.
e. Heat leak for adapter and Tug mounted vacuum jacketed lines without bayonet joints
is 8 Btu/hr-ft2 (25.2 W/M2 ), the average heat leak for the 10-inch (25.4 em)
diameter S--IVB LH 2 feed line installation supplied by Stainless Steel Products.
f. Thermal conductivity of foam insulation, used is 0.13 Btu/hr ft 2_. R(0.74 W/M2-° K).
g. Tank weight partials with respect to pressure are 1S and 8 lb/ psi. (11.8 and 5.26
kg (N/cm2) for LH2 and LO2
 respectively.
Results of the study are summarized in Table 4.4-10. Use of the vacuum jacketed
common line was selected for LH 2 because it was lighter (50 lb (22.7 kg) deployment
payload increase), and less hardware was required. In essence the trade was between
1) increased tank pressure (0.7 psi. or 0.48 N/cm2) , or 2) an added vacuum jacketed
line of 3/4 inch (1.9 cm) diameter, the latteb decreasing payload capability.
Use of the separate LO 2 topping line was selected because it is lighter in weight (141 lb
(64 kg) deployment payload increase); the required vacuum jacketed line was smaller
and therefore considered less expensive. In essence the trade was between 1) a bare
aluminum line of 4.0/5.0 in. (10.2/1.2.7 cm) diameter plus a 3/4-inch (1. 9 cm) vacuum
jacketed duct; and 2) a single 4.0/5.0 in. (1.0.2/x2.7 cm) diameter vacuum jacketed
duct, the latter causing additional payload penalty.
4.4.5 ALTERNATIVE MID-BODY VENT AND DUMP EXITS. Rockwell International
is currently considering the use of mid-body exits (i. e. , in the mid-fuselage forward
of the 1307 bulkhead) for lines that do not require a connection to ground. Included
in this category are:
a. Dump lines for both propellants.
1b. Leakage vent lines for both propellants
e. GO  grow, d/flight vest.
Analyses were made to assess the impact of these changes on the baseline Tug and
its interface equipment requirements. Figure 4.4-29 shows a schematic of the line
routing and diameter for the baseline (T-0 exit) and the alternative (mid-body exit).
Configuration of the lines within the Tug itself (L e. , from the disconnects forward)
was ass-c-nied to be the same for both alternatives. Figure 4.4-30 shows the con-
figuration of the complete LO.
,
 dump line from the tank outlet to the mild-body exit.
The configuration, of this line from the disconnect to the mid-body exit is typical for
all lines analyzed.
Table 4.4-10. LH2 and LO  Topping Lane/insulation Trade Study
Common	 Separate
item	 Line*	 Line
LH Line Dia in. (cm)2	 F, L` & D	 5.0 (]12.7)
Topping
Topping ®T, ° R (° K)
	 0.4 (0.222)
Saturation Pressure	 (	 2j	 ( ), psia (N/cm	 10.0 13.
LH2 Density, Ib/ft3
 (kg/M3)	 4.398 (70.445)
Propellant at Constant Tank Vol, lb (kg) -18.2 (-8.3)
5.0 (12.7)
0.75 (1.9)
0.12 (0.067)
15.3 (10.54)
4.41: (70.641)
Ref
Residual Gas, Weight lb (kg)	 -+4.73 (2.1)	 Ref
Tank AM, lb @;g)	 12.6 (+5.7)	 Ref
Line AWt, lb (kg)
Tug	 Ref.	 -x-44.4 (20. 1)
Orbiter/Adapter	 Ref.	 x-34.4 (15.6)
Payloads lb (kg)
Deploy	 x-49.4 (22.4)	 Ref.
Retrieve	 -21.5 (9.8)	 Ref
*Common line selected. Less hardware, greater payload capa,bi ity.
r
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Table 4.4-10. LH2 and LO  Topping Line/Instdation Trade Study (Contd)
-	 -
item
Common
Line
Separate
Line*
LO 	 Line Dia, in. (cm) (10.2/12.7)
F, D &: D 4.0/5.0' 4.0 (x.0.2)/
5.0 (12.7)
Topping --- 0.75 (1.9)
insulation
F, D & D Vac Jacket Nome
Topping — Vac Jacket/Foam
Topping AT, O R ( 0 K) 2.05 (1.14) 0.576 (0.315)
Saturation Pressure , psia (N/cm 2) 16.82 (11.59) 15.51 (10.69)
LO  Density, lb/ft 3 (kg/M3 ) 70.81 (1134.3) 71.06 (1138.3)
Propellant at Constant Tank Vol, lb (kg) -148 (-67.1) Ref
Residual Gas Weight, lb (kg) +14.5 (6.6) Ref
Tank AWeight, lb (kg) +10.5 (4.8) Ref
Line AWei.ght, lb (kg)
F, D & D
Tua +28.5 (12.9) Ref
FUNCTION DIA
IN. CMIBASELINE) CODE
LH2 FILL, DRAIN & DUMP 5.0 12.7 1
GHZ VENT (PRELAUNCH) 3.0 7.6 2
GHZ VENT ( IN-FLIGHT) 2.5 6.4 3
L142 TANK LEAKAGE VENT 0.75 1.9 4
NA DRAIN & RELIEF 0.5 1.3 5
L02 FI LL DRAIN & DUMP 4.0 10.2 6
L02 TOPPING 0.75 1.9 7
G02 VENT 2.0 SA 8
L02 TANK LEAKAGE VENT 0.75 1.9 9
HELIUM SERVICE 0.38 0.95 10
OPTION
LH2 DUMP 4 .8 12.2 1
LH2 FILL, DRAIN & TOPPING 2.0 5.1 11
LO  DUMP 4.0 10.2 6
L02 FILL DRAIN & TOPPING 2.0 5.1 7
9
6
7
10
BASELINE
TUC
]^^e DIF
ORB
z3
OPTION
TUG
1
134T	 --
a
t
4
1
5
2
7
10
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Figure 4.4-2B. Comparison of Baseline and Mid-Body Exit Configuration
I
- 	 I Line sizing data for abort dump is sum-
marized in Figures 4.4-0,1 and 4.4-32.
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These times approach the maximum thrusting time available from the Orbiter, esti-
mated at 310 and 250 seconds for OMS and RCS respectively (Table 4.4-9)o
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Figure 4.4-31. Mid-Body Exit Oxidizer Figure 4.4-32. Mid-Body Exit Fuel Dump
Flowrate versus Accel-	 Flowrate versus Accel-
eration and Duct	 eration and Diameter
Diameter
Therefore, it may be possible to design the dump system for orbital dump within the
Orbiter thrusting time available, obviating the requirement for aft-directed dump for
settling, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.3. Impact of so designing the system was not
assessed.
Figure 4.4-32 gives LH2 dump system flowrate as a function of line diameter and
vehicle acceleration. A minimum lire diameter of 4.7 inches (11.9 cm) is required
for the 300-second RTLS dump. Orbital dump time is 310 seconds.
Tug performance differences for the baseline and mid-body alternatives are negligible.
Tug weight is slightly increased since the only significant difference forward of the
disconnects is a change from a 3/4-inch (1.9 cm) L0 2 topping line to a 2-inch (5.1 cm)
line for fill, drain and topping, increasing weight approximately 20 lb (9.1 kg).
Weights in the Orbiter-mounted portions of the lime are reduced an estimated 47 lb
(21.3 kg) so that payload performance is essentially the same. It was concluded that
either the baseline or the mid-body alternative are equally acceptable from the Tug
standpoint. The advantages of the mid-body exit appear to be 1) simplification of
Orbiter plumbing and interfaces, and 2) possible elimination of the requirement for
redirection of dumped propellant for orbital dump settling.
4.4.6 LINE PHYSICAL REQUIREMENTS. Final baseline Tug fluid systems and
associated fluid service equipment are shown schematically in Figure 4.4-33.
Selection of the basic system arrangement, line sizes, and specification was based
on the requirements and trade studies discussed above in conjunction with the addi-
tional analyses presented below. Detail design performance requirements at the
1307 panels derived from these trades and analyses are given in Tables 4.4-11 and
4.4-12. The selected diameters given are the diameters of the service lines forward
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Figure 4.4-33. Fluid System Schematic
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Table 4.4-11, Tug fluid Interface Requirements at Station 1307,
Oxidizer Panel
+ r
ENVIRONMENT LIMITS
DESIGN MAX INTERFACE DESIGN CONDITION
!02 PANEL FLOW RATE HEAT PRESS
_
TEMP C.F. AMBIENT
DIA,ONCHI ACTIVE MIN-MAX LEAK (
	
sial (R) FLOW PRESS TEMP PRESS
SELECTED RED DURING Ob•scc) (Btuhtr) MAX I MIN MAX MIN Ilblsaci (psial 4R) 4041)
1. FILL, DRAIN, DUMP 4.0
a.	 FILL 2.0 G 5.30 28,5 14.7 560 163 24.5 28.5 163.25 14.7
b. DRAIN 2 .0 G 30 - 285 14 . 7 560 163 24 . 5 19 9 163.25 14.7
c. ABORT 4RTLSI 4.0 G/A5/O 147 - 26,0 0 560 163 147 18,0 163,25 0
2. LEAKAGE VENT 0.75 ALL
a. FLANGES
h. PANEL PURGE
c. CONTAINMENT 0.008 16 0 560 180 0.008 1.0 180 0.8
3. TOPPING 0.75 0.75 G 0.152.0 55 35 0 560 163 2.0 33.6 162.7 14,7
4, HELIUM FILL 0.375 0.30 G 0.022 - 3,200 0 560 500 0.022 200 520 14.7
5. RTG WATER IN 015 0.5 G 2 60 0 560 520 2 60 520 14.7
6, RTG WATER OUT 05 0.5 G 2 50 0 680 600 2 59 600 14.7
7. RTG STEAM VENT 3.0 3,0 AS, O OD135 1.25 0 570 560 0.0135 725 560 0
ENVIRONMENT LIMITS
DESIGN MAX INTERFACE DESIGN CONDITIONL3}2 PANEL FLOW RATE HEAT PRESS	 TEMP I.F. AMBIENT
q IA (cm ► ACTIVE MIN-MAX LEAK (NIcm2 )	 (KI FLOW PRESS TEMP PRESS
SELECTED RED DURING (KU/sec) (watt)
_
MAX MIN	 MAX MIN (Kgls^c) fNlem2} (K) (Nlcm2)
1. FILL, DRAIN, DUMP 10,16
o. FILL 5,1 G 23.13.6 - 19.6 10.1 311 90.5 11.1 19.6 90.7 10.1b. DRAIN 5,1 G 13.6 - 19.6 10.1 311 90.5 11.1 ia1 90.7 10.1
c. ABORT (RTLSI -
1.9
10 , 16 GIASIO
ALL
I	 66.7 - 17. 9 0 311 90_5 66,7 1Z4 947 0
2. LEAKAGE VENT
a. FLANGES
b. PANEL PURGE
c. CONTAINMENT 40036 - 11.031 0 371 100 0,0626 0.67 100 455
3. TOPPING 1.9
-
1.9
_
G 407.0.09 16,1 24.1 0 311 50.5 0.09 23,2 90.38 10,1
4, HELIUM FILL 495 0.76 G 0.01 - 220-3 0 317 278 0.01 138 289 10.1
5, RTG WATER IN 1.27 1.27 G
G
CL9 - 41.4 0 311 289 49 41.4 288 10.1
6. RTG WATER OUT 1.27 1.27 0.9 - 34,5 0 378 333 0.9 34.5 333 10.1
7. RTG STEAM VENT 7.62 7.62 AS, O O.OD6 - 086 0 317 311 CLOGS 0,86 311 p
G = GROUND	 AS=ASCENT	 0 ORBIT
I`
i
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Table 4.4- 2. Tug Fluid Interface Requirements at Station 1307,
Fuel Panel
ENVIRONMENT LIMITS
DESIGN MAX INTERFACE DESIGN	 CONDITION
FLOW RATE HEAT PRESS TEMP I.F. AMBIENT
LH2 PANEL DIA (INCH) ACTIVE MIN-MAX LEAK ipsia) IR) FLOW PRESS TEMP PRESSMAX	 d71N MRX MINSELECTED REO DURING dh-scc) IBtufltrl o h/sec) Ipsia) IRI (psial
S. FILL, DRAIN, DUMP 5.0
1a,	 FILL 2.0 G 2.0.4.15 24 14.7 560 36 4,15 23.5 37.0 14.7
h. DRAIN 2.0 G 4.15 - 24 14.7 566 4.15 16.3 37.0 14.7
c. TOPPING 0.75 G 0.15025 350 24 14.7 560 36
136
0.25 235 37.0 14.7
d. ABORT DUMP 5.0 GlAS/0 25 24 0 560 36 125.0 17A 37.0 0
9. TANK VENT 3.0
PRELAUNCH VENT 3.0 G 025 23 74 560 140 0 25 t5.0 60.0 14.7
10. TANK RELIEF 2.5 25 AS/a/RE 0.144 - 20 0 1 560 40 p.144 15.7 75.0 0.25
11. LEAKAGE VENT 0.75 ALL
a. FLANGES 025
b. PANEL PURGE 0.5
c. CONTAINMENT 0.75 0.08 16.0 I 0 560 40 0.08 1.0 100 0.8
12, N2H4 FILL.DRAIN 0.375 0375 G OAS 0.05 251) 520 74.7
& RELIEF i
ENVIRONMENT LIMITS
DESIGN MAX i	 _INTERFACE DESIGN	 CONDITION
LH PANEL2
DIA . Icm)
SELECTED REO
FLOW RATE
ACTIVE	 I MIN-MAX
DURING i (Kglsccl
HEAT
LEAK
Iwatul
PRESS '
{Nlcm2)
TEMP
( K) FLOW
( K/secl
I.F.
PRESS
WcA
TEMP
(K)
AMBIENT
PRESS
(N/cm2)MAX MIN MAX IMIN
8. FILL, DRAIN, DUMP 127
I
1
I
a.	 FILL
b. DRAIN
51
5.7
I G	 0.91.1.86
G	 1.88
-
-
16.5
16.5
10.1
10.1
311
311
20
20
1.88
1.88
16.2
11.2
20.5
20.5
lal
10.1
c. TOPPING 1.9 G	 f	 0.07.0.11 102 16.5 10:1 311 20 all 15.2 20.5 141
d. ABORT DUMP 127 GlA5lO	 11.34 - 16.5 0 311 20 11.34 12.0 20.5 0
9. TANK VENT 7.6 f
PRELAUNCH VENT 7.6 (i all 15.4 10.1 311 22 10.9 33.3 10.1
10. TANK RELIEF 6.4 6.4 ASlO1RE (107 - 13.8 0 311 22 10.8 41.7 0.17
11. LEAKAGE VENT 1.9 ALL
a. FLANGES 0.64
b. PANEL PURGE 1.3
c. CONTAINMENT 1.9 80036 - 11.03 0 311 22 0.68 55.5 0.55
12. N2H4 FILL.DRAIN 495 0.95 G 10.023 - - 0 311 17.2 289 10.1
RELIEF
j 1 278 . 1 1
G= GROUND	 AS = ASCENT	 0 = ORBIT	 R£ = RETURN
^w
of the 1307 panels. The design condition data provided allows determination of
Orbiter service line design requirements for compatibility with Tug requirements.
This data should be interpreted as follows:
a. Orbiter-to-Tup, flow. The Orbiter should provide fluid at flowrate and pressure
equal to or greater than specified and a temperature equal to or less than
specified.
b. TLtg--to-Orbiter flow. The Orbiter should accept fluud at flowrate and tempera-
ture equal to or greater than specified at a pressure equal to or less than
specified.
f	 All design condition data are for an Orbiter/Tug acceleration of 1.0 g.
4.4.6. 1 L02 Fill, Drain, and Dump Line_. This line is sized by the RTLS abort
dump requirement, as discussed in Section 4.4.2.2. The Tug line diameter is 5.0
inches (12. 7 cm), including both halves of the disconnect, and the adapter line to the
1307 panel is 4.0 inches (10.2 cm) diameter. Design condition pressures were
determined as follows:
Fill
Tank pressure, psis (N/cm2)
Head pressure, psia (N/cm 2}
OP (1307 to tank) psia (N/cm2}
Total, psia (N/cm2)
Specified, psia (N/cm2
Drain
Tankressure	 2p ,psia (N/em )
Head pressure, psia (N/cm2)
AP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psia (N/cm2)
21.0 (14. 5) (max design)
7.2 (4.96) (full tank)
+0.2 (0.14)
28.4 (19.6)
28.5 (19.65)
16.0 psi (11) (vapor pressure)
+3.5 (2.4)	 (empty tank)
--0.2 (0.14)
19.3 (13.3)
3Dump
2Tank pressure, psia (N/cxn )
Head pressure, psia (N/cm 2)
AP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psis (N/cm. 2)
Specified, psia (N/em 2)
17.0 (11.7) (min regulated during dump)
+7.2 (4.96) (full tank)
-6.2 (4.3)
18.1 (12.5)
18.0 (12.4)
4.4.6.2 L_O2 Top in . A small-diameter (3/4 inch) (1.9 cm) vacuum jacketed
topping line was added to minimize propellant saturation pressure as discussed in
Section 4.4.4. Actual diameter selection was based on a 10 psi (6.9 N/cm 2) maxi-
mum pressure loss from the T-0 panel to the Tug tank at the level adjust flowrate
of 2.0 lb/sec (0.91 kg (sec). Design condition data specified is at the final level
adjust flowrate of 2.0 lb/sec (9.1 kg/sec). Interface pressure required was deter-
mined as follows:
Tank pressure, psis (N/cm 2
Head pressure, psis (N/cm2)
AP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psis (N/cm2)
Specified,	 2
	 psia (N/em )
21.0 (14.5) (max design)
7.2 (4.96) (full tank)
3.9 (2.7) (1307 to tank)
32.1 (22.1)
32.0 (22.1)
Maximum heat leak and temperature specified are compatible with the following
assumptions-
a. Vapor pressure at T-0 panel: 1.5.0 psia (10.3 N/cm 2)
b. Vapor pressure of LO2 topping flow arriving at Tug Tank: 15.5 psia
(10.7 N/cm2).
4.4.6.3 GO2 Vent. The GO2 Tent line exits the Orbiter through the mid-body. Since
it does not pass through the 1307 interface panels, data for the line is not given in
Table 4.4--9. The primary design requirement for the line was a maximum AP of 0.5
psi (0.35 N/cm 2) at thn maximum boiloff rate of 0.2 lb/sec (0.09 kg/sec) for com-
patibility with the tank saturation/ullage pressure of 15.5 psia (10.7 N/cm 2). Selected
line diameter is 2.0 inches (5.08 cu), resulting in a AP of 0.15 psi. (0.1 N/cm 2) at
the design condition.
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4.4.6.4 LH2
 Fill, Drain, Dump, and Topping. A single common line was selected
for all of these functions, as discussed in Section 4.4.4. The line diameter selected
to satisfy the abort dump requirement is 4.0 inches (10.2 cm), as discussed in Section
4.4.2.2, from the 1307 panel to the Tug tank. Design condition data pressures were
determined as follows:
Fill and Topping
Tank	 2pressure, psia (N/cm )
Head pressure, psia (N/cm 2
AP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psia (N/cm2)
Specified, psia (N/cm 2}
Drain
Tank pressure, psia (N/cm2)
Head pressure, psia (N/cm 2)
AP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psia (N/cm2)
Specified, psia (N/cm`^)
Dump
Tank pressure, psia (N/cm2)
I
Head pressure, psia (N/cm 2)
IMP, psia (N/cm2)
Total, psia (N/cm2
Specified, psia (N/cm2
22.5 (15.5) (max design)
0.9 (0.62) (full tank)
0.07 (0.05) (negligible topping)
23.47 (16. 2)
23.5 (16.2)
16.0 (13.03) (vapor pressure)
+0.45 (0.31) (tank empty)
-0. j7 (0.05)
16.38 (11.20)
16.3 (11.2-t)
18.5 (12.75) (min regulated during dump)
+0.9 (0.62) (tank full)
--2.54 (1.75)
16.86 (11.62)
17.0 (11.72)
R
Maximum heat leak and tempex-ature specified are compatible with the following
assumptions:
a. Vapor pressure at T--u panel during topping: 15.0 psia (X0.3 N/cm2)
b. Vapor pressure of LH2 topping flow arriving at Tug tank: 16.0 psia (11. 03 N/cm2)
4-221
4.4.6.5 LH2
 Tank Vent. This vent exits the vehicle through a connection at the T-0
panel to ground disposal facilities. The primary design_ requirement was for a pres-
sure drop of 0.5 psi (0.34 N/cm 2) maximum at the maximum bailoff rate of 0.25
lb/sec (0.11 kg/sec), for compatibility with 2 tank saturation pressure of 16.0 (x1.03
N/cm2 ). T-0 interface pressure assume] was 15.0 (10.3 N/cm 2). The selected line
diameter results in a maximum dP from Tug tank to the T-0 panel of 0.3 psi (0.2
N/cm2 ) ind a calculated exit Mach no. of 0.06. The 1307 interface pressure speci-
fied was determined as follows:
Taub; pressure, Asia (N/cm2)
2AP, psia (N/cm)
Total specified, psia (N/cm2)
16.0 (11.03) (saturation pressure)
0.2 (0.14)
15.8 (10.9)
4.4.6.6 LH2 Tank Relief. This line vents the tank at, all times after launch. It
was assumed to exit the Orbiter through the top of the vertical tail. A line diameter
of 2.5 inches (6.35 cm) was selected. t this diameter is maintained to the vertical
tail exit, maximum AP is 1.0 psi (0.67 N/cm 2) at a flowrate of 0.22 lb/sec (0. 1
kg/sec), twice the predicted steady-state boiloff rate for an aborted flight landing
with a full LH2
 tank. This presumes a failure of the abort dump system. AP at
twice the maximum predicted flight boiloff rate is 0.4 psi (0.28 N/cm 2). Interface
pressure for the flight vent case was determined as follows:
Tank pressure, psia (N/cm2) 	 16.0 (11.03) (saturation-pressure)
AP, psia (N/cm2)	 0.22 (1.5) (tank to 1307 panel)
Total, psia (N/cm2)	 15.78 (10.9)
Specified, psia (N/cm2)	 15.7 (10.8)
4.4.6.7 Leakage Vents. These lines collect all leakage and conduct it to the T-0
panels for disposal. The condition that sizes the vent lines is vent-down of the leak-
age containment membrane during ascent as the payload bay pressure drops rapidly.
To limit the maximum LAP across the membranes to 0.1 (0.7 N/cm2 ) a diameter of
0.75 inch (1.9 cm) was required for both the LH2 and the LO2 membranes. The
maximum AP occurs 80 seconds after launch where the ambient pressure is 0.8
psia (0.55 N/cm2).
4.4.6.8 Helium- rill. This line provides for charging and discharging the helium
storage mottles in both the Tug and the Tug deployment adapter. Quantities are as
follows:
Adapter:	 61 lb (27.7 kg)
Tug:	 20 lb (9.1 kg)
4-222
For an assumed one-hour charge time requirement, a flow rate of 0. 022 lb/sec
(0. 01 kg/sec) is required. For the 3/8 (0.95 cm) tubing selected, pressure loss dur-
ing charging at the one-hour rate is 2.5 (1.7 N/cm2 ) allowing adequate margin for
higher rate charging if desired.
4.4.6.9 Hydrazine Relief. This line provides N2 H4 dump capability to relieve AP
bottle overpressure due to N2 H4 decomposition.. At the nominal tank pressure of 300
(206 N/cm2 ) theentire load of N2 H4 could be dumped in 1.5 minutes through the
selected 3/8 inch (0.95 cm) line through a connection at the T--0 panel. The design
condition data shown is for this condition. _j
1. 5 ENVIRONMENTAL INTERFACE
The Tug and its payload must be capable of surviving in the environment of the pay:nad
bay; conversely, the Tug must not produce an environmental condition that can ad-
\ersel: effect the Orbiter or payload. This subtask assessed the environmental inter-
face using the NASA--supplied baseline Tug and payload environmental requirements
from the IUS/Tug Payload Requirements Compatibility Study. Thermal, contamination,
and acoustic environments were considered. Trade studies were conducted to estab-
iish compatible ground conditioning specifications and Orbiter payload bay conditioning
control requirements for baseline Tug. Special emphasis was placed on analyzing
potential contamination sources and determining their effect on the Space Tug/
Spacecraft.
4. 5. 1 TIIERNIAL CONTROL. The most significant thermal control interface consid-
eration for the Tug in the Orbiter payload bay involved the prelaunch conditioning of the
Tug and spacecraft to provide an acceptable thermal environment. The operational
conditioning gas temperature and flow envelope wrs defined, which was compatible with
both Tub; rind spacecraft requirements. The Tu; mounting-point worst-case tempera-
ture conditions were also established for all the separate modes of vehicle operation.
It was found that no Tug design impaci was caused by mounting-point temperature
extremes.
-l. 5. 1. 1 Prelaunch Conditioning. The analysis of prelaunch conditioning requirements
in the Or ilAter payload bay was begun with a review of the SSPD data (Reference 4. 5-1)
to determine the temperature limit extremes required for each spacecraft when mated
to Tug. The data on Figure 4. 5-1 show the all-inclusive temp rature band for the
spacecraft limit temperatures to be between 59F and 69F (288K and 294K) in the worst
case for four of the 50 payloads. This band is acceptable for all SSPD Tug payloads,
and for simplicity can be specified for temperature control of all spacecraft.
Tne predicted power dissipation characteristics of each payload in the prelaunch mode
were determined from the level B SSPD data (Figure 4. 5-1). Data are unavailable for
approximately half of the spacecraft for prelaunch; however, the maximum power use
indicated is 560 watts for payload AS-20-A. A review of total power requirement
shows three payloads will use 5000 watts of power when operational (data not available
for prelaunch for these spacecraft).
A Tug/spacecraft thermal analysis of the effect of spacecraft power dissipation on
nitrogen p,irge gas heating was conducted to establish the possible effect of self heating
on the average spacecraft purge environment. For this purpose a parametric analysis
of the worst-case purge gar, temperature rise was run as a function of power dissipa-
tion and purge flow rate. The data are shown in Figure 4. 5-2. The maximum tem-
perature rise for the worst-case prelaunch power dissipation given is only 1.3F (0.7K)
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Figure 4. 5-1. Spacecraft Prelaunch Power and Temperature Requirements
for Tug-Mounted Payloads in Payload Bay
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Figure 4. 5-2. Purge Gas Temperature
Rise Due to Spacecraft
Heating
for a purge flew as low as 100 lb/min
(45. 5 kg/min). This is an insignificant
amount, and heating of the purge gas by
spacecraft power dissipation can be
disregarded.
The -.najor prelaunch conditioning analy-
sis concerned the determination of gase-
ous nitrogen (GN2) purging requiren^ nts
to provide the Space Tug with an accept-
alble prelaunch environment. In accord-
ance with JSC 07700 (Reference 4.5--2).
The Orbiter payload bay GN2 ground
purging capability is:
Figure 4. 5-3. Orbiter Ground Purge,
Distribution System
The configuration of the Orbiter purge distribution system is shown in Figure 4. 5-3.
Thn Space Tug is oriented in the aft por-
tion of the payload bay, facing forward,
with the spacecraft mounted to the end of
Tug located nearest the purge manifold.
The present configuration of the purge
distribution system contains a main purge
manifold plus three optional stub outlets
from the main distribution line. For the
analysis conducted in this study, the
optional stub outlets were not used. As
the detailed thermal characteristics of
Tug subsyc+eras become defined, it may
be necessary to use conditioning flow
frown one or more of the stub outlets to
satisfy specified hardware conditioning
requirements.
An evenly► distributed purge flow was assumed around the annulus between the Tug and
payload bay liner. GN2 purge gas flowed from the purge manifold to the aft portion of
the payload bay. The design of the purge outlets was such that flow up to 115 lb/min
(52.3 kg/min) left the payload bay through check valves at the aft bulkhead. till flow
great :r than 115 lb/min (52.3 kg/min) left the bay through the sidewall vents at Sta-
tion 128. The heat transfer characteristics of the propellant tanks during ground hold
conditions were extrapolated from actual test data obtained by General Dynamics
Convair (Reference 4.5-3) on a test configuration nearly identical to that of Space Tug
baseline (Reference 4.5-4).
The Tug prelaunch conditioning analysis was conducted parametrically to define the
temperature drop of the GN2 purge gas and the Tug shell as a function of purge flow
rate and temperature. The purge gas temperature drop was calculated by performing
an iterative nodal energy balance on the flow stream and propellant tanks. The Tug
shell minimum temperature was determined for fully developed turbulent flow using
Colburn's equation to establish the local heat transfer coefficient. 	 a results of the
study are shown in Figures 4.5-4 through 4.5-6. The exit tempe 	 ee of the nitrogen
purge gas is a function of both the initial gas temperature and flow rate. For a nominal
initial gas temperature of 70F (294K) and the maximum flow rate of 364 lb/min
lfi5 4 7,,/ i	 +h xha" t as tem eratur,m is 45F (279 4K) at the Station 1128 vent
and 12F (262.2K) at the Station 1307 vent. The minimum Tug shell temperature under
the same flow conditions was -33F (237. 2K).
Spacecraft requirements were reviewed to determine the parametric constraints to be
used in purge gas thermal analyses for Tug conditioning durin g prelaunch tanking.
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Temperature at	 Temperature at
	
Station 1128 Vent	 Station 1307 Vent
Temperature and humidity limit require-
ments were determined from the NASA/
MSFC SSPDA document published in
July 1974, for the 50 Space Tug payloads.
Temperature limit data as previously
indicated showed a common max/min
temperature limit band between 59F
(288K) and 69F (294K), with a maximum
relative humidity requirement of 0 per-
cent for some spacecraft and values up
to 95 percent for others. No minimum
limits were given, L e. , 0 percent rela-
tive hu taidity is apparently acceptable
for all spacecraft.
GNZ PURGE GAS FLOW RATE, LBIMIN, IKGIMINI	 To preclude condensation of moisture on
payload bay, purge nitrogen is required
Figure 4.5-6. Minimum Shell
	 with a dewpoint below that of anticipated
Temperature Tanked	 surface temperatures. As shown in
During Prelaunch Purge
	
Figure 4. 5-7, a purge rate of 120 to 140
lb per minute (54.5 to 63. 6 kg/minute)
is required for purge nitrogen having a dewpoint of -76F (213K). For gas with a
-45F (231X) dewpoint, 230 to 280 lb per minute( 104. 5 to 127.3 kg/minute) flow is
4-227
120
(320)
105
90
(300)
75
60
45 L
0(280)
2
LL
..J
aaaU
w
r
a
W
W
o-
n
w
z
a
en
w
cn
n
z
CM
(213) 1231) (230) K SHELL TEMPERATURE (DEWPOINT LIMITS)
•76	 -45 •32F
RECOMMENDED
SPACE TUG
OPERATIONAL
ENVELOPE
(DEWPOINT •76F)
PAYLOAD TEMP
REaUIREMENTS	 NNEEZZI/
100	 200	 300	 364
(0)	 (50)	 (100)	 1150)
GN 2
 PEJRGE GAS FLOW CAPABILITY, LB/M IN, (KG/MIN)
Figure 4. 5-7. Prelaunch Conditioning; Maximum Flow Through 1307 Bulkhead is
115 lb/min (52.3 kg/min); Remainder Exhausted Through
Side Vents
required, and for gas with a dewpoint as high as -32F (238K), the flow rate require-
ment is beyond the present Orbiter capability of 364 lb per minute (165.4 kg/minute).
Relative humidity for purge gas with dewpoints such as these is, for all intents,
0 percent. and can only be measured in terms of parts per million, grains per lb, or
dewpoints in the negative F range. Condensation and frost formation will result if
purge gas with anyting over a fractional part of I percent relative humidity is used
with a cryo upper stage for the prelaunch tanking period.
4.5.1.2 Fitting/Shell Temperatures, Analysis of the maximum and minimum tem-
perature extremes has been made for the Tug/Orbiter attachment fittings and Tug
shell for fotir separate modes of operation: prelaunch, orbit-doors open, orbit-doors
clo. qnd entry/landing. The analysis was performed to determine any design im-
pact	 ged b; the predicted fitting temperature extremes.
The Tug plus deployment adapter is attached at two points along each side of the
Shuttle cargo bay below the door hinge and at two points on the bottom centerline of
'the cargo bay. Ground prelaunch attachment fitting temperatures are rased on the
temperature of the purge GN2. An on-orbit preconditioning period is planned for
Shuttle before entry so that the attachment fittings will not exceed 170F (350K) at
i	 -
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entry and landing. Minimum entry temperatures occur when the Tug returns with the
LH2 tank full, after having been on orbit with the doors closed. The surface a/E = 1.6
and E = 0.8 for a 6--hour fixed attitude and 3-hour barbeque mission profile, respec-
tively. Maximum fitting temperatures with the doors closed are equal to maximum
predicted Shuttle structure temperatures with the Tug propellant tanks empty. Mini--
mum fitting temperatures are less than minimum predicted Shuttle structure tempera-
tures when cryogens are in the MLI insulated Tug tanks. The temperature limits of
the Tug shell during prelaunch are determined by the GN2 purging conditions. The
inflight limits are established as described above. The location of the Tug primary and
alternative ( point 2) mounting attachment fittings is shown in Figure 4.5--8.
e6h	 TUG STATION	 1181 1246
1	 2	 3
®5	 W4
I	 r
i
^.5
9
	 2	 3
MISSION PHASE
MAXI 7UM/MINI?&UM TEMPERATURES, F (K)
1 2 3 4 5 SHELL
PRELAUNCH 1201+45 1201.42 1201.76 1201.42 1201+45 12006
(3221280) (3221232) (32212131 (3221232) (322/2801 (3221213)
ON-ORBIT- DOORS OPEN 2501-85 2501.05 2501.85 1051-185 1201-140 2501.168
(3941208) (3941208) (3941208) (3141164) (3221178) (3941162)
ON-ORBIT- DOORS CLOSED 101. 193 371-194 501. 118 1061. 165 120/140 1131-183
12611148) (2761153) (2631191) (3141164) (3221178) (3181193)
ENTRY AN 
	 LANDING 1701.180 1701. 181 1701. 113 1401. 162 1401-137 170010
(3501149) (35011551 (3501193) (3331166) (3331179) (3501194)
Figure 4. 5-8. Attachment Fitting and Shell Temperature Extremes
The Tug shell temperatures were calculated for worst-case extreme conditions on the
shell. The predicted maximum and minimum temperature extremes are also shown
in Figure 4.5-8. A rather wide variation in fitting and shell temperatures is pre-
dicted for the various Orbiter modes of operation. These extremes, particularly the
low values, require special attention in the selection of materials for attachment
fittings, but generally the materials are well within the present state of the art. The
Tug deployment adapter shell is of epoxy graphite composite construction, which is
compatible with a very wide range of temperatures. It is recommended that the
attachment fitting designs incorporate the use of materials such as titanium and,
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possibly, multiphase alloy MP35N, which are compatible with the anticipated low
temperature extremes. Deta , '.ed definition of the attachment design requirements is
contained in Section 4.2.3. Based on the combined thermal and structural analyses.
there appears to be no Tug design impact caused by temperature extremes.
4. 5.2 CONTAMINATION CONTROL. Ground and flight operational procedures and
facilities for the Space Tug and its payload were reviewed to determine potential con-
tamination sources and contamination control requirements. To provide the greatest
degree of assurance for mission success from a sensitivity to contamination standpoint,
all elements of the space transportation system (STS) must be guarded against the five
major types of contaminants: particulates, volatile condensable materials, hydro-
carbons, moisture and nonvolatile residue. All, in one way or another, can cause
system malfunction, degradation of component life or reliability through corrosion or
wear, optical interference, and possible explosion or fire.
4.5.2, 1 Ground Operations. During ground operations as depicted by Figure 4. 5-9.
contamination can occur during transport, handling. maintenance and mating with
spacecraft or Orbiter; from ambient or induced environments, dirty surfaces, system
venting. leakage, or material outgassing.
PROCESSING
ar, TOW	 ORBITER	 VAB TRANSPOR T O IN
SHUTYLE ON MLF
FACILITY
ORBITER
LANDING ;icyLJ5AFE &
SAEF NO. 1	 UNLOADTUG-SIC
TUGS /C DEMATE
LOAD
T{1GS/C L,^ ^- -	 LAU	 FINC	 PAO
TUG REFURB
TUG PREP&
CLEAN
	
- _+^TUG/SPACECRAFT
TRANSPORT
INSTALL IN
OR7UG•S1C TFIROUGH PCR
MATE
r
l
Figure 4. 5-9. Typical. Space Tug Ground Flow Sequence
Contamination requirements for Tug payloads (spacecraft), obtained from SSPDA
documEntation, were compared with the various Shuttle user agency requirements.
Spacecraft requirements, Table 4. 5-1, vary from 100 to 100, 000 particles per cubic
foot (3531 to 3, 531,470 particles/m3) for the 130 examples shown.
Purity of prelaunch conditioning purge gas is specified in the MSFC, DOD and JSC
documents shown in Table 4.5-2, and varies by two orders of magnitude.
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Table 4. 5-1. Spacecraft Cleanliness Requirements
t
Requirements
Cleanliness Class,
(partiel^s/ft3)
(particles/M3)
Spacecraft
Total 4 100 (3531)
Quantity
6 5, 000 (176, 573)
From
23 10, 000 (353, 147)
SSPD 67 1.00, 000 (3, 531., 470)
Data 24 TBD6 N/A
Table 4.5-2. Purge Gas Cleanliness
Requirements
Cleanliness Class,
(part icles/ft3)
(particles/M3)
Payload Bay
DOD 7-15-73 100, 000 (3, 531, 470)
MSFC PD 73-1 10, 000 (353, 147)
JSC 07700 100 Nom 5, 000 Guar
(3531 Nom 176,373 Guar)
ICSC Payload 10, 000 (353, 147)
Processing Facility
Definitions of these cleanliness levels are:
Class 100, 000 is a nominal cleanliness level for assembly operations, but is
inadequate for maintenance of spacecraft surface cleanliness if the purge is con-
tinued fer more than an hour or so.
Class 10, 000 purge is a good, clean environment, adequate for 92 percent of the
spacecraft in the mission model, and is available at existing 	 facilities for
vehicle maintenance and refurbishment, and spacecraft mating. (Manned Space-
craft Operations and Checkout Building, MSDB, and the Spacecraft Assembly and
Encapsulation Facility, SAEF #1.)
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Class 100 purge is a highly controlled, small volume condition necessary for
preparation of highly contamination-sensitive spacecraft but is impractical for
large maintenance facilities and mating operations.
Contamination can best be controlled through application of three separate and distinct
control methods: Design, Controlled Environment Purge, and Surface Cleaning.
Design. All elements of the STS must be designed to minimize outgassing, through use
of approved minimum outgassing materials only. To prevent contamination from
vehicle system venting and leakage, it is recommended that all tank vents be ducted
overboard from the Orbiter, employing purge envelopes to contain such contaminants.
0.1
	
Controlled Environmental Purge. To prevent buildup of surface contamination and
maintain existing cleanliness, Class 10, 000 environmental purge is recommended for
all facilities used during ground operation, for all GSE ground operations, and for the
Orbiter payload bay. Class 10, 000 is a good, clean environment for 92 percent of the
spacecraft in the mission model, and is available at existing KSC facilities for vehicle
maintenance and refurbishment, spacecraft mating, and Orbiter mating. To provide
maximum confidence in a Class 10, 000 environment or better, Class 100 (two orders
of magnitude cleaner) air is supplied to the cleanroom facilities noted, including the
Iaunch pad payload changeout room.
Surface Cleaning. Cleaning and inspection of all STS elements should be done just be-
fore mating, at the completion of maintenance and refurbishment functions for the
Orbiter and Tug, and at the completion of flight preps for the spacecraft. Sui-Laces
should be cleaned to a visibly clean, Level 300A condition for compatibility with the
Class 10. 000 environmental purge. For spacecraft ( g
 percent) with more stringent
cleanliness requirements (Surface level 100 or 10, Purge Class 5000 or 100), the
spacecraft sponsor should clean to his own required surface cleanliness level, and
spacecraft shrouds or component covers should be provided to maintain cleanliness.
Study recommendations for prelaunch/postlanding contamination control are sum-
marized in Figure 4. 5-10.
A special analysis was made of Tug fluid venting sources to determine the extent of
potential contamination of the spacecraft environment in the Orbiter cargo bay. All
propellant boiloff and tank leakage is captured and ducted overboard, and pose no
spacecraft contamination hazard. The major potential fluid contamination source is
the helium purge gas used for multilayer insulation (MLI) conditioning before propel-
lant tanking. The helium gas will be vented into the Tug cavity between the propellant
tanks. Purging will occur for 15 minutes before propellant tanking, at which time the
vent will be closed. from this time until liftoff, the only source of additional helium
will be any leakage from the MLI purge bags. During all grounc4 operations when
helium is present in the MLI, the cargo bay of the Orbiter will be purged with gaseous
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CONTAMINANT
SPECIFICATION SOURCE
JsC	 MSFC	 DOD
07700	 PD-73.1	 7.15.73
RECOMMENDATION
PAYLOAD BAY ENVIR PURGE
PARTICULATES 100/5,000	 10,000	 700,000 10,000
VCM —	 2 x 10.13 L8/LB 2 x 10.9 LB/LB
HYDROCARBONS 15 PPM	 ---	 — 15 PPM
HUMIDITY 1 GR/LB
	
11 PPM	 -40 DEG F (DP) 11 PPM
1-
LL
106 [	 LEVEL 300r^I.EANLINESS
SURFACE CLEANLINESS
-^	 104PARTICULATES VISIBLY CLEAN	 LEVEL 300 v	 VISIBLY CLEANNVR —	 TB0	 LEVELA
Q	 702
a	 1	 10	 100	 390	 1,00
2	 PARTICLE SIZE {MICRONS)
VENTING (TUG & SPACECRAFT) —	 iI	 — GHe & GN2 INTO SAY, OTHERS
OVERBOARD
OUTGASSING 1%MTL LOSS	 V,
	
— L'SE APPROVED MATERIALS
0.1;6 VCM
LEAKAGE NEGLIGIBLE CONTAMINANT LEAKAGE
INTO BAY ( PURGE SAGS CONTAIN
LEAKAGES & DUCT OVERBOARD)
k^,
I
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Figure 4.5--10. Contamination Control Recommendations
nitrogen (GN2). The GN2 purge will be
introduced at the forward end of the
cargo bay, flow past the spacecraft and
Tug and exit from the aft end of the
cargo bay (see Figure 4. 5-11). Mini-
mum GN 2 flow rate with the Tug in the
cargo bay is 140 lb per minute (63. 6
kg/min) .
Figure 4. 5--11.
	 Model for Analvsis of
Potential Spacecraft A worst-case static (no GN 2 flow) analy-
Contamination Due to sis was performed to determine the
Space Tug Helium maximum possible rate of diffusion of
Venting helium from the Tug intertank area to
the Tug/spacecraft interface.	 The rate
was established as approximately 0. 0005 pound per minute (0.00023 kg/min). 	 It is
readily apparent that helium in any significant quantity will not reach the interface
with GN2 purge in operation. During ascent, conditioning gases venting from the
spacecraft will also prevent any inflow of the surrounding environment. Therefore, it
is concluded that no contamination of the spacecraft environment will be caused by
venting of the MLI helium purge gas into the cargo bay.
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4. 5.2.2 Flight Operations. Inflight contamination can result from a variety of
sources including fluids venting, materials outgassing, transfer of contaminants from
cargo bay surfaces, and Orbiter APS thruster exhaust impingement. Venting of fluids
from the Grbiter and Tug should be directed away from the payload and/or inhibited
during periods when contamination potential is highest, such as during deployment and
retriev'yI operations. Outgassmg problems can be minimized by proper choice of
materials. Maintenance of required cargo bay cleanliness levels and installation of a
cargo bay liner to minimize exposed surface areas and contaminant collection points
will reduce surface transfer contamination.
Orbiter x.eS thruster contamination can be held at acceptable levels by use of forward
firing thrusters to separate Orbiter from the Tug following RMS release. Exact posi-
tioning of the Tug for the separation maneuver is a function of the desired separation
distance and time before activating the Tug APS or main propulsion systems. Fig-
Lire 4. 5-12 illustrat%6 +-he time to achieve one-mile (1609 m) separation by firing three
forward-facing 900 lbf (4003N) Orbiter
thrusters until the 95 percent flux line
ORRITERICARGOSEPARATIO N	 intercepts the payload for the three Tug
and payload positions illustrated. The
1
3	 minimum separation time is achieved by
position 3. Rotation of the payload past95'. MASS
FLUX LINE y	 the 30 degree (7r/6 rad) position (num--
3 FORWA Q O	 ber 3) to the Z axis is undesirable due to72 DEG
T BUSTERS	 py(0.4nRAOf.	 -300EG	 reduced h sical clearance with the7HRUS	 f	
In/6AT9aRL6f	 Orbiter vertical stabilizer. Determina-14003NJ
tion of a minimum safe separation
POSITOON	 SEPARATION VELOCITY 
APPROXIMATE
	
velocity and distance required before
j	 1	 5.5 f7!5EC 0.60 MISECJ
	 16.0 MIN activation Of Tug APS or main engine
2	 8	 (7 47.5 FTISEC 	MISECJ
	 13.5 MIN
	
ignition is
	 before performing3	 3	 6.1 FTISJC f^ 47 M7SEC)
	
11.0 MIN	 ^	 necessary
	
	 g
further evaluation of separation
Figure 4. 5-12. Firing Three 900-lbf
	 techniques.
(4003N) Thrusters Until
k
95 Percent Flux Line
	 4. 5.3 VIBRATION AND ACOUSTICS.
E	 Intercepts Payload	 As with all launch vehicles, the Shuttle
induces a significant vibration and
acoustic environment. This task investigated Tug plus payload dynamic response and
compared Orbiter and payload acoustic environments.
A combined Tug/Orbiter/payload structural dynamics analysis was beyond the scope
of this study and is not advisable until a more detailed definition of both Tug and
Orbiter characteristics become available. However, a preliminary analysis of Tug-
forced response characteristics due to the Shuttle liftoff transient was made. The
acoustic environmental requirements of tug payloads were compared with the Orbiter
conditions. Requirements for additional sound suppression were noted and some pre-
liminary recommendations made.
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4. 5.3. 1 Dynamic Response, Both modal and forced response analyses were con-
ducted on candidate Tug/Orbiter support arrangements (determinate. load balanced,
and redundant). The analyses showed that four Z and two Y supports are required to
maintain adequate Tug/Orbiter clearance. The details of the analyses are contained
in Section 4.2.3 of this report.
4.5.3.2 Acoustic Response. A preliminary evaluation was made of Orbiter payload
sensitivity to acoustical noise. The NASA/MSFC payload description document (Ref-
erence 4. 5-5) was reviewed to determine applicable spacecraft and their acoustic-
limits in terms of overall sound pressure level. These data with the SSPD payload
dest.ciptors are shown in Table 4. 5-3. Figure 4. 5-13 shows the estimated acoustic
environment of the Orbiter payload bay during liftoff. It was determined from Rockwell
International (Reference 4. 5--6) that aerodynamic noise at maximum dynamic pressure
(q) flight conditions would be lower than liftoff noise. Because of its more recent
development, the acoustic environment described by Figure 4. 5-13 was used for anal-
ysis in lieu of that shown in Figure 4-6 of "Space ShuUle System Payload Accommoda-
tions," JSC 07700, Volume XIV, Revision C, datbd 3 July 1974.
Referring to Table 4.5-3 it was noted that, based on overall sound pressure level,
the acoustic limits of 50 of the 78 defined payload it+ams were less than the level of the
estimated environment. Furthermore, the acoustic., limits of 39 of the 50 items were
6 dB or more (acoustic power ratio of 4) below the environmental acoustic Ievel
(Figure 4. 5-14). Hence, at this point it was suggested that 50 payload items will
require Further evaluation with respect to their acoustic Iimits, and that a significant
percentage of the 39 items might require attention from the design and/or installation
standpoints. Although tentative warnings have been given of the acoi.fstie sensitivity
of 64 percent of the payload items, it was worthwhile to examine the premises upon
which the above warnings were based. First, indication of an acoustic limit without
definition of an allowable exposure time was meaningless. For example, a payload
item with a limit of 142 dB may fail in an 150 dB environment only after exposure for
30 minutes. On the other hand, failure could occur in 1 second. The allowable expo-
sure time of a particular itein to the ambient acoustic environment of the orbiter pay-
load bay, therefore, must be considered relative to the required life of the item.
Next, the definition of an acoustic limit in terms of overall sound pressure level,
per se, has little significance. For example, the response of an elastic mass (pay-
load item) to a broadband random forcing function (acoustic pressures) becomes sig-
nificant only at frequencies where there is effective coupling and an efficient transfer
of energy to the elastic mass. These frequencies are the resonant frequencies of the
elastic mass and only the energy within narrow frequency bands around the resonant
frequencies, generally described by the one-half power points, does any useful work.
A payload item -% ith an acoustic limit of 140 dB, as described previously, would be
considered unacceptable under the present ground rules in a 150-dB environment.
However, if this item were sensitive to noise only at a frequency of 4000 Hz, reference
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Table 4.5--3. Summarized NASA Payload Description Level A Data
SSPD Acoustic SSPD Acoustic SSPD Acoustic
Payload Limit (dB) Payload Limit (dB) Payload Limit (dB)
AP-01-A 146 EO-07-A 150 OP-03-A 1.:30
AP-02-A 146 EO-08-A 150 OP-04-A 150
AP-03-A 146 EO-09-A 150 OP-05-A 150
AP-04-A 146 EO-10--A 150 OP--06-A 150
AP-05-A 138 EO-12-A 145 OP-07--A 150
AP-06--A 145 EO-56-A 150 OP•-51-A TBD
AP-07-A 145 EO-57-A 150 PL-01-A 135
AP-08-A 145 EO-58--A 150 PL-02-A 135
AS-01-A 140 EO-59-A 150 PL--03-A 142
AS-02-A 140 EO-61-A 150 PL-07-A 135
AS-03-A 120 EO--62-A 150 PL-08-A 135
AS-05-A 140 HE-01-A 140 PL-09-A 135
AS-07-A 140 HE-03-A 140 PL-10-A TBD
AS-11-A 140 HE-05-A 140 PL-11-A 142
AS--13-A 120 HE-07-A 140 PL-12-A 135
AS--14--A 120 HE-08-A 151 PL-13-A 142
AS- 16-A 142 HE-09-A 151 PL-14-A 135
AS-17-A 140 HE-10-A 140 PL-15-A 135
CN-51-A 150 HE,-11-A 140 PL-16-A 135
CN-52-A 150 HE-12--A 142 PL-13-A 135
CN-53-A 150 LS-02--A 148 PL-19-A 135
CN-54-A 150 LU-01-A 135 PL-20-A 135
CN-55-A 150 LU-02-A 135 PL-22-A 142
CN-56-A 150 LU-03-A 135 SO-02-A 140
CN-58-A 150 LU-04-A 135 SO-03--A TBD
CN-59-A 150 OP-01-A ? 50 SP 01.-A 145
CN-60-A 150 OP-02-•A 150 ST-01-A 145
a
4-236
d
OCTAVF. PASS BANDS IHz1
45	 90	 1130	 155	 710 1.4a02,8005,500 11,2013
C Datafram RI InternaI Letter I
SSP/V&A•74•84,
12 Jul 74
,.I 15[
OCTAVE
^
/^.	 ^OVerall
BAND ta0`	 Acoustic OVERALL 14CSOUND EnvironlTtentPRESS UntPRESS M SOUND
LEVFL tso , PRESSURE1
LEVEL 1311(d9I
G2 	 125	 250	 500 1,0a0 2.0 04.000 B 4O00	 ; lit
•	 .,^5 . 	t	 ^ 	 5.	 ^	 7	 6
100	 1,40n	 10.000
FREQUENCY IHtI 1{7(
OVERALL
ACOUSTIC
ENVIRONMENT
14'=: OF PAYLOADS
504, OF PAYLOADS
	Figure 4. 5-13. Estimated Orbiter Payload 	 Figure 4.5-14. Payload Acoustic
	
Bay Acoustic Environment 	 Limit
at Liftoff
to Figure 4. 5-13 shows by inspection that there would be no problem. However, if the
sensitivity were at 63 Hz, there could very well be a problem. Thus, to define the
acoustic limit of a payload item, the spectral characteristics of its noise sensitivity
must be compared with the spectral distribution of the noise field in the payload bay
of the orbiter. Time of exposure at resonance then becomes a meaningful parameter
upon which to base an evaluation.
An evaluation was made of the estimate of the acoustical environment in the payload
bay of the Orbiter. Thp procedure in estimating the acoustical environment was to
subtract the estimated acoustic attenuation of the payload bay structural enclosure
from the estimated external sound pressure levels (Reference 4, 5--7). Based on past
experience, including a comprehensive and detailed review of the repeatability of
actual noise measurements on launch vehicles at liftoff, it wa ,_ considered tb,: t the
reliability of estimated external sound pressure levels at liftoff is no better than ±5 dB
(Deference 4. 5-8).
The analysis of interior noise levels by RI (Reference 4. 5--9) was straightforward, and
it was freely noted that there were areas that are questionable due to as-yet unresolved
problems; e. a., the final design of the cargo bay doors, which involves the radiator
configuration. The following commente are in no way to be construed as criticisms,
but merely relate to some details of the analysis that could influence the results to a
significant degree. The assumption of a +6 dB per octave mass law transmission loss
(TL) above resonance applies to a plane wave at normal incidence and is highly opti-
mistic. Extensive Convair test data on a wide variety of structural panels indicates
that for random incidence a +4 dB per octave TL is more realistic. The assumed TL
of -6 dB per octave below resonance is theoretical and largely unsubstantiated. Below
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resonance, in the stiffness controlled regime of the cargo bay structure, the volume	 p
stiffness of the enclosure has a significant effect on the acoustic transmission loss and
could establish a limiting value. It was assumed that the cargo bay was empty. This
provides highly diffuse conditions, which will exist only at high frequencies when a
large payload volume is carried in the bay. A more precise noise reduction analysis
should consider characteristic dimensions of the residual cargo bay volume, with a
payload 'installed, relative to acoustic wavelengths. In conclusion, based on presently
available information, it appears premature to penalize either payload items or the
cargo bay structure to achieve compatibility between them from the acoustical
standpoint.
It is recommended that more detailed data be developed for questionable payload items.
The acoustic analysis of the payload bay must be refined and structural transmission
loss test data be obtained for representative elements of the payload bay enclosure.
Noise reduction measurements should be made on a full-scale payload bay enclosure
with a dummy payload installed and the acoustic compatibility of payload items
reevaluated.
t
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	 4. 6 AVIONICS INTERFACES
Avionics interfaces between Tug and its operating environment are of both a functional
and physical nature and consist of 1) hardwired interfaces between the Tug vehicle, its
deployment adapter, the Orbiter, ground operations, and the Tug payload; and 2) RF
communication links interfacing the Tug with Orbiter and ground equipment when the
Tug is deployed from the Orbiter. These interfaces are identified in Figure 4.6-1.
The avionics task was concerned with
implementing avionics interface require-
ments, as contrasted to definition of
interface requirements supplied from
other studies. Each avionics interface
is integ-,ated with and directly involved
in Tug management, control, and moni-
toring of structural, mechanical, fluid,
and thermal operations, as well as the
Tug avionics system itself. Although
the actual physical interfaces (size, lo-
cation of wires) are necessary to define
total system interface requirements,
the more fundamental question was con-
cerned with selection of the monitor and
control 'implementation technique and
the equipment allocation to accomplish it,
which was defined during this task.
TOG ORBITER
*AVIONICS SYSTEMS
	
	
MONITOR & CONTROL EGUIP.
MISSION SPECIALIST STA.epAYLOAD SPECIALIST STA.,
ADAPTER
INTERFACE UNITS
*ORBITER
oTUG
GGROUND
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oPOWER	 •HARDOIAREIN 
TER, 
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mCOMMUNICAT[GNS
	
•GROUND CHECKOUT
*STATUS
	
*LAUNCH CONTROL
FLIGHT EflfAC[GNS
1	 *RFINTERFACE	 I
Figure 4.6--1. Tug/Orbiter/Ground
Avionics Interfaces
The avionics interface task consisted of first defining flow much Orbiter monitor and
control capability should be supplied by Orbiter-supplied equipment versus Tug-unique
equipment, Once this determination was made, the Orbiter crew stations were evalu-
ated for the implementation and allocation of the interface requirements. An assess-
ment was then made of Tug/Orbiter crew man-machine interface effectivity, and Tug/
payload electrical power requirements unposed on the Orbiter were identified and
evaluated. Finally, an assessment was made of Orbiter cargo bay electrical and
service panels (Figure 4.6-2).
To determine Orbiter capability, two basic questions must be considered: "What
equipment is available in the Orbiter? and "Will it always be available to the Tug when
needed?" A third key issue or question that must also be considered is, "If the Tug
requires equipment applicable to a large class of other type payloads, but such equip-
ment is not presently available in the Orbiter, would it be advantageous for the Shuttle
to provide it?"
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Figure 4.6-2. Tug Avionics Interfaces
The latest definitions of Tug requirements and Orbiter equipment were evaluated
througho-it the study to define the available options of a hardware and software inter-
face implementation split between Orbiter and Tug. Factors evaluated during the
study that influenced these decisions are shown in Table 4.6-1.
Output of this task is a recommended technique for Tug/Orbiter interface implementa-
tion with an identification of Tug-unique equipment and Orbiter-supplied equipment, In
addition, any significant interface benefits realized by changes to Orbiter equipment
were identified through Level II change requests. Information resulting from this task
includes a specification for each major piece of Tug unique equipment, expressed in
terms of number of wires, wire type, shielding requirements, size, routing, ground-
ing provisions, power requirements, cooling, weight, and mounting criteria. Costs
of each piece of equipment were estimated and included in Vol. IV. In addition,
input/output requirements of the interface equipment, were identified based on func-
tional requirements as shown in Table 4.6-2.
4.6.1 AVIONIC FUNCTIONAL INTERFACE DEFINITION. Tug control and monitor
data flow requirements were assessed as a function of Tug/Orbiter mission phase to
determine the Tug--Orbiter interface implementation requirements. Redundant paths
were provided as necessary to meet safety needs, enhance mission reliability, or
provide operational flexibility. The resulting interface data paths are tabulated in
Table 4.6-3.
0.,
This table indicates that four types of operational phases are important for Tug/Orbiter
operations:
a. Prelaunch.
b. Ascent/descent.
c. On-orbit attached.
d. On-orbit detached.
These involve five types of interfaces:
a.. Safety critical.
b. Abort control.
c. Ground communications.
d. Power.
e. Npi•ma.l control and monitor operations.
Table 4.6-1. Tug/Orbiter Hardware/Software Allocation Factors
Equipment dedication requirements as a function of Tug/Orbiter operational
please. Example: use of critical Orbiter-supplied Tug support equipment
could not be restricted during Tug abort operations.
Capability of existing Orbiter-supplied support equipment.
Software interface requirements in terms of operating speed, Bore memory
requirements, language requirements, mass data storage requirements,
etc.
Software development and procedural requirements with respect to software
time sharing, checkout, ;validation.
Interface equipment physical and functional requirements.
Tug vehicle autonomy level and sophisitication in terms of built-in test
equipment and onboard checkout capability.
Special requirements reflecting USAF or payload operations such as com-
munication security. *
*Evaluated as part of Sensitivity Analysis (Section 5).
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Table 4. 6--2. Functicaia.l Requirements
Signal Function	 Hardwire safety monitors
Hardwired backup control discretes
Flight Initialization Control
Tug vehicle valve & function control
Power change control & monitor
Arm/Safe control & monitor
Multiplex downlink control & data
Electrical Power
Signal Type
Data Transfer
Requirements
Communication Formats
Analog
Digital
Discrete
RF
Power
Data rate
Synchronization
Modulation
Interface impedance,
Processing rates
Error rates
Security provisions
-r
voltage, current
PCM
Digital command/ monitoring
RF command decoding
Interface Implementation Requirements. Safety critical interfaces communicate safety
monitor data from the Tug, spacecraft, and deployment adapter to Orbiter and/or
ground personnel. These interfaces, which convey caution and warning signal data,
must be redundant and operational during all Tug/Orbiter mission phases from pre-
launch through landing when the Tug is attached to or in near vicinity of the Orbiter.
Abort control interfaces are concerned with the execution, control, and monitoring of
Tug abort operations. Because of the abort interface criticality, it must be redundant.
and operationally active during all flight mission phases where the Tug is attached to
the Orbiter. It is also a requirement that safeguards be implemented to prevent
-:iiadvertent execution of abort operations by any single anomalous crew action of
interface equipment failure.
Two categories of ground communication interfaces are required for Tug/Orbiter op-
erations. The first category consists of hardwired interfaces required for prelaunch
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Phase
	
Function
Prelaunch	 Safety Critical
Operations
Power
Table 4.6 -3. Tug/Orbiter/Ground Interface Implementation
Backup	 Primary Path	 Backup Path
Require-
ment*	 Up	 Down	 Up	 Down
8
2
I
Comments
S	 Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Operational B/U via gnd
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 RF/PSP Iink
O	 Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM TLM via Orbiter is aiterna-
Link lank Link 2 Link 2 tive (RF or umbilical)
S	 Orb Sta 695 - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Ded Fuel Cell Main Bus through Orb Sta 1307
Ascent	 Safety Critical	 S	 PSP - GPCC &W to MSS	 PSP - GFC	 TLM -PSP
No. 1	 TLM - PSP	 No. 2	 No. 2
Abort	 S	 PSP to DMS	 TLM via PSP	 PSP to CIU &	 PSP No. 2	 Operational B/U via gnd
D/A IU
	
RF/PSP
i'	 Ground Comm	 C	 PSP	 PSP	 PSP 2	 PSP 2Y
Power	 S	 Tug Fuel	 -	 Orb Sta 695	 Deployment adapter przwer
Celle (2)	 through Orb Sta 1307
f	 ^ On-Orbit	 Safety Critical
Attached	 Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Operations	 O	 PSP -- DMS	 PSP to GPS	 PSP 2 TO	 PSP 2 TO
PSP-C/O	 PSP to Gnd
	
DMS	 Gnd
from Gnd
On-Mbit	 Safety Critical	 S	 PI	 PI	 PI 2	 PI 2	 Arm/Safing & Ioiter RF
De'..ached	 commands
Operations	 R	 Gnd Net	 Gnd Net	 Gnd Net 2	 Gnd Net 2	 PI is backup for less than
20 miles
*S = Safety 	C = See comments
R = Mission Reliability	 O = Operational Convenience
operations. It is a Tug baseline requirement that a Tug/ground interface be provided
to allow uplink/downlink communication (with LPS) without requiring the Orbiter's
avionic systems to be activated. Two important points concerning Tug/ ground inter-
faces are: 1) Tug/Orbiter interface through the Orbiter's payload support equipment
permits Tug/ground communication through the normal Orbiter/ground hardwired and
RF interface paths, and 2) GSE power will be supplied to Tug and spacecraft functions
during prelaunch operations through the Orbiter power distribution system (using the
same interfaces that are available to payloads during flight operations).
Tug, spacecraft, deployment adapter, and aft crew station equipment functions will
t !	 require electrical power from the Orbiter during the various Tug/Orbiter mission
phases. The associated power interfaces will be required to reflect Orbiter power
requirement such as:
a. Limited Orbiter power availability during certain mission phases.
b. Maintaining separation of Orbiter current from separate Orbiter fuel cells.
c. Use of Orbiter multiple-point ground philosophy.
The final class of interfaces includes all of the interface functions required for normal
prelaunch and flight operations. These interfaces murit allow reliable control and
monitoring of operational functions such as:
a. Propellant tanking and Tug DMS update (prelaunch)
b. Deployment adapter control during Tug deployment/ retrieval operations.
Other interfaces of this nature involve the transfer of data to the Tug (such as GN&C
update parameters and time reference data).
Avionics Interface Block Diagrams. The recommended Tug/deployment adapter to
Orbiter interface implementation is indicated in the block diagram of Figure 4.6-3
for NASA and DOD payloads, ground and flight operations, and flight attached and
detached operations. The major functional units associated with this interface consist
of the Tug avionics (transponder, command decoder, and computer interface unit),
deployment adapter interface avionics, and Orbiter avionics and man-machine
interfaces.
Major electronics elements associated with the Tug deployment adapter include the
deployment adapter interface unit, valves and actuators associated with the control of
propellants, fluids and gases; deployment interface hardware, instrumentation, and
the deployment adapter power control unit. The deployment adapter interface unit
includes a command decoder, command distributor, and a downlink data multiplexer
unit (PCM TLM).
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The Orbiter payload support avionics available and used for the Tug/Orbiter interface
includes the payload interrogator (PI), payload signal processor (PSP), C &W elec-
tronics, master tuning unit (MTU), payload data interleaver (PDI), payload
multiplexer-demultiplexer (M!]M), and limited use of the Orbiter's general-purpose
computer system, data recorders, and communication system.
The equipment and interface specifications affecting its use are described in document
JSC--07700, Section 14 (Revision C, Change 7); selected portions of this document
showing functional block diagrams and interface characteristics are included in
Appendix D for reference.
In the diagram of Figure 4.6--3, Tug use of Orbiter avionics equipment located at and
associated with the Mission Specialist t.^ tation (MSS) is also assumed. This capability
includes Orbiter-supplied CRT and keyboard, associated alphanumeric display elec-
tronics, and Orbiter C &W display devices. Tug--provided unique equipment required
in the aft crew area includes Tug two operations control panel located at the MSS and
one control panel at the payload handling station (PHS) for control and monitoring of
Tug validation, deployment, and activation functions.
Judicious use of the present Orbiter payload support capability was assumed in the
recommended configuration to 1) reduce Tug design and development costs by not
duplicating Orbiter payload support functions, 2) simplify Orbiter/Tug operations on
the ground and in flight, 3) reduce the number, weight, and complexity of the physical
interfaces at Tug/Orbiter bulkheads, and 4) take advantage of the high level of Orbiter
redundancy and built-in test (SIT) capability to increase Tug/Orbiter operational re-
liability and safety. Less Tug unique equipment and interfaces installed into the
Orbiter should aid turnaround time and assist interface test and checkout; during in-
flight operations crew familiarity with standard Orbiter hardware should ease crew
operation associated with Tug.
All Orbiter payload support equipment associated with the Tug/Orbiter interface is
redundant except for the payload data interleaver and the PCM recorder unit. In
addition, all Tug aviontc functions employ dual redundancy to achieve operational
reliability. In like manner, all major uplinks and downlinks associated with the Tug/
deployment adapter/Orbiter interface are redundant (and use the corresponding
redundancy level associated with the Tug and Orbiter interface avionics units.
A. summary of the interface hardware required is presented W Tables 4.6-4 through
4.6-6. These interfaces are briefly described below. Interface characteristics
referenced are compatible with the payload support equipment described in JSC-07700.
Tug Uplink Commands. During Tug attached to Orbiter operational phases the Tug
uplink command interface will allow commands to be transmitted to the Tug,
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Table 4.6--4, Tug Aft Cabin Equipment Requirements
Panel
Power Wt, lb Space,
Requirement Capabilities Supplier Location (AVE) (Itg) in. (cm2)
Data Control GPC
Processor Real time, time shared, 16 bit Orbiter
word, 20 kops, dedicated use
all mission phases, redundant.
PCM decoder, two channels Orbiter PSP,TLM Decom
(redundant) at 10 kbps, data PDl,
accessible by payload Master
software. PC M
Unit
TMIE Code.- G14IT accurate to Orbiter MTUi/O
1 ms; 30 discrete.
Inputs and outputs to aft crew MDM
cabin.
Tug support executive soft- Tug/ GPCSoftware
ware control of five S /1V Orbiter
categories:
Application S/W Real time monitor/C&-W
Initialization /status
Deploy/capture
RP communications See See See
Utility & control Nate Note Note
Common Storage TLNI tables, interface tables
Data Storage CPC
Operating Memory 15 k words Orbiter
Rapid Access (1 see) 10.7 k words IY
Communications
Hardwired Uplink 2 k baud/see, 131 - 0 - I. Orbiter PSP
(redundant).
Hardwired Down-- IG k baud/sec, two redundant PSP
Iink channels (DOD/NASA + D/A).
RI' Data processor interface, PI
transmitter/receiver, S-Hand
DOD/NASA, redundant
components.
Uplink 2 k baud/sec.
Downlink 10 k baud/see.
Crew Interface CRT & keyboard (redundant). Orbiter MSS
Panels C&W electronics & Orbiter HISS
annunciators.
Tug master caution/warning Tug MSS 10 1(.45) 3(20)
lights.
Tug deployment/capture Tug PHS 20 4(1.8) 23 (148)
panel.
Tug initialization & safing Tug MSS 20 6(2.7) 48(310)
panel.
Tug abort control panel. Tug KISS 20 4(l.8) 23 (148)
Tug panel control electronics. Tug MSS 30 5(23) 0
^o
4
r^
C
Requirement Capabilities Supplier Location
Power
(watts)
Deployment Adapter Tug/Orbiter avionics; I/F. Tug D/A 75
Interface Unit
Command Decoder Decode D/A commands from
& Distributor Orbiter 2k baud Bi-O--L up-
link (redundant).
D/A PCM Format & transmit D/A
Downlink PCM data to Orbiter PDI
(redundant).
Instrumentation Monitor D/A controls actu- Tug D/A 75
ators and safety functions.
Power Control Unit Control prime &backup power 'Fug D/A 200 (pk)
to Tug/SC , and Tug PCOS.
Actuators Control of D/A abort, de- Tug D/A See Note
He Valves ployment & capture See Note
Rotary Deployment functions. 355
Capture Latches 448
D/A Junction Box Cable & signal, routing ter- Tug D/A -
minal for Tug & S/C to
Orbiter interface.
S/C Junction Box Optional cable & signal rout S/C D/A -
ing terminal for S/C
interface.
Forward Junction Optional S/C wiring terminal S/C Fwd. Discon.
Box for spacecraft functions.
t'
1
,a
Table 4.6-5. Tug Cargo Bay Avionic Equipment
Table 4.6-6. Tug/Orbiter Interface Cable Kits
Function	 From	 To
1
2
3
! 4
t
5
6
i
' 7
j
!
ppU
9
10
Tug/Spacecraft End Power
D/A Power
Tug/Spacecraft Prelaunch Func-
ti,ons (A1)
Tug/Spacecraft Prelaunch Func-
tion.s (A2)
Tug/Spacecraft Prelaunch Func-
tions (B1)
Tug/Spacecraft Prelaunch Func-
tions (B2)
Tug/Deployment Adapter Digital
Uplink/Downlink (A1)
Tug/Deployment Adapter Digital
Uplink/Downlink (A2)
Ti,g/Deployment Adapter Digital
Uplink/Downlink (A3)
Tug/Deployment Safety Adapter
Monitors (A1)
Orb. Sta. 695
Orb, Sta. 1307
D/A J/B
Orb. Sta. 1307
D/A J/B
Orb, Sta. 3.307
D/A J/B
Orb, Sta. 1307
Orb, Sta. 576
D/A J/B
D/A PCU
D/A IU
Orb. Sta. 1307
Orb. Sta. 1439 (T-O
Fuel Panel)
Orb, Sta. 1307
Orb. Sta, 1439 (T-0
Oxidizer Panel)
Orb. Sta. 1307
Orb. Sta. 576
Orbiter PI, PSP, PDI,
MTU Units
Orb. Sta, 1307
11 Tug/Deployment Safety Adapter Orb. Sta. 1307 Orb. Sta. 576
Monitors (A2)
12 Trig/Deployment Safety Adapter Orb. Sta. 576 Orbiter C&W Ele. Units
{ Monitors (A3)
13 Tug Control Panel Harness MSS, PHS Orbiter MDM Units
F
i
14 Tug Control Panel Power MSS, PHS Orbiter Aft Cabin
L
Harness x-28 vdc
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deployment adapter, or spacecraft through Orbiter payload interrogator/payload signal
processor unit. For NASA missions these commands will be routed from the Orbiter
PSP units to the command decoder unit associated with the Tug, spacecraft, or deploy-
ment adapter. Each command decoder unit will respond only when the uplink command
data contains that unit's unique address. In this manner the single uplink channel
associated with each PSP unit may be used to communicate with all payload functions
within the cargo bay. Each uplink channel will communicate at a 2k baud per second
information data rate through a Bi-c¢--L signal format. Signal characteristics associ-
ated with the PSP at the PSP channel output are:
Logic level one	 6 plus 0 minus 0. 5 volts peak
Logic level zero	 0 plus or minus 0.5 volts peak
Rise time*	 Less than 1. 0 microsecond
Fail time*	 Less than 1.0 microsecond
Data code	 Manchester 11, bi-phase level (Bi-O-L) as defined in
MIL-STD-442
Impedance	 75 plus :L-7 ohms, single ended
Jitter	 Not tQ exceed 0.5 percent of the pulse period
*The rise and fall time shall be measured between 10 and 90 percent of the voltage
limits.
For DOD Tug missions, Orbiter uplink and downlink communication with the Tug and
spacecraft are routed through the Orbiter's payload interrogator units. This interface
will be implemented in basically the same manner as the NASA uplink, except that the
data will be transmitted in a FSK/AM format (2k baud) and will be received at the Tug
through the Tug's transponder unit(s). The Orbiter provides for installation of de-
scription and encryption units between the PSP and PI to allow communication of DOD
secure mission data.
Signal characteristics associated with the PI uplink output are:
Signal type	 FSK/AM Ternary
Data rate	 2k baud
Waveform	 FSK/ AM
Tones 1 = 95 kHz x:0.01 percent
0 = 76 kHz :L0. 01 percent
S = 65 kHz Q. 01 percent
Sync AM = One kHz triangular ±0.01 percent
50 percent AM Modulation
A
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tOutput impedance	 75 ohms X10 percent
Output termination	 Single ended
Output power	 10 dBm f 3 dB
Tug Telemetry Downlink. During those operational, phases in which the Tug is attached
to the Orbiter, the Tug telemetry downlink interface will allow Tug telemetry data to
be input to the Orbiter systems for processing on the Orbiter or for transmission to
ground operations. For NASA missions, a dual downlink capability is achieved by
routing each redundant channel of Tug TLM to the TLM input of each Orbiter PSP unit.
e l	 The PSP unit will accept 16 kbps of telemetry data through its payload umbilical inter-
face. The input signal characteristics are as follows:
Logic level one	 3 to 6 volts peak
Logic level zero	 0 plus or minus 0.5 volt peak
Rise tune*	 Less than I.0 microsecond
Fall time*	 Less than 1.0 microsecond
Data code	 Manchester II, bi-phase level (Bi-¢-L) as defined in
MIL-STD-442
Impedance	 71 _+10 percent
Jitter	 Not to exceed 0.5 percent of the bit period
*Rise and fall time measured between 10 and 90 percent of bit period.
DOD Tug TLM downlink data channels will be routed through the payload iliterrogator
units to take advantage of signal conditioning capability and to allow Orbiter encryption
and decryption of DOD transmissions. The PI input signal characteristics for DOD
payload umbilical input channels is:
Data rate
	 16 kbps
Data waveform	 PSIS of 1. 024 MHz carrier
Modulation	 Bi-O-L or NRZ--L
Input impedance	 75 ohms ±10 percent
Input termination Single ended
Input power
	 6 dBm ±3 dB
It should be noted that in the recommended configuration, Tug spacecraft TLM down-
link data will be routed to the Orbiter through the three (five total) available input
channels associated with the payload data interleaver unit.
".
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Time Code Data Transfer. To allow the Tug DMS to automatically update or verify its
internal clock and time parameters (to 1 ms), GMT through an IR.IG B code signal will
be transmitted directly from the Orbiter master timing unit to the Tug digital interface
unit. A redundant link will be employed to maintain high operational reliability.
Caution and Warning Monitor Signals. Three hardwired (not multiplexed) backup Tug
warning signals (representing L02 and LH2 tank pressure and Ng H4 temperature)
will be input to the Orbiter-supplied C&W electronics unit. These signals, in conjunc-
tion with C &W electronics unit logic and the C &W annunciator assembly will alert the
Orbiter crew to out-oft-tolerance safety-critical functions. The analog input signals
associated with the C &W electronics unit's (CWE) Tug interface will be a positive,
unipolar, grounded or ungrounded voltage in the range of zero to 5 volts do from a
source with an impedance of 100 ohms or less. Input circuit characteristics off the
CWE are:
Type. Differential, balanced to CWE signal common.
Common Mode Rejection, For input voltage levels of minus 1. 0 to plus 6. 0 volts
the common mode rejection shall be 40 dB minimum with +5.0 volts peak common
movie signal over a frequency range of do to 1.0 kHz. For discrete input voltage
levels of +18 to +37.5 volts, the presence of + or -- 5.0 volts common mode signal
over a frequency range of do to 1.0 kHz shall not cause the input to be
misinterpreted.
Input Current. For input voltage levels of -1.0 to +6. 0 volts, input current shall
not exceed 25 microamperes. For input voltages of +18 to +37.5 volts, input
current shall not exceed 10.0 milliamperes.
y
Signal Return Isolation. Isolation between input signal returns shall be 1001c ohms
minimum with X5.0 volts difference between return lines from de to 1.0 kHz.
Alarm Limits. The CEW shall incorporate provisions to allow alarm limits for
each system status input to be selected in 98 even increments over the range of
0.1 to 5.0 volts (nominal 50 millivolt steps).
Limit Detection. The CWE shall provide high-, low-, and dual-limit detection
for each system status input as follows:
High Limit. An output signal shall be generated whenever the input voltage
exceeds a predetermined limit. This limit may vary from +0.3 volt do to +5.0
volts dc.
Low Limit. An output signal shall be generated whenever the input voltage falls
below a predetermined limit. This limit may vary from +4.8 volts do to +0. 1 volt
dc.
4
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Dual Limit. An output signal shall be generated whenever the input voltage devi-
ates above or below predetermined levels. The upper and lower limits may vary
as described above, and the voltage range between the upper and lower limits may
vary from -!-0.2 volt do to x-4.8 volts de. Trigger point variation shall not exceed
plus or minus 25 millivolts from the alarm limit.
Response Time. The CWE shall respond when one or more system status inputs
is continuously out of limits for 100 x-.25 milliseconds. The system status output
shall remain activated until the input signal is continuously in limits for 100 4-25
milliseconds.
Sa.fi.ng Commands. Nine backup Tug swing commands allow control of Tug umbilical
panels and abort functions should the primary Orbiter to Tug communication link be-
come inoperative. These commands would use the same redundant multiplexed uplinks
described above but would cause separate control output discretes to be generated when
decoded by Tug or deployment adapter command decoder 1-mits. These discrete outputs
would be transmitted directly to the safety or abort control actuators and would be
capable of overriding any other existing actuator commands. This provides the
Orbiter a fallback position in the event of all Tug and certain Orbiter computer failures.
D/A Downlink. Monitoring of deployment adapter operations and instrumentation will
be accomplished through redundant multiplexed data links routed from two deployment
adapter PCM telemetry units to two channels (of 5 available) of the Orbiter payload
data interleaver unit. This data would then be made available for Orbiter or ground
processing in the same manner as Tug TLM data. input signal characteristics
associated with this interface are listed in Table 4.6--7.
Orbiter/Tug Software Interfaces. During Orbiter ascent and through Tug deployment
and capture operations the Tug will be supported by dedicated portions of the Orbiter
general-purpose computer (GPC) system and associated Orbiter and Tug unique soft-
ware. Thus software interfaces must be considered in addition to the traditional
hardware interfaces associated with Tug/Orbiter operation. Failure by program
management to acknowledge software requirements, the associated interfaces, and
implementation concepts early in the system design cycle invariably results in cost
and scheduled penalties later in the design, development, and operational phases of
system life. These penalties usually result from a combination of the following types
of problems:
a. Software becomes the critical path in the system development plan.
b. Software operational and bulk memory requirements will double.
c. Much hardware and software redesign activity will be required during final system
integration and validation phases.
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Table 4.6-7. PDI Data Input Characteristics
Input Interface. Each of the following payload signals is transmitted on a
separate twisted shielded pair (TSP) cable:
a. Clock Signal. The clock signal shall be return-to-zero at 50 percent
duty cycle. The duty cycle shall be accurate to within t15 percent of the clock
period not to exceed 10 microseconds, whichever is less. Rise and fall times
shall not exceed 0.5 microseconds.
I
	 ,: 7
=r.
1
t	 b. Data Signal. PCM telemetry formats shall conform to the NASA
i
	 Aerospace Data Systems Standard (ADS), Document X-560--63--2 and teleme-
try working group, Inter-Range Instrumentation Group (TRIG), Document
106--73. The input data signal shall be accurate to within ;h5 percent of the
clock period, not to exceed 10 microseconds. Rise and fall times shall not
exceed 0.5 microseconds. Data leading-edge skew when referenced to the
clock signal shall not exceed :h5 percent of the clock period or a maximum.
of 10 microseconds, whichever is less.
c. Minor Frame Sync Signal. Minor frame synchronization signal shall
have a minimum pulse width equal to the clock period times the duty cycle.
The maximum minor frame sync pulse width allowed is equal to the length of
the minor frame sync word. Rise and fall times shall not exceed 0. 5 micro-
seconds. Leading edge skew shall not exceed ±5 percent of the clock period
or a maximum of 10 microseconds, whichever is less.
d. Major Frame Sync Signal. Major frame synchronization signal shall
have a. minimum pulse width equal to the clock period times the duty cycle.
The maximum major frame sync pulse width allowed is equal to the length
of the minor frame sync word. Rise and fall times shall not exceed 0.5
microseconds. Leading edge skew shall not exceed :h5 percent of the clock
period or a maximum of 10 microseconds, whichever is less.
Input Logic States. The logical one ( 11 1 11) state shall be 5 volts +2 volts.
The logical zero (11 011 ) state shall be 0.0 volts :1 volt.
Input Data Rates. Telemetry data rates shall not exceed 64.0 kbps from
any cne channel.
Signal Cables. Input PDI signal cables shall be two-conductor twisted
shielded jacket cable having a distributed capacitance of less than 50 pico-
farads per foot and impedance of 70 ohms +10 percent.
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Table 4.6-7. PDI Data Input Characteristics (Contd)
Signal Cable Length.. The cable length may be up to 126 feet between the pay-
load line drivers and the PDI.
Signal Waveform Distortion. Overshoot and undershoot of the received sig-
nals shall be less than 26 percent of signal levels.
Timing. Input timing signals shall conform to the accompanying timing
diagram.
DATA	
I 
I a  1 1 0^ tl o 1 I t I tl t f
NRZ-L	 1	
1	 II
NRZ•C	 o
^.
1
RZ
tl
7
CLOCK
0
MINOR
FRAME	 -	 MINIMUM PULSE WIDTH{
SYNC	 O -
MAJOR
FRAME	 MINIMUM PULSE WIDTH
SYNC	 O
Early predevelopment software/ hardware integration will eliminate or alleviate these
problems.
The paragraphs below and those that follow in Section 4. 6.4 discuss the Tug/Orbiter
software requirements at a preliminary concept level. It is hoped that Tug/Orbiter
software requirement definitions may continue as the Orbiter software structure is
developed and integration details become available.
The total set of software interfaces associated with Tug/spacecraft/Orbiter opera-
tion includes the following:
a. Intra-Tug Software. Communication of data between the various Tug DAM soft-
ware modules.
b. Tug/S, acecraft Software. Software that transmits or receives data communicated
between Tug and its spacecraft payload.
c. Tug/Orbiter Software. Software on the Tug and Orbiter that controls transmis-
sion or reception of multiplexed data across the physical Tug/Orbiter interface.
d
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d. Tug/Ground Software. Software associated with communication of commands to
the Tug and Tug telemetry to ground equipment during maintenance, prefJ.ight,
Orbiter--attached and Tug-flight portions of the mission cycle.
e. Intra-Orbiter Tug/Orbiter Software. Orbiter-supplied and Tug unique software
programs that function within the Orbiter's general-purpose computer (GPC)
operating system in support of Tug/Orbiter operations.
The scope of the Tug/Orbiter software interface definition (for this study) was limited
to preliminary definition of the requirements and implementation of the intra-Orbiter
Tug software 'item a above). This set of software consists of five categories of Tug-
unique software programs (Table 4.6-8), which operate as application programs
under the executive operating systems associated with the Orbiter general,-purpose
flight computer operating system (FCOS).
Table 4.6-8. Tug-Unique Orbiter Support Software
ID Tug Support Software Memory
Speed
(Avg)
100 Tug real-time monitor 850 1.0 kOPS
200 Tug initialization, status 4,890 0.03
300 Tug deploy/capture 200 0.01
400 Tug RF control 2,225 0.1
500 Tug utility & control 505 0.5
Data Common storage, tables, etc. 1,500
Base
TOTAIS 10,170 2.0 kOPS
The data in the table indicates that the total mass storage required from the Orbiter
is approximately 11k words. During normal operations, however, only two programs
will operate simultaneously: 1) Tug critical function monitor, and 2) the program
associated with the current operational event (i.e., rotate D/A up). Thus, actual
working computer memory requirements should not exceed 5k words (program and
data base) at any one time. These software estimates assume that the Orbiter GPC
has provided a software operating system, and crew operator interface compatible
with Tug unique software requirements.
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The software structure assumed is a real-time operating system where the payload 	 :ainput/output is controlled through data base tables processed by the Orbiter executive.
This simplifies the Tug application software tasks since all the telemetry processing, 	 g
display input/output, mass memory interface, and system communications are handled
with structured data blocks. This type of system is illustrated in Figure 4.6-4,which
shows the Tug/Oribter hardware/software interface in block diagram form.
GROUND k__- 	NETWORKSIG PROC
MASTER
PDI X U-41T
TUG
P
PIL
MOM
Figure 4.6-4. Tug/Orbiter Interface Software
A summary of the Tug-unique software requirements and ground rules associated with
the Orbiter GPC system is presented in Table 4.6-9. It should be noted that the
five Tug-unique software program categories may be divided into two groups consisting
of 1) safety--critical programs and 2) nonsafety-critical programs. These two groups
may reside in separate regions of the GPC system; however, it is required that the
safety-critical programs (category 100, real-time monitor) be continually in residence
in the redundant GPCs.
Table 4.6-9. Ground Rules for Use of Orbiter GPC Software
3	 IO tc words (32-bit) memory allocation (half word instructions — OK)
18 k adds/sec (time continually available)
Orbiter provided library (math) routines
Orbiter provided display formatting software (payload software will "input"
to this)
Mass memory available for "program roll fn", accessible within 1/2 to 8
seconds on command from payload software)
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Table 4.6-9. Ground Rules for Use of Orbiter GPC Software (Contd)
Keyboard, CRT available to payload
External PCM decom utation of:
36 kbps Tug bit stream (through payload signal processor)
16 kbps deployment adapter bit stream (through payload data interleaver)
Spacecraft status monitoring and command programs provided by spacecraft
user
GPC has backup input to C &W annunciator
Safety-critical data monitor software is resident in the GPC system continually,
and cannot be superseded.
Nonsafety-critical data functions are grouped separately
4. 6.2 ELECTRICAL, UMBILICAL ROUTING SERVICE PANELS. The electrical serv-
ice routing implementation for the spacecraft, Tug, deployment adapter, and Orbiter
are shown in Figure 4.6-5. The various Tug and spacecraft interface functions are
grouped according to function and identified by code numbers. Tug and payload C&W,
safing control and on-orbit power functions (Codes 5, 3, 8, and 9) are routed through
the Tug deployment adapter through the Orbiter aft cargo bay bulkhead at station 1307,
thus providing hardwired control during all attached operations including predeploy-
ment and post-capture. A forward Tug disconnect (Code 4) is provided near station
961 for on-orbit and prelaunch checkout of Tug-spacecraft. This umbilical interface
provides payload access to the Orbiter, T-0 umbilical panels and the T-4 umbilical
panels with minimum weight penalty to the Tug vehicle.
Spacecraft junction box (JB) mounting facilities are provided at both the forward dis-
connect and on the deployment adapter to allow maximum spacecraft flexibility without
adding additional weight to Tug or Orbiter systems. In like manner all Tug, deploy-
ment adapter, and spacecraft control and monitor signals are routed through the de-
ployment adapter junction box for distribution to and from standard Orbiter interface
connections at Orbiter station 1307. Redundant Tug (and spacecraft) uplinks and down-
links to ground are shown to be split, with each redundant set of signals routed
through the separate T-0 umbilical panels, located on each side of the Orbiter at
station 1439.
Power is supplied to the Tug/spacecraft and the deployment adapter through separate
interfaces (Codes 6 and 7, respectively). Orbiter dedicated and backup power from
station 695 is available to the Tug through the deployment adapter power control unit
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ORBITER SERVICE REQUIREMENTS
	
UMSILICALOETAILS
}
CODE FUNCTION FROM I TO
1 SIC UL, CONTROUMONiTOR SIC TUG
7 SICPOWER TUG SIC
3 5JC DL, CLAW, SAFETY SIC ORBITER
s SIC VQ PRELAUNCH SIC ORBILPS
S TUGWA UL, OL, CSK TIME TUGOM ORBITER
6 TUG-SIC POWER ORBITER TUG
7 DIAPOWER ORSITER OIA
S TUG51C, UL, UL, DATA TUO SIC LPS
P TUGSIC, UL, OL, DATA TUGSIC LPS
IO TUG AFT CABIN WIRING MSS OISTIMOM
11 SIC AFT CABIN FRRIWG PSS 01=18DM
STA. 1207
INTERFACE STA.676 ITO AFT CABIN) IT-0 UMBILICAL)
ORBITER TSP 207 169 202
CAPABILITY TP 96 9S
-
COAX 29 10 14
CABLE B 6 2
TSP 16 31 GTUG
REQUIREMENTS TP - -- -
COAX - 2
CABLE H
SPACECRAFT TSP 121 121 is
REQUIREMENTS TP - - 24
COAX 3 3 -
CABLE 8 -
COMBINED
	 T TSP 137 152 21
TUG AND TP - - 24
SPACECRAFT COAX 3 3 2
REGUIREMENTS CABLE B
Figure 4.6-5. Tug Electrical. Services Routing
(PCU) for on orbit-checkout and validation operations, while deployment adapter power
(dedicated and backup) is provided through Orbiter station 1307.
Tug and spacecraft control and monitor functions interface with Orbiter payload sup--
;	 port avionics via connections at station 576. An Orbiter distribution box provides
limited payload capability in routing signals to the aft crew station locations and se-
lected payload support avionics. This configuration does not, however, allow payload
unique equipment located in the aft crew station to interface with Orbiter payload sup-
port avionics (such as the MDM), thus it is recommended that all payload signals from
i	 both the aft crew cabin and cargo bay locations be routed through the Orbiter's payload
i	 signal distribution box.
in summary, the Tug/spacecraft/deployment adapter electrical service requirements
fall within the current Orbiter capability except for the spacecraft requirement for
24 TP cables in the T-0 umbilical. it is recommended that these signals use the spare
TSP cable available to satisfy this requirement.
4.6.3 TUG/ PAYLOAD POWER REQUIREMENTS. An analysis was performed to
determine the power requirements as a function of operational phase for the Tug , its
spacecraft, the deployment adapter, and Tug-unique s lapport equipment located in the
v
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Orbiter aft cabin. These payload requirements were then compared with the Orbiter
capabilities to determine if incompatibilities occur.
The resulting data indicates that sufficient power is available from the Orbiter to sup-
ply both Tug and spacecraft requirements during all Tug/Orbiter mission phases
except Orbiter ascent, descent, and post-launch operations. During these mission
phases, the Orbiter power allocated for payload functions is constrained to 350 watts
average (420 watts peak) to the aft flight deck and 1000 watts average (1500 watts peak)
to the Orbiter cargo bay interfaces. During normal ascent operations the combined
Tug, spacecraft, and deployment adapter requirements are 1478 watts, thus exceeding
Orbiter capability by 478 watts. This problem becomes even more.- ,significant if a
Tug abort operation is required during ascent because 2413 wadsAf cargo bay power
will be required.
During all other Tug/Orbiter operating phases, sufficient Orbiter power availability
from cargo bay interfaces far exceeds that required by all Tug, deployment adapter,
and spacecraft functions combined. The maximum cargo bay power requirements
(2702 watts) occur during ground prelaunch operations when either: 1) 3000 watts
average (4000 watts peak) are available, or 2) on-orbit power levels are available
when the Orbiter is configured to require minimum power. The maximum on-orbit
power required for Tug/deployment adapter/spacecraft functions occurs during Tug/
spacecraft deployment operations when a total of 2603 watts are required. NASA Docu-
ment JSC 07700 (change 6) indicates that while on on-orbit status, the Orbiter will
provide 750 watts average (1000 watts peak) to the aft flight deck for payload-unique
operation functions equipment, and either:
a. 7000 watts maximum (12, 000 watts peak) at the mid--cargo bay electrical interface
(station 695) using a payload-dedicated fuel cell.
b. 5000 watts maximum (8000 watts peals) at the second mid-cargo bay electrical in-
terface when sharing a power source with the Orbiter or,
c. 3000 watts average (4000 watts peak) to the aft cargo bay electrical interface
(station 1307).
It should be recognized that the 3000 watts available at the aft cargo bay is supplied
through two 1500 watt interfaces, which may not be connected together by payload
avionic circuitry.
The data discussed above representing the Tug/spacecraft/deployment adapter power
requirement and the corresponding Orbiter capabilities as a function of mission phase
is summarized in Table 4.6--10. In addition to the Orbiter cargo bay requirements,
it is estimated that the Tug-unique control panel located within the Orbiter aft crew
compartment will require an additional 100 watts during all Tug/Orbiter mission
phases.
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Table 4.6--10. 	 Tug/Spacecraft and Deployment Adapter Power Requirements (Watts)
Pre-
Prelaunch Ascent Deployment Deployment Capture Descent Abort
Spacecraft 600 600 650 700 0 0 600
Tug Avionics 979 320 992 801 778 294 335
Tug Actuator 761 225 296 321 371 404 768
D/A Avionics 150 150 150 150 150 150 150
D/A Actuators 212 183 183 631 631 234 530
Tug plus S/C 2340 1145 1938	 - 1822 1149 698 1703
Totals
ho
Deployment 261 333 333 781 781 384 680
Adapter Totals
Cargo Bay Totals 2702 1478 2271 2603 1930 1082 2413
t	 i
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The spacecraft and Tug avionics power data analyzed above is based on inputs from
companion on-going apace Tug studies (Space Tug avionics definition study and TUS/
Tug Payload Requirements Compatibility Study). To establish the Tug and deploy-
ment adapter power requirements for electromechanical actuators (e. g., valves,
motors, solenoids), all valves and actuators were identified, and their power, arm-
safing, control, and monitor requirements were tabulated as a function of mission
phase. Power requirements were then determined for each mission phase by sum
marizing the power requirement for the individual devices activated for the major
event in each mission phase that required the most total power. The results of this
tabulation are shown in Tables 4.6-11 and 4.6-12. It should be noted that this
analysis was based on data from the Tug interface fluid schematic (I/T-74-010) dated
10-25-74. This schematic has been updated once since that time; however, it is not
expected that the results obtained will differ to any significant degree. This sche-
matic is presented for reference in Figure 4.6-6.
Several alternative methods of providing power to the cargo bay were investigated to
alleviate the insufficient ascent power problem. Methods considered included 1) use
of deployment adapter batteries, 2) use of T •
 r batteries, and 3) use of Tug fuel cells.
Option 3 was selected.
The power distribution concept recommended is shown in Figure 4.6-7. In this
concept the deployment adapter would receive power from the Orbiter aft cargo bay
interfaces during all mission phases, while the Tug and spacecraft would nominally
receive power from the Orbiter mid-cargo bay interface only during prelaunch opera-
tions. At all other times the Tug/spacecraft power would be supplied through the Tug
fuel cells, which would be activated just before launch. Although use of Orbiter power
for Tug/spacecraft functions would not normally be required during Tug/Orbiter on-
orbit operations, the backup capability would be available in the event of Tug multiple
fuel cell failure or if spacecraft checkout power requirements exceeded Tug fuel cell
capability.
The Orbiter station 695 power service panel was selected as the Orbiter cargo bay
Tug/spacecraft power source because of the 7 kW Ave (12 kW peak) power availability
at this point. The deployment adapter avionics are connected to the Orbiter station
1307 power interface because of its close proximity and due to the fact that deployment
adapter power requirements are within the capability of this interface (1.0 kW ascent,
1. 5 kW on orbit) .
The Tug/spacecraft/Orbiter power distribution diagram indicates that both the primary
and backup Orbiter power sources from the Orbiter station 695 power service panel
will be input to the Tug deployment adapter power control unit. Power control logic
and switches in this unit will automatically switch from Orbiter prime power to the
back-up mode in the event of an Orbiter prime power interruptive without violating the
Orbiter ground rule by connecting multiple Orbiter fuel cell outputs together. In addi-
tion a separate power control switch is provided to control Orbiter power application
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Table 4.6--11. Tug HPllum Valves Under Orbiter/GSE Control
/i I .r I	 F ^	 g'	 ti'
/'	 y^ / c ^ 4
Valve No Name /Function o tF
 a	 c 	 i^ /	 / 4 h° a .0
T-1f-ODI fie high Pressure Fill Vaive 1 X B4	 8 .1 ^ 8i B4 84
-002 He High Preaaure Fill Valve 2 X I	 81 I I	 84 84
-063 lie Vent Valve 1 X -	 28
-604 lie Vent Valve 2 X 28
-005 lie Vent Valve 3 X X	 28	 f '
-006 Ile APS Pressurization Valve I X X	 €	 5-i
-007 fie APS Pressurization Valve 2 X X	 84 ' J
-006 fie APS Pressurization Vent Valve I X 84
-009 lie APS Pressurizatfon Vent Valve 2 X 84
-010 lie APS Pressurization Vent Valve 3 X I X	 I	 ^4 -
-C11 Ile L112 Fuel Tank Pressurization 1 X 84	 84 84 84 04
-012 lie L112 Fuel Tank Pressurization 2 X 84 84 84
-013 A&i3 lie Gil 2 Vent Valve Control 1 $ 28	 GG
-014 lie Gil2 Vent Valve Control 2 X 28
-D15 A & 11 lie Lll2 Fill, Drain & Dump Control 1 X 28	 56 5G 56
-DIG A&D Ile LIl 2 Fill, Drain & Dump Control 2 X 28 I 56 56
-017 lie RLIO Engine Prevalve X X	 28
-018 Spare
-DID A&B fie L02 Fill, Drain & Dump Valk Control 1 X 128	 256 256 256
-020 He LO  Fill, Drain & Dump Valve Control 2 X 128	 f 256 250
-021 fie RLIO Engine Feed Pro-Valve X X	 28
-022 lie L02 Tank Pressurizatiun Valve I X 20	 28 2B 28
-023 fie LO2 Tank Pressurization Valve 2 X 2B 26 28
-024 A& D He GO Vent Valve Control 1 X 26	 06
-025 lie 602 Vent Valve Control 2 X 28
-026 lie RLIO LIl 2
 Pre-Valve Control X X	 28
-027 its RLIO LH 2 Engine Main. Valve Control X X	 26
-028 lie RLID LO  Engine Blain. Valve Contrul X X	 26
-029 lie LO  Topping Valve Control X 28
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Table 4.6-11. Tug Helium Valves Under Orbiter/GSE Control (Contd)
F^
1
C71
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\	 a	 oC
B	
:.,	 ^	 ^^	 4°	 .c	 ^	 ^^	 poi	 ^'	 yea
Volvo No.	 Name/Functlou	 ^	 1	 42	
o
0
.^	 4	 T	 •K	 V	 4	 O	 q
T-H-04D	 Ile Purge htanHoid Supply Valve S X 28 28 26
-041	 Ile Purge htartlfold Supply Calve 2 X 28
-042	 Spam X
1
28
-048	 Ile APS Itellcf Line Purge X 28
-044
	 Ile LEE 	 Engine Feed Lino Purge
	 ^ X 28
-046	 Ile LEE 	 Propellant Tank FLU L Dump Line 1 Purge 1	 X f 28 28
-046	 [to LH2 Propellant Tank Fill & Dump Line 2 Purge X 28 28 Ze 28
-047	 Etc LIE2 Leakage Containmenthiem6. Purge X la 28 26 28
-048	 He LH2 Tank Insulation Purge X I 28 28 28 26 28 28
-040	 He LIE 2 Purge Bag Vent Control X 1 28 2B 28 28 26 28
-050	 He RL10 Engine Feed Lino Purge X I 28
-051	 He LO  Zagino Feed Line Purge X 28
-052	 He LOZ FRI, Drain & hump Line Purge 1 X 28 28
-058	 ite LO  FHI, Drain & Dump Line Purge 2 X 2B 28
-054	 Etc LO 	 Tank IneuIntion Purge X 28 28 Lo 28
-055	 lie LO 	 Leakage COntftirunent. hlem6. Purge X 28 28 28 26
-056	 Etc LO  Purge Bag Vent Central X 28 28 28 2tf E	 26 26
L02 (Oxidizer; - 0
IT-0-001	 GO2 Autogunoua Pressurization Vd1Ve X X 26
-002	 G02 ZOro-G Vent Valve 1 X 28 28 28 28
-000	 GOZ Zero-G Vent Valve 2 X 28 h
-004	 GO„ Zero-G Vent Selector Valve
405	 LO2 Zero-G Dent Mixer &later
X
X
28
75 75 75
26
75
-005	 L02 Fuel CCU Feed X 28
I
I
f
Table 4.6-11. Tug Helium. Valves Under Orbiter/GSE Control (Contd)
F^
9
l^
Valve No.
`G
,^+	
04
•:.	 ^`	 ` / C^3	 cam,	 T	 ,^^	 .?j	 4G	
c
y	 ^	 ^~	 c^^	
Sys	
m	 R^	 ^^	 ^	 ^Name/Function	 ^o	 $o	 `ll	 ,^	 0^	 ^	 ^,	 0^
LH2 (Fuel) = F
T-F-001	 GH2 Autogenous Pressurization Valve X x 20
-002	 Gil 2 Zero-G Vent Valve 1 x 28 26 28 28
-003	 GH2 Zero-G Vert Valve 2 x 28
-004	 Oil  Zero-G Vent Selector Valve x 28 28
-005	 LH2 Zero-G Vent Miner Motor x to 10 10 111
-006	 LH2 Flu-01 Cell Feed x 78
Fuel Call 11202 Water Relief Valve 2B
N2H4 (APS) = A
T-A-001 N2H4 F111 & Drain Valve (M -mnl) X 26
-002 Spare x 28
-003 N2H4 Thruster Module A Shut-aff Valve X X 28
-004 N2H4 Thruster Module 8 Shut-off Valve x X 28
-005 NN Thruster Module C Shut-off Valve x X 28
-000 N.H. Thruster Module D Shut-off Valve X x 28
-0f 7 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve X x 28
-01B N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve X x 28
-0r0 N2114 APS Thruster Control Valvc x x 28
-030 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve x X 28
-0I31 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve x X 28
-O42 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve x X 2B
-0113 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve x x 28
-054 N2H4 APS Thruster Control Valve x x 2B
-066 N2114 Relief Valve 1 x 2B
-056 N2H4 Relief Valve 2 x 2B
-057 N2I14 Relief Valve 3 x x 28
i	 -
_u.
Fable 4.6-12. Deployment: Adapter Actuators and Valves
F!^
L1J
Identification
Humber Name/Function
Normnlly
Open Closed
D/A
Arm/Safe
Centro!
(Amp)
Power Monitor Data
Nominal
Value
P	 6
Accuracy	 O
D/A Valves
D/A-11-001 Ile Supply System Primary Valve 1 X 84 4000-TO-50 psi 3200 psi ,no psi 84 84 64 84
-002 tic Supply System Pa 	 ry Valve 2 X 84 1000-TO-50 pal 3200 psi f50 psi 84 84
-003 Ile Supply System Secondary Valve 1 x 84 60-TO-0 psi 50 psi :I psi 84 84 84 s4 84
-004 He Supply System Secondary Valve 2 X 84 60-TO-0 psi 50 psi , ,1 psi '84
-U05 He Bottle Fill (Deployment Adapter) Valve X 128 ON/OFF 3200 psi X50 pal 128 128
-000 He Graund Hold Fuel Panel Purge Valve X 33 ONIOFF 60 psi fl psi 33 33 33 33
-007 He Ground Hold Oxidizer Purge Valve X 33 ON/OFF 50 psi fl psi 33 33 33 32 33
-008 lie Flight G11 2 Vent Valve 1 X X 33 ON/OFF 50 Psi +l psi 33 33 33
-009 He Flight GE2 Vent Valve 2 X X 33 ONiOFF 50 pal 11 pal
-010 Ile Deployment Adapter Vent 1 X 33 ON/OFF 50 pal i4 psi
-011 He 17eployment Adapter Vent 2 Y 33 ONIOFF 50 psi t1 psi
D/A Actintcrs
D/A-DCU-001 Deploymmit Control Arm/Safe Switch X 224 Arm or Safe
-002 Fluid Umbilical Panel Control I X X 150 Engaged or Disengaged
-003 Fluid Umbilical Panel Control 2 X X 150 Engaged or Disengaged
-004 Tug IloMion Actuator X X 355 Up or Down
-005 ElemAcal Umbilical Panel Control x X 150 Engaged or Disengaged
-006 Tag Capture batches lI0) X X 448 Engaged or Released 448
1i
S
.ti
^9i19h!(Pid'd2 ab:....	 _ _ ^	 -	 —.lt y'L,-rav^^wen^tii^ • _ -..,. __.. a^tio-	 - -..n......xn.^....:,.w._........afwd^k,.,.-.. .,,r
Figure 4.6-6. Preliminary Tug Inte:
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to the Tug and Spacecraft. Where it is desired to connect Orbiter power to the Tug/
spacecraft (descent operations); deployment adapter commands initiated via the Tug
'	 payload support equipment are transmitted to the Tug vehicle power change-over
switch, causing it to assume the external power mode (disconnecting the Tug from its
fuel cells), then power is applied to the Tug via the deployment adapter power control
switch. The Tug is configured so that when external power is applied to the Tug its
critical power bus, which supplies the Tug CIU/DIU communication system, is ener-
gized thus allowing selective power control of the other Tug systems or application of
z power to the Tug payloads. This configuration, therefore, allows power to be applied
to payloads during prelaunch and maintenance operations without activation of the total
Tug avionics system. Additionally, a ground transfer power interface is provided for
3	 power application to the Tug/spacecraft during prelaunch ground handling operations.
This allows Tug or spacecraft safety functions to be continuously monitored (if
'r required).
T"Q
UMBILICAL	 SPACECRAFT
'	 GNO	 GNO TRANSFER POWERr:	 _ +	 _ 
I	 INSTALLATION	 20 VQC700 WATTS MAX
DEDICATED
STA	 +20V
	 ©	 ftPC
=695	 BACKUP	 CMQ	
PWR
CIO
PRELAUNCH
	
RPC
POWER
	
POWER	 SW	 a
0-000 WATTS)
	
CONTROL
j'	 UNIT
TUG FUEL	 pIUCE L L5
STA	 DEDICATED
1307 :1 DIA QTHERBACKUP	 ELECTRONIC	 CIU	 AV ON1CS780 WATTS (MAX)
DEPLOYMENT ADAPTER 	 TUG AVIONICSSYSTEM
ORBITER
	
1
`-	 AFT4	 TUG AND SPACECRAFTCREWCABIN	 150 WATTS	 UNIUUE EQUIPMENTSUP
Figure 4.6-7. Tug Power Distribution Diagram
4.6.4 OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION. The Tug/Orbiter interface operational charac-
teristics are described in this section for prelaunch, launch/descent, and on-orbit
operations. The subjects addressed include: operational command and monitor func-
tions, abort, C&W operations, °.d the associated crew control and Orbiter/Tug sup-
port equipment and software.l:
c_
To augment the information presented in this section, a summary of the Orbiter pay-
load support equipment and its associated capability is included in Appendix D of this
volume, and the Tug aysonic system and Orbiter/spacecraft interfaces are summar-
ized in Volume IU, Section 4.
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Figure 4.6-8. Recommended Interface Operations Allocation
4.6.4.1 Tug/Orbiter Operations per Mission Phase. The recommended baseline
operational allocation of control and monitoring responsibilities for ground, Orbiter
and Tug are shown in Figure 4.6-8. This configuration includes recommendations
from the various sensitivity analyses and from coordination meetings among NASA/
MSFC and the five Tug study contractors. For this recommended operations plan,
the ground facilities are responsible for operations involving detailed data analysis,
large data processing hardware/software acti-0 ties, and for operations where detailed
knowledge of the Tug or its subsystems is needed. The launch complex ground facili-
ties (LPS) will be responsible for Tug/spacecraft prelaunch checkout, interface veri-
fication, Tug propellant loading operations, and monitor and control for caution and
warning functions. These operations will normally be performed by launch crew per-
sonnel using lau: Jh GSE (LPS), which interfaces to t?le Tug/deployment adapter through
the Orbiter T-0 umbilical panels. It should be noted that, although ground operations
will employ Tug independent uplink/downlink capability through the T-0 umbilical, it
is possible and recommended that the normal Orbiter/ground interface communications
links be available as an operational backup mode. No significant Tug/Orbiter checkout
operations are planned to be performed by the Orbiter crew during this time because
1) crew ingress occurs after the majority of prelaunch tests and propellant loading
operations (T-45 minutes), and 2) the Orbiter's vertical position and the orientation
of,the crew seats make impractical any extensive use of the Orbiter payload support
facilities located at the AOS/PSS. Therefore, the only actions required of the Orbiter
crew during this time involve activation of the '.Lug real-time monitor software and
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subsequent monitoring for Tug out-of-tolerance conditions or caution and warning in-
dications. This operation is expected to take only 20 seconds of mission specialist
time and involves a simple Orbiter CRT/keyboard operation.
During Orbiter ascent/descent, no Orbiter crew actions are required in support of Tug
operations other than monitoring Tug caution and warning indicators. During this time
period, the Tug real-time monitoring software (in the GPC) will monitor all Tug critical
fivactions and will 1) indicsite status to the crew (through CRT or CWE) in the event of
anomalous behavior, and 2) cause activation of automatic corrective action sequences
for selected anomaly types and situations. Identification of specific anomalies and the
required corrective action was outside the scope of the current study.
t'	 During ascent and on-orbit operations, the Orbiter is given prime responsibility for
caution and %v... ning monitor and control operations, including Initiation and execution
of Tug abort sequences.
Tug and deployment adapter status and caution and warning parameters will be inter-
leaved with Orbiter telemetry data and transmittal to Orbiter and Tug ground operations
centers for processing during this and other flight-operational periods. The telemetered
data vrHI be immediately analyzed for out-of-tolerance conditions and subjected to trend
analysis to predict potential flight or mission anomalies. Further non real-time pro-
cessing of the data will. be
 performed to aid Tug maintenance operations at the con-
clusion of the current mission.
The Tug/Oribter on-orbit category of operations contains five operational periods
consisting of:
a. Predeployment operations.
b. Deployment operations.
c. Post deployment operations.
d. Precapture operations.
e. Capture operations.
During predeployment operations the Orbiters cargo bay do. is are opened, Tug is
activated, and the status of its operating systems is verified through simple tolerance
checking of Tug and deployment adapter telemetry data. Any detailed or functional
checkout required will be performed through Tug/Orbiter to ground RF data links.
Before initiating deployment operations, a final predeployment status will be per-
formed to verify that all Tug parameters, systems, valves, and actuators are In the
correct deployment configurations.
The deployment sequence is initiated by arming the deployment adapter arm/safe switch
to allow power application for capture latches and rotation actuators. The Orbiter then
releases the forward support fitting latches, and D/A actuators are used to rotate the
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Tug to its 35-degree removal position. The Tug RF communisations system is acti-
vated and Tug/Orbiter RF communication, is established and verified at this time. The
Orbiter crew (PHS) then attaches the RMS to the Tug end effector socket and releases
the D/A capture latches. Latch release includes a push-apart motion that disengages
Tug to D/A alignment devices and electrical umbilicals. If the Tug payload requires
the use of a Tug forward umbilical, the previous two steps must be preceded by re-
traction of that unit.
When the Tug and deployment adapter are disengaged by the capture latches, the Orbiter
remote manipulation system (RMS) assumes full responsibility for Tug position and
attitude control. RMS alignment, attachment, Tug positioning, and deployment adapter
disengagement/insertion are performed using a computer-controlled man-in-the-loop
operation with direct and TV-augmented monitoring. Each major segment of the oper-
ation has specific viewing procedures and control requirements associated with it. TV
cameras mounted on the RMS wrist and de ployment adapter structural shell provide
the additional operator monitoring needed to oversee and adjust the preprogrammed
insertion sequence.
Once the Tug clears the adapter, positioning continues under computer control with
manual jog override until the desired Tub/Orbiter deployment positions are achieved.
The Tug is then released, completing this' operational phase.
Immediately following RMS release the Orbiter performs a backup maneuver with its
nose-mounted axial ACS thrusters. After an initial Orbiter to Tug clearance is obtained
(suggest 100 ft or 30 m), the Tug APS is armed by an Orbiter RF command executed
through the mission specialist Tug control panel, which enables Tug attitude stabiliza-
tion. When the 1-mile (1.85 km) separation is achieved, Tug control is transferred
from Orbiter to ground. During the 1-mile (1.85 km) initial separation, and following
ground handoff, the Orbiter has primary and backup RF control, respectively, of Tug
APS and main propulsion systems through arm/safe switches located in the crew corn-
partment. This backup capability should be limited to a Tug vicinity of 20 miles (37km).
Through an RF link, ground control then commands the Tug actual mission sequence to
begin: extend engine nozzle, arm main Tug propulsion system, and start Tug mission
sequence (GO TO FLIGHT). The Orbiter will have the capability to effect these com-
mands (as a backup mode) in the event of ground facility problems or lack of ground
communications coverage.
After Tug mission completion and Tug return to the Orbiter/Tug rendezvous orbit, the
Tug ground operations cause the Tug to be safed through Tug/Ground RF data and com-
mand links. Safi.ng operations include main propellant tank drain and vent, retraction of
the main engine nozzle, main propulsion system safing, attitude holding through the
APS, and status (safe for Orbiter retrieval) verification. After handoff has been accom-
plished, the Orbiter crew verifies the Tug safety status and performs the rendezvous
maneuver.
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During Tug/Orbiter capture operations the Orbiter approaches the Tug and positions its
RMS within wrist extension distance (24 inches (61 em)) of the Tug end effector socket.
When this alignment is obtained, both the Tug and Orbiter auxiliary propulsions systems
are turned off (Tug's through Orbiter RF command), the EMS is attached to the Tug,
and the Orbiter RCS is re-enabled to maintain Orbiter attitude. The Orbiter program
for retracting the Tug through automated EMS control under flight crew (PHS) super-
vision is then activated and the Tug is positioned into the Tug deployment adapter.
Insertion is completed by D/A capture latch engagement (under the control of the Tug
deploy/capture panel), which draws the separation interface together and mates the
` .	 safety critical (caution and warning) electrical umbilicals. Orbiter RF to hardwire
communications handoff is verified, and the Tug plus deployment adapter is rotated 35
degrees back into the cargo bay followed by forward support fitting latch engagement
and Orbiter verification of Tug status. The forward umbilical panel is re-engaged,
+28V DC power supply transferred from Tug to Orbiter fuel cells, and the Tug fuel
cells are shut down. Tug propellant tank safing and repressurizati.on is accomplished
through a GPC software program, which controls Tug and the abort helium supply
located in the deployment adapter. The deployment adapter syste_a (capture latches,
rotary actuators) is safed for return by removing the power supply to these functions
through the Tug panel arm./safe switch.
Orbiter/Tug descent and landing operations are primarily involved with monitoring the
applicable Tug caution and warrn.ng functions and maintaining Tug propellant tank and
tank MLI system pressures above ambient. No special Tug/Orbiter control and mon-
itor operations are associated with the Orbiter after touchdown. After rollout, addi-
tional Tug propellant tank and insulation purging is accomplished using ground-supplied
helium. Post-landing hydrogen venting, if required, is performed with the Orbiter
in-flight relief until an appropriate OH 2 vent umbilical is attached to the Orbiter T-0
fuel panel disconnect. Safety monitoring capability during Tug removal is supplied
from a deployment adapter attached ground power umbilical.
4.6.4.2 Tug/Orbiter Interface Operation. Tug/Orbiter interface control and monitor
operations start and terminate with the Orbiter crew or the Tug support equipment
located in the Orbiter crew compartment. This section discusses the operation of the
various Tug/Orbiter avionics interfaces employed during flight operations: 1) normal
control, 2) normal monitor, 3) caution and warning, and 4) sating/abort control.
The Tug/Orbiter flight operations described in Section 4.6.4.1 are monitored or con-
trolled through an Orbiter multifunction CRT display system (MODS) CRT and keyboard
terminal located at the MSS through one of three Tug-unique control and monitor panels,
or through the Orbiter-supplied payload caution and warning annunciator panel. Three
Tug-unique panels were selected (as opposed to only one) for three reasons:
1, It was found that the aft crew cabin control and monitor functions fall into three
main categories, a) those associated with Tug initialization, checkout, and RF
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control operations, b) those associated with deploymelt and capture of the Tug
and its spacecraft from the Orbiter, and c) those associated with Tug abort and
safing operations.
2. These panels are functionally most convenient when located near the Orbiter work
stations related to the Tug/Orbiter task being performed.
3. The use of Tug-unique panels aids the Orbiter crew effectivity (see crew effectivity
analysis of Section 4.6.5) by simplifying repeatable, routine but error-prone
operation to a flip of a switch. Note that all panel operations could be performed
through CRT and keyboard control.
These three panels and the associated control and monitor functions are illustrated in
Figures 4.6-9 through 4.6-11.
MISSION SPECIALIST STATION
TUG ABORT CONTROL PANEL
Dt5
	 AUT	 OFF OCL OFF OCL OCN OFF CL OFF
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II
O Q
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r
O	 ^o
DISABLE	 AUTO	 OFF CLOSED OFF CLOSED CLOSED -OF-- CLOSED OFF
Figure 4.6-9. Tug Abort Control Panel
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Figure 4.6-10. Tug Checkout, Initialization, and Safing Panel
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Tug deployment/capture functions are located
PAYLOAD HANDLING STATION	
at the payload handling station (PHS) near the
	
TUG DEPLOYMENTICAPTJRE
	 aft window, and the initialization, C/O, and
safi.ng panel is located near the MSS CRT dis-
plays. The abort control panel is also located
	
FORWARD TUG	 CAPTURE
at the MSS but positioned such that the mis-
	
DEPI.0V UMBILICAL ROTATION LATCHES SPARE	 SPARE	 sion specialist has easy access to it duringARM	 RETRACT
	 UP	 RELEASE	 ON	 ON
1
	 - O ^	 O the Orbiter ascent mission phase. In general,
19:
	 the switch functions shown are arranged such
	
SAfE ENGAGE DOWN ENGAGE 	 OfF	 OFF	 that their operation proceeds from left to
right and the indicated function is executed
Figure 4.6-11. Tug Deployment/ 	 when the switch is in the up position. Two
Capture Panel	 status lights (low-power led type) are shown
above each function switch to indicate func-
tion status (function initiated - red, function complete -- green). The operation of these
panels, as well as the operation of the Orbiter MCDS and the Orbiter C&W and payload
support equipment to effect Tug/deployment adapter control, is discussed below.
Normal Control and Monitor. The Tug/spaceera . t^- Orbiter control and monitor inter-
faces used for normal in-flight operational phases are shown in Figure 4.6-12. Tug
telemetry data (through PSP units) and deployment adapter serial data is input to the
PD1, where it is decommutated and stored into 2048 x 16 bit PDl buffer memory units.
The contents of this memory is transmitted on demand to the active PCM master unit,
where the data will be interleaved into the Orbiter 128 kbps downlink-, placed. onto
Orbiter tape recorders, or made available to the Orbiter's GPC system through one of
the five redundant data bus systems connecting the two PCM master units to the five
GPC computers.
Access to PCM te^emetry data is controlled by GPC operating system software, which
both requests data from the master PCM units and loads (updates) the data in payload-
dedicated rapid-access memory locations within the GPC system. Tug--unique control
and monitor soffivare would access this same telemetry table to verify Tug/deployment
adapter status and to monitor the results of previous commands or to monitor Tug/
deployment adapter caution and warning parameters.
All commands transmitted to the Tug or the deployment adapter will emanate as a re-
sult of Tug and/or Orbiter software control. Ground-generated RF commands are
received b, the Orbiter S-band communication system, processed in the GPC system,
and routed to the Tug or deployment adapter in a 2k baud serial format through the
appropriate Orbiter payload MDM, PSP, and PI units. in a like manner, other Tug
or deployment adapter commands are generated by Orbiter or Tug-support software
associated with the GPC system.
Tug support software is activated in one of three ways: 1) by the Orbiter crew via the
Tug-unique control panels located at the MSS and payload handling stations, 2) b y the
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Figure 4.6-12. Normal Tug Control/Monitor Interface
Orbiters MCDS display and Keyboard units located at the MSS, or 3) by automatic Tug
safing software programs activated by the Tug caution and warning monitor programs.
As indicated above, normal routine operations that occur in sequence for each Tug
mission are initiated by switches located on the Ting control panels. Each switch out-
put is connected to one of the discrete input channels associated with the payload MDM
unit. The change of state associated with the panel switch operation will be monitored
by the Orbiter GPC software, which will detect the change of state and update a data
table in memory. Periodic scanning of this table by Tug-unique real-time monitor
software in the GPC will detect change of state (pseudo priority interrupt) and cause
execution of the appropriate Tug application program to accomplish the desired task.
Are example of this type of operation is the Tug initialization command. Operation of
the Tug initialization switch by the mission specialist will cause a discrete input to
the P/L MDM to activate Tug support software in the GPC. In this case the Tug ini-
tialization software will format a command to be transmitted to the Tug DMS (through
the PSP), telling the Tug DMS to execute its initialization sequence. The GPC initial-
ization software will then monitor the progress of the Tug initialization through the Tug
telemetry downlink (through the PDI). This action causes a red light above the control
panel switch to light, indicating the desired action has started. Any anomalies asso-
ciated with the planned initialization sequence or status messages will be displayed to
the mission specialist through the MSS CRT display unit.
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When the Tug initialization sequence is successfully completed and verified, the GPC
software will cause a green light associated with the Tug control panel switch to light
from a discrete output command from the P/L MDM, then terminate. A program flag
in memory associated with the program successful termination will then allow the next
task in the deployment/capture operating procedure to be activated.
An additional data link is used to transmit GMT timing data to the Tug DMS from the
Orbiter MTU. This data will be transmitted in a standard IRIG-B digital format and
is decoded by the Tug avionics to provide the Tug with synchronized timing accurate
to one ms.
Operation Support Software. Tug unique software associated with the Orbiter GPSti	
system required to support the recommended baseline interface concept control and
monitoring operations is shown in Table 4.6-13. The five categories of programs
listed include a preliminary estimate of software characteristics such as processor
memory size, data base size, average response time (tune from program initiation
until completion), and relative program complexity. To aid determining software
development cost, the complexity of each software program was identified by an alpha-
numeric code indicating both the degree of past experience associated with the software
task as well as its relative level of difficulty. This code is shown below:
First Letter
A. We have done this task beford
B. We have done a similar task before
C. New task, no previous experience
Second Numerical
1. Simple (non-real time)
2. Easy (simple but real-time)
3. Average
4. Complex
5. Difficult
In addition to software characteristics, Table 4.6-13 indicates the primary (P) and
backup modes (S, T) of causing execution of each program and the Orbiter control loca-
tion.. The operational phases during vrhich each program would normally be executed
are also shown.
Baseline software services and programs available from the Orbiter are listed below:
a. Memory. 10, 000 32-bit words are offered by the Orbiter for payload use.
1, half word instructions are permitted — (thus, two instructions could be packed
into one 32-bit word).
2. Math library services are provided (square root, sine, cosine) external to
the 10, 000-word allocation.
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-1,6-13. Tug 'Orbiter Software for Ascent, Deployment and Capture
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Orbiter Control Location Software Characteristics Operational Phase
Abort Deploy lnitiallze KB Memory Data Speed Kops Response Ascent/ Pre- Deploy/
Option Software Option Name/Function Control Panel CIO Safe CRT It Base (avg) Time Complexity Descent Deploy Capture I
Tub Caution, Warning wad Abo r t Options
101 Execute Tug Critical Function Status Monitor I P 700 100 0.3 1 see B-2 A,D P D,C
102 Execute Tug Abort :Made 1 or 2, x P, T S 150 50 I	 1.0 0.1 see C-3 A P
Tug Initialization, Checkout
201 Execute Tug Initialization P S 500 200 0.01 30 min B-4 P
I!
202 Execute Tug State Vector, Update P S 200 200 0.033 1 min B-3 P
203 Execute Command Tug Fuel Cell ON/OFF P S 20 5 0.02 1 sec B-2 D,C
204 Execute Command Tug Communications ON/OFF P S 20 5 0.02 1 sec B-2 D, C
205 Execute 'flag Prodployment Status Check P S 2000 500 I	 0.03 1 min B-3 P D
206 Execute Tug Post Capture C/O P 5 2005 500 0.03 1 min B-3 C
207 Execute Tug Post Capture Sating P S 150 50 0 . 003 1 min B-3 C
Tug Deployment/Capture +.,pVons I
301 Execute Deploy Arm /Safe S:vitch to xxxxx i	 P S I	 40 50 0.01 30 see B-2 D,C
302 Execute Retract/Engrgo Fluid Umbilical I	 P S 40 10 0.01 30 sec C-2 D,C
303 Execute Notate D /A Up/Do%vn xxxxx P ° 40 10 0.01 2 min C-2 D,C
304 Execute Retract / Engage Electrical Umbil ical I	 P S 40 10 0.01 30 sec C-2 D,C
305 Execute Engage/Release Capture Latches P 5 40 20 0.01 30 see C-2 D,C
Tug RF Control Options
01 Execute APS Arm /Safe and Switch to xxxxx P S 45 100 0.01 30 sec C-3 D, C
402 Execute Alain Propulsion Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx P S 45 100 0.01 30 see C-3 D
403 Execute Tug Loiter Mode ^ P S 45 100 0. 1 2 see C-3 D
40-. Execute State Vector Update P S 45 100 0.01 30 see C-3 D
405 Execute Go to Flight Command i P S 45 100 0.1 2 sec C-3 D
407 Execute Precapture Sating i P S 2000 100 0,033 1 min `	 C-3 C
Tug Control wad Utility Options
501 Execute Switch to Orbiter Power P S 20 5 0.01 2 sec B-2 P
502 Execute Switch to Tug Internal Power P S 20 0 . 01 2 sec B-2 P
:,03 Execute Switch Tug Power OFF P S 20 0.01 2 sec 13-2 P
541 Execute Tug-D /A (azx) Actuator xx to xxx (ON/OFF) P 65 300 0.5 2 see B-2 P
505 Execute Output Tug-D/A Control Status P 250 300 0.5 2 sec B-2 P
506 Execute Load I • ig DAIS Loc xxx with xxx P 45 10 0.4 1 sec B-2 P
507 Execute Read 'hag DMS Lae xxx with xxxxx P 45 10 0.4 1 sec B-2 P
500 Execute Display Tug TLM xxx continually P 40 500 0 . 4 1 sec B-2 P
M iscellaneous TaWes 1500 AD P D,C
V00d 
4iQ
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b. PCM Data Input. This function inputs the telemetry words to the payload software
from the telemetry data streams. Sof fare use requirements are to provide a
measurement list and sample rate for each measurement.
c. Tolerance Checldng Software. Needs data tables as input, effectively listing
measurement to be tolerance checked, and its high/low limit range. More than
one consecutive tolerance violation is required to trigger a display comment.
Selected variable time variable tolerance limits are permitted.
d'. Display overhead and servicing software is available, (i.e., keyboard interfacing
software, CRT driver software, are provided). Display superstructure software
is estimated to require 200 32-bit words per page. Only data to be displayed need
be input to this superstructure. Mass memory provisions for up to 20 payload-
unique display pages is provided. A mass memory display page can overwrite the
current display page in resident GPC memory.
e. Preprogrammed command sequences can be stored in an MDM PROM and called
from the payload software with one or two commands. Each PROM allows storing
of up to 512 command words. In effect, this feature allows selected (repeated)
command routines to be called as subroutines.
Considering the services offered, and matching them against Orbiter/Tug support soft-
ware needs, it is concluded that the Tug/Orbiter checkout software requirements can
be easily met.	 ,
Orbiter Caution and Warning Interface. The philosophy used in the caution and warning
system is that caution and warning indication. should be used only when a threat to the
safety of the Orbiter or crew manifests itself and immediate crew action is required.
Implicit in this philosophy is the requirement that the crew must have available to them
some action that will counteract the hazard. The caution and warning functions for the
Tug were identified through review of failure modes and effects analysis (FKEA) and
hazard analyses. The caution and warning philosophy and the FMEA are described in
detail in Section 4. 7 of this volume.
A Tug caution and warning philosophy of alerting the Orbiter crew only during periods
of anomalous Tug or Deployment Adapter operation is recommended. Thus, during
normal in-flight operations the Tug master caution, master warning and Orbiter C &W
panel indicators would not be illuminated. In addition, the MSS CRT display would pre-
sent no Tug caution and warning information.
The safety of the Shuttle and its crew is ensured during both Tug attached and detached
modes by providing appropriate crew Tug caution and warning indicator in a timely
and reliable manner. The caution and warning indicators recommended consist of a
master Tug caution, a master Tug war n'' _gig and provisions for five specific warning
indicator functions on the payload warning indicator panel. B is suggested that these
indicators be grouped and located on the aft-facing instrument panel at the forward
?i
ww
4-279
d
side of the mission specialist station (within view of the mission specialist during ascent
operations). In addition to these caution and warning indicators, use of the MSS CRT
and keyboard is recommended for display of detailed caution and warning data and
corrective action aids.
During operational phases when the Tug is attached to the Orbiter, two operationally
redundant communication paths are used to transmit the ten Tug and seven deployment
adapter caution and warning measurements to the Orbiter. During detached operations
(deployment and capture), continuous monitoring of Tug and spacecraft C&W functions
is mair_tained through the Tug/Orbiter RF telemetry link. Tug antenna loading and the
final rotation angle will be designed such that this link may be established and verified
after Tug rotation but before retraction of the Tug deployment adapter umbilicals.
For warning signals the primary path is implemented by hardwiring the output of the
three Tug warning sensor parameters (N2H4 pressure, L02 tack pressure, and LH2
tank pressure) directly to the Orbiter caution and warning electronics unit as shown in
Figure 4.6-13. Annunt;iators associated with single or multiple combinations of inputs
to this unit will be activated when the input signal characteristics exceed either high or
low out-of-tolerance levels (98 increments of approximately 5( ­ v steps between 0. 1
and 5 Vdc;).
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Figure 4.6-13. Tug Caution and Warning Monitor Interface
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Figure 4.6-14. Typical Tug Warning
Implementation
MISSION SPECIALIST
STATION
TUG WARNING PARAMETERS
N2 H4 TANK OVERPRESSURE
L02 TANK OVERPRESSURE
LH2 TANK OVERPRESSURE
L02 TANK UNDERPRESSURE
LH2 TANK UNDERPRESSURE
In the secondary path for transmitting Tug
warning signals to the crew, the warning
data from separate sensors is multiplexed
onto the Tug telemetry data stream an
transmitted to the crew through the PSP/
GPC/MSS CRT display equipment, Figure
4.6-14. 'lug and Orbiter C&W software
will allow the crew to further monitor the
anomaly and relate its cause. It should be
noted that no warning functions associated
with the deployment adapter have been
identified.
Warnings result in 1) illumination of the master warning light, 2) illumination of a
specific warning light, 3) continuous sounding of the warning tone, and 4) an indica-
tion on the CRT of the warning condition and the crew action to be taken. Tb.e master
warning and the warning
 tone can be reset to OFF, but the specific warning light and
the CRT display will .remain active until the hazardous condition is actually cleared.
The crew visual alert indicators for a typical Tug warning anomaly are shown in
Figure 4.6-15. When the warning condition causing the alert is detected by the
Orbiter avionics (C&W electronics or TLM/GPC), the master caution indicator will
7UG
WARNINGMASTER INDICATORS TUGCAUTION
ER C&W PANEL
MSS CRT DISPLAY" 
"N
O	 ORBITER C&W PANEL	 Q
N2Hq
02' L
LO1 HI
LHZ LO
LHy HI
Q	 Q
Figure 4.6-15. Tug Caution and Warning Crew Alert for Warning Condition
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be illuminated, the specific Tug warning lamp on the Orbiter C &W panel located at the
MSS will be illuminated, and a GPC-generated message describing the specific anomaly
and corrective action information will be displayed on the MSS CRT display. The cor-
rective action message would include the manual operation available to correct the
problem as well as identification of the CRT page code (OPS X--\'X-X) associated with
the Tug-unique Orbiter software programs required to investigate or correct the an-
omaly under computer control.
In the example illustrated, the software programs on the CRT page referenced by the
display OPS X-XX-X code might: 1) allow control of the Tug vent valves, 2) initiate an
L02
 propellant dump sequence, 3) allow verification of the L02
 system status, or 4)
present the L02
 tank pressure history for the past five minutes.
Figure 4.6-16. Typical MSS CRT For-
mat to Investigate
"Warning" Alert
61AS1EH
CAUTION
AM'"	 TLM No ISF"! NI]
E
7LN No 7
UM
l dS^:M
SEN NU ?
Figure •1.6-17. Typical Tug/Deploy
ment Adapter. Caution
The CRT format of Figure 4.6-16 repre-
sents typical data that might be displayed on
the MSS CRT as the Orbiter crew investi-
;ates an anomaly causing a Tug warning
alert. In the case illustrated, the results
of two Tug-unique softtivare programs lo-
cated in the Orbiter GPC system are shown,
Can the left side of the CRT, the Tug L02
system status is displayed indicating that
both (primary and secondary) Tug L02
 tank
vent valves are closed. This system status
data also indicates that other valves and
actuators associated with the Tug LO2 sys-
tem are in the proper configuration.
On the right side of the CRT, a 5-minute
plot of the LO2 tank history is displayed
(updated once a second). This histogram
would indicate that one normal op,^ration
cycle of the Tug L02 vent valves occurred
(between times 0 and 1. 7 on chart) before
anomalous operation began and that the L02
tank pressure was rapidly approaching a
danger level.
Implementation	 As indicated in Figure 4.6-17 the seven
Tug and seven deployment adapter caution
measurements will he transmitted (in a redundant manner) in the respective TLM
downlinks. Cautions result in 1) illumination cf the master caution light, 2) intermit-
tent sounding of the warning tone, and 3) an indication on the CAT of the caution condi-
tion and the crew action to be taken. The master caution light and the warning tone
can be reset to OFF, but the CRT display will remain active until the potentially haz-
ardous condition is cleared.
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The crew visual alert indicators for a typical Tug caution anomaly are shown in Fig-
ure 4. 6.4-11. 'When a caution condition is detected by the software program monitor-
ing Tug/deployment adapter TLM data, the Tug master caution indicator will be illu-
minated (under software control) from an output from the payload MDM. In addition,
a message describing the specific problem and corrective action information will be
displayed on the MSS CRT display. The corrective action data displayed would include
the manual operation available to correct the problem (if any), as well as identifica-
tion of the unique CRT page code (OPS X-XX-X) associated with the invastiga.tion or
automatic corrective action for the specific caution anomaly. In the case illustrated
in Figure 4.6-18, the CRT page referenced by the OPS X-XX-X code might allow:
1) the operator to execute a software program to activate the deployment adapter switch
(D/A-E-1 r) to disarm the deployment adapter, ox 2) verify the deployment adapter
status through another program.
The data in Figure 4.6-19 indicates typical data that might be displayed on the MSS
CRT as the Orbiter crew investigates an anomaly causing a caution alert. In the ease
illustrated, the mission specialist has caused execut-on of a Tug-unique software pro-
gram located within the Orbiter GPC system to determine the deployment adapter
status.
It is felt that Orbiter crew effectiveness will be enhanced and problem recognition and
solution time will be reduced if color displays are made available for payload opera-
tions. A suggested color scheme is to use: 1) red for caution and warning messages,
PIASTER INDICATORS	 TUG^
	EWARCAUTION 
ARBITER C&+nl PANEL JOS
MSS CRT DISPLAY N
U	 ORBITER C&N1 PANEL	 Q
N2H4
L0 2 L0_
L02 Hi	 ^S@ J4'N
LH2 LO
	
^O
LH2 HI
0	 0
TUG CAUTION PARAMETERS
APS ISO VLV OPEN
ME ISO VLV OPEN
ME ARMISAFE ARMED
APS ARMISAFE ARMED
APS CLUSTER FAILED
APS PRt ELEC FAILED
APS PROP LOW
DEPLOYMENTIADAPTER
CAUTION PARAMETERS
DEPLOY ARM/SAFE ARMED
TUG/ADAPTER LATCH OPEN
TUGiSUPPOFIT LATCH OPEN
TUG/ORB DISC OPEN
H2 IN LCM
H2 IN PIL BAY
N 2H4 IN PIL BAY
Figure 4, 6-18. Tug Caution and Warning Crew Alert for Caution Condition
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Figure 4.6-19. Typical MSS CRT
Format to Investigate
Caution Alert
out of tolerance indication, and undesired
status indicatioa, 2) yellow to indicate cor-
rective action messages, and 3) green to
indicate normal conditions and normal dis-
play operations messages.
Tug/Orbiter Abort and Safing Interface
Operation. A Shuttle abort may result from
either a cargo or Shuttle system anomaly or
malfunction. If a safety critical Tug out-of-
tolerance condition is detected and the appro-
priate corrective action measures are un-
successful, an abort c«E:np of Tug propellants
may be required.
Three operational methods of executing saf-
ing and abort commands are available to the Orbiter crew and the ground-based Tug.
The primary technique consists of initiating safing or abort sequences by Tug abort
panel switches, causing execution of a Tug software support program to transmit the
associated uplink commands to the Tug DAIS through the CIti). The 'rug DAIS would
then activate the proper Tug actuator(s) and verify that the proper abort activity occur-
red. The associated Orbiter support S/W program would verify the action by monitoring
Tug telemetry data. Two backup modes ensure abort operations through either an MSS/
PSS automatic sequence or, if necessary, the MSS operator can execute the abort con-
trols manually. Three abort control switches allow control of abort enable, manual
versus automatic operation, and the abort execution command. The abort enable switch
ensures that at least two switch operations are required to initiate the abort sequence
thus limiting the probability of an inadvertant crew initiated abort.
If the manual abort mode is selected, seven additional switches allow control of the
individual abort operations. To effect the dumping of Tug LH2 and L02 propellants,
suitable settling thrust must be provided to orient the propellants over the tank drain
outlets. Orbiter thrust availability is dependent on the mission phase during which
abort is initiated. For early aborts, return to launch site (RTLS) and abort once
around (AOA), sufficient settling thrust and duration are provided by the Space Shaa.ttle
main engines (SSME) or orbital maneuvering system (OAIS) for dump completion. For
later aborts, abort to orbit (ATO) or abort from orbit (A FO), the Orbiter has insuffi-
cient propellant quantity and settling thrust to provide orientation from dump initiation
to propellant depletion. To obtain complete dump during these abort modes, Tug pro-
pellants are exhausted axially at the Orbiter dump ports to provide settling thrust dur-
ing the intermediate dump period. Orbiter OMS or RCS thrust is used at dump initia-
tion and termination for settling orientation and residual reduction, respectively.
During detached operations, the Orbiter crew and ground stations have the capability
of safing the Tug through RF control using the standard Tug RF uplink system and
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I	 command decoder units (redundant also). Normal RF sating commands transmitted by
the Orbiter are the APB arm./safe commands, used to enable or disable the Tug APB
system during deployment/capture operations, and the loiter anode command, used to
direct the Tug to assume a safe stable condition (APS system on, main propulsion sys-
tem off.) The Tug/Orbiter interfaces associated with the Tug safing and abort opera-
tions are shown in Figure 4.6--20.
DETACHED
MODE
a PRIMARY ABORT UNDER TUG CONTROL
-- INITIATED VIA COMMAND TO DMS
a SECONDARY MODE TO TUG ACTUATORS
— DIRECT CONTROL OF ACTUATORS VIA COMMAND
DECODER LINK
m OPERATIONAL BACKUP VIA REDUNDANT PSPICOMMAND DECODER
Figure 4.6-20. Tug Safing and Abort Operations and interfaces
t'
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4. 6. 5 CREW EFFECTIVITY/MAN--MACHINE INTERFACE. A crew effectivity,/man-
machine interface analysis was conducted to 9.ssess Zhe. ability o=' the Orbiter crew to
perform the interface functions necessary for Tug monitor and control. In this study
the analysis consisted of two main parts:
a. Analysis to determine concept validity (i.e., can the crew member at the appro-
priate Orbiter crew station accomplish the required tasks within the limits of
available operation time, physical ability, and operational complexity,
b. Analysis to determine the degree of manual (crew controlled) versus automated
control and monitoring of Tug operational functions.
Crow Effectivity Analysis. In performing the crew effectivity analysis, a timeline was
developed for a geosynchronous placement and return mission. Crew activities were
assigned and task durations established for the recommended baseline i:ilplementation
concept. Crew task time requirements were summed per mission phase and compared
with the time available to accomplish the tasks. The results, which are summarized
in Table 4.6-14, show that with a three--man Orbiter crew, more than adequate time
is available to accomplish the required tasks daring all normal mission phases.
(Orbiter/Tug abort timelines were not considered in this analysis.) In this table, time
available for crew operations is shown in, parenthesis under each mission phase head-
ing followed by required crew times for the mission specialist, pilot, commander, and
payload specialist.
It should be noted that only one crewman is required for Tug monitor and control oper-
ations for all mission phases except deployment and capture, and that the total time
required for Tug activities is 4. 5 manhours out of a total of 55, 3 for a three-man crew.
The duties of the mission specialist were separated into two categories corresponding
to: 1) tasks that are the dedicated responsibility of the mission specialist, and 2)
tasks that could be performed by a payload specialist (if necessary).
This separation of duties was performed to determine the task mix ratio between the
mission specialist and a Tug payload specialist (if one were employed). The results
indicate that mission specialist duties require approximately 33 minutes compared
with 66 minutes of Tug monitor and control oriented duties. Most important, how-
ever, the results indicate that during periods when a mission specialist would be busy,
the payload specialist would be idle (and vice versa). Furthermore, unless the pay-
load specialist had other duties pertaining to the Tug's spacecraft, he would be re-
quired for only 66 minutes out of an 18.6 hour mission.
It is therefore recommended for Tug missions that the mission specialist be trained
in Tug flight operations and that the payload specialist function (if required) be dedi-
cated for the Tug's spacecraft operations. Other arrangements supporting this con-
clusion are based on the fact that Tug payloads occupy approximately 40 percent of
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Table 4,6-14. Orbiter Crew Activity Summary
Crewman
{operation
(Hr:Min:Sec)
Prelaunch
(45 Min)
Ascent
(10 Hr, 32 Min)
Deploy
(1 Hr, 16 Min)
Return/
Capture
(5 Hr, 43 Min)
Descent
(20 Min)
Mission C&W & RF Comm Tug 0:20 0;20 0:05 ^ 30:10 2:00 ^ 36:00 31:30 31:30 0:00 2:002:00Specialist Control/Monitor 0:00 30:05 34:00 0:00 ,
Pilot Deployment/Capture 0:00 0:00 41:00 55:00 0:00
Commander Vehicle Control 0:00 0:00 9:00 43:00 0:00
P/L Specialist No task 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
r
w4
Orbiter flights. Thus training of a limited number of mission specialists to perform
Tug deployment and capture duties will probably be easier and more cost effective
than training Tug specialists to be familiar with many diverse spacecraft functions;
or worse, qualifying a large number of spacecraft specialists to perform Tug deploy-
ment duties. The detailed data from which the results of Table 4.6--14 were obtained
is presented in Table 4.6-15. This table separates each mission phase into the indi-
vidual mission events required and identifies the vehicle affected, event start/stop
times, crew member involved, and Tug/Orbiter support software required.
Ilan-Machine Interface. Analysis of the crew man-machine interface environment was
also conducted to determine a recommended concept for: 1) the degree of manual con-
trol versus crew automated support, and 2) types and locations of crew display and
control devices. This analysis was conducted with respect to limits of crew physical
ability, response time operational complexity, crew training requirements, and data
access requirements.
The recommended launch and on-orbit positions of the commander, pilot, and mission
specialist are indicated in Figures 4.6-21 and 4.6-22.
During prelaunch activities, the crew will be constrained to a reclining position by the
launch attitude of the Orbiter, thus it is recommended that Tug activities performed
during this period be restricted to executing a small number of Orbiter software
options to perform C &W monitoring and Tug status verification through the Orbiter
CRT display system.
During Orbiter ascent the crew will be exposed to 3g acceleration loads, limiting Tug
mission specialist physical activity required to operate control panel switches to for-
ward (f45 degrees lateral) reach locations, which do not require forward body lean.
Monitoring activity during this period will be somewhat less restricted in that the Tug
mission specialist will have sufficient head and neck movement capability to observe
both the forward bulkhead of the mission specialist station and the CRT and control
panels located at the MSS tc his right. During ascent, therefore, it is recommended
that the Tug/spacecraft caution & warning annunciators be located forward of the mis-
sion specialist on the forward bulkhead of the MSS, and that backup C&W information
be automatically displayed on the MSS CRT display to the mission specialist's right-
hand side.
During on--orbit operations, including Tug deployment and capture, the crew has
greater liberty to move about the Orbiter cabin. Control and monitor interfaces may
be designed and located to facilitate each crewman's task. For Tug deployment it is
recommended that the commander maintain control of the Orbiter (through the aft
vehicle control station) while the pilot controls Tug deployment through the remote
manipulator station and a Tug deployment control panel. Mission specialist duties
would include execution of the control for arming and safing the deployment adapter
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Table 4.6-15.	 Tug Crew Effectivity Analysis (I/T 74-025)
Orbiter	 Event
C.biter 	 SM	 Start Time
Event came
	 Vehicle	 Crow	 S/W	 Time
	
Hr hUn Sec
Event
Duration
Hr Min See
Elapsed
Time
Ur Min Sec
1.0.0 Prelaunch Operations G/T -2	 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
1, 1.0 Power Data hilt, and Comm. G/T -2	 0 0 0 0 0 -2 0 0
1.2.0 L04, LH2 Tank Chiildown G/T -2	 0 0 0 10 0 -1 50 0
1.3.0 Insulation, Membrane Purge G/T -1 50 0 2 0 49 0 10 49
1.4.0 L02 Slow Fill G/T -1 50 0 0 10 0 -1 40 0
1.5.0 LH2 Slow Fill G/T -1 50 0 0 13 0 -1 37 0
1. G.0 L02 Fh st Fill G/T -1 40 0 0 24 0 -1 16 0
1, 7.0 LH2 Fast Fill G/T -1 37 0 0 25 0 -1 12 0
1. S.0 L02 Slow Fill G/T -1 16 0 0 4 0 -1 12 0
1, 9.0 LH2 Slow rill G/ 1 -1 12 0 0 5 0 -1 7 0
1.10.0 Propellant Utilization Check {Qty. ITOG) G/T -1	 5 0 0 1 0 -1 4 0
1.11.0 Continuous Feel Replenishment G/T -1	 5 0 1 3 45 0 1 15
1.12.0 Crew Entry O/T -0 45 0 0 15 0 -0 30 0
t 1.13.0 Initiate Caut. & Wng. Flt, hlonit. O/T MS	 101	 Cont. -0 30 0 0 0 20 -0 29 401.14.0 Subsystem States Check C/T -0	 5 0 0 2 0 -0 3 0
1.15.0 Secure Propellant Replenishment )Stop Topping) G/T -0	 1 15 •0 0 15 -0 1 0
1.16.0 Termination Insulation Purge G/T -0	 0 40 0 0 0 -0 0 40
1.17.0 Loclt LH2 and L02 Vent Valves G/T -0	 0 40 0 0 20 0 0 40
1.18 . 0 Initiate Automatic Launch Sequence Orbiter -0	 0 32 0 0 S -0 0 27
1 1.19.0 Enable Thrust Vector Control Hyd. Orbiter 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.20.0 Enable Arm/Safe Switch No. 1 Orbiter 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 000
to 2.0.0 Launch to Orbit Orbiter 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1.0 Liftoff Orbiter 0	 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.1.1 Begin Ascent Guidance - Pitchover Orbiter 0	 0 5 0 0 15 0 0 20
2.1.2 Roll Maneuver Orbiter 0	 0 6 0 0 25 0 0 31
2.1.3 Begin Gravity Turn -End Pitchover Orbiter 0	 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 20
a^ 2.2.0 Un[eck LH2 and L02 Vent Valves Tug 0	 1 50 0 0 0 0 1 50
^+
Q^
2.3.0 SRM Burnout/SeparaHan Orbiter 0	 2 5 0 0 0 0 2 5
N 2.4.0 Main Engles Cutoff Orbiter O	 5 4 0 0 4 0 8 42.5. 0 Jettison External Tank (Retrofire) Orbiter 0	 8 26 0 0 40 0 9 G
2.0.0 Achieve Initial Earth Orbit Orbiter 0	 8 49 0 3 11 0 12 0
2.6,1 MIS Burn Orbiter 0	 8 49 0 1 21 0 10 10
2.6.2 Lock LH2 and L02 Vent Valves Tug 0 10 19 0 0 1 0 10 20
C- "*U 2.6.3 Enable Zero-G Vent Devices Tug 0 10 49 0 0 1 0 10 60
2.6.4 Terminate All Purges Tug 0 10 49 0 0 0 0 10 49
2.6.5 Coast Operations 0rNter 0 10 49 0 1 11 0 12 0
t.a 2. 7.0 Cargo Initial Preparation Orbiter 0 12 0 0 0 0 0 12 0
2,7.1 Release Cargo Bay Locks Orbiter 0 12 0 0 0 30 0 12 30
2.7.2 Open Orbiter Cargo Bay Doors Orbiter 0 12 30 0 1 0 0 13 30
2.7.3 Verify Electrical Power to Tug O/T MS 0 14 0 0 0 5 0 14 5
2.7.4 Activate Tug Initialization O/T MS	 201	 30 Min 0 15 0 0 30 0 0 45 0
2.7.5 Monitor Tug Critical Parameters O/T &IS 0 16 0 0 0 5 0 16 5
Table 4.6--15. 'Atg Crew Effectivity .Analysis (I/T 74025) (COntd)
Orbiter Event Event Elapsed
Orbbiter S/w Start Time Duration Time
Event Event lame Vehicle Crew S 1V Time Hr ,lain Sec Hr Alin Sec Hr Min Sec
2.8.0 OMS Burn (Transfer to 160 x 150 N.M1.) Orbiter 0 41 14 0 1 52 0 43 6
2.4.0 Coast Operations Orbiter 0 43 G 0 42 50 1 26 2
2.10.0 OMS Barn (Circularize at 150 N. MI,) 1 26 2 0 0 55 1 26 57
2.11.0 OMS Burn Complete 1 26 57 0 0 0 1 26 57
2,12.0 Update Guidance and Navigation 1 27 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2.13.0 Coast Operations, Mission Dependent O	 iter 1 27 0 9 19 0 10 40 0
3.0.6 Predeployment O/T 10 4G 0 2 0 0 12 46 0
3.1.0 Tug/Orbiter Status Checks O/T 10 46 0 0 0 0 10 46 0
3.1.1 Checkout Manipulator Control Station Orbiter P 10 46 0 0 2 0 10 48 0
3.1.2 R0ease Manipulator Latches Orbiter P 10 48 0 0 1 0 10 49 0
3.1.3 Checkout Manipulator Orbiter P 10 44 0 0 5 0 10 54 0
3.1.4 Tug Status Check (Verify Tug/PL Readiness) O/T 'MS 205 1 min 10 46 0 0 10 0 10 56 0
3,1.5 P/L Status Check O/PL
3.2.0 Orient Orbiter for Tug Deployment Orbiter C 16 s6 0 0 5 0 11 1 0
3.3.0 D/A Arm/Safe to Arm O/T P 361 30800 11 I 0 0 0 11 2 0
3.3.1 Align Tug IMU to Orbiter MU (state vector O/T MS 202 1 min 11 2 0 0 1 0 11 5 0
Ph. update)
3.3.2 Unlatch Tug Forward Attachment O/T P 302 30500 11 3 0 0 1 0 11 4 0
to 3.3 . 3 Retract Fluid Umbilicals O/TO 3.3.4 Verify Adaptor Ready for Rotation Orbiter P, tits 11 4 0 0 1 0 11 3 0
3,3.5 Verify Tug/Payload Beady for Rotation Orbiter P, MS 11 5 0 0 1 0 11 6 0
3.4.0 Rotate Tug out of Bay O/T P :103 2 min 11 10 0 0 5 0 11 15 6
3.5.0 Perform Final Activation/Status Check O/T IIIS 11 15 0 0 0 0 11 15 0
3.5.1 Activate Fuel Cells O/T MS 203 1 sec 11 t5 0 0 2 0 11 17 0
3.5.2 Activate Zug/Orbiter RF Links O/T his 204 1 sec 11 17 6 0 3 0 11 20 0
3.5.3 Switch from Orbiter to Tug Power O/T NIS 502 2 sec 11 20 6 0 1 10 11 20 10
3.5.4 Tug/PL Status (Final Go Ahead) G/Orb, 11 20 0 0 I n 0 11 30 I0
3.5.5 Disconnect Ele, Umbilicals O/T his 304 30 sec 11 32 0 0 1 0 11 3.9 0
3.5.6 Verify Zug/Payload Ready for Deployment G/Orb. MS 11 35 0 0 10 0 11 45 0
3.6.0 Connect Manipulator to Tug Orbiter P 11 36 0 0 5 6 11 41 0
3
3.7.0 D isengage Deployment Adaptor Capture Latches Orbiter Si5 305 30 sec 11 41 0 0 5 6 11 46 0
3.8.0 Deploy Tug O/T
3.8.1 Extend Manipulator Orbiter P
3.8.2 Verify Tug Communication RF Uplink O/T MS 401 11 54 0 0 1 0 11 55 0
3.8.3 Rolense Zug from Manipulator Orbiter P 11 55 0 0 0 lu 11 `.4 10
3.8.4 Orbiter APS Burn — Sep to Safe Distance Orbiter C 401 30 sec 11 56 0 0 G 0 11 56 30
3.9.0 Verify Tug Attitude Control (Visual) O/T P, C 11 59 0 0 2 0 12 01 0
3.10.0 Estab. Gnd—Tug Rr Link, Control G/T Gnd 11 56 0 0 2 0 11 58 0
3.11.0 Retract and Stow 'Manipulator Arm Orbiter P 11 56 0 0 5 0 12 1 0
'	 ^.._	 s	 r	 is
Table 4. 6-154	 Tug Crew Effectivity Analysis (I/T 74--025) (Contd)
Orbiter Event Event Elapsed
Orbiter 5111'	 Start Time Duration Time
went No. Event Name Yelsicie ['rc Time
	
I`_r MW Sec fir Min Sec fir Alin See
3.12.0 Retract and Sto%v Deployment Adaiztor Orb[ter P 21 min	 12 1 0 0 5 0 12 6 0
3.I3.0 Safe Deployment Adaptor Orbiter 1'	 y01 30 sec	 I8 r, 0 0 1 0 12 7 0
3.1$.0 EnaU/Activ 11tg limn Prep Subsystem and G/TIOri)J GnelQIs j 	 11031 30 set,	12 78 0 0 2 0 12 9 0
Extend Nozzle (Automatic)
3.15.0 Perform Pest-Sept.	 Ilig Subsys Checks G/T Gnd 12 1 0 0 20 0 12 21 0
3.16.0 Transmit TLgSubsystems Checkout Data Tug Gad 12 1 0 0 20 0 12 21 0
3.17.0 Verify Payload Ready for Phasing Injection G/T Gltd 12 21 0 q 1 0 12 22 0
3.18.0 Coast (Mission Dependent) Tug 12 21 0 0 26 0 12 47 0
4.0.0 Mission (Geosyn Plemt ^ Retrvl) G/T 12 47 0 0 0 0 12 47 0
4.1.6 Phasing Orbit Tug I2 47 0 0 0 0 12 47 0
4.1.1 Attitude Update Tug 12 47 0 0 5 0 I2 52 0
4.1.2 Position and Velocity Update G/T (Orb.) Gnd {5 [S)	 (404) 30 sec	 12 52 0 0 3 0 12 55 0
4.1.3 Go to Flight G/T (Orb.) Gnd fAlS)	 (405) 2 see	 12 55 0 0 2 0 12 57 0
4.1.4 Compute POI Burn Parameters Tug 12 57 0 0 1 0 12 58 0
4.1.5 Verify MPS Ready for Burn Tug 12 50 0 0 2 0 13 0 0
4.1.6 Maneuverto Burn Attitude Tug ZS 0 0 0 5 0 13 5 0
4.1.7 Report Status to Tug Opus Ctr G/T Gnd 13 5 0 0 1 0 13 6 0
4.1.8 Perform POI Burn (Main Engine) Tttg 13 6 0 0 17 0 13 23 0
4.1.9 Orbiter Monitor Dept/Perf On-Orb Opns Orbiter 13 G 0 0 0 0 13 6 0
4,1.10 Position and Velocity Readout G/T 13 23 0 0 5 0 13 2B 0
l	 i 4.1.11 Report Status to Tug Opns Center G!T 13 28 0 0 1 0 13 29 0
4.1.12 Coast (Mission Dependent) TWg 13 29 0 1 21 0 14 50 0
4.2.0 Transfer Orbit Tug 14 50 0 0 0 0 14 5n 0
4.2.1 Attitude Update 1%g 14 50 0 1 0 0 15 50 0
4.2.2 Position and Velocity 'Update G/T 15 s0 0 0 5 0 I5 55 0
4.2.3 Compute TUT Burn Parameters Tug 15 55 0 0 1 0 15 56 0
4.2.4 Maneuver to Regd Attitude for TOI Burn Tug 15 56 0 0 5 0 15 1 0
4.2.5 Verify Subsystoms Ready for Burn Tug 16 1 0 0 2 o 16 3 0
4.2.6 Report Status to Tug Opns Center G/T 15 3 0 0 2 0 16 5 0
4.2.7 Perform TOI Burn (Main Engine) Tug 16 5 0 0 14 0 16 19 0
4.2.8 Coast, Position and Velocity Update G/T 16 19 0 1 0 0 17 19 0
4.2.9 Determine Params for Midcaurse Correctn Tug 17 14 0 0 1 0 17 20 0
4.2.10 Maneuver to Read Attit for Corr Burn Tug 17 20 0 0 5 0 17 25 0
4.2.11 Report Status to Tug Opus Center G[T 17 25 0 0 2 0 17 27 0
4.2.12 Perform MCC Burn - Pump Idle Mode " [b 17 27 0 0 2 0 17 29 0
4.2.13 position and Velocity Readout G, T 17 29 0 0 S 0 17 34 0
4.2.14 Report Status to Tug Opns Center G/T 17 34 0 0 2 0 17 36 0
4.2.15 Coast Operations TAig 17 36 0 2 32 0 20 B 0
4.3.0 Payload (Geosynchronous) Orbit Trig 20 8 0 0 0 0 20 9 0
4,4.0 Payload Deployment Tug 22 59 0 0 0 0 22 59 0
4.5.0 Payload Target Phasing Orbit G/T 2.1 19 1w 0 0 0 24 19 16
Note is (X)gOrbiter B ackup to Ground Function
r,__ _ - '
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Table 4.6-15. Tug Crew Effectivity Analysis (I/T 74--025) (Contd)
Orbiter	 Event	 Event	 Elapsed
Orbiter S/S4 Start Time Duration Time
Event No. Event Name VCl1Icle Crew SAV Time Hr hfin Sec fir 'Min See fir Min Sec
4.6.0 Rendezvous Orbit Insertion C/T DI 20 0 0 0 0 9.1 20 0
4.6.3 Compute Randez. Circularization Parmas Tug 95 25 a 0 1 0 95 23 0
4.7 Rendezvous With Target Spacecraft Ng 96 20 0 u 0 0 90 20 0
4.8 Payload Docking G/T/PL 98 35 0 0 0 0 98 35 0
5.0 Roturn Rendezvous Tug 102 64 0 0 0 0 78 54 0
5.1.0 Return Transfer Orbit Tug 102 54 a 0 0 0 105 54 6
5.2.0 Return Phasing Orbit rug 108 8 0 0 0 0 108 8 0
5.9.0 Orbiter - Rendezvous Orbit Tug 131 1 0 0 0 0 131 1 0
5.3.1 Attitude Update Tug 131 1 0 1 0 0 132 1 D
5.9.2 Position and Velocity Updata G/T 132 1 0 0 5 0 132 a 0
5.3.3 Compute Rendezvous Orbit Burn Params Tug 132 G 0 0 1 0 132 7 0
5.3.4 Maneuver to ]Reqd Attit for ROI Burn Tug 132 7 0 0 5 0 132 12 0
- 5.3.5 Verify Tug S ubsys Ready for TOI Burn Tug 192 12 0 0 2 0 132 14 0
S.S.G Report Statue to Tug Opno Center G/T 132 14 0 0 2 0 132 IG 0
5.3.7 Perform ROI Burn (Main Eng.) 160 N. Mi. Tug 132 16 0 0 3 a 132 19 0
5.3.8 Position and Velocity Readout O/T P 132 20 0 0 5 0 132 25 G
5.9.9 Stationlmop, Radar Dock -on G/O/T Gad (his ) (403) 2500 132 25 0 0 10 0 132 35 0
5.3.10 Report Statue to Mission Control G/T hi5 132 35 0 a 2 0 132 37 0
6.3.11 Coact Oporations Tug 132 37 0 0 0 0 132 37 0
Le7 5.4.0 Safe Tug G/T Gnd {SiS) (447) 132 30 0 0 0 0 13:: 30 0
_ 5.4.1 Disarm 1ltain Propulsion System G/T Gad (MS) (342) 30 sec 132 30 D 0 0 30 132 30 sD s
-`^ 5.4.2 Close Main Propellant Isol. Valves Itig 132 30 0 0 0 0 132 30 0
5.4.3 Open Main Engine Valve - Dissipate Prop. Tug 132 30 0 0 2 0 132 32 0
5.4.4 Close Main FU.-Ine Valves Tug 132 32 0 0 0 a 132 32 0
5.4.5 Retract Nozzle Tug 132 32 0 0 1 0 132 33 0
5.5.0 Rendezvous with Tug {Orbiter Ops) Orbiter 132 25 0 0 0 0 132 25 0
5.6.1 Arm Deployment Adapter Orbiter P :101 SO sec 132 25 0 0 1 0 132 26 0
5.5.2 Rotate Aaploymt Adaptor to Docking Attit Orbiter P 303 2 min 132 26 0 0 5 0 132 31 0
5.5.3 Release Manipulator Arm Latches Orbiter P 132 31 0 0 1 0 132 32 0
5.5.4 Extend Manipulator Orbiter P 132 32 0 0 3 0 132
35 0
5.5.5. Estate. Comm Between Tug and Orbiter O/T NIS 132 38 0 a 2 0 132 40 0
5.5.6 Verify Orbiter to Tug RF Command O/T NIS 132 39 0 0 1 0 132 40 0
5.5.7 Vert_ry Orbiter leas Tugs Attit Control O/T hi5 403 2 sec 132 39 0 0 2 0 132 41 0
5.5.8 Maneuver to Rendezvous Attitude O/T C, NIS 403 2 sec 132 40 0 0 5 0 132 45 0
5.5.9 Statfonlmop Orbiter C 132 45 0 4 0 0 132 45 0
5.5.10 Verify Deployment Adaptor Ready to Reev Tug Orbiter P 132 45 0 0 2 0 132 47 0
5.5.11 Determine Range and Range Rate Orbiter C 132 47 0 0 5 0 132 52 0
5.5.12 Determine Rendezvous intercept ]Maneuver Orbiter C 132 52 0 0 5 0 132 57 0
5.5.13 Compute Burn Parameters Orbiter C 132 57 0 0 1 0 132 58 0
5.5.14 Maneuver Orbiter for Proper Bum Orbiter C 132 58 0 0 5 0 133 3 a
5.5.15 verify Orbiter Readlnese for Burn Orbiter C 133 3 0 0 1 0 133 4 0
5.5.16 Perform Burn (01AS) Orbiter C 133 4 0 0 3 0 133 7 0
5.5.17 Coast, Holunann rransfor Orbiter C 133 7 0 0 •10 0 I33 47 0
5.5.18 Verify Safety Status of Tug O/T NIS 406 1 min 133 42 0 0 3 0 133 45 0
5.5.19 Orient Orbiter for Final Maneuvers Orbiter C 133 45 0 0 3 G 133 48 D 1i
4.
:N.
T__
Table 4.6-15. Tug -Crew Effectivity Analysis (I/T 74--025) (Contd)
Orbiter Event Event Elapsed
Orbiter S/kv Start Time Duration Time
Event ho. Event Name Vehicle Crew SLv Time Hr Min See 11r	 ,lain	 Sec Hr Alin Sec
5.5,20 Perform Final Burn Maneuvers (APS) Orbiter C 133 48 0 0 5 0 133 53 0
5.5.21 Stationkoep (Crew Task Time) O/T MS 403 133 53 0 2 37 0 136 30 0
105.6.(l Tug-Orbiter pocking O/T 13G 30 0 i0 0) 136 30 0
5.6.1 Cbmmand Tug Orient to Prof Dkng Attitude O/T P, mS 403 136 30 0 0 5 0 • 136 35 0
5.6.2 Vis Insp Tug for Maig Readiness Orbiter C, P 136 35 0 0 5 u 130 40 0
5.6.3 Maneuver Orb to D oohing Pose. Statienkeep O/T C, P 13G 40 0 0 5 0 136 45 0
5.6.4 Inhibit Tug APS system O/T MS 401 30 sec 136 41 0 0 0 0 136 41 0
6.6.5 Attach Manipulator To Tug Orbiter P 136 41 0 0 2 0 136 43 0
5.6.0 Verify Manipulator Attauhment Secure Orbiter P 130 43 0 0 1 0 13G 44 0
5.6.7 Verify Tug Subsys Safe for Retraction O/T MS 406 I min 136 44 3o 0 1 30 136 46 0
5.0.8 Retract '-'ug Onto Adaptor Orbiter P 130 46 0 0 5 0 136 51 0
5.0.9 latch ana 9eeure '14ig to Base Rine O/T P 305 30 see 136 51 0 0 3 0 136 54 0
5.6.10. Connect EIuatrieal Umbilicals O/T P 304 30 sec 136 54 0 0 3 0 136 57 0
5.6.11 Verify Monitoring of Caut. 8: Warning Orbiter l' 101 Cont. 137 7 0 0 0 30 137 7 30
5.6.12 Turn Off RF Unk O/T 1- 204 1 sec 137 7 30 0 0 30 137 8 0
5A.13 Orbiter Prnver to Tug, Fuel Cells Off O/T P 501,203 3 Bee 136 57 0 0 1 0 136 58 0
5.6,14 Release, Stow, Deactivate Ma:dpulator Orbl:ar P 136 58 0 0 3 0 137 1 0
5.6.15 Rotate Tug into Cargo Bay O/T P 303 2 min 137 1 0 0 5 0 137 G 0
dy 5.6.16 latch Tug Forward Position to Orbiter. Orbiter P 137 6 0 0 1 0 137 7 0
F 5.6.17 Connect Fluid Umbilicals O/T P 302 30 see 137 7 0 0 1 0 137 8 0
5.7.0 Phase in Orbit O/T 137 8 0 25 9 0 IG2 17 0C^
6.0.0 Descent Operations Orbiter 102 18 0 0 0 0 162 17 0
G.1.0 Configure Cargo Bay for Reentry Orbiter 162 17 0 0 5 0 162 22 0
6.2.0 Configure Tug Subsys for Reentry O/T AIS 206 1 min IG2 22 0 0 2 0 162 24 0
6.9.0 Secure Loose Articles In Cabin Orbiter 162 17 0 0 10 0 162 27 0
6.4.0 Position and Velocity Update G/O 102 27 0 0 5 0 162 32 0
6.5.0 Re-Orient Orbiter for Descent Firing Orbiter 162 32 0 0 5 0 162 37 0
6.6.0 Cloa.r Cargo Bay Doors Orbiter I62 32 0 0 2 0 162 34 0
. 6.7.0 Compute Do-Orbit Burn Parameters Orbiter 102 37 0 0 1 0 162 38 0
G.8.0 htanauvar to Regd Attit for De-Orb Burn Orbiter 102 38 0 0 5 0 102 43 0
6.9.0 Verify Subsystems Ready for De -Cubit Orb iter 162 43 0 0 2 0 1G2 45 0
6.10.0 Report Status to Mission Control G/O 162 45 0 0 2 0 162 47 0
6.11.0 Perform De-Orbit Burn Orbiter IG2 47 0 0 2 16 162 49 16
6.11.1 Dump Tug Propellants and O/T NIS 207 1 min 1G2 47 0 0 2 0 162 49 0
6.11.2 Purge Tug Tanks Tug 162 40 0 0 4 0 102 53 0
0.12.0 Coast for Atmospheric Entry Orbiter 162 49 30 0 5 30 102 55 0
6.13.0 Re-Orient for At;MOSpI>eric Entry Orbiter 102 55 0 0 5 0 163 0 0
6.14.0 Begin Insulation Purge Tag 162 55 0 0 0 0 162 55 0
6.15.0 Re-Enter Atmosphere Orbiter 163 0 0 0 4 0 163 4 0
6.16.0 Aerodynamic Coact Orbiter 1G3 4 0 0 9 30 163 13 30
6.16.1 Lack LH2 Vent, 9011 Ft Tug 163 4 0 0 0 0 103 4 0
0.16.2 Estab Airspeed and Alt Cntrl Parameters Orbiter 163 4 0 0 4 0 163 8 0
6.16.3 Re-estabIlsh Radio Contacts Orbiter 163 8 0 0 5 0 163 13 0
6.16.4 Verify Radar Coverage Orbiter 163 8 0 0 5 0 163 13 0
6.16.5 Unlock LH2 Vent, 20K Ft Tug 103 9 0 0 0 0 163 9 0
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Table 4.6--15. Tug Crew Effectivity Analysis (I/T 74--025) (Contd)
i Orbiter	 Event Event Elapsed
Orbiter	 SAV	 Start Time Dunitiou 'rime
Event No. Event Nance vchicle Crew	 a/W	 Time	 fir 'lilt sec ilr Min tiec lir in Sec
8,18,6 Prepare Orbiter Subsystems for I-=dittg Orbiter 163	 IO 0 0	 v 0 163 15 0
6.10.7 Configure Cabin for Landing Orbiter 1G3	 12 30 0	 1 0 I63 13 a
7.0.0 Land Orbiter Orbiter 163	 18 0 0	 24 0 163 42 0
7.1.0 Estab communications with Landing Zone G/O 163	 18 0 0	 3 0 1G2 21 0
7.2.0 Gear Down Orbiter 103	 21 0 0	 0 30 163 21 30
7.3.0 Begin Terminal Area Energy Management Orbiter I63	 21 30 0	 20 30 163 42 n
7.3.1 Monitor Airspeed, Altitude Orbiter 103	 21 30 0	 20 30 163 42 n
7.3.2 Final Approach Orbiter 163	 38 0 0	 4 0 163 421 0
7.4.0 Toucl[down Orbiter 163	 42 0 0	 0 0 103 42 0
7.8.0 Rollout Orbiter 163	 42 0 0	 0 45 103 42 45
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Figure 4.6-21. Tug/Orbiter Ascent Crew StationsIn
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Figure 4.6-22. Tug On-Orbit Crew Stations
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and Tug, plus Tug initialization and configuration validation. These commands would
be initiated through a Tug control panel located at the MSS work station. The control
and monitor functions associated with the various control, panels are shown in
Figures 4.6-23 and 4.6-24.
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Figure 4.6-23. Tug Man-Machine Interface at MSS
The philosophy devs' •sped for automated support of Tug control and monitor activities
is:
a. Large numbers of control panel switches and monitor lamps (and the panel space
and interface electronics) can be avoided by employing the payload support data
processor and Tug-unique software to transmit, monitor, and verify commands
to the Tug and deployment adapter.
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Figure 4.6-24. Tug Man--Machine Interface at PHS
I). Automated control and monitor sequences should be initiated in one of three ways:
1. Normal routine command sequences (such as release deployment latches),
which occur as procedures dining each mission, and safety-critical command
and monitor sequences (abort) should be initiated by a manual switch located
on the appropriate control panel. In operation, the switch would be connected
to the discrete input module of the payload MDM unit, where the change of
state would be recognized by a Tug-unique vE latchdog software program. This
in turn would cause execution of the appropriate software application program.
2. The Orbiter MCDS CRT and keyboard would be used primarily for nonroutine
operations such as fault isolating or to backup the panel switches. These
functions would be in addition to their normal role of supplying operational
status information to the mission specialist.
3. The crew would be provided rapid access (within 5 seconds via CRT and key-
board) to selected telemetry data, which summarizes Tug and deployment
adapter downlink data indicating system and subsystem status and any
nomalous conditions.
In summary, the intent of the preceding philosophy is to provide the Orbiter crew with
sufficient information and capability to actively control Tug operations (initiate,
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monitor, analyze, investigate) but not burden them with complex/routine manual or
mental tasks that can be performed by an automated support system in a reliable,
repeatable, controlled manner.
-t. ^.6 AVIONICS NONFUNCTIONAL INTERFACE EVALUATION. Tug interfaces
identified as nonfunctional interfaces represent those interfaces that may affect the
Tug/Orbiter operations but are not associated with Tug/Orbiter control and monitoring
operations. Three nonfunctional interfaces were evaluated as part of the interface
study tasks and are discussed in the following text. The nonfunctional interfaces
evaluated involved Tug/Orbiter power return and grounding philosophy and EMC; pay-
load RTG radiation effects on Tug avionics; and evaluation of Tug/Orbiter rendezvous
and docking problems resulting from static charge buildup on either vehicle (see
Figure 4.6-25).
NONFUNCTIONAL INTERFACES
FMC/GROUNDING	 RTG RADIATION	 STATIC CHARGE BUILDUP
P/ L
	 Q
	
Y	
±P
PiL
	
E- +P
C
l	 I
Figure 4.6-25. Tug Nonfunctional Interfaces
Tug./Orbiter Single Point Versus Multiple Point Ground. An analysis of the Tug/
Orbiter grounding concepts was performed to evaluate the acceptability of Orbiter
multipoint (AIPG) ground philosophy with respect to the Tug preferred single point
ground (SPG) concept. This analysis assumed an Orbiter configuration in which
transient Orbiter load currents at locations forward of the cargo bay, h tween Sta-
tions 576 and 1307, and aft of Station 1307, were 530A, 100A and 300A respectively.
Superimposed on the Orbiter power requirements were Tug/spacecraft and deployment
adapter loads of 84A and 28A respectively. Using an Orbiter de electrical model
(data from NAR report "Space Shuttle Payload Grounding Study") wherein: 1) the for-
ward cabin return path impedance (R F) was 2. 5 m Q, 2) the cargo bay (structure) im-
pedance (R M was 25 u Q; and 3) the aft Orbiter return path (RA) was 2. 5 m St; a maxi-
nium noise transient of approximately 1. 5 volts was found to be imposed on the Tug/
spacecraft and deployment adapter ground as a result of Orbiter load switching (for
the MPG versus SPG). This model is shown in Figure 4.6-26.
This voltage is within the specified tolerance of power supplied to payloads by the
Orbiter system. Thus, it is concluded that payloads desi, ted to operate using Orbiter
1_
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R F = >2.5mf2
R M = 25MO
RA
 = >2.5mQ
ORBITER LOADS:
FWD 530A
MID 100A
AFT 300A
TUG LOADS:
TUG 84A
D/A 28A
TUG MAX AV :z: 1.5 VOLTS
ORBITER SYSTEM
Figure 4.6-26. Orbiter/Tug Multiple-Point Ground do Electrical Model
supplied +28 Vdc power as specified in JSC 07700 (Table 4. 6. 6-1) can operate in prin-
cipal using the Orbiter MPG philosophy.
t
Table 4.6-16. Shuttle Payload Power
33 Vdc Nominal
Steady-state limits: 23-40. 5V
intermittent
24-30. 5V
continuous
The primary difference between the t-:ro
philosophies for Tug/Orbiter operation is
that use of a MPG system would force
both Tug/spacecraft and aft Orbiter load
currents to return to the Orbiter power
reference through the same path (Orbiter
structure). This point is illustrated in
Figure 4.6-27 where it is shown that
Ripple voltage:	 4V peak-to-peak	 Tug load currents are returned directlyto the Orbiter fuel cell ground plane in
Payload power: 	 1, 000 W operations	 the SPG system; and for the MPG system,
3,000 W coast
	
the Tug power return is connected to the
i	 Orbiter ground at or aft of the cargo bay
interface at Orbiter station 1307. This
makes Tug/spacecraft avionics susceptible to transient noise due to switching (on or
off) of Orbiter loads. Other differ;_ _ces include: 1) twisted shielded pair cable could
be easily used with the SPG system to reduce coupling between Tug/spacecraft and
Orbiter systems, 2) the well-defined return path provided by SPG systems will ease
identification and correction of noise problems involving ground loops.
A comparison of the two philosophies indicates that higher Orbiter DDT &E cost and
weight penalties will result from a single point ground system due primarily to the
increased cabling required to route payload +28 Vdc return to a common Orbiter
ground point near the Orbiter fuel cell systems. However, it should be noted that
several advantages associated with the SP(3 philosophy may decrease payload and
Orbiter casts associated with payload/Orbiter integration, testing, problem isolation,
and requirements redefinition, thus offsetting the initial Orbiter DDT&E cost
difference.
4-299
r	 k
1
r30
• HIGHER DDT&E COST & WT
• MINIMIZES CROSS COUPLING
• WELL DEFINED P/L RETURN PATH
*ISOLATION FROM ORBITER LOADS
RO
• LOWEST DDT&E COST & WT
• LARGE LOOP SIZE AIDS CROSS COUPLING
• UNDEFINED RETURN PATH
• SUCCEPTABLE TO ORBITER LOAD CURRENTS
Figure 4.6-27. SPG vs MPG Comparison
} SILL LONGERON
ORBITER CABLE
\ TRAY
\	 PAYLOAD
CABLE
^ '♦ TRAY
Figure 4.6-28. Orbiter/Payload Cable
Tray Locations
The results of the single point ground
(SPG) versus multipoint ground (MPG)
investigations indicate that the MPG sys-
tem is acceptable for Tug/Orbiter oper-
ations; however, the preferred method is
to employ SPG philosophy. Two areas of
concern identified as a result of the in-
vestigation are: 1) low-level analog and
digital_ interface signals betwe rn the Tug/
spacecraft and Orbiter (such as C&W
signals) are expected to exhibit transient
noise, which may interfere with interface
operations; and 2) the Tug support fittings
that interface the Tug to Orbiter should
not be used as a ground return path, be-
cause these fittings attach to the rela-
tively nonconductive Tug graphite--epoxy
structure and not directly to the Tug
avionic ground plane.
The payload wire trays provided by the
Orbiter were investigated and found to
be acceptable in that provisions were
made for separation of Orbiter signal
cables from payload signal cables (B/A
metal Orbiter wire tray cover), and
partitions within the payload portion of
the wire tray will allow separation of
payload signals by type (RF, analog,
digital). See Figure 4.6-28.
An investigation of an Orbiter lightning
strike (during launch) was also conducted
to determine the effect on the payload
ground due to 'urge lightning induced
current flowing in the Orbiter cargo bay
structure (Figure 4.6-29). It was found
that lightning should have minimal effect
(0.5 volt transient) on payloads; however,
it should be noted that the investigation
did not consider the effect of the
lightning-induced electromagnetic fields
on the Tug or spacecraft systems. Cur-
rent launch vehicle program past experi-
ence would suggest using twisted shielded
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LIGHTNING
CURRENT 400 TO ZOOK AMP
DURATION UP TO 360 M SEC
VOLTAGES 0.5V (CARGOSAY1
cable and isolation or current-limiting
devices on interface signals and their
respective circuits.
B	 It is recommended for Tug/Orbiter MPG
ENTRY. 	 C	 operations that the Orbiter implement
LOCATIONS
-- ------------
	
_= ----------------
{ a
	
payload grounding provisions at Orbiter
locations Stations 576, 695, and 1307 for
EXIT LOCATIONS	 both payload return cables and payload
cable connector backshells that interface
with panels at these locations. In addi-
	
Figure 4.6-29. Orbiter/Tug Lightning 	 tion it is recommended that the payload
	
Model Characteristics 	 ground returns on the Orbiter side of
these panels be connected directly to the
Orbiter structure rather than be part of an aft Orbiter ground bus tree through which
large Orbiter currents flow. This action will allow Tug and Orbiter return current to
be routed to the cargo bay structure in a parallel manner thus minimizing the effective
connection impedance-induced voltages. It is also suggested that the Orbiter sill
longerons be investigated as possible ground connection points for Orbiter payloads
since they run the length of the cargo bay on both sides of the Orbiter and provide a
relatively unobstructed path for payload return current.
Tug Susceptibility to Payload RTG Radiation. Space Tug missions subject the Tug
avion:es to a variety of natural and man-made radiation, which may eegrade the Tug
performance (r its components. Natural radiation sources to be encountered will de-
pend on the specific mission characteristics but will include: Van Allen belts and the
South Atlantic anomaly (protons and electrons), cosmic radiation (high-energy charged
particles from outside the solar system), plus the solar wind and associated solar
flares (high-energy protons and charged particles). Artificial or man--made sources
of radiation include the spacecraft radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) used
to provide spacecraft electrical power. The effect of one of these sources of radiation
was investigated as part of the Interface s'udy special emphasis work.
A preliminary investigation was conducted to determine if spacecraft RTGs would cause
damage to Tug avionic components. The nuclear radiation flux environment model
used to determine the effect of payload RTGs on Tug avionics systems is shown in
Figure 4.6-30 along with typical nuclear radiation environment data from natural space
radiation sources. A spacecraft of the MJS-77 type with three MHW model RTG units
mounted as shown in the diagram was assumed for this analysis. This payload (and
associated RTG units) was chosen for this analysis because it closely resembles NASA
planetary payloads (PL-IIA through PL-13A) proposed for Orbiter launch during the
1981 through 1986 time period.
In the configuration shown, RTG units located 18 in. (0. 5 m) above the Tug avionics
produce a nuclear radiation environment consisting of alpha particles (neutrons) and
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RADIATION SOURCES PARTICLES FLUX/cm2/SEC ENERGY(MEV)
ALPHA 2,900$ PAYLOAD RTGs GAMMA 170 x 10 .3 RAD/HR
PROTONS 103 1.5
PROTONS 6 x 104 30-700
® VAN ALLEN BELTS ELECTRONS 108 >40
ELECTRONS 104-105 ?1.6
ELECTRONS 105 --7.0
PROTONS 103 -40®SOUTH ATLANTIC ANOMALY ELECTRONS 107 X05
PROTONS
*COSMIC RADIATION [ALPHA, ETC) 1.5 • 4 1,000
PROTONS 1012 >10 KEV
*SOLAR FLARES PROTONS 106 10-500
PROTONS 103 X1,000
Figure 4.6-30. Tug Nuclear Radiation Environment
Lramma rays at flux rates of 2900 neutrons per cm per second and 170 milli-rad per
hour, respectively (Ref. JPL IOM No. 365-B-200-74). The Tug radiation levels indi-
cated above are based on the following assumptions concerning RTG operating charac-
teristics (referenced in JPL IOM--353:72-27):
1. 2400 watts (thermal' per RTG.
2, 10000 neutrons/see-gm 238 Pa.
3. 1. 18 subcritical multiplication factor.
1. 5-year old fuel.
Further assumptions concerning the Tug/spacecraft model used are given below. The
2. 5 day exposure time is based on RTG unit installation on the spacecraft at T-2 days
and Tug deployment of the spacecrMt within 12 hours after Orbiter launch. This is
conservative when compared with current launch vehicle practice of RTG installation
at T-1 day and deployment within six hours of launch. The effect of radiation shield-
ing due to avionics unit and individual component packaging was not taken into consid-
eration and use of only current state-of-the-art nonhardened semiconductor components
was assumed.
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These assumptions result in RTG neutron and gamma radiation fluxes of 6.26 x 106
r4 /cm2 and 10. 20 Rad respectively per Tug mission. Thresholds of damage levels for
bipolar and 1IOS devices are generally above 10 11 N/cm2 and 5 x 10 3 Had (Table
4.6-17). Thus the results show that payload RTG LuAts of the type and number used
in the model would have no significant effect on Tug avionics. These results are based
on analysis that indicates at least 159 average Tug missions carrying payloads typical
of the test model would be required to degrade the Tug avionics to the damage thresh-
old. A Tug design life of 20 missions, therefore, provides a factor of safety of approx-
imately eight. The probability of RTG radiation damage is further reduced by the fact
that only 14 payloads (10 percent) in the Tug mission model (NASA) will be equipped
with RTG units. Thus even if all RTG carrying payloads were to be flown on one Tug
vehicle, the Tug would not be degraded sufficiently to affect mission performance. Even
greater factors of confidence can be obtained by spreading the RTG payload flights
among the entire Tug inventory.
Wf-
Table 4.6-17. General Radiation
Damage Levels for Tug
Avionics
'Threshold of Damage
Device Gamma Neutrons
i
Bipolar
L
NIOS
104 Rad
5 * 10 3 Rad
1011 N/ctn2
10 11
 N/cm2
It is important to note that these results
should not be construed to imply that a
Tug vehicle will experience no radiation
damage during the operating life of the
vehicle. This investigation did not 'ake
into account radiation from other sources
(see Figure 4. 6. 6-6) and other Tug mis-
sion models. It is therefore recom-
mended that a more thorough analysis be
conducted for several mission types
wherein all natural and artificial radia-
tion sources are considered, and shield-
ing and other secondary effects are taken
into consideration. This evaluation should be accomplished per NASA TM X--64713
using the NASA radiation flux and dose rate determination programs.
Tug/Orbiter Static Charge Buildup. Several mechanisms can occur that may cause
the Tug and/or Orbiter to become electrically charged during one or more inflight op-
orations. A special emphasis task was conducted to determine if static charge accumu-
lation on the Orbiter or Tug would create operational problems or damage (to either
vehicle) during Tug rendezvous and docking operations. Tug/Orbiter/ spacecraft prob-
lems which can result from this phenomenon include; 1) attraction of contaminating
particles in the vicinity of the charged vehicle surfaces resulting in degradation of
vehicle optical systems and ther :pal surfaces, and 2) electrostatic discharge of charged
vehicle surfaces may generate :i-Jficient EMT to interfere with avionics system opera-
tion or cause activation of pyre L *•hr : c devices. El4Lt ostatic discharge effects may
also cause physical damage to vehicle dielectric surfaces such as the multilayer insula-
tion (ML I), solar panels, and optics systems; a sec mdary effect of the physical damage
mechanization is the release of additional contaminants.
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The various charging mechanisms examined as part of this task include triboelectric
charging, engine charging, and charging due to photoelectric and space plasma effects.
The expected voltages due to these charging mechanisms as a function of the Tug/
Orbiter/spacecraft mission phase, where; each is applicable, is shown in
Figure 4.6-31. These charging machanisins are briefly discussed below.
OPERATIONAL PHASE
EXPECTED ORBITER LOW TUG P/L
VOLTAGE ASCENT EARTH ASCENT ORBITER
20KV — X
20D ICV
X
0-2UKV X
X X
0 — 6AV X X X
3V— X X X
10KV
Figure 4.6-31. Tug/Orbiter Charging Mechanisms Contributing to
Static Charge Accumulation
Triboelectric (or functional) charging results when vehicles fly through suspended
particles (clouds, ice crystals, atmospheric or meteoric dust). Aircraft charging
to 500 kilovolts and launch vehicle potentials of up to 200 kV (Titan III--C--20) have
been observed due to this charging mechanism. The charging rate due to triboelectric
charging is a function of the particle charge, particle density, particle/ vehicle differ-
ential velocity and the contact surface area. The charge polarity acquired by the
vehicle is a function of its surface dielectric constant with respect to the intercepted
particle: the higher particle in the triboelectric series tends to acquire a positive
,; harge.
Engine charging apparently results when the highly mobile electronics in t1ke thermally
ionized engine plasma migrate to the metallic engine walls (and then to the vehicle
skin), and the heavier less mobile positive ions are expelled with the engine exhaust
products. Charging potentials of up to 150 W and 200 kV have been observed for
aircraft and launch vehicles respectively. Charging characteristics associated with
engine charging include: 1) engines always charge negatively, and 2) charging rate is
a function of plasma temperature and altitude (affecting ion mobility). Engine charging
decreases with altitude to less than 20 kV above 40 k feet. Little or no data is avail-
able concerning L02/LH2 engine charging. It is tho 'it, however, that due to the
very high engine plasma temperature (6000R) and because almost complete ion
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recombination occurs before combustion products are exhausted, little or no engine
charging wil' result from Tug L02/LH2 engine operation.
Photoelectric charging results when photons with energies of up to 50 IN cause photo-
emissions of electrons from illuminated vehicle surfaces. In the lower ionosphere,
the electron density of the surrounding plasma are sufficiently high that electron col-
lection predominates over photoelectric charging, and the vehicle acquires a small
negative Potential. In the upper regions of the ionosphere photoelectric, charging
dominates on the sunlit side of the vehicle (0 - 6.4 V) and plasma charging predomi-
nates on the dark side (-2000 V) and during periods of eclipse (--11 kV). Ionosphere
electron density as a function of altitude and ground track is shown in Figures 4.6-32
and 4, 6--33 respectively.
The results of this evaluation showing
Tug/Orbiter voitnge potentials expected
during the various operational flight
phases are plotted in Figure 4. G-34.
Tub to Orbiter discharge problems are
not expected during Orbiter ascent, de-
ployment, and descent operations since
the Tug and Orbiter are in constant
contact during these operations and thus
should develop no potential differences.
This result does assume, however, that
the Tug outer shell structure surface
(graphite epoxy) is made conductive and
is connected electrically to the Tug tank
structure and also to the Orbiter struc-
ture through a Tug/Orbiter interface
6	 cable. Additionally, no problems are
ELECTRON DENSITY Wcc)	 expected during Orbiter/Tug docking,
since any charge acquired by either
Figure 4.6-32. Vertical Electron 	 vehicle is expected to be quickly (within
Density Distribution	 one millisecond) equalized by the highly
(38 Deg Latitude, 75	 ionized ionospheric plasma at the dock-
Deg Longitude)	 ing altitude (160 n.mi. (300 km)). Any
problems due to electrostatic charging
are expected to occur during Tug ascent or on-orbit operations where vehicle
potentials (during eclipse) may be as great as 11 kV. Spike effects are depicted
on the graph to indicate the effect of ACS engine burns.
The results indicate that no significant Tug/Orbiter docking problems due to discharge
of static potential between the two vehicles is expected due to the high electron density
at Orbiter docking altitudes and to the resulting short equalization times, which permit
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Figure 4.6-34. Tug/Orbiter Static Charge Per Operational Phase
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both vehicles to be near the same potential prior to docking. Possible problems may
occur at Tug/spacecraft mission orbits, however, and special attention may be re-
quired with respect to grounding of vehicle surfaces and Tug/spacecraft orientations
(with respect to the sun) during Tug/spacecraft rendezvous and docking operations
(see Figure 4.6-35).
To prevent the occurrence of electrostatic charge problems during Orbiter ascent/
descent operations it is recommended that the Tug structure be well grounded to the
Orbiter. It is also recommended that the Tug MLI insulation layers be grounded to
the vehicle structure (Figure 4.6-36) and that methods be investigated to discharge the
Tug graphite epoxy external surfaces by grounding the graphite layers or through con-
ductive coating.
Because of the lack of charging data associated with LH2 /L02 powered vehicles, it
is further recommended that a Centaur vehicle be instrumented to collect engine
charging, photoelectric and plasma charging data in the region from.iow earth altitude
(160 n. mi. (300 km)) to synchronous altitude. A Titan-Centaur launch of a Helios
satellite (TC-5) scheduled for 1976 will have excess performance capability that might
be used for Tug development purposes.
OSUN
(.11 KV ECLIPSE)
Figure 4.6--35. Expected Tug/
Spacecraft Vehicle
Potentials at	 Figure 4.6-36. MLI Bonding
Synchronous Altitudes 	 Technique
The above data reflects in part the results of previous space vehicle static charge
studies and analysis. Documents referencing this task include:
A. Nanevicz, J. E. , Pierce, E. T and Whitson, A. L. - Atmospheric Electricity
and the Apollo Series, June 1972
B. "Thermal Shield Static Charge", Feb. 1975
C. D.A. McPherson - Spacecraft Charging at High Altitudes - the Scatha Satellite
Program, Jan. 1975
D. Alan Rosen - Spacecraft Charging: Environment Induced Anomalies, Jan 1975
E. Adamo, R. C. and Nanevicz, J. E. - SRI Engineering Support for Skylab Contamination
Experiment, Oct. 1972
F. Vance, E. F. and Nanevicz, J. E. - Rocket Motor Charging Experiments, June 1966
G. Nanevicz, J. E. and Chown, J. B. - SRI Experiments on AFCRL Nike-CaJun
Rocket AD 6.842 and on Trailblazer 11, Dec. 1967
H. Naneviez, J. E. and Hilbers, G. R. - Titan Vehicle Electrostatic Environment,
July 1973
I. Vance, E. F. , Seely, L. B. and Nanevicz, J. E. - Effects of Vehicle Electrification
on Apollo Electro-Explosive Devices, Dec. 1974
J. Nanevicz, J. E . , Adamo, R. C. and Scharfman, W. E. - Satellite-Lifetime Monitoring,
March 1974
K. Lightning and Static Electricity Conference 12-15 Dec. 1972
4.6.7 AVIONICS INTERFACE ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS. The recommended Tug/
spacecraft/Orbiter avionics interface configuration discussed in the preceding sections is the
result of work performed to resolve several electrical interface issues so that operational
complexity will be reduced. The major areas of concern and the resulting recommendations
are discussed below and summarized in Figure 4.6--37.
a. Physical Interface in the Bad. These interfaces consist of aft bulkhead connec-
tors for T-0 umbilical wires and for power, mid-bay connections for T-4 umbili-
cals and power, and forward bulkhead connectors for wiring to Orbiter payload
support avionics. These interfaces are minimized by use of data links and using
only hardwires for C &W monitors and power.
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REDUCED TUG/ORBITER OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Tug Support Software
- GPC Software
- Tug Unique Software
Crew Effectivity
- Commander
- Pilot
- Mission Specialist
-- Payload Specialist
Operational Recommendations
Minimize Physical I/F Requirements
Multiplex majority of command
& monitor
- Hardwires only for inflight
safety critical functions
Optimize use of Orbiter support
Equipment
- Reduce Tug DDT&E costs
- Simplify ground ops & turnaround
- Standardized Orbiter equipment
Use Orbiter S/W operating system
- Provide Tug unique software per
selected baseline
-- Reduce S/W complexity by using
Tug capability
-- Minimize actual program count
Use 3-man crew
- Commander: Orbiter maneuvering
- Pilot: Manipulator station (Tug
Deployment)
- Mission Specialist: MSS (abort,
status, control)
- Payload Specialist: Not required
for Tug
Operational Interfaces
Tug/Orbiter Electrical I/F
- T-0, T-4 Umbilicals
- Orbiter Cargo Bay Fwd & Aft
Orbiter Power I/F
Tug Support Equipment
- Orbiter-Supplied Equipment
i'	 - Tug Unique Equipment
- MSS vs PSS
Figure 4.6-37. Tug/Orbiter Interface Recommendations
b. Tub Support Equipment. This equipment is located in the Orbiter crew compart-
ment and falls into two categories: Orbiter-supplied gear and Tug-unique gear. 	 i
By judicious use of the Orbiter's payload support hardware, Tug development
costs for Tug-unique electronics is minimized. Also, maintenance and turn-
around time between Tug and other Orbiter payload missions are reduced.
c. Tug Support Software. Software located within the Orbiter's rapid access and
mass storage memories also falls into two categories: the Orbiter-supplied op-
erating system and Tug-unique software programs executed by the Orbiter's
GPC. Software interface complexity can be reduced by using an executive/tenant
approach wherein the Tug-unique software would operate within the Orbiter
operating system and individual tenant programs would interface with a set of
software tables. This will allow Tug supplied programs to be isolated from most
of the real-time requirements associated with the Orbiter avionics system and the
Tug/Orbiter hardware interface. Software complexity can also be reduced by
using the Tug DMS capability in lieu of Orbiter and ground software whenever
practical, and by limiting the numbers of Tug support programs to those fre-
quently used.
d. Crew Effectivity. This involves the manner in which the crew members are used
to perform tasks for P/L support such as status and C&W monitoring, activation,
power control, arming/safing, deployment, and capture. Analysis has shown that
a Payload Specialist is not required for Tug support, thus the TUG control and
monitor panels and man--machine interface functions are shown to be located at the
MSS station.
4.7 SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ANALYSES
The Tug interface design approaches were analyzed to assure that the recommended
interface designs are both safe and reliable. The analyses were performed concurrent
with the design effort, and the safe'.y/reliability features were accordingly designed-in
as an integral element of the interface study program.
4. 7. 1 SAFETY. The Tug interface safety requirements were defined early in the
program (reference Sections 2.3 and 3. 1.4) and were used as design stanards through-
out the study. A study ground rule was imposed to assure that each safety requirement
would be specifically addressed and a resolution to each requirement would be identi-
fied. The results of this implementation of Tug/Orbiter interface safety requirements
are summarized in Table 4.7-1. The Tug/Spacecraft safety requirements are sum-
marized in Table 4.7--2.
4.7.1.1 Exceptions to Safety Requirements. As indicated in the tables, the only
Tug/Orbiter safety requirements to which exceptions are taken are: requirement 29,
whinh requires horizontal drain capability for main propellants, and requirement 33,
which requires positive seals at the fluid fill and drain disconnect. The rationale for
the exceptions to these requirements are presented in the following paragraphs. The
trade study data associated with the horizontal. drain 0 _ghilif-v Aat-icinn fc nrrnQ=nfAA
in Mgure 4.7-1.
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Table 4. 7-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria
i
w
CR ITER ION
rDag/Orbiter Requirements
1. Tug safety data, controls, hardware, safety pro-
cedures, etc. , that are necessary to prevent dam-
age to and to insure the safety of the Orbiter shall
be provided. The safety critical data, displays,
and controls shall be capable of being verified
functionally.
2. Materials, fluids, etc. , shall not be released or
ejected into the payload bay from the Tug. Venting
relief, and release of material from the Tug shall
be through the Orbiter provided vent system. Con-
trol of the venting, etc. , by the Orbiter for certain
mission phases may be required.
3. Redundant equipment having safety implications
shall be located away from the primary source to
which it provides safety protection or which pre-
vent hazard propagation.
4. Where hazards can occur due to the presence or
contact of mutally incompatible materials, fluids,
electrical potential, etc. , such as fuels and
oxidizers, these materials, fluids, etc., shall be
separated to the maximum possible extent.
RESOLUTION
Tug safety controls/monitors for all safety critical
functions are provided by Tug Data Bus Monitor Signals
and by analog instrumentation (Hardwired) for Caution
and Warning functions. BacImp control discretes for
crew override of safety critical functions are also
provided for in the interface design.
All potentially hazardous fluids are vented external to tl
Orbiter via Orbiter provided vent systems. Emergency
He dump capability, external to the Orbiter, is also
provided in the interface design.
Redundant valves, controls etc. , identified in the inter-
face study are considered to be physically isolated to the
maximum practical extent.
All fuels and oxidizers are routed through separate dis-
connect panels. The fuel and oxidizer panels are locat-
ed on opposite sides of the Tug adapter and are individ-
ually purged with He. The purge He for the fuel and
oxidizer panels are individually vented external to the
Orbiter.
Table 4.7--1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safely Criteria (contd)
I
	
CRITERION	 I	 RESOLUTION
Tug,/Orbiter Requirements
5. Provisions shall be included for emergency
manual release of Tug to Orbiter connections.
6. Provisions shall be made for remote emergency
jettisoning of Spacecraft deployment equipment
and antennas as necessary to complete retrieval
and stowage operations of the Tug.
7. Tug shall provide at all time to the Orbiter such
information as necessary concerning the status or
condition of Tug and Spacecraft systems to ensure
safety of Orbiter and crew. Provisions shall also
be made for Orbiter override of safety critical
Tug and Spacecraft functions during stowage
aboard the Orbiter during Tug deployment and
retrieval phases of operations.
8. Provisions shall, be included for control of all
safety critical Tug functions, including attitude
and translational position control by Orbiter crew
during post-deployment and pre-retrieval operation
for Orbiter/Tug separation distances to 20 U. mi.
Tug to Orbiter connections are automatically released
on Tug adapter rotation. Tug/adapter latches can be
manually released via EVA.
Interface requirement: requires Spacecraft designers
to provide this capability.
Tug safety critical data that require urgent action on the
part of the crew are contained in the Tug Caution and
Warning panel. This data includes: LH2 Tank Over- or
Under pressure, L02 Tank Over- or Under pressure,
and N2 H4 tank pressures. Orbiter mounted arm/safe
switches and command links provide override control
of safety critical Tug and Spacecraft subsystems.
Requires that avionics design be capable of performing
these post-development and pre-retrieval operations via
RF link.
Table 4.7-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety CLi0ria (contd)
I	 CRITERION	 I	 RESOLUTION	 I
w
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
9. Provisions shall be made to confirm that all safe-
ty critical Orbiter/Tug electrical connections,
fluid lines, etc., interfaces are securely
connected.
10. Tug deploy/release/retract mechanisms shall not
cause a hazard even after a failure has been
experienced with that system(s).
11. Provisions must be made for verifying readiness
of safety critical Tug systems before activation.
12. All mechanical, elp^±rical and fluidic connections
between the Tug and Spacecraft and Orbiter shall
be fail safe.
Verification of electrical connections can be verified by
actuation of pro^dmity switches on the disconnect panels
and thru-plug continuity checks. Verification of fluid
interconnects can be provided by a fluid detection moni-
tor in the disconnect purge cavity.
Dual motors are used in each of the two deployment
actuators. In the event of a jammed actuator, the de-
sign allows for disconnection of the failed actuator via
the RMS or EVA and continued Tug deploy/restow
operations.
Readiness of safety critical Tug peripheral systems is
verified by monitoring signals for the various safety
critical functions to be performed (i. e. , umbilical panel
engaged, oxodizer panel engaged, etc.). Tug status
check information is provided via Tug on-board check-
out programs.
All safety critical electrical connections are dual re-
dundant. Fluid connections effectively utilize triple re-
dundant seals and He purge to assure at least fail safe
capability. Umbilical panel actuators are safed (power
inhibited) while engaged.
13. Provisions shall be made for detecting the ,resence I It is intended that I£2 , 02 and N2 H4 leak detectors be
of spilled hazardous fluids or materials during 	 installed in the payload bay. This is an Orbiter inter-
handling or transfer. 	 face requirement.
CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
14. Environmental control of the Tug, if required, No pre launch environmental controls are required for
shall be provided after propellants/pressurants cryogenic Tugs for safety purposes. A ground GN
are loaded until launch. purge capability for the payload bay should be provided
by Orbiter/GSE design (interface requirement).
15. Purge provisions shall be available to neutralize A GHe purge is provided through leakage containment
propellant-leaks during and after propellant ser- membranes on both propellant tanks and all disconnect
vicing and after Orbiter landing. panels.
it'. Ventilation shall be provided under positive pres- Ventilation of deployment adapter is provided by open
sures for all propellant loading operations to pre- structure design. No other interface equipment en-
vent accumulation of hazardous vapors. closes a sufficient volume to pose a significant hazard.
17. Transfer lines shall be purged after the transfer H2 and 02 transfer lines and N2 H4 relief line are purge
of hazardous fluids. via the Tug He system.
18. Integrated checkout and testing of safety critical integrated checkout and testing prior to installation in
Tug systems shall be conducted prior to installa-- the Orbiter must be accomplished as part of ground
Lion in the Orbiter and verified after installation operations procedures. After installation in the Orbiter,
Into the Orbiter. the interfacing systems that are used in monitoring/
control of safety critical functions will also be used in
statusing most functions. Some functions, such as Tug
rotation, APS operation, cannot be verified after in-
stallation in the Orbiter.
Table 4. 7--1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)	 {
CRITERION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
19. Tug pressurized systems shall have a ma3dmum
operating pressure helium leak check before in-
stallation into the Orbiter payload bay and an inert
gas leak check before loading propellants.
20. Internal attitude control signal of the Tug shall be
capable of being checked for accuracy by the
Orbiter crew before release.
RESOLUTION
Requirement for maximum operating pressure He leak
check prior to Tug installation into an Orbiter is out-
side the scope of the Interface Study. An inert gas leak
check can be conducted via the propellant fill and drain
interface while the Tug is in the Orbiter.
Tug safety controls/monitors are provided for all safety
critical functions including ACS functions, by the Tug
Data Bus Monitor signals and by analogue instrumenta-
tion (hardwired) for Caution and Warning functions.
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21. Provisions shall be made to pressurize propellant Tug is pressurized via the He pressurization system .
tanks of Tug to avoid implosion during return flight. prior to return flight. He storage capability is provid-
ed by Tug peripheral equipment.
Design factors of safety are in accordance with Rev. C
of the referenced document. These same requirements
have been applied to all interface equipment.
It is intended that the He tanks required for propellant
tank repressurization and/or abort dump be subjected
to a fracture mechanics program. Program to be de-
veloped during phase C/D.
22. Tug propellant tank and pressure vessel design
factors of safety shall be as specified in Space
Shuttle System Payload Accommodations dSC
07700, Vol, MV, Rev. B, December 21, 1973.
23. Pressure vessels and tanks shall conform with
and be maintained under a fracture mechanics
control program.
24. Pressure lines and vessels shall be clearly coded to Design detail. Requirement should be implemented dur-
identify contents, capacity and operating pressure. I ing phase C/D design...
CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tua/Orbiter Requirements
25. Flexible sections of pressure hose disconnects All pressure hose disconnects are restrained by the
shall be restrained so that a failure will not cause disconnect panels.
damage to adjacent equipment or injury to
personnel.
26. A structural interface shall be provided between Tug support adapter/attach pointsAatches are designed
the Tug and the Orbiter payload bay support points to withstand most adverse Shuttle design loads with the
that transmits the Tug and Spacecraft loads into required 2510
 safety margin.
the Shuttle structure with a 2576
 margin of safety
under the most adverse Shuttle design loads, ex-
cluding crash loads which are ultimate.
27. Provision shall be made to detect incipient failures Interface equipment subject to this requirement are the
of tanks containing hazardous fluids or high pres- He tanks. it is intended that they be subjected to a frac-
sures to the greatest extent possible. true mechanics program during phase C/D.
28. A redundant relief capability shall be provided for Redundant vent valves are provided for the H2 and 02
the Tug tanks which automatically limits the maxi- propellant tanks. A single disconnect fitting is provided
mum pressure. at the Tug/Orbiter interface for each pair of valves.
The N2 H4 and He pressurant systems incorporate
both relief and dump capability.
29. Tug propellant drain and vent interface with the Complete tank drain can be accomplished only with the
Orbiter shall permit main propulsion system Tug in vertical attitude. Since bath H2 and 02 will be
propellant venting, and emergency detanking dumped during an abort, there is no need for draining
(whether Orbiter is horizontal or vertical attitude), these propellants while Tug is in horizontal attitude.
Propellant tank vents are functional for both vertical
and horizontal attitudes of the !'.;s.	 Result of Trade
Study, see Figure 4.7--1.
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Table 4.7-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
Table 4.7-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
I	 CRITERION	 I	 RESOLUTION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
30. A capability shall be provided for the Orbiter crew
to dump hazardous Tug fluids and vent Tug pres--
surants overboard within the time constraints im-
posed by an abort  situation, This capability shall
be available with the payload bay either open or
closed.
31. Tug cryogen tank thermal protection systems shall
be designed to minimize (below ignition regimes)
accumulation of flammable fluids resulting from
propellant system leakage.
Tug main propellants can be dumped -%i*ztliin 200 seconds.
This assures that propellant dump can be completed
prior to reaching a point where the atmospheric pres-
sure can form a flammable mixture «-ith the dumped
H2
 . Tug pressurants and RCS propellants can also be
dumped during an abort.
Provisions are made at the oxygen and hydrogen dis-
connect panels for overboard venting of the leakage con-
tainment purge gases. Thus any leaks that should
develop in the hydrogen or oxygen tanks will be carried
safely away.
32. Any Tug supplied deployment/retrieval syste$i shall Dual motors are used in each of the two deployment
provide positive control of the Tug movements dur- actuators. in the event of a jammed actuator, the de-
ing translation out of or into the payload bay. It	 sign allows for disconnection of the failed actuator
shall be designed for fail operational./fail safe oper- through the RMS or EVA and continued Tug deploy/
ation or shall be jetti,sonable to preclude exceeding restow operations.
the Tug stowage envelope,
ra
33. Tug fluid fill and drain umbilical disconnects shall
have positive sealing at disconnect. Provisions
shall I, made to prevent pressure buildup in the
system.
34. Leakage sources of the Tug or its equipment shall
be minimized by use of all welded or brazed
construction where practical.
Triple seals, bathed up by an He purge, are used at all
disconnects that can contain hazardous fluids.
Design detail. Requirement should be implemented
during phase C /D design.
Table 4.7--1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety ,
 Criteria (contd)
CRITERION
	 RESOLUTION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
35. Components and assemblies selected for the Tug
	 Design detail. Requirements should be implemented
shal1 be marked or tagged to identify their manned- during phase C /D design.
mission application.
36. Cleanliness requirements and fluid contamination
	 All interface fluid disconnects incorporate helium
for propellants and propellant systems shall be
	 purges, shut-off valves, or self-sealing features that
controlled and monitored to assure that the STS 	 prevent contamination of fluid lines.
safety is not jeopardized.
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37. Hypergolic propellant tanks, fuel and oxidizer,
shall be pressurized from separate pressure
sources.
38. A leak sensing system shall be utilized to detect
leaks at the deployment adapter interface.
39. Tug propulsion system start sequence logic status
and valve positions shall be monitored and mess-
age signals shall be provided at the Shuttle Data
Management Interface. Transmission shall be
through hardwire whale within the Orbiter bay but
once outside it may be transmitted directly from
the Ting.
No hypergolic propellants are contained in present Tug
baselines.
Leak sensing is accomplished in the purge cavity of
the disconnect panels.
Safety critical valve position data are transmitted to
Orbiter crew via hardwire. Transmittal of start
sequence logic status is by data bus and RF link.
Table 4.7--1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
w
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CRITERION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
40. Systems containing fluids that are subject to de-
composition through contamination or loss of
passivation (such as monopropellants) shall be
safed by appropriately sized and located vents for
the worst case decompositions rate.
41. Message signals for Tug system, by hardwire and
RP telemetry, shall be provided at the Shuttle Datrl
Management System Interface. Measurements shall
include Tug latched/released indications, deploy
mechanism position indications, discrete pyro-
technic event indications, sequence logic status,
valve psoitions, temperature and pressure meas-
urements, and failure indications. This informa-
tion shoidd also be available prior to retrieval.
42. Tug critical command and control circuitry shall
be designed to be fail operational /fail safe as a
minimum.
RESOLUTION
Propellant systems that contain fluids that are subject to
decomposition must be designed to accommodate the
worst case decomposition rate that can be expected dui •-
L g fill. The interface design provides for overboard
(external to Orbiter) venting to accommodate any over-
pressures that may occur dre to mild contaminatioL or
loss of passivation.
Interface provisions have been made to allow transmittal
of safety critical data by hardwire when Tug is in payload
bay or otherwise via RF telemetry data lWr.
lace design provides for dual redundant digital data
between Orbiter and Tug.
43. Tug batteries shall have the case vented through 	 Tug overboard battery venting will be via the hydrogen
relief valves into Orbiter overboard battery venting vent line interface.
system.
Table 4.7-1. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
I	 CRITERION	 I	 RESOLUTION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
a
44. Electrical umbilical disconnects between the Orbite:
and the Tug and between the Tug and Spacecraf4
shall be separated from hazardous fluid disconnects
shall be qualified as explosion proof, and shall not
have power applied during disconnect.
45. Power circuits shall be separated from critical
pyrotechnic circuits within a cable or wire bundle.
46. Tug structure shall be grounded to Orbiter, struc-
ture to prevent electrostatic charge buildup and an
electrical shock hazard. Within the Tug, grounding
shall be such as to preclude an electrical shock.
47. Safety critical electrical and electronic components
shall be potted, hermetically sealed or similarly
protected against the effects of liquid leakage,
moisture condensation, vibration and arcing
contacts.
48. Capability shall be provided for static discharge
between Tug and Orbiter and between the Tug and
Spacecraft.
Electrical disconnect panels are separate from fluid
disconnect panels. The electrical disconnects should
be qualified as explosion proof during phase C/D. It
is intended that the Tug be switched to internal power
and that power at disconnects be shut down prior to
disengagement.
Design detail. Must be implemented during detail de-
sign (phase C/D).
Tug structure to be grounded to Orbiter via a grounding
pin in one of the electrical disconnects. Grounding with-
in the Tug is considered to be a Tug contractor
responsibility.
Tug structure shall be grounded to the Orbiter and the
Spacecraft via grounding pins in the electrical dis-
connects.
Safety critical switches are interlocked with enable
switches to preclude inadvertent actuation of safety
systems. The enable switches are guarded with switch
covers to preclude inadvertent actuation.
50. Tug shall have a means of shutting off its electrical Tug electrical power can be shut down via commands
power under emergency conditions. 	 I transmitted on the digital data link.
CRITERION
u^
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
51. Electrical wiring must not be routed against or
around sharp edges.
52. Electrical wiring must not be in contact -with
flammable fluids.
53. Electrical circuits which will be cut by guillotine
cutters must be dea.dfaced.
54. Provisions shall be included for Tug Caution and
Warning functions which will provide both audible
and visual warning to Orbiter personnel of
hazardous situations while the Tug is in the
Orbiter payload bay or being deployed.
55. Only GN2 shall be permitted to be dumped into
Orbiter payload bay from the Tug and then only
under controlled conditions.
Design detail. To be implemented during phase C /D.
Electrical connectors are routed through disconnect
panels that are separate from fluid panels.
No guillotine cutters are used on the present Tug/
Orbiter of Tug Spacecraft interface designs.
Tug Caution and Warning data is displayed on the
Caution and Warning panel. Safety critical caution and
warning functions are described in Section 4.7.1-3.
The only Tug pressurant is He. During ground pres-
surization of the He system, any over pressurization
of the He system will be vented external to the Orbiter
via a relief valve on the GSE. If an over pressuriza-
tion of the He system should take place after the GSE
is disconnected, the He pressurant can be dumped
through an externally vented dump line. (Note: Some
He flows into the payload bay as a normal sequence
of insulation purging. (See Section 4.5 of the report
for details).
E
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Table 4.7--1.. Tug/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
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CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Orbiter Requirements
56. Artificial sources of radiation from the Tug shall No radiation sources are used on present Tug designs.
be shielded, oriented, otherwise limited to pre-
vent exceeding flight crew dosimetry requirements
as established by the NASA radiation constraints
panel.. Compliance with critical equipment radia-
tion requirements shall also be maintained.
i
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CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
I. Spacecraft will provide Caution and Warning data Provisions for Spacecraft Caution and Warning functions
to the Orbiter and Crew for safety critical functions are provided by both hardwire and payload telemetry
while aboard or in the vicinity of the Orbiter. downlink.
2. Provisions shall be made to confirm that all safety Spacecraft/Tug interfaces are powered via a C&W arm
critical Spacecraft/Tug and Spacecraft/Orbiter safe switch and are monitored for safe status via the
interfaces-are securely concerned. hardwire when attached and when detached via the pay-
load telemetry downlink. Spacecraft/Orbiter interfaces
are considered to be the responsibility of Orbiter/
Spacecraft contractors.
3. Any Spacecraft subsystem operation which impacts Interface provisions for monitoring Spacecraft safety
safety during the launch and entry phases shall be critical functions are provided by the payload telernctry
monitored from the Orbiter flight station. downlink detached and via hardwire signalswheu attached.
4. A means shall be provided for controlling the vent- Relief provisions for payload hazardous fluids (N2H4) can
ing of Spacecraft fluids while in the Orbiter payload be provided via the Tug N2H d. relief line. Other hazard-
bay. ous fluids must be relieved via a separate Spacecraft/
Orbiter interface.
S. Provisions shall be made for verifying critical Spacecraft caution and warning signals are transmitted
Spacecraft systems readiness before activation. via Tug telemetry. Specific spacecraft safety critical
functions must be identified by the spacecraft contractor.
.-..:._ 
Table 4.7--2. Spacecraft/Orbiter Interface Safe4° Criteria (contd)
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CR ITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
6.	 All electrical, emchanical and fluid connections Electrical signals are via dual redundant links; Tug/
between the Spacecraft and Tug and/or Orbiter Adapter latches are two failure tolerant; fluid con-
shall be designed to be fail safe. nections utilized dual and triple redundant seals. Tug
to Spacecraft latches and umbilicals are the responsibil-
ity of the Tug contractor.
7.	 Systems containing fluids that are subject to de- Spacecraft containing N2 % propellants can be relieved
composition through contamination or loss of via the Tug N'2% gent interface. Other hazardous fluids
passivation (such as monopropellants) shall be must incorporate separate relief provisions via a
safed by appropriately sized and located vents for Spacecraft/Orbiter interface.
the worst case decomposition rate.
8.	 A redundant relief capability shall be provided for Relief/vent valve provisions for Spacecraft are consid-
Spacecraft tanks which automatically limits the ered to be the responsibility of the Spacecraft contrac-
rna. Cmum. pressure.	 Relief shall be through the tor.	 Weld.. /r^?Tef tine liitiirli--:.s a- .J praw.d-^1 `)-- 7
Orbiter vent system overboard. Overpressure above.
relief capacity shall be redundant to vent capacity.
(When vent capability is provided, relief capability
need not be redundant. )
9.	 Spacecraft propellant drain and vent interface with Interfaces associated with Spacecraft propellant vents/
the Orbitar shall permit Spacecraft maim propulsion drains are considered to be the responsibility of the
system propellant venting and emergency detank- Spacecraft/Orbiter contractors.
ing (whether Orbiter is in horizontal or vertical
attitude) until launch commit, with the Orbiter pay-
load bay doors closed or open.
CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
10. Spacecraft fluid fill, drain, and vent umbilical dis-- Same as 9 above.
connects shall have positive sealing at disconnect,
whether the action is intentional or accidental.
Provisions shall be made to prevent pressure build
up in the system.. Dual valving shall be provided to
ensure emergency drain if one valve should fail.
11. Spacecraft cryogen tank thermal protection systems Spacecraft containing liquid hyd.mgen and/or liquid
shall be designed to minimize (below ignition re- oxygen can have their thermal protection systems vent-
gimes) accumulation of flammable fluids resulting ed via the corresponding thermal protection system
from propellant system leakage. vents in the Tug. Other potentially hazardous cryogens
that are not computable with hydrogen or oxygen sys-
tems must be vented through a separate interface.
12. Propulsion system safety critical data, start se- Spacecraft safety critical data can be transmitted via
quence logic status and valve positions shall be the payload telemetry downlink. Use of an arm safe
monitored and signals provided to the Orbiter for switch, controlled by the S/C C&W panel has been
corrective action to be taken. recommended for systems, which must remain dormant
in the Shuttle vicinity.
13. Provisions shall. be made to verify completion. of Same as 12 above.
main engine propulsion system safing prior to
retrieval,.
i
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CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
14. Message signals from Spacecraft systems shall be Same as 12 above.
provided at the Shuttle Data Management System
Interface. Measurements shall include at least
Spacecraft latched/released indication, deploy
mechanism position indications, discrete pyro-
technic event indications, sequence logic status,
valve positions, temperature and pressure measure
ments, and failure indications.
15. Spacecraft critical command and control circuitry Spacecraft command and control circuitry is Spacecraft
shall be designed to be fail-operational/fail safe responsibility. Data link to circuitry is provided by
as a minimum. redundant Payload Digital Data link.
16. Automatic event sequencing programs and automatic Safing of event sequencing and automatic controls is
controls whose actuation could affect flight person- Spacecraft responsibility. Operation/control of Space-
nel safety shall. be operative only by the Orbiter, or craft by Orbiter can be accomplished via payload digital
by ground control enabling switches (command over data link. Spacecraft systems/operations involved
ride), e.g., pyrotechnic sequences, automatic de- should be arm/safed in Orbiter payload Calif panel.
ployment sequences, etc.
17. Commands affecting safety critical equipment status Safety status interface is provided by hardwire plus
must have associated data transmission to provide payload telemetry downlink.
a positive functional verification.
ua
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Table 4.7--2. Spacecraft/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (contd)
Table 4.7-2. Spacecraft/Orbiter Interface Safety Criteria (eontd)
CRITERION RESOLUTION
Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
18. Spacecraft propulsion system start sequence logic While within the payload bay, status of safety critical
status, and valve positions shall be monitored and Spacecraft equipment is provided by hardwire plus pay-
message signals shall be provided at the Shuttle load telemetry downli.nlc. Outside of Orbiter, Spacecraft
Data Management System Interface. The trans- data transmitted by RF is considered to be Spacecraft
mission shall be through 'ug hardwire while with-- responsibility.
in the payload bay but, once outside, it may be
transmitted either directly from the Spacecraft
or via the Tug telemetry system.
19. Spacecraft shall have a means of shutting off their Signal to shutdown Spacecraft power can be transmitted
electrical power under emergency conditions. through payload digital data link. Spacecraft design
must incorporate shutdown. capability.
20. Safety critical control circuits shall be capable of Payload safety critical circuits can be verified via pay-
being verified. load telemetry downlinnl{.
21. Provisions shall be included for Spacecraft Caution Spacecraft Caution and Warning data can be transmitted
and Warning functions which will provide both to Orbiter crew via payload telemetry downlink. 	 Spec-
audible and visual warning to Orbiter crew of ific cautions and warnings associated with spacecraft
hazardous situations while the Spacecraft is aboard operat°ons must be identified by Spacecraft contractors.
the Orbiter or being deployed.
Table 4.7-2. Spacecraft/Orbiter Interface Safety- Criteria (contd)
CRITERION	 RESOLUTION
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Tug/Spacecraft Requirements
22. Means shall, be provided to control toxic, flammable
explosive and corrosive substances aboard Space-
craft and to preclude their accumulation in or vent-
ing into the Orbiter payload bay. The maximum
operating temperature shall be taken into consider-
ation as a generative source of hazardous fluids.
23. Integrated checkout and testing of safety critical
Spacecraft systems shall, be conducted prior to in-
stallation on the Tug and verified after installation
into the Orbiter.
24. Spacecraft shall have capability for the Orbiter
crew to dump hazardous fluids and vent pressurants
overboard within TBD seconds in an abort situation.
25. Electrical umbilical disconnects between the
Orbiter and the Spacecraft and/or Tug shall not
have power applied during disconnect.
Payload N2 H4 can be relieved via Tug N2 H4 relief line.
Other Spacecraft hazardous fluids must be vented/
relieved via a Spacecraft/Orbiter interface.
Spacecraft verification after installation in the Orbiter
can be acl,' eyed via the payload digital data link. Spec-
ific test parameters must be identified by the Space-
craft contractors.
Spacecraft fluid dump capability is considered to b a
Spacecraft/Orbiter responsibility. Interface consider-
ations associated with hazardous fluid dump must be
mutally resolved by NASA, Orbiter contractor, Space-
craft contractor, and the Tug contractor.
Tug will be switched to internal power prior to dis-
connect. There will be no power applied across inter-
face during Tug/Orbiter separation or recovery. It is
assumed that this same procedure will apply to Tug/
Spacecraft separation.
M = 301 LB (790 LB PAYLOAD)
Figure 4.7-1.. Drain/Vent Trade Study Results
4-329
The tanit configurations in this figure represent the following capabilitie ,: Z) 1orizontal
vent capability for hydrogen tank; no horizontal dram, and 2) no horizontal vent or hori-
zontal drain capability for the oxygen tanit. The possible conditions tlat would require
ground draining/venting of the hydrogen or oxygen tanks are listed along with the
safety/operations consequences that are associated with those conditions. The prob-
abilities of occurrence for each condition are also presented to indicate the expected
frequency of occurrence. These probabilities are based on conservative success prob-
ability estimates of 0, 999 for each leg in the redundant dump valve or abort dump
pressurization systems. The probability that both legs will fail during an attempted
abort is P = 2R-R2 , where R is the reliability of a single leg.
The safety/operations consequences of each failure indicate that failure of the hydrogen
dump system, or failure in the dump pressurization system, can result in turnaround
time delays. These turnaround delays, should they occur, could be eliminated by the
addition of a horizontal dump system at a weight Penalty of 130 pounds. A failure of
the oxygen system dump system has more serious consequences. The present Tug
t oxygen tank design is incapable of maintaining structural integrity during a fully tanked
landing. This consequence can only be avoided b`/ increasing the structural strength of
the ct-ygen tank at a weight penalty 171 pounds.
The two most important points indicated in the analysis are that 1) the probability that
any negative condition will occur is low, and 2) the only serious consequence is related
to the inability of the oxygen tank to retain structural integrity if a landing is attempted
with a full tank. This second point is related only to tank structure itself and is inde-
pendent of whether or not a horizontal drain is provided.
SAFETY/OPERATIONS TUG WEIGHT PENALTYCONDITION CONSEQUENCE TO AVOIDCONSEQUENCE
° TANK STRUCTURE OK
ATl.5 ABORT;
REDUNDANT LM2 ° HORIZONTAL VENT 78 LB
°	 DUMP VALVES FAIL ALLOWS BOILOFF (2 VALVES/ LINES}
(P < 1 PER 106 ABORTS) ° TURN-AROUND
TIME DELAY
RTLS ABORT;
REDUNDANT L02
DUMP VALVES FAIL
° L02 TANK
STRUCTURE FAILS
171 LB (STRUCTURE,
2 VALVES/LINES)
ON LANDING(P < 1 PER 106 ABORTS)
o > 8576 OF LH2 DUMPED
• > 8076 OF L02 DUMPED 52 LB
--	 RTLS ABORT;
REDUNDANT ABORT
° TANK STRUCTURES OK
' L42 VERTICAL VENTS
V L02
AL
V
ESJLINES)
78 L
L
BDUMP PRESSURIZATION ALLOW L02601L•OFF LH2SYSTEMS FAIL
(P c 1 PER 106 ABORT,; } °	 2LH HORIZONTAL VENT VALVES/LINE=S)
^-^--- ALLOWS LH2 BOIL OFF
s TURN-AROUND 130 LB
TIME DELAY
i
The conclusion is that the weight penalties ; , asociated with the addition of horizontal
drain capability to the hydrogen and oxygen tanks are not justified.
With respect to Tug/Orbiter safety requirement 33, the fluid fill and drain system is
also used for propellant dumping. Consequently, a positive seal at the disconnect for
this concept would not be appropriate. Since this line is drained and purged after
propellant loading has been completed, the line will contain no liquid propellants at
time of disconnect.
4.7. I.2 Verification of Tug/Orbiter Interconnects. The capability of verifying that
Tug/Orbiter- interconnects have been safely made is of paramount importance in
assuring interface safety. Verification of electrical interfaces can be accomplished
with relative ease through the use of electrical panel engagement switches and by
verification of the connection with test signals.
Verification that critical fluid system interface connections have been safely made is
a more complex problem. This is especially true when the verification must be made
after Tug recovery. To provide a means of assuring that the fluid connections have at
least fail-safe capability, the interconnect design concepts in Figure 4.7-2 have been
developed. In these concepts, redundant fluid seals are used at the primary intercon-
nect surface. In addition to these seals, 'a purge seal is provided that effectively re-
sults in a third backup seal. By monitoring the He flow (or pressure) in the purge
cavity, the helium purge seal can be verified. By monitoring the purge gas for the
presence of the fluid being contained (such as H2), verification can be made that at
least one of the fluid seals is operational. These design concepts thus allow the flight
and/or ground crews to verify that the fluid interconnect is at least fail--safe prior to
beginning the next major operation.
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i	 Figure 4.7-2. Fail-Safe Verification of Interconnects
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4.7. 1.3 Caution and Warning Application. The basic philosophy used in the C &W
system is that caution and warning indicators be used only when a threat to the safety
of the Orbiter/crew has manifested itself and immediate crew action or attention is
required to control the hazard. Warnings are intended to identify imminent dangers
to the crew that require direct and immediate corrective actions. Cautions indicate
that a hazardous condition will exist if 1) a hazardous condition is not corrected before
entering the next mission phase, or 2) as equipment failure has occurred during a
critical maneuver and a single backup equipment is being relied on to preclude a
catastrophic consequence.
Advisory data is used to indicate loss of redundancy and/or possible loss of mission
objectives. The data is not intended to elicit immediate responses from the crew.
The philosophy here is that advisory data will be evaluated by the crew at specific
points during the mission and that appropriate action will be taken by the crew before
proceeding to the next mission phase.
As indicated in Figure 4.7-3, the functions of the Caution, Warning, and Advisory data
must be aligned with the mission phases and discrete events that occur in the course of
a Tug mission. Advisory data is called up by the Mission Specialist at discrete points
in the mission. The advisory data is checked against the mission rules for a particu-
lar mission and a decision made as to whether or not the mission should be continued
TUG MISSION	 TUG RETURN
DEPLOYMENT k	 i RECOVERY
SHUTTLE BOOST
	
ORBITER RETURN
PRELAUNCH
	
GND OPS
LAUNCH	 IGNITE	 SAFETY	 SAFETY
TUG	 STATUS
	
STATUS	 TYPICAL
TUG	 ENG	 VERIF	 VERIF	 MISSION
DECLARED	 ROTATE	 DEPLOY ROTATE	 DISCRETES
READY	 ADAPTER P1L	 ADAPTER
ADVISORY DATA
• CHECKED PRIOR TO INITIATION OF EACH DISCRETE
— REDUNDANCY STATUS
— MISSION CRITICAL EQUIPMENT STATUS
— TUG SAFETY STATUS
WARNING DATA
o CONTINUOUS WHILE TUG IS IN OR NEAR ORBITER
— REQUIRES URGENT CREW ACTION
CAUTION DATA
o CONTINUOUS WHILE TUG IS IN OR NEAR ORBITER
-- REQUIRES CREW ACTION PRIOR TO NEXT
DISCRETE EVENT
Figure 4.7-3. Caution and Warning Application
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or aborted. Warning data is continuously available while the Tug is in the payload bay
or is in the near vicintiy of th,« Orbiter.
Caution data is also continuously available while the Tug is in or near the Orbiter.
The caution data is, however, event-sequence oriented. For example, when the Tug/
adapter latches are open during the deployment sequence, the condition is obviously
normal and the caution light should remain extinguished. If, however, an attempt is
made to rotate the Tug back into the payload hay with any of the late hes open, the
caution light should illuminate to indicate that an unsafe condition is being approach ;d.
The caution light indicates that this condition must be resolved before entering the 1,ext
mission phase; i, e. , Orbiter return and landing.
Tug hazard analyses (reference Space Tug Systems Study, MAS 8-29676) and the inter-
faceFailure Modes and Effects Analyses (Table 4.7-4) were reviewed to identify
which potential hazards required immediate crew action (warnings) and which required
i	 crew action prior to performing the nest mission discrete evert (cautions). The condi-
tions that roquire warning and caution signals identified in the analysis are contained
in TablC 4. 7-3.
Table 4.7-3. Conditions Requiring C&W Signals
E	 Warning	 I	 Caution
i
N2 H4 Tank Overpressure	 APS ISO Vlv Open	 Deploy ArmSafe Armed
L02 Tank Overpressure 	 ME ISO Vlv Open	 APS Cluster Failed
LH2 Tank Overpressure	 Tug/Adapter Latch Open APS PRI Elec Failed
L02 Tank Underpressure	 Tug/Support Latch Open APS Prop Low
LH2 Tank Underpressure 	 Tug/Orb Disc Open	 H2 in LCM
E	 ME Arm/Safe Armed	 H2 in P/L Bay
APS Arm/Safe Armed	 N2H4 in P/L Bay
i
Each warning signal will illuminate a master warning light on the C &S panel and cause
the warning tone to sound continuously (the tone can be reset to OFF by the crew). A
specific warning light is also illuminated to indicate the hazardous condition that re-
quires crew attention. The warning also appears on the CRT along with a description
of the crew action to be taken. A caution signal will illuminate the master caution light
-wd cause the warning tone to sound intermittently. The specific cautionary data will 	 i
appear on the CRT along with a description of the crew actions to be taken.
i
To determine how each caution and warning signal should be related to each mission
phase, logic diagrams, such as the typical case in Figure 4.7-4, were used.	 {
e
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Figure 4.7-4. Typical Master Warning Implementation
The diagram on the upper half of this figure indicates the logic associated with the
warning system. The logic symbols are the same as those used in fault tree analyses.
Note that warning indications can be initiated by either of two paths. One is the Tug
attached path and the second is the Tug detached path. The crew actions that must be
taken (and that appear on the CRT) will be different depending on whether the Tug is
{	 attached or detached. For example, with the Tug attached, an LH3 tank overpressure
warning may :require override control of the vent valves or initiation of propellant
I dump. If the same warning appears while the Tug is detached, the crew action would
be to immediately achieve a safe separation distance between Orbiter and Tug. The
avionics equipment required to implement the caul.on and warning capability are de-
scribed on the lower half of the figure.
1	 The logic diagram approach to implementation of the caution function is similar to that
used on the warning svAem. If the conditions described by the logic diagram are met,
the caution light will illuminate and the warning tone will sound intermittently to indi-
cate a potential hazard. The fault that causes the caution will appear on the CRT with
the crew action required to correct the condition. Typical master caution logic is
illustrated in Figure 4.7-5. The avionics equipment associated with the caution eys-
tem is described on the lower half of the figure.
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Figure 4.7-5, Typical Master Caution. Implementation
4.7.2 RELIABILITY. The reliability of the interface design candidates were evalu-
ated to assure that the selected interface designs will not compromise the overall
reliability of the Space Tug. This was accomplished by conducting a failure modes
and effects analysis (FMEA) on the interface designs to determine if single failure
points exist in the design that could 1) compromise crew safety, or 21 cause mission
loss. In conducting this analysis, considerable attention had to be given to the detailed
Tug designs as well as to the interfaces themselves. That is, to evaluate the effects
that potential interface failure modes can have, it was necessary to evaluate the fail-
ure effect with respect to the entire Shuttle/Tug system. Consequently, the resultant
output of the FMEA includes interface design modifications and recommendations for
Tug designs that will improve the overall safety and reliability of the system.
The failure modes and effects analyses conducted during the Tug interface study are
contained in Table 4.7-4. As suggested in this table, the FMEA was first conducted
{	 on the early Tug and Tug interface designs. As potential single-point failures were
identified, the Tug and Tug interface designs were modified to eliminate those single-
point failures,
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SUBSYSTEM: He Press & Controls
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic l/T 74-010 Chg B)
WW
cn
ITEM IDENT,
FUNCTION & SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION
RESULT-
INGQUANTITY USED REF NO (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN I/T 74-010 CHG C) CRIT.*
He High Pres- T-11-001 N. C. Parallel Charge Valves None required
sure Fill T-H 002 Fail closed - either valve can fail closed NI NI
Valve No. I Fail open or leakage - valves In series with de- NI NI
and No. 2 ployment adapter D/A-H-001
He Vent Valve T-H-003 N.C. Series Vent Valves None required
No. I and T--H--004 Fail closed - either valve failure will shut down Ni NI
No. 2 one leg of system, but parallel T-H-005/buret disk
is safety backup
Fail open or leakage - either valve can fail open NI N1
and system will continue to function
He Vent T-H-005 N. 0. In Series with Burst Disk None required
Valve No. 2 Fail open or leakage - normal safe condition NI NI
Fail closed - shuts down one leg of the parallel NI NI
vent system and relies on T-H-003 and T-H-044.
Fail to close after burst disc - loss of all He con- Ni NI
trol and purge capability.
Although the burst disc will prevent the He bottles
from blowing, not being able to reshot the vent
line by T-H-005 failure to close world deplete all
Tug He.	 However, not a single failure point.
He overpressure most likely on the ground.
He APS Press T-H-008 N. O. Parallel Valves None required
Valve No. I T-H-007 Fail open or leakage - would pressurize the APS Ni N1
and No. 2 N2H4 fluid system - but-all outlets have series
redundant shutoff.
Fail closed - either valve could fail closed. NI NI
*NI = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Made Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
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ITEM #DENT,
FUNCTION & SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION
BESOCR
QUANTITY USED REF ND ( IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY * (CONTAINED IN #/T 74 -010 CHG C) INGCHIT.*
He APS Press T-H-008 N.C. Series Vent Valve None required
Vent Valve T-H-009 Fail closed - ci.ther valve failure will shut down INI N1
No. 1 and one leg --: -^ ant system, but parallel T-H-010/burst
No. 2 disc is safety backup.
Fail open or leakage - either valve can fail open NI NI
and system will continue to function.
He APS Press T--H-010 N. O. In Series with Burst Disc None required
Vent Valve Fail open or leakage - normal safe condition. NI NI
No. 3 Fail closed - Shuts down one leg of parallel vent Ni NI
system and relies on T-11-008 and T-11-009.
He L02 Fuel T-H-011 N. C. Parallel valves feeding individual regulators in Shut-off valves have been added in
Tank Pres- series with valves	 - series with the pressure regulators.
sure Valves Fail closed - Either leg can fail closed. NI A failed open or leaking regulator can NI
No, I and Fail open or leakage - regulator will continue to Operational be individually shut down. 	 If failure NI
No. 2 maintain tank pressures within operating minb rum. Constraint occurs after Tug/Orbiter separation,
Problem during safing where venting propellant Tug could be lost.
tank to low pressures to evacuate tank would also
deplete onboard He supply.	 Loss of He would drop
out He controls b, Iore Tug retrieval by Orbiter;
i.e., N. C. vent valve controls would lock up tank
vent capability.	 Changes some reconnect sequenc-
ing but not a safety inhibiter.
He GHZ Vent T-H-013 N.C. Parallel Control Valves Each of the vent control valves has
Valve Control T-H-014 Fail closed - either leg can fail closed. NI been backed up with an additional NI
No. 1 and Fail open or leakage - will hold the vent valve Operational control valve to preclude leakage/fail NI
No. 2 open, venting the propellant tank.	 Depending upon Problem to open problem.
time frame during operation, the venting fluid may Potentially
freeze to slush/solid and present an abort problem. Catastrophic
Also presents a venting problem after landing.
Recommend added series valves in each parallel
leg and interconnect; i. e., quad redundant.
*NI = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Made Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
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ITEM IDENT, SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULT-INGFUNCTION & REF NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN IIT 74-010 CHG C) CHIT.*QUANTITY USED
He LH2 Fill, T-H-015 N.C. Parallel Valve Control of Parallel Propellant Backup, normally open, dump valve
Drain - T)ump T--H--016 Valves has been added on adapter.	 If one of
No. I and Fail closed - either leg can fail closed. NI the primary dump valves fails open, NI
No. 2 Fail open or leakage - will hold the propellant Operational backup valve can be closed to preclude
valves open, dumping propellants and all pressuri- Problem to loss of propellants/pressure. 	 Butter-
zation He gas. Not only will the H2 tank be com- Potentially fly flapper on backup valve is biased
pletely vented, but the onboard He supply could be Catastrophic toward the open position to allow con-
depleted in the systems attempt to maintain struc- tinued dump capability if the flapper
tural integrity of the main tank. Recommend added should fail.	 If primary dump valve
series valves in each parallel leg and interconnect; should fail open after Tug/Orbiter
i.e., quad redundant. separation, Tug could be lost.
He RL10 T-H-017 N. C. - In series with Engine Prevalve T-H-016 None required for safety.
Engine Pre- Fail closed -- no propellants to engine.	 - N1 NI
valve (Tank Fail open - allows propellants to enter feed duct NI NI
lsolatioa from main tank to engine inlet. T-11-17 acts as
Valve) backup for duct failure.
He L02 Fill, T-H-019 N. C. Parallel Valve Control of Parallel Propellant Backup, normally open, dump valve
Drain & Dump T-H-020 Valves has been added on adapter.	 If one of
Valve Control Fail closed - either leg can fail closed. Nl the primary dump valves fails open, Nl
No. I and Fail open or leakage - will hold propellant valves Operational backup valve can be closed to pre- NI
No. 2 open, dumping propellants and all pressurization Problem to elude loss of propellants/pressure.
He gas.	 Not only will the 02 tank be completely Potentially Butterfly flapper on backup valve is
vented, but the onboard He supply could be de- Catastrophic biased toward the open position to
pleted in the systems attempt to maintain struc- allow continued dump capability if the
tural integrity of the main tank. Recommend added flapper linkage should fail. 	 If pri-
series valves in each parallel leg and interconnect; mary dump valve should fail open
i.e., quad redundant. after Tug/Orbiter separation, Tug
could be lost.
*II = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
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ITEM [DENT,
FUNCTIUN & SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION
RESULi-
IWO,
O.UANTITY USED REF, NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY'S (CONTAINED IN IJT 74 .010 CHG C) CRIT.*
He RL10 L02 T-H-021 N.C. - In series with Engine Prevalve T-H-028 None required for safety.
Engine Pre- Fail closed - no propellants to engine. NI NI
valve (Tank Fail open - allows propellants to enter feed duct NI NI
Isolation from main tank to engine inlet. 	 T-H-021 acts as
Valve) backup for duct failure.
He L02 Tank T-H-022 N. C. Parallel valves feeding individual regulators in Shutoff valves have been added in
Pressuriza- T-H-023 series with valves series with pressure regulators.
tion Valve Fail closed - either leg can fail closed. NI Failed open or leaping regulator can NI
No. 1 and Fail open or leakage -- regulator will continue to Operational be individually shut down. NI
No. 2 maintain tank pressures within operating minimum. Constraint
Problem during safing where venting propellant
tank to low pressures to evacuate tank would also
deplete onboard He supply. Loss of He would drop
out He controls before Tug retrieval by Orbiter;
1. e. , N. C. vent valve controls would lock up tank
vent capability.	 Changes some reconnect sequenc-
ing but not a safety inhibitor.
He G02 Vent T-H-024 N. C. Parallel Control Valves Each of the vent control valves has
Control No. 1 T-H-025 Fail closed - either leg can fail closed. NI been hacked up with an additional NI
and No. 2 Fail open or leakage - will hold the vent valve Operational control valve to preclude leakage/ NI
open, venting the propellant tank. 	 Depending Problem to fail open problem.
upon time frame during operation, the venting Potentially
fluid may freeze to slush/solid and present an Catastrophic
abort problem. Also presents a venting problem
after landing.	 Recommend added series valves in
each parallel leg and interconnect; i, e. , quad
redundant.
He RL10 LH2 T-H-026 N. C. in Series with T-H-017 None required for safety.
Prevalvo Fail closed - no propellant to engine. NI NI
Control Fall open or leakage - slightly higher He safing NI NI
purge rate through engine.
ITEM IDENT, SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTIONFUNCTION &
QUANTITY USED REF. NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN I/T 74-010 LHG C)
ING
CRIT-`
He RL10 LH2 T-H-027 N. C. in Series with Engine Prevalve T-H-026 None required for safety.
Engine Main Fail closed - no propellant to engine. NI NI
Control Valve Fail open or leakage - in series with T-H-026. NI NI
He RL10 L02 T-H-028 N.C. in series with Engine Prevalve T-H-021 None required for safety.
Engine Main Fail closed - no propellant to engine. NI NI
Control Valve Fail open or leakage - in series with T-H-021. NI NI
He L02 Top- T-H-029 N. C • . NI None required for safety. NI
ping Valve Fail closed - no topping, potential launch scrub. N1 NI
Control (Tank Fail open or leakage before liftoff - topping would Ni NI
Isolation be stopped by ground valves - potential launch
Valve) scruN.
Fail open or leak after liftoff - in series With dis- NI NI
connect poppets.	 Topping line filled with
propellant.
RESULT-
I - --- —
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Table 4. 7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
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*NI = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
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ITEM )DENT, SCHEM FAILURE MODE &EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULT-INGFUNCTION & REF, NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN 11T 74010 CHG C) CRIT.'QUANTITY USED
N2H4 Fill & T-A-001 N. C. Seal leakage - Safety cap prevents leakage from NI None required NI
Drain, escaping from system.
Manual
N2H4 T-A-008 N. O. Fails open in Orbiter bay; thruster series NI None required NI
Thruster T-A-004 redundant valves prevent N 2 114 from entering bay.
Shutoff: T-A-005 Fails closed - closed is 'safed' condi^ion. NI NI
Module A T-A-006 Internal leakage while in Orbiter bay; thruster Ni NI
Module B series redundant valves prevent fluid escaping into
Module C bay.
Module D
N21-4 T-A-007 N. C. Fails open in Orbiter bay, series thruster shut- NI None required NI
Thruster through off valves prevent N2H4 from entering bay.	 -
control T-A-054 Fails closed - Normal "in bay safed" condition. NI NI
Valves Internal leakage while in Orbiter bay; series NI NI
thruster control shutoff valves are series redund-
ant, in addition to module shutoff valves being
shut.
N2114 Relief T-A-055 & N. C. Valve in series with T-A-056. None required
Valve No. 1 T--A-056 N. C. Valve in series with T-A-055.
and No. 2 No flow or leakage if either valve fails open. NI NI
Failed closed normal "safed" condition. NI NI
N2H4 Relief T A-057 N. O. by APS arm safe not energized, in series with None required
Valve No. 3 burst disc.
Failed open or leakage normal safed condition. NI NI
Failed closed - redundant system with valves NI NI
No. 1 and No. 2
M = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
ITEM III ENT,
FUNCTION & SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULT-
QUANTITY USED REF NO (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY*' (CONTAINED IN IIT 74.010 CHO C) INGCRIT.*
G02 T-0-001 N. C, fails open or leakage: allows G0 2 from main Catastrophic Check valve has been added in series Ni
Autogenous tank to back feed to main engine, and through the with autogenous pressurization valve
Press. engine flow control valve and out 0 2 injector into to preclude possible back flow of
Orbiter Bay.
	 Single failure would dump main tank propellants through a failed open
G02 into Orbiter, pressurization valve.
Fails closed: Normal safety condition. Ni NI
G02 Zero G T-0-002 N. C. None required
Vent Valve T-0-003 N. C.
No. 1 and Fail closed - Normal safe condition. NI NI
No. 2 Fail open or leakage - Main tank allows G02 to be NI NI
vented overboard through G02 vent line.
G02 Zero G T-0-004 N. C. to zero thrust exhaust, open to overboard vent None required
Vent Selector line.
Valve Failed closed; normal safed condition. NI NI
Fail open or leakage: Vents G02 through zero NI NI
thrust exhaust into Orbiter bay - but must also
have Fail open of either No. 1 or No. 2 vent
valve before venting can occur.
L02 Zero-G T-0-005 N. C. Failed closed: normal safe condition NI None required NJ
Vent Mixer Failed open - (motor off): thermal efficiency less NI NI
Motor requiring mcre propellant vent to maintain Ares-
' sure - but no safety problem with higher vent
rates.
L02 Fuel T-0-006 N. C. Failed closed: normal safe condition NI None required NI
Cell Feed Failed open or leakage: shut-off valve within fuel NI NI
cell is backup for feed line failure to fuel cell.
i
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Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
*N1 = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
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ITEM (DENT, SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULTFUNCTION & REF NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY * (CONTAINED IN I/T 74010 CHG C) INGQUANTITY USED CR1T.
GH2 T-F-0"1 N. C. Fails open or leakage: allows GH 2 from main Catastrophic Check valve has been added in series NI
Autogenous tank to back feed to main engine, through engine, and with autogenous pressurization valve
Press. out H2 injector and into Orbiter Bay. 	 Single failure to preclude possible back flow of
would dump main tank GH 2 into Orbiter. propellants through a failed open
pressurization valve
G02 Zero G T-F-002 N. C. None required
Vent Valve T-F-003 N. C. Failed closed: normal safe condition NI I^TI
No. 1 and Failed open or leakage: allow main tank GH2 to NI NI
No. 2 be vented overboard through G02 vent line.
GH2 Zero G T-F-004 N. C. to zero thrust exhaust, open to overboard vent None required
Vent Selector l:-Ae
Valve Failed closed: normal safe condition.	 - NI NI
Failed opan or leakage: vent GH2 through zero Ni Nl
thrust exhaust into Orbiter bay, but must also
have failed open either No. I or No. 2 vent valve
before venting can occur.
LH2 Zero G T-F-005 N.C. Failed closed: normal safe condition NI None required Nf
Vent Mixer Failed open - (motor off): 'thermal Efficiency less Ni Ni
Motor requiring more propellant vent to maintain pres-
sure - but no safety problem with higher vent rates.
LH2 Fuel T-F-006 N.C. Failed closed: normal safe condition NI None required NI
Cell Feed Failed open or leakage: shutoff valve is backup for Ni NI
feed line failure to fuel cell.
'kNl = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic I/T 74-010 Chg B) (Contd)
SURSYSTFM: T)anlovment Adantor	 PAGE 9 OF 10
E
ea
ITEM IDENT, SCHEM, FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULT-INGFUNCTION & REF, NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN Ili' 74.010 CHG C) GRIT'.*QUANTITY USED
He Supply D/A-H-001 N. C.
System Pri- D/A--H-002 N. C.
mary Valve Fail closed: Parallel valves, either one can fail. NI None required NI
No. 1 and Fail open or leakage and tug attached: Tug helium NI NI
No. 2 fill valves T-11-001 and T-H-002 would also have
to fail.
Fail open or leakage and Tug deployed: adaptor NI NI
disconnect poppet would also have to leaf before
losing adaptor He supply.
He Supply D/A-H-003 N. C.
Secondary D/A-H-004 N.C.
No. I and Fail closed: Parallel values, either one can fail. Ni None required NI
No. 2 Fail open or leakage: in series with: 006,`007, NI NI
008, and 009 valves for specific functions.
He Bottle Fill D/A-H-005 N. C. Fail closed - would lose ability to fill or supply NI None required NI
Valve He for purges, tank pressurization and pilot
operated valves.
Failed open:	 in series with CI{ valve. NI Nl
He Ground D/A-H-008 N. C. Failed closed: Loss of He purge pressure to NI None required NI
Hold Fuel fuel panels (Tug/adapter and adapter/Orbiter).
Panel Purge Panels would be filled with He purge from main fuel
tank insulation purge exhaust.
Failed open or leakage: No backup from exhaust- Operational NT
ing adaptor He supply after Tug deployment.	 If Coast-mint
He supply depleted, Tug tanks cannot be repres-
surized during reentry. Tug and PL must be
jettisoned in space.
*Ni = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
Table 4.7-4. Interface Safety Failure Mode Effects Analysis (Schematic, I/T 74-410 Chg B) (Contd)
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ITEM IDENT, SCHEM. FAILURE MODE & EFFECT CORRECTIVE ACTION RESULT-FUNCTION & REF. NO. (IDENTIFY POTENTIAL HAZARD) CRITICALITY* (CONTAINED IN I/T 74010 CHG C) INGQUANTITY USED CRIT.*
He Ground D/A-11-007 N. C. Same problems as D/A-H-DOG Operational None required Ni
Hold Oxidizer Constraint
Panel Purge
He Flight D/A-H-008 N.C. Failed closed: parallel valves, either one can NI None required NF
GH2 Vent D/A--H-009 fail.
Valve No. I Failed open or leakage: either can fail open in Ni NI
and No. 2 series with GH2 ground vent selector valve.
He Deploy- D/A-H-010 N. C. Valves in series None required
ment Adaptor D/A-H-•011 Failed closed: Normal safe operation except in NI N1
Vent No. 1 overpressure condition, in which case a parallel
and No. 2 burst disc will protect system from catastrophic
condition.
Failed open: Either valve can fail open and not NI NI
interfere with operations or system safety.
w
*M = No impact on Space Shuttle Safety.
}
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The reference fluid system schematic, I/T 74-010 CHG B, used for tLis FMEA has
been updated (CHG C) to incorporate the indicated corrective action. Ac an aid in
following Table 4.7-4, a copy of the outdated schc matic has been included as Fig-
ure 4.6-6. The up-to-date X'tuid system schematic, which reflects implemented cor-
rective action, is contained in Section: 4 of Volume III.
The principal design features that were implemented to improve safety and reliability
are:
a. The fuel and oxidizer fluid lines are routed through separate disconnect panels.
b. Each fluid interface panel is completely enclosed in a purge can. These purge
cans are continuously purged with helium while the Tug contains propellants or
propellant vapors and the Space Shuttle is within the earth's atmosphere.
C. Backup dump and vent valves have been incorporated into the interface to preclude
the possibility that a failed open dump or vent valve on the Tug will result in
implosion of a propellant tank or ingestion of atmospheric air. The backup valves
are butterfly type that are biased to the open condition.
d. The oxygen topping line incorporates a self-sealing disconnect at both the Tug/
adapter interface and the T-0 panel as backups to the topping line shutoff valve.
e. The helium fill lines incorporate self--sealing disconnects on both sides of the
Tug-adapter interface. These disconnects provide backups to both the Tug helium
supply shutoff valves and the adapter helium supply shutoff valves.
f. Helium purge components have been incorporated into the hydrogen fill/drain/dump
line, hydrogen vent line, oxygen fill/drains/dump line, and the oxygen vent line.
This purge precludes possible backflow of atmospheric oxygen and/or contami-
nants into these lines.
g. The helium supply system on the adapter incorporates dual redundant pressure
regulation systems. Each regulator is backed up by a shutoff valve to guard
against a failed-open regulator. The helium purge control valves are configured
to provide at least fail-safe capability. In most cases, redundant control valves
are used. The only instances where single control valves are employed are in
the purge controls to the disconnect purge panels. The reason for these single
control valves is that purging of the disconnect panels is required only when the
redundant seals in a disconnect have failed.
h. Series valves have been incorporated on the helium fill line to preclude loss of
helium if one of the valves should fail open. These valves also provide an over-
board dump of the helium if required for an abort landing. Additionally, a burst
disk is employed at the helium bottle manifold. If the dump system should fail
4-345
during an overpressurization condition, the helium pressure will be relieved
through the burst disk.
In addition to the safety features that are a part of the MSFC baseline Tug design, the
following modifications are recommended to enhance safety and reliability. These
design features are contained in drawing VT 74-010 chg C (contained in Section IV of
Volume III.
a. Hydrazine storage bottles are provided with both overboard relief capability and
crew-controlled overboard dump capability.
b. Tug helium pressurant supply bottles incorporate relief capability and crew-
controlled overboard dump capability.
c. Helium pressure regulators are redundant, and each regulator is in series with a
shutoff valve to protect against a failed open regulator.
d. All safety critica.i functions performed by the Tug have been provided with redun-
dant control systems (propellant dump valves, propellant vent valves, tank pres-
surization regulators). Helium pressurant used in controlling valve positions is
independently routed to each of the redundant valves. The control valves them-
selves are series redundant to preclude the chance that a failed open control valve
will result in loss of control of any safety critical function.
e. Check valves are used between the autogenous pressurization control valves and
the main engine. These check valves preclude backflow of propellants through the
engine and into the payload s,ay if an autogenous pressurization control valve
should fail open.
f. The helium pressure control valves that operate the main propellant isolation
valves are separate from the control valves that operate the main engine valves.
Consequently, a failed open control valve will not result in propellant flow through
the main engine.
It is concluded that incorporation of the safety features described above for the Tug and
the Tug interface equipment designs will result in a system that is wholly compatible
with operations of the manned Space Shuttle. As indicated in the failure modes and
effects analyses, all identified safety-critical single-point failures have been elimi-
nated through design changes. Several single-point failures that can cause mission
loss remain in the design. Most notable of these is the potential failure of the oxygen
or hydrogen zero g vent systems. If either of these devices should fail while the Tug
is in the Orbiter, the Orbiter crew can either 1) use the Orbiter RCS to accelerate the
Orbiter to settle the propellants so that the ground/ascent vent system can be used, or
3) the Tug propellants can be dumped through the abort dump system. Failure of the
zero g vent system will, however, cause mission loss and possibly loss of the Tug and
i
'J
4--346
^ I ?
payload. it may be necessary to incorporate redundant zero g vent systern , in the Tug
design to assure attainment of the 0.97 Tug reliability requirement.
4.7.3 SAFE RETRIEVAL OPERATIONS. The operations that pose the greatest
hazards to the Orbiter/crew are considered to be those flight operations associated
with retrieval of the Tug by the Orbiter. The Tug retrieval analysis contained in the
Space Tug Systems Study (cryogenic) Vol II, Report No. CASD-NAS 73-033, was
accordingly updated to reflect the ;hanges to the Tug designs, including the result of
the Tug Avionics Definition Study, to the present time. The Tug retrieval flight
operations are summarized in Table 4.7-5. The updated Tug retrieval hazard analy-
sis is contained in Table 4.7-6.
Each hazard in the hazard analysis is classified according to NASA Specification
NFM 5300.4 (ID). The Hazard Severity column refers to the consequences of the
hazard if it should occur. The Resulting Hazard Level column refers to the hazard
level once the appropriate design or procedural controls have been implemented. The
hazard levels and the corresponding hazard categories as defined in 5300.4 (ID) are:
a. Catastrophic (CA). No time or means are available for corrective action.
b. Critical (CR). Hazard may be counteracted by emergency action performed in a
timely manner.
c. Controlled (CN). Hazard has been counteracted by appropriate design, safety
devices, alarm/caution and warning devices or special automatic/ manual
procedures.
Th a Hazard Resolution/ Control Actions column contains the designs, procedures, and
operational constraints required to eliminate or control the hazard. The Constraints/
Impacts column identifies organizations that are influenced by, and must implement,
hazard controls.
As indicated in the hazard analysis, the safety features that have been designed into
the Tug result in. the capability to safely perform retrieval operations. The Tug
deployment/retrieval mechanisms are designed to provide fail-operational/fail-safe
capability, and the probability of multiple failures is considered to be small. Due to
the nature of the Tug deployment/retrieval operation, however, it is conceivable that
multiple failures of the deployment/ retrieval system could, nevertheless, occur. To
determine the feasibility of RMS/EVA use as a backup to the normal deployment/
retrieval operations, an analysis was conducted to identify the RMS/EVA requirements
that would have to be implemented to support Tug contingency deployment/retrieval
operations. The results of this analysis are contained in Table 4.7-7.
i
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1Table 4.7-5. Tug/Orbiter Docking Sequence of Events
Tug Subsystems Active
O R. U
° d N r! waPi^
b o :c
^^^^
Pi
Event Sequence
Initial Condition -M Tug in Rendezvous Orbit --
Orbiter Moved Within Docking Region
1. Dump main propellant residuals through abort
dump system
2. Safe main propellant lines
3. Orbiter establish communication link with Tug
4. Transfer Tug flight control to Orbiter
5. Verify Tug safe for docking
6. Orbiter ready cargo bay and manipulator
7. Command Tug to preferred docking attitude
8. Orbiter maneuver to final docking station
9. Inhibit Tug APS thrusters
10. Attach manipulator to Tug
11. Retract Tug to cargo bay
12. Mate and latch Tug to adapter
13. Connect umbilicals
14. Rotate into cargo bay and latch forward
structural support
15. Shut down GN&C and communication
16. Switch to Orbiter power, shut down fuel cell
17. Purge LH2 tank with helium
18. Pressurize main propellant tanks and lines with
helium
Table 4.7-6. Tug Retrieval Hazards Analysis
Con- Resulting
Event Hazard Hazard Resolution/ straints/ HazQxd
No. Hazard Severity Control Actions Impacts Level
0 Tug enters collision course CA Tug return profile places Tug Design/ CN
with Orbiter at Tug return (Tug) in an orbit 10 n. mi. above Orbiter/ (Tug)
due to Tug guidance navigation CA that of Orbiter.	 Tug has dual Opera- CN
error or human error. (Orbiter) communications links to en- tions (Orbiter)
sure safe remote Tug engine
shutdown capability.
1 railure to establish com- CA Tug design incorporates dual P2sign CN
munication can result in:	 (1) (Tug) redundant communication ('Tug)
inability to crew to obtain con- CN links, either of which will CN
trol of safety critical functions (Orbiter) allow the Orbiter crew to (Orbiter)
(2) inability of crew to status status the Tug and to obtain
Tug safety critical control of safety critical
functions.
2 Inability of Orbiter crew to ob- CA Tug design incorporates dual Design CN
tain control of Tug flight control (Tug) data management systems. (Tug)
system will result in inability CA dodecahedron IM!!s, fail op- CN
to command Tug to preferred (Orbiter) erational/fail safe ACPS and (Orbiter)
docking attitude and inability to dual communication links.
override Tug unprogrammed This design provides a
motion. backup for all safety critical
command and control
functions.
3 Inadvertent activation of main CA Tank outlet valves, in series Design/ CN
propulsion system while Tug (Tug) with the main engine valves, Opera-- (Tug)
is in vicinity of Orbiter or in CA are closed via rf link.	 Main tions CN
payload bay. (Orbiter) engine valves are then (Orbiter)
sequentially opened to vent
the main propellant lines.
4 Status of unexpended pyro- CA Dual redundant communica- Design CN
technics, hazardous payloads (Tug) tions used.	 All safety criti- (Tug)
and safety critical components. CA cal components statused prior CN
(Orbiter) to approach to Tug.	 Ade- (Orbiter)
quacy of ACPS propellant
quantity verified.
6 Contamination of Orbiter due CR ACPS propellants are not Design/ CN
to Tug dumped ACPS normally dumped.	 (ACPS Opera-
propellanks, propellant dump may be Hens
accomplished during an
aborted flight)
7 Tug/Orbiter collision (due to CA Tug ACPS incorporates dual Design, CN
failed Tug ACPS, failed Tug (Tug) redundant astriontes system Opera- (Tug)
data management, failed Tug CA and propellant isolation valves tions CN
guidance). (Orbiter) that are controlled by the (Orbiter)
Orbiter crew via rf link.
ACPS is fail oparational/fail
safe.
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Table 4.7-6. Tug Retrieval Hazards Analysis (Contd)
1
Con- Resulting
Event Hazard Hazard Resolution/ straints/ Hazard
No. Hazard Severity Control Actions Impacts Level
7 Tug perturbation due to plume CA Tug ACPS system will remain Design/ CN
impingement from Orbiter RCS (Tug) activated until just prior to Orbiter/ (Tug)
thruster could cause rotation CA manipulator engagement. Opera- CN
of Tug into Orbiter during (Orbiter) Tug ACPS will have the caps- tions (Orbiter)
critical retrieval maneuver. bility of holding the Tug in a
steady attitude.
7 Tug/Orbiter collision. 	 Due to CR All the Tug vents are nonpro- Design/ CN
energy imparted to Tub from pulsive.	 Any minor pertur- Orbiter/
propellant venting. bations due to venting will be Opera-
cancelled by action of ACPS. Lions
a If ACPS is not inhibited until C3 Tug ACPS is inhibited just Design, CN
after manipulator engage- (Tug) prior to engagement by Orbiter (Tug)
ment, Orbiter and Tug ACPS CR Orbiter manipulator. 	 Dual CN
may begin to "fight" each (Orbiter) communication links are used (Orbiter)
other. to assure receipt of ACPS
inhibit command.
r Puncture of a main propellant CA Tug will incorporate a rein- Design/ CN
tank with the manipulator arm (Tug) forced buffer shield around Opera- (Tug)
can cause loss of Tug. 	 Punc- CA the manipulator attachment tions CN
ture of a high pressure bottle (Orbiter) area.	 The Tug bottles are Orbiter (Orbiter)
can cause damage to the located in the protected
Orbiter. intertank area.
10 Damage to manipulator and/or CA Retraction of Tug into pay- Orbiter, OPEN
Orbiter due to use of mantpu- (Tug) load bay must be done very Opera- (Requires
(ator to accelerate Tug at CA slowly.	 It may be necessary tions Orbiter
excessive rates. (Orbiter) to employ a rate limiter on action)
the manipulator.
11 Inability to engage Tug latches/ CA Redundant electrical power Design/ CN
umbilicals will result in a (Tug) sources are used to operate Orbiter (Tug)
potentially hazardous situation CA Tug/Adapter latches,	 Addi- CN
as there will be no monitoring (Orbiter) tionally, latch and umbilcal (Orbiter)
and override control of Tug engagement capability is
safety critical functions. available via RMS or EVA
if normal latching is
unsuccessful,
11 High voltage arcing/burning CA No high voltage will be pres- Design CN
at electrical disconnects could (Tug) ent at Tug/Orbiter umbilicals (Tug)
preclude reconnection. CN during docking. CN
(Orbiter) (Orbiter)
13 Failure of retraction mechanism CA Retraction mechanism com- Design, CA
to rotate Tag/adapter to stowed (Tug) mand and control is dual re- Opera- (Tug)
position resulting in inability to CA dundant. Both Tug and tions CN
close payload bay doors. (Orbiter) adapter can also be remotely
or manually disengaged from
Orbiter via RMS or EVA.
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Table 4.7-6. Tug Retrieval Hazards Analysis (Contd)
Con- Resulting
Event Hazard Hazard Resolution straints' Hazard
No. Hazard Severity Control Actions Impacts
Design/
bevel
13 Tug/payload instability due to CA Forward attachment link can CN
failure of forward attachment (Tug) be engaged via RXIS or EVA. Orbiter (Tug)
link to ongage. CA if this is unsuccessful, it may CN
(Orbiter) be necessary to jettison the (Orbiter)
Tug/payload prior to Orbiter
return.
14 Loss of Tug power due to In- CA Power supply paths between Design. CA
15 ability to shift to Orbiter Crug) Orbiter and Tug are expected Opera- (Tug)
power will result in loss of CA to be redundant. 	 if both paths tions, CN
capability to perform safety (Orbiter) fail, it may be necessary to Orbiter (Orbiter)
critical monitoring and over- abandon 'rug in orbit.
ride functions.
16 Failure to achieve dump of re- CR Series 'parallel dump val+es Design, CN
sidual main propellants will not, (Orbiter) art, used to assure dump cif- Orbiter (Tug)
in itself, present a hazard to pability for both propellant CN
the Orbiter or Tug.	 It is. how- tanks.	 This arrangement (Orbiter)
ever, considered to be good also assures that dump lines
safety practice to dump the ' can be reelased prior to
residuals and to use the abort purging anti entry operations.
helium to purge the hydrogen
tank.
17 ,Bain propellant tanks/lines that CA The abort helium system is Design, CN
18 are emptied must be repres- (Tug) used to purge the hydrogen Opera- (Tug)
surized prior to entry to pre- CA tank and lines.	 Both hydro- tions CN
elude crushing. (Orbiter) gen and oxygen tangs and (Orbiter)
lines are then pressurized
with helium to approximately
20 psi (14061 kg/m2).
The contingency analysis indicates that use of the RMS as an emergency backup device
will enhance the overall safety and reliability of the Tug operations. For the RMS to be
fully effective, however, the RMS must incorporate the capability to provide on-orbit
end effector exchange and stowage capability. This will allow the RMS to be used in
accomplishing wrenching or grasping functions during contingency operations.
A Space Shuttle program Level II Change Request was accordingly generated to request
increased capability and flexibility of the RMS terminal device/end effector. Incor-
poration of this change will result in increased capability of the RMS to be used in re-
covering from contingency situations. Details of the RMS requirements change request
are contained in Level H Change Request 005 (reference Section 5 Volume III).
4.7.4 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES SUMMARY. The safety and reliability analyses have
indicated that the interface designs are in conformance with all significant Space Tug
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idble 4.7-7. RMS/EVA Requirements to Support Tug Deployment/Retrieval Contingency Ops
E
ca
cn
Deployment/Retrieval
Function Sequence
Mechanism involved
and Design Features
Contingency Ops Support Requirements
RMS EVA Remarks
1 Undock RMS and 10 Orbiter provided function.
move clear/stow
RMS
2 Retract/reconnect 9 Fuel and oxidizer disconnect panel X X End effector adapter or
retraction actuator. EVA tool to apply required
torque to screw driveRedundant motor elec. screw
mechanism.
actuator.
Z Deployment adapter rotation
CD
Cr (step 4/7) will disconnect/con-
rn nett lines.
CD
3 Unlatch/latch S Q) Forward Z fitting and guide. X X Assume capability for end
a forward Z fittings (D effector adapter or EVA
A a Redundant motor elec. airedtool to apply requ
actuator. torque to drive mechanism.
(Orbiter provided, assumed
compatible with RMS/EVA
tool. )
4 Rotate payload out 7 Pivot actuators X X End effector adapter to pull
of/into cargo bay pin and permit redundantDual redundant elec. motor actuator to accomplish ro-
Disengage/engage actuator drive. tation.	 EVA tool for same
fwd and aft Y use.	 Also end effector EVA
fittings
Deployment/Retrieval
Function Sequence
Mechanism Involved
and Design Features
Contingency Ops Support Requirements
RMS EVA Remarks
Tandem motors on each drive. tool to apply required
Forward and aft Y fittings and torque.
guides.
5 Attach RMS 6 Orbiter provided RMS with end X From this point to deploy--
effectors. ment step 10, RMS is
attached to Tug and is notGrasping point(s) on Tug com--
available for contingency
o
patible with end effectors.
use.	 EVA is only option.
0 - (Also applies from retrieval
0, step 2 to this step in re--rn W trieval sequence. )
d r,
CD to assist with RMS
c attach/release function.
W
A 6 Retract/reconnect 5 Electrical umbilical panel and panel
electrical umbilical retruulti.on actuator.
panels Rad)-;ndant motor elec. screw
actua t ,- .
Tug withdrawal from/insertion Rely upon Tug motion out of/
into adapter will disconnect/ into adapter to :xucomplish
reconnect elec. lines. disconnect/ reconnect of
elec. lines
i
S
Table 4.7-7. RMS/EVA Requirements to Support Tug Deployment/Retrieval Contingency Ops (Contd)
Table 4.7-7. RMS/EVA Requirements to Support Tug Deployment/ Retrieval Contingency Ops (Contd)
e
W
to
0.
Deployment/Retrieval
Function Sequence
Mechanism Involved
and Design Features
Contingency Ops Support Requirements
RMS EVA Remarks
7 Unlatch/relatch Tug- 4 11 Tug-adapter latches. X Failure of one latch will not
adapter latches. require EVA for deploy-
Disengage/reengage Over center link with redundant ment.	 EVA tool to apply
shear pins motor elec. screw actuator. required torque to actuator
Adjoining latches are coupled drive in event of multiple
for redundancy on unlatching. failure.
Actuator provides sufficient
force to disengage/ reengage
alignment shear pins.
S Deploy/retrieve 3 Cri Orbiter provided RMS.
using RMS
9 Extend/retract engine 031 ai Tug engine supplied actuator Tug in deployed position and
nozzle final pre- subsystem held by RMS. Nozzle actu-
deployment C/O, ation, C/O, safety check
preretrieval safety accomplished using Tug-
check. Orbiter RIB' lints.	 Tug pro-
vide means to jettiE on noz-
zle extension if it can't be
retracted.
10 Release/attach RMS Z Orbiter provided RMS with end X EVA to assist with release/
effectors. attach function.
NOTE: Tug engine nozzle Grasping point(s) on Tug com-
is retracted before RMS patible with end effectors
attach to Tug during re-
trieval sequence.
E
i
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i
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safety requirements except those for horizontal drain of the main propellants. The
reliability analysis, based on conservative reliability estimates for the dump valves,
indicate that the chance of an abort dump failure is extremely remote. If, however, a
dump failure of the hydrogen tank should occur, the Orbiter can still land safely. The
horizontal vent valve will allow safe venting the hydrogen, and the only consequence
would be a possible turnaround delay due to having to.wait for hydrogen boiloff. If
failure of the redundant dump valves on the oxygen tank should result in failure to
dump the oxygen during abort, the oxygen propellant tank will structurally fail at
landing. Horizontal drain capability in this case will not, of course, preclude this con-
sequence. If an abort dump pressurization failure should occur, at least 65 percent
of the hydrogen and 80 percent of the oxygen will be dumped. The Orbiter can land
safely with the residual propellants aboard, and the propellant levels will be below the
vent outlets. The propellants can thus be safely boiled off. The only negative con-
sequence in this case, as in the case of a hydrogen dump failure, is that a turnaround
time delay may occur.
The conclusion drawn from the analysis is that the additional cost, weight, and com-
plexity associated with implementation of horizontal drain capability is not justified.
The caution and warning logic described in Section 4.8 provides a systematic and dis-
ciplined approach to identifying the safety critical data that should be displayed to
flight and ground crews. The specific cautions and warnings identified are based on
Tug designs and operations concepts to date. It should be recognized, however, that
modification to Tug designs and/or operations concepts can result in a different set of
caution and warning parameters.
The Tug hazard analyses and failure modes and effects analyses should be continually
updated to reflect the changes associated with the evolving Tug program, and the re-
salts of these analyses should be used in assessing the adequacy of the caution and
warning system.
}	 A conflict in the safety requirements contained in different segments of MSFC 68M00039
can have a significant influence on the Tug and the Tug interface designs. The potential
conflicts in the safety requirements contained in the Tug requirements documents deal
with the level of fault tolerance to be designed into the Tug. AMFC 68M00039-1,
Appendix II, requires that all mission-critical functions be designed to fail operational/
all others fail safe. The requirement in the MSFC 68MO0039-1 document requires thatf	
no single failure will result in hazards which jeopardize the safety of the Orbiter or
iIf the Tug mission critical subsystems are designed to fail operational, the equipment
redundancy necessary to attain this requirement can be extensive. For example: if
the Tug arm/safe switch were made fail-operational, a series/parallel network of four
arm/safe switches would be required (to allow continued operational capability if any
switch should fail in the open or closed mode). Individual monitoring and control of
each of these arm/safe switches would significantly increase the complexity of the
Orbiter/Tug interface.i
In contrast, the requirement that no single failure will result in a hazard that jeopard-
izes the flight or ground crews can be implemented with relative ease. 'In the arm/
safe switch example, only a single arm/safe switch is required for fail-safe operation
(i. e., it would take a failure of both the arm/safe switch and an inadvertent signal for
the safety of the flight or ground crews to be compromised). This, of course, greatly
simplifies the Tug design and the associated interfaces. It is therefore recommended
that the criterion be "no single failure shall result in a hazard which jeopardizes the
flight or ground crews. " Any exceptions to this requirement, such as a fail-operate/
fail-safe deployment/retrieval system and fail-operate/fail-safe ACPS should be
specifically identified in the requirements document.
1c
SECTION S
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
Incorporation of specific rug interface needs in the Orbiter before Tug development
requires a complete understanding of what effect Tug operations and systems changes
will have on interface requirements. Tug changes that result in critical Orbiter inter-
face requirement impacts were identified in this task to permit possible desensitizing
of applicable Tug/Shuttle interface accommodations.
Detailed Tug/Shuttle interface requirements were obtained in Task 2 (Section 4) for
the Space Tug. The sensitivity analysis determined impacts to these interface require-
ments caused by major changes in Tug operational and design characteristics.
Sensitivity investigations were made to consider variations in the following areas;
Orbiter Versus Ground Control and Monitoring — Four options to the baseline system
were investigated for reducing Tug ground control and status monitoring; 1) increased
Orbiter crew monitor and control capability, 2) high Tug autonomy for onboard control,
3) expanded use of peripheral avionics equipment on the Tug deployment adapter, and
4) La se of Tug-supplied rather than Orbiter-supplied Tug support equipment.
Tug Self-Checkout Capability — Implementation of higher and lower levels of onboard
checkout capability (with respect to the baseline Tug) were examined.
Secure Communications — Department of Defense may incorporate communications
security (COMSEC) units on Tug, its payload, and on Orbiter. The physical, func-
tional, and operational interface impact was assessed.
Fluid Services -- Major sensitivities in Tug design and operations were investigated for
storable propellants, load dump variations, N 2 pressurization/purge, cryogenic ACPS,
and off-pad loading.
Tug Payload Services — Service sensitivities due to two types of Tug changes were
considered: changes affecting 1) the number and type of payload/Orbiter services that
can be routed through the Tug, and 2) payload services provided by the Tug.
Alternative Abort Modes -- Parametric data was generated to provide rapid effects
evaluation for abort sensitive Tug/Orbiter interfaces; i.e., LH 2 and LO  dump line
diameters.
Tug. Length — The possible need to deploy very long spacecraft or perform high-energy
retrieval missions may result in Tug length variations from 20 to 35 feet (6. 1 to 14.7
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meters. Interface effects due to these length changes include structural ^_tachment
and pivot locations, reaction magnitudes, and Tug center of gravity position.
Description of investigation approach and results/recommendations for each of these
seven sensitivities is contained in Sections 5. 1 through 5.7. A summary of the com-
bined results/recommendations and their influence on interface analyses results ob-
tained in Task 2 (Section 4) is presented in Section 5. S.
5.1 ORBITER VERSUS GROUND CONTROL AND MONITORING
The avionic analyses conducted in study Task 2 started from a baseline operating con-
cept (supplied by NASA) that specified to what eAent Orbiter performed Tug control
and monitor operations (with respect to those allocated to ground functions). The
Orbiter Versus Ground Control and Monitoring sensitivity eras performed to assess
the interface requirements impact (benefit versus costs) due to implementation of four
variations of the baseline control and monitor concept.
Three of the four alternative Tug control and monitoring concepts involve allocation of
control philosophy with respect to the ground, Orbiter, or Tug vehicle. These are:
1) increased ground control/decreased Orbiter control, 2) increased Orbiter crew
monitor and control capability, and 3) increased Tug autonomy/decreased Orbiter/
ground control.
The fourth alternative is somewhat different from the other three because the baseline
Orbiter/Tug/ground control and monitor operational allocations are the same but
alternative means of providing the control and monitor equipment and software employs
Orbiter-supplied payload support equipment is evaluated against the use of Tug
supplied-control and monitor equipment at the payload specialist station and a Tug
data processor capability located in the Orbiter cargo bay on the Tug deployment
adapter.
These four alternative concepts (Figure 5. 1-1) were evaluated with respect to: safety,
interface complexity items including equipment required, physical and software inter-
faces, operational complexity, crew effectivity, weight, and cost.
Details of these configurations, associated sensitivity analyses, and results are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
5. 1. 1 MONITOR AND CONTROL GROUND RULES. Before initiating this task it was
necessary that common ground rules be established for certain Orbiter safety, relia-
bility, and operational procedures. These are:
a. Tug shall be fail-safe (not necessarily fail-safe/fail-operational).
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Figure 5. 1-1. Alternative Tug/Orbiter/Ground Control and
Monitor Concepts
b. Safety functions shall not require Orbiter support during prelaunch operations.
c. Safety functions require backups by data link or hardwire.
d. Safety functions (abort control) shall not be dependent on RF links to/from ground.
e. Safety monitors will be telemetered to ground.
f. Reliability of ail Orbiter 1anctions is equal to one (by definition).
g. Tug will telemeter deployment adapter (D/A) monitors when in cargo bay.
5.3-2 CONCEPT 1, MINIMUM ORBITER MONITOR AND CONTROL/MAXIMUM
GROUND CONTROL. Concept 1 was investigated to determine if Orbiter onboard con-
trol of Tug and Tug associated interfaces can be minimized by designing Tug such that
the majority of its nonautonomous control and monitoring operations are performed by
a ground flight control operation. The interface control and monitoring paths and the
functional operations allocated among the Tug, Orbiter, and ground for this concept
are shown in Tables 5.1-1 and 5.1-2 respectively. As indicated in these tables, this
system would rely on Tug/ground and Tug/Orbiter/ground RF communication Bake for
i;
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6.inw as ascent
O	 GNI7 to ORB/ PSP'ORB to GND to ORB PSP 2 ORB to
PSP GND PSP 2 GND
S	 PI PI PI PI 
R	 Gnd Net Gnd Net Gnd Net 2 Gnd Net 2
C	 See comments
0 = Operational Convenience
Arm Safinn & loiter RF
commands
i
Table 5. 1-1. Tug Interface Paths (Concept 1 -- Increased Ground Control)
Backup	 Primary Path
	 Backup Path
Require-
Phase	 Function	 ment*	 lip	 Down
	 Up	 Down	 Comments
S	 Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TL,1I Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Operational BOU vier gnd
Link Linn Link 2 Link 2 RF/PSP link
O	 Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLP.1 Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM
Link Link Link 2 Link 2
S	 Orb Sta 695 - Orb Sta ti9a - Deployment adapter power
Ded Fuel Cell Main iius through Orb Sta 1307
S	 PSP - GPC C&%\' to Mss PS1' - GPC Ti 'm - 1'SP
No. 1 TLDI - PSI' No. 2 No. 2	 '
PSP to DIMS TLM via PSP PSP to CIl' & PSP No. 2 Operational B/U via gnd
D A IU RF/PSP
C	 PSP/ORB PSP'ORB PSP VORB PSP 2/ ORB
S	 Tug Fuel _ Orb St<1 695 - Deployment adapter power
Cells (2) through Orb Sta 1307
Prelaunch Safety Critical
Operations
Power
Ascent Safety Critical
Abort
in Ground Comm
Power
On-Orbit Safety Critical
Attached Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Operations
Qn-Orbit Safety Critical
Detached
Operations
*S	 = Safety
R = Mission Reliability
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Table 5. 1-2.	 Concept 1,
Control/Monitor
Ground Orbiter Tug
CONTROLS
Safety Critical. B/U X
Communications X
Vents X
Purges x
Update G&N X
is Umbilical Mechanisms X
Forward Latches X
D/A Rotation X
i D/A Latches X
c
Fuel Cell Activation ^	 X
Power Changeover X
Predeployment Checkout X
ACS Arming X B/U
Loiter X B/U
Main Propulsion Arming X B/U
Mission Sequence Start X B/U
Main Propulsion Safing B/U x
Propellant Dump X
Precapture Checkout X
r,
r: ACS Sa.fing B/U X
Fuel Cell Deactivation x
Abort B/U X
MONITORS
C &W B/U X
Tug Status X B/U
 Increased Ground Control Operations Allocations
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all operational command, control, and data monitoring operations. During ascent/
descent, before Tug deployment, and after Tug rendezvous and capture by the Orbiter,
this communication link must interface with and employ the Orbiter's RF communica-
tions system to communicate with the Tug ground control facility/system.
Because this concept is dependent on adequate ground coverage during launch, descent
and Tug/Orbiter on-orbit operations (160 n. mi., 300 km), a ground coverag_ valua-
tion was performed for NASA STDN, NASA TDRS, and DOD SCF communication net-
works. Typical c7iverage from STDN and TDRSS is shown in Figure 5.1-2. Although
precise covernga can be determined only for a specific trajectory, this figure shows
that there are regions of assured 100% coverage, others of less than 100 %, and even
some excluded regions of zero coverage. Four STDN ground stations are shown.
These provide full tracking and data services for direct communication or communica-
tion via a TDRS. The longest interval between STDN stations is between Madrid and
Orroral. If the radius bisecting the great circle between these stations is extended, an
altitude is reached (14, 888 n. mi. , 27, 600 km) at which both stations are visible. The
peak at approximately 76 degrees longitude represents a region of no STDN coverage
below an altitude of 14, 888 n. mi. (27, 600 km). There are similar regions between
each pair of stations. However, the no coverage: altitude is very much lower since the
stations are closer together. At approximately 6400 n. mi. (11, 860 km), the maximum
altitude for 'TDRSS use is shown with three small regions of excluded coverage.
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Figure 5.1-2. Tug-TDRS/STDN Ground Coverage
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During Tug/Orbiter operations through the Tug's first engine burn, the Tug and Orbiter
are at an altitude of about 160 n, mi. (300 Jun). At this altitude, the groL..Id station
radius-of-visibility is approximately 900 n. mi. (1667 km). Figures 5. 1--3 and 5. 1-4
illustrate the areas of coverage for the STDN and SCF stations. It is apparent that the
chances of Orbiter/Tug operations and Tug first burn occurring over an existing
ground station are slim unless the trajectory is severely constrainted. Thus, the
TDRS system and/or a network of instrumentation ships or mobile ground stations is
required to make Concept 1 a viable Tug control and monitor candidate. In any event,
since ground coverage during all Tug/Orbiter mission phases cannot be assumed, it is
recommended that safety functions and abort control responsibility be allocated to the
Orbiter and its crew for all Tug/Orbiter concepts.
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Figure 5.1-3. Ground 'Track for Reusable Tug Reference Geosynchronous
Mission NASA STEIN Network
5.1.3 CONCEPT 2, INCREASED CREW MONITOR AND CONTROL. Concept 2 was
evaluated to determine if increased Orbiter support capability in excess of the Orbiter
crew-controlled baseline Tug functions for critical safety items, Tug deployment,
retrieval, retrieval "safed" interrogation, and abort could significantly reduce ground
control requirements. Also, additional Orbiter requirements (in relation to baseline
Tug) and corresponding impacts on the Orbiter data management system, software,
MSS/PSS equipment allocation, Orbiter crew effectivity, power requirements, data
transmission requirements, etc. were determined. These operations would include
Tug checkout and greater RF control of the Tug while in the deployed mode.
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Figure 5. 1-4. Reference DOD Geosynchronous Mission Ground Trace
Tables 5.1-3 and 5.1-4 show the Tug/Orbiter/ground interface paths and the operations
allocations, respectfully, for this configuration,
5. 1.4 CONCEPT 3, HIGH AUTONOMY TUG. A reduction in Tug-to-Orbiter/ground
interface requirements will result from a Tug data management system design that
provides a hardware and software capability to perform complete Tug health assess-
ment and to execute abort, deployment, or rendezvous and docking operations autono-
mously. No ground flight control facility would be required and only a limited degree
of Orbiter support capability would be required. The basic Tug/Orbiter/ground inter-
face and operational requirements for this concept were developed using, but not
significantly adding to, present Orbiter payload support capabilities. Additional re-
quirements for the Tug, its support adapter, and communications interfaces were also
identified and costed. Tables 5. 1-5 and 5.1-6 describe the concept, where only "red"
or "green" status indications for each major Orbiter/Tug flight operation are needed.
5.1.5 CONCEPT 4, EXPANDED SUPPORT ADAPTER AVIONICS. An analysis was
performed to evaluate the use of a separate and unique Tug support station (TSS) that
communicates with a data processor located on the Tug support adapter to effect Tug
operational (nonsafety) control and monitor functions. This technique, shown sche-
matically in Figure 5.1-5 permits the Orbiter crew to maintain necessary control over
Tug with minimized use of Orbiter GPC and GPC software support system.
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A
Primary Path	 Backup Path
Up Down Up Down Comments
• jg T-0 Data Tug T -n TLIM Tug T-0 Data Tun T-n TLIM Opc i ational B'1' via land
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 RFfPSP link
Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLhI Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM TLM via Orbiter is alterna-
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 tive (RF or umbilical)
Orb Sta 695 - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Ded Fuel Cell Main Bus through Orb Sta 1307
PSP - GPC C &W to MSS PSP - GPC TLM - PSP
No. 1 TLIM - PSP No. 2 No. 2
PSP to DMS TLM via PSP PSP to CIU & PSP No. 2 Operational B /U via gnd
D/A IU RF/PSP
PSP/ORB PSP,'ORB _PSP 2 11ORB PSP 2/ORB
Tug Fuel - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Cells (2) through Orb Sta 1307
Tabie 5. 1-3. Tug Interface Paths (Concept 2, Increased Orbiter Control)
	
I
ftj !a
t+
QnI
Phase	 function
Prelaunch	 Safety Critical
Operations
Power
Ascent	 Safety Critical
Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Backup
Require-
ment*
S
O
S
S
S
C
S
On-Orbit
Attached
On-Orbit
Detach -M
Safety Critical
Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Operations
Safety Critical
Operations
Same as ascent
O	 PSP - GPC PSP to GPS PSP 2 to GPC PSP 2 to GPC
S	 PI PI P12 PI 
R	 Pi PI PE 2 PI 2
Includes significant prelaunch
checkout, TLM monitoring,
data reduction trend
monitoring.
Arm/Sating & loiter RF
commands
No ground operations capa-
bility. Orbiter performs
precapture Tug safing. con-
trol. & checkout.
•S = Safety C = See comments
R =	 Mission Reliability 0 = Operational Convenience
Table 5. 1-4.
	 Concept 2, Increased Orbiter Interface Operations Allocations
Controller/Monitor
Ground Orbiter Tug
CONTROLS
Safety Critical x
Communications x
Vents x
Purges x
Update G&N x
Umbilical Mechanisms x
Forward Latches x
D/A Rotation x
D/A Latches x
Fuel Cell Activation x
Power Changeover x
Predeployment Checkout x
ACS Arming B/U x
Loiter B/U x
Main Propulsion Arming B/U x
Mission Sequence Start B/U x
Main Propulsion Safing B/U x
Propellant Damp x
Precapture, Checkout x
ACS Safing B/U x
Fuel Cell Deactivation x
Abort x
MONITORS
C &W B/U x
Tug Status B/U x
5-10
Same as ascent
O	 PSP - GPC PSP to GPS PSP 2 GPC PSP 2 GPC
S	 PI PI PI PI 
R	 ORB/Pi GRB/PI Gnd Net 2 Gnd Net 2
Table 5.1-5. Tug Interface Paths (Concept 3, High Autonomy Tug)
Backup Primary Path Backup Path
Require--
Phase	 Function .sent* Up Down Up Down Comments
Prelaunch	 Safety Critical S Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Operational B 1U via gnd
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 RF/PSP link
Operations O Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM TLM via Orbiter is alterne-
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 tive (RF or umbilical)
	 — —.-
Power S Orb Sta 695 - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Ded fuel Cell Main Bus through Orb Sta 1307
Ascent	 Safety Critical S PSP - GPC Caw to MSS PSP - GPC TLM - PSP iNo. 1 TLM - PSP No, 2 No. 2
Abort S PSP to DMS TLM via PSP PSP to Cru & PSP No. 2 Operational B/U via gnd
D/A IU RF/PSP
cn
_
N► 	 Ground Comm C PSP PSP PSP 2 PSP 2
f.a
Power g Tug Fuel - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
through Orb Sta 1307
On-Orbit Safety Critical
Attached Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Operations
On-Orbit Safety Critical
Detached
Operations
*S = Safety
R = Mission Reliability
Orbiter monitor results of
Tug control requests (red/
green light approach)
Arm/Safing & loiter RF
commands
C = See comments
O = Operational Convenience
s
f	
^ ^
a
	 Table 5.1-6. Concept 3, High Autonomy Tug Interface Allocations
Controller/Monitor
Ground	 I	 arbiter
CO.N'E' ROLS
Safety Critical
Communications
Vents
Purges
Update G&N
Umbilical Mechanisms
Forward Latches
D/A Rotation
D/A Latches
Fuel Cell Activation
Power Changeover
Predeployment Checkout
ACS Arming
Loiter
Main Propulsion Arming
Mission Sequence Start
Main Propulsion Safing
Propellant Dump
Precapture Checkout
ACS Safing
Fuel Cell Deactivation
Abort
MONITORS
C &W
Tug Status
x
y
x
X}
X
a
x
x
X
x
x
X
X
X
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
B/U -	 x- 	 x-
Deployed	 Deployed	 Attached
B/U	 x
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Figure 5.1--5. Tug Specialist Station Concept/Deployment
Adapter Processor
The major system-level differences between this and the baseline Tug/Orbiter interface
concept (also high-autonomy Tug capability) is that a large portion of the Orbiter-
supplied data processing requirements are eliminated. However, Tables 5. 1-7 and
5.1-8 show that the Orbiter is still responsible for certain Tug support functions.
These include: safety, RF communication with a deployed Tug (in the Orbiter vicinity),
and attached Tug RF communications to ground routed through the Orbiter RF com-
munication system. Thus, the Tug's physical interface to the Orbiter and into payload
support avionics is not reduced via the use of this concept, and in fact is increased
slightly to account for the communications link between the deployment, adapter proc-
essor and the TSS control and monitor display (CRT and keyboard).
5. 1. 6 CONCEPT EVALUATION. To evaluate these four interface concepts, five
sensitivity analyses were performed in the areas of: 1) interface minimization, 2)
weight minimization, 3) crew effectivity, 4) software interface reduction, and 5) cost
differences. These sensitivities and their results are presented in the following
paragraphs.
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Backup
Require-
Phase Function ment Up Down Up Down Comments
Prelaunch Safety Critical S Tug T-0 Data 'rug T-0 TL;1] Tug T-0 Data Tug 'r-0 TLZI Operational B-'U via gnd
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 RF/PSP link
Operations O Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLbi Tug T-0 Data Tug T-0 TLM TLM via Orbiter is alterna-
Link Link Link 2 Link 2 tive (RF or umbilical)
Power S Orb Sta 695 - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Ded Fuel Cell 'Alain Bus through Orb Stn I307
Ascent Safety Critical S PSP - GPC C&kV to MSS PSI' - GPC TLM - PSP
No. I rL.Il - PSP No. 2 No. 2
Abort S PSP to Dht5 7'I,'Af
	 is PSP I'S], to CIU & PSP No. 2 Operational B.X via gnd
D A It: RF PSP
Ground Comm C PSP LISP _PSP 2 PSP 2
X31
t
t-+
Power S Tug Duel - Orb Sta 695 - Deployment adapter power
Cells (2) through Orb Sta I307
On-Orbit	 Safety Critical
Attached	 Abort
Ground Comm
Power
Operations
On-Orbit	 Safety Critical
Detached
Operations
•S	 Safety
R = Mission Reliability
Samc at • ascent
O	 PSP - Gr1 C	 PSP to GIP S	 PSP 2 GPC	 PSP 2 GPC
PSP-CO	 PSP to G,nd	 -	 PSP 2 Gnd
frrm Gnd
S	 PI	 PI	 Pl 2	 PI 
R	 Gnd Net	 Gnd Net
	 Gnd Net 2	 Gnd Net 2
C	 See comments
0 = Operational Convenience
Arm. Safing & loiter RF
commands
PI is backup for less than
20 miles
X
X
X
X
x
B/U
x
B/U
B/U
B/U
B/U
B/U
x
x
B/U
x-
Attached
x-
Attached
x
B/U
j
y
B/U
X
x
x
x
x
X
x
f	 x
;
I
x	 i1
x	 i4	 x
xI
x
B/U-	 x-
Deployed
	 Deployed
B/U-	 X-
Deployed	 Deployed
Ii
Table 5.1-8. Concept4, Deployment Adapter Processor Operations Allocation
Controller/Monitor
D/A
Ground	 Orbiter	 Tug	 Processor
CONTROLS
Safety Critical
Communications
Vents
Purges
Update G&N
Umbilical Mechanisms
Forward Latches
D/A Rotation
D/A Latches
Fuel Cell Activation
Power Changeover
Predeployment Checkout
ACS Arming
Loiter
Main Propulsion Arming
Mission Sequence Start
Main Propulsion Safi.ng
Propellant Dump
Precapture Checkout
ACS Swing
Fuel Cell Deactivation
Abort
MONITORS
C&W
Tub; Status
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Interface Minimization. The size of the Tug/Orbiter wiring interface was investigated
for each of the four interface concepts. The results indicate that the size of the Tug/
Orbiter physical interface is relatively independent of the concept selected (Table 5. 1-9).
These interfaces are required to satisfy safety ground rules or because practical con-
cept implementation must employ, or be routed through, Orbiter equipment. Thus,
unless basic Tug/Orbiter ground rules are changed (such as not requiring the Orbiter
to monitor caution and warning (C&W) signals and transmitting Tug C&W data to
ground), interface size benefit cannot be considered as concept selection criteria.
This fact is especially true in light of the small size (16 TSP) of the recommended
baseline interface concept.
Table 5. 1-9. Tug/Orbiter Avionics Interfaces vs Interface Concept
Increased
Ground	 Autonomous	 D/A
Interface	 Control	 Baseline	 Tug	 Processor
C &W Monitors
TLM
Time Codes
Uplink (NASA Mission)
Uplink (DOD Mission)
Uplink (RF detached)
TSS or D/A TLM
Prelaunch (T-0 Panel)
17	 17	 17	 17
2 @ 16K BPS* 2 @ 16K BPS* 2 @ 16K BPS* 2 @ 16K BPS*
1 1 1 1
2* 2* 2* 2*
2* 2* 2* 2*
2* 2* 2* 2*
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
*Inciudes Redundancy
NOTE: The number of communication channels is indicated above, not wire counts.
Crew Effectivity. A crew effectivity analysis for the four interface concepts was per-
form9d to evaluate the effects of each concept with respect to crew time required. The
results were then compared with the baseline concept to determine the benefits or
penalties associated with each alternative concept. The results of three of the four
concepts are shown in Table 5. 1--10 and indicate that: 1) the Orbiter commander and
pilot work load is relatively independent of the interface concept choice; and 2) the
mission specialist work load is reduced by 76 minutes, 68 minutes, and 32 minutes
respectively for the maximum ground, high autonomy, and D/A processor concepts.
The total crew time for the D/A processor concept is equal to that of the baseline.
3
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Table 5. 1-10. Crew Time Requirements vs Operational Concepts
to
w
Phase
Operational Concepts
Baseline Max Ground Control High Autonomy Tug Processor in D/A
C P MS C P MS C P MS C P MS TS
Prelaunch 0 0 :20 0 0 :20 0 0 :20 0 0 :20 :20
Launch to Orbit 0 0 30:10 0 0 :05 0 0 :05 0 0 :05 30:05
Predeploy & Deploy 9:00 41:00 36:00 9:00 30:10 3:00 9:00 36:30 10:00 9:00 41:00 2:00 34:00
Return Rendezvous 43:00 58:00 31:30 43:00 39:30 17:30 43:00 56:30 19:34 43:00 58:00 29:30 2:00
& Capture
Descent 0 0 2:00 0 0 2:00 0 0 2:00 0 0 0 2:00
Mission Totals 52:00 99:00 100:00 52:00 69:40 23:55 52:00 95:00 31:55 52:00 99:00 31:55 68:25
Note: C = Captain, P = Pilot, MS = Mission Specialist
Thus, the 32 minute mission specialist time saved is actually picked up by the Tug
specialist duties (operating Tug support equipment located at the PSS) associated with
this concept. The result of the maximum Orbiter control noncept (not shown in table)
will result in a significant increase in mission specialist (or rug specialist) duties of
approximately 83 minutes. This additional time would bo used to perform the detailed
data checkout and analysis tasks, and Tug RF control and monitor tasks that are al,o-
cated to ground facilities in the baseline co ►^figuration.
The resu'.t of this analysis indicates that the maximum ground control and high autoton--
omy Tug concepts offer the greatest benefit to the Orbiter crew from the standpoint of
reducing crew time required to support Tug activities. Both these alternative concepts,
however, have cost, and Orbiter operational complexity penalties that must be con-
sidered before a change to the baseline is recommended.
Weight Effects. An analysis was performed to determine the weight increases (with
respect to the baseline) resulting from the various interface concepts. It was con-
cluded that Concepts 1, 2, and 3 resulted in no significant weight increase or decrease.
(All interface, Tug, D/A, and Orbiter interface equipment is the same as for the
baseline.) Concept 4 (D/A processor concept), however, results in an Orbiter/deploy-
ment adapter weight increase of approximately 92 pounds (42 kg) (33 lb, 15 kg of pay-
load weight). This weight increase is co4siaered quite small and can be made even
less significant if the D/A processor and TSS equipment were used to support Tug
spacecraft functions. If used in this manner a net Orbiter/deployment adapter weight
penalty of approximately 45 pounds (20 kg) (16 lb, 7 kg of payload weight) would result
(Table 5. 1-11). It is therefore concluded that no significant weight differences result
from the interface concept selected and that . ?eight should not be an important selection
criterion.
Software Effects. An analysis was conducted to determine the major software differ-
ences between the various interface concepts. For this analysis the number of words
of Tug support software was estimated ii r the data processors in the ground support
equipment, the Orbiters GPC, the Tug (interface software only), and the deployment
adapter processor (Concept 4 only). The results of this analysis are presented in
Tables 5.1-12 through 5.1-16 and summarized in the results section below.
The data indicates that Concept 3 (high autonomy Tug) results in the least total amount
of software (50k words) and the least amount of Orbiter support software (3k words)
for the concepts studied. However, it also results in the greatest amount of more
expensive Tug software (32k words;, and the lowest amount of less expensive ground
software.
Concept 1, on the other hand, requires a total of 63k words of which 14k words are of
the airborne type and 49k words of the less expensive ground type. Although Concept 1
is attractive from the software cost standpoint, the additional ground hardware and
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Table 5.1-11. Weight Penalty for D/A Processor Concept
Weight Difference
Charge (from Baseline) 	 lb	 (kg)
Remove Spacecraft Wires from 	 -67	 (-30.4)
Station 1307 to P/L MDM
Add 1 Mbps Data Link Wires from 	 +6	 (+2.7)
TSS to D/A
Add TSS Equipment lb (kg) +52	 (+23.6)
2 CRT's 30 (13.6)
2 Keyboards 4 (1.8)
1 Display Electronics 15 (6.8)
Harnessing 3 (1.4)
Add D/A S/C MDM +20	 (+9.1)
Add D/A Processor +34	 (+15.4)
Total Weight G +45	 (+20.4)
Equivalent Payload Deployment	 16.2	 (7.3)
Penalty (Orbiter Wt x 0.36)
personnel may offset this benefit. Other disadvantages are that a greater number of
series hardware/ software systems (Tug control facility, tracking stations, and Orbiter
equipment) must be operational for mission success.
Concept 2 (high Orbiter capability) eliminates most of the ground facilities and software
(as does Concept 3) and thus incurs long term operational cost advantages. This con-
cept requires a greater interface with the Orbiter than Concept 3 and is thus consid-
ered less desirable.
Concept 4 reduces the actual Orbiter GPC required software to 4 K words (same as
Concept 2) at the expense of an additional 17 K words of airborne softwaxe associated
with the deployment adapter processor. The total amount of software required for this
concept is approximately 74 K words and thus represents the maximum of the four
methods investigated. Concept 4, however, provides some additional benefit in that a
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Table 5.1-12. Software Requirements vs Control/Monitor
Concept for Baseline
"eElwu•e option Name/Function
Baseline
option
Software Location & Storage Required (Number of Words
Ground orbiter Tug D/A
'I'llG CAUTION. (YARNING & ABORT OPTIONS
Executo Tug Crilical Function Status Monitor 101 700 1, 500 Oafety)
1Sxecute 'rug lhort Bode I or 2, x 102 150 1, 000 (Formatter)
400 (Cmd. Decoder)
TUG INITIALIZATION, STATUS DISPLAY
Rxccute'I%tg Initialization 201 500 600
Execute Tug Mate Vector, Update 2t12 200
Exec • ttc Command Tug Foc' Vell ON/O1 , F 203 20
Exectu ,^  Command 'Rig Communications ON/OFF 204 20
Execute '.'uV Prcdcployment Status I119pTity 205 2. 000 0, 2n0 (Status)
1•:xec•ute Tu, t post Capture Status Display 208 2,000
EXCCnti: 'Put; post Capture Safe 207 150
TUG 1]CT'I.L15' p;EN',','CAl'T[ t RF: OPTIONS
Execute DLyiloy A m / safv ,witch to vom 301 40
Execute Retract/K%age fluid Umbilical 302 .10
Execute Rotate D!A Up/Down xxxxx 303 .t0
Execute Rrttact/Fngige Electrical Umbilical 304 40
Execute Vugagi'/ltult'„sr Capture Latches 305 •i0
TUG R1' t'ONTWL 011VIONS
Execute ApS Arm/Safe and Switch to x,:xac 4011 (200) 45
f:xccute Al,1sn Propulsion Arm/Safe ,Mitch to xxxxx 402 200 (45)
ExcanLQ TLIg I.oiter Mode 403 200 (45)
Execute State ':oc'tor Update 404 200 (45)
I•:xceute Go to Flight Command 405 200 (45)
E:xl • CLLIe 1'r^ • captu re Status Display 406 2, 000
Excrutc Prrcapture C/O 5.000
TUG CONT1101, & UTILITY OPTIONS
Nxecute Switch to Orbiter Power 501 20
Execute SN uti to 'Pug Internal Power 502 20
Execute SaiWh Tug Power OFF 503 20
Execute 7119-WA (let) Actuator xx to xxx (ON/OFF) 504 65
I-:xecute Output Tug-D/A Control Status 505 250
Execute Load Tug DMS Loc xxx with xxxxx 506 45
Execute Read 'Pug Dhls Loc xc x with xxxlot 507 45
Execute Display Tug'1 LM` xxr continually 508 40
OTHER TUG i/F SOrrWARZ
Rendezvous & Docking Control 15,000
Tug Predeployment C' /O 20,000
Tug Precapture Safing 2,000
Common Stnrai,e, Tables, etc. 1,500
Note 1: (X)	 Backup Capability	 Totals 43,000
	 10,170	 9,700
ORIGINAL RZIGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
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Table 5.1-13. F iftware Requirements vs Control/Monitor
Concept 1, Increased Ground Control
Software Option Name/Function
Baseline
Option
Software Locatien & Storage Required (Number of Words
Ground Orbiter Tug D/A
TUG CAUTION. WARNING k ABORT OPTIONS
Execute Tug Critical Function Status Monitor 101 700 1, 500 (Safety)
Execute Tug Abort Made I or 2, x 102 150 1, 000 (Formatter)
400 (Cmd. Decoder)
TUG INITTALI`LATION, STATUS DISPLAY
Execute Tug Initialization 201 6011
Execute Tug State Vector, Update 202
Execute Command Tug Fuel Cell ON /OrF 203
Execute Command Tug Communications ON/OFF 204
Execute Tug Predeployment Status Display 205 6, 200 (Status)
E'xeoute Tug Post Capture Status Display 206
Execute'i'ug Post Capture Safe 207
TUG DEP?..(11'AIENT/CAPTURE OPTIONS
Execute I)Lploy Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 301 4u
Execute 11.etr:Lct/Engage Fluid Umbilical 302
Fxecute Rotate D/ A Up/Hewn xxxxx 303
Lxecutc Itictract/E:nt;.igc Flectrical Umbilical 304
Execute Fligage/Release Capture Latches 305
TUG I1F CONTROL OPTIONS i
Execute APS Arm/Safe and Switch to x-AxxK 407 (200) 45
Execute Alain Propulsion Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 402 200 (45)
Exuoute Tug Loiter Made 403 20D (45)
Execute State Vector Update 404 200
Exec!ite Go to Flight Commiuid 405 200
Execute Prucapture Status Display 406 2,000
]execute Precapture C/O S, 000
TUG CONTROI. & UTILITY OPTIONS
E:xcoutf , switch to Orbiter Poster 501 20
Execute Switch to Tug Internal Power 502 20
Execute Switch Tug Power OFF 503 20
Execute Tug-D/A (xx) Actuator xx to xxx (ON/OFF) 504 65
Execute Output Tug-D/A Control Status 505 250
Execute Load Tug DMS Lee xxx with xxxxx 506 45
Execute Read Tug DMS Loc xxx with a-Axxx 507 45
Execute Display Tug TLM xxx continually 508 40
OTHER TUG I/F SOFTWARE
Rendezvous & Docking Control 15,000
Tug Predeployment C/O 20,000
Tug Precapture Safutg 2,000
Common Storage, Tables, etc, 700
Note I: (X) __ Backup Capability Totals 48,600	 3,730	 D, 700
0jV P^It a ^
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Table 5.1-14. Software Requirements vs Control./Monitor
Concept 2, High Autonomy Tug
software Option Name/Function
Raseltno
Option
Software Location & Storage Required (Number of Words
Ground Orbiter Tug D/A
TL'G CAUTION, WARNING & A13ORT OPTIONS
Execute Tug Critical Function Status Monitor 101 350 2,500 (Safety)
Execute Tug Abort Mode 1 or 2, x 102 45 I, 000 (Formatter)
400 (Cmd. Decoder)
TUG INITIALIZATION, STATUS DISPLAY
Execute Tug Initialization 201 45 600
Execute Tug State Vector, Update 202 200
Execute Command 'Pug Fuel Cell ON/OFF 203 20
Execute Command Tug Coin mun teations ON/OFF 204 20
Execute Tug Predeployment Status Display 205 200 6,200 (Status)
Execute Tug Post Capture Status Display 206 200
Execute Tug Post Capture Safe 207 45
TUG DEPLOYMENT/CAPT1tRE OPTIONS
Execute Deploy Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 301 40
Execute Retract/Engage Fluid Umbilical 302 40
Execute Rotate; D/A Up/Do^km xxxxx 303 4 0
Execute Retract/Engage Electrical Umbilical 304 40
Execute Engage/Rela':ise Capture Latches 305 40
TUG RF CONTROL OPTIONS
Execute APS Arm/Safe and Switch to xxxxx 401 45
Execute Alain Propulsion Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 402 45
Execute Tug Loiter Mode 403 15
Execute State Vector Update 404 45
Exucute Go to Flight Command 405 45
Execute Procnpture Status Display 406 200
Execute Precapture C/O 5,000
TUG CONTROL & ITTILITY OPTIONS
Execute Switch to Orbiter Power 501 20
ol , cute Switch to Tug Internal Power 502 20
Execute Switch Tug Power OFF 503 20
Exocutc 'i ug-D/A (xx) Actuator xx to xxx (ON/OFF) 504 65
Execute Output Tug-D/A Control Status 505 250
Execute Load Tug DAIS Loc xxx with xxxxx 506 45
Execute ]lead 'rug DMS Loc xxx with xxxxx 507 45
Execute Display Tug TLM xxx continually 508 40
OTHER TUG T/F SOFTWARE
Rendezvous & Docking Control 15,000
Tug Predeployment C/o 0, 000
Tug Precapture Safing 2.000
Cemmen Storage„ Tables, etc. 1.100
Note 1: (X)	 Backup Capability	 Totals	 15,000	 2,905	 31,500
r
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Table 5.1-15. Software Requirements vs Control./Monitor
Concept 3, Increased Orbiter Capability
Soft,vare Option Name/Function
Baseline
Option
Software Location & Storage Required (Number of Words
Ground Orbiter Tug D/A
TUG CAUTION, WARNING & ABORT OPTIONS
Execute Tug Critical Ittnetion Status Monitor 101 700 1,500 (Safety)
Execute Tug Abort Mode 1 or 2, x 102 150 1, 000 (Fomatter)
400 (Cmd. Decoder)
TUG INITIALIZATION, STATUS DISPLAY
Execute Tug Initialization 201 600
Execute Tug State Vector, Update 202 200
Execute Command Tug Fuel Cell ON/OFF 203 20
Execute Command Tug Communications ON /QFF 204 20
Execute Tug Predeployment Status Display 205 2,00o 6,200 (Status)
Execute Tug Post Capture Status Display 206 2,000
Execute Tug Post Capture Safe 207 150
TUG DEPLOYMENT/CAPTURE OPTIONS
Execute Deploy Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 301 40
a,xecute Retract/Engage Fluid Umbilical 302 40
'Execute Rotate D/A Up/Down xxxxx 303 40
Execute Retract/Engage Electrical Umbilical 304 40
Execute Engage/Release Capture Latches 305 40
TUG RF CONTROL OPTIONS I
Lxecute APS Arm/Safe and Switch to xxxxx 401 45
Execute Main Propulsion Arm/Safe Switch t., xxxxx 402 (45)
Execute Tug Loiter Mode 403 (45)
Execute State Vector Update 404 (45)
Execute Go to Flight Command 405 (45)
Execute Precapture Status Display 406
Execute Precapture C/O 5,000
TUG CONTROL & UTILITY OPTIONS
Execute Switch to Orbiter Power 501 20
Execute Switch to Tug Internal Power 502 20
Execute Switch Tug Power OFF 503 20
Execute Tug-D/A (xx) Actuator xx to xxx (ON/OFF) 504 B5
Execute Output Tug-D/A Control Statue 505 250
Execute Laud Tug DMS Luc xxx with xxxxx 506 45
Execute Read Tug DMS Lee xxx with xxxxx 507 45
Execute Display Tug TLM xxx continually 50S 40
OTHER TUG i/F SOFTWARE
Rendezvous & Docking Control 15,000
Tug Predeployment C/O 20,000
Tug Precupture Sating 2,000
Common Storage, Tables, etc. 1,500
Note 1: (X) = Backup Capability 	 Totals	 15,000	 35,170	 9,700
F:
i
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Software Option Name/Fnnotion
Baseline
Option
Software Location & Storage Required (Number of Words
3rottnd Orbiter Tug D/A
TUG CAUTION, WARNING & ABORT OPTIONS
Execute Tug Critical Function Status Monitor 101 700 1, 500 (,Safety) 700
Execute Tug Abort Mode 1 or 2, x 102 is() 1, 000 (Fomatter) 150
40U(Clud. decoder)
TUG INITIALIZATION, STATUS DISPLAY
Execute Tug Initialization 201 000 500
Execute Tug State Vector, Update 202 200
Execute Command Tug Fuel Cal l. ON/OE F 203 20
Execute Command Tug Communications ON/OFF 204 20
Execute Tug Predeployment Status Misplay 205 6,200 (Status) 2,000
Execute Tug Post Capture Status Display 200 2.000
Execute Tug Post Capture Safe 207 150
TUG DEPLOYhIENT/CAPTURE OPTIONS
Execute Deploy Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 701 40
Execute Retract/Engage Fluid Umbilical 3V 40
Execute Rotate D/A Up/Dona xxxxx 303 40
Execute Rctract/Engaige Electrical Umbilical 304 40
Ex&cutc Engage/Release Capture Latches 305 40
TUG RF CONTROL OPTIONS a
t'xecute APS Arm/Safe and Switch to xxxxx 401 (200) 45
Execute Main Propulsion Arm/Safe Switch to xxxxx 402 200 (45)
L•'xccute Tug Loiter Riede 403 200 (45)
Execute State Vector Update 404 200 (46)
Execute Go to Flight Command 405 200 (45)
Execute Precapture Status Display 406 2,000
Execu te P recapture C/O 5,000
TUG CON'T'ROL & UTILITY OPTIONS
Execute Switch to Orbiter Power 501 20
Execute Switch to Tug Internal Power 502 20
Execute Switch Tug Power OFF 503 20
Execute Tug-D/A (xx) Actuator roc to xxx (ON/OFF) 504 65
Execute Output Tug-D/A Control Status 505 250
Execute Load Tug DAIS I= : xx with xxxxx 506 ^ 45
Execute Read Tug DNIS Lac xxx with xxxxx 507 45
Execute Display Tug 'T'LM xxx continually 508 40
OTHER TUG I/F SOFTWARE
Rendezvous & Docl.ing Control 15,000
Tug Predeployment C/O 20,000
Tug Precapture Safing 2,000
Common Storage, Tables, etc. 700
D/A Processor Time Share Executive 10, 449
16,694
I
r
f^
Note 1: (X) - Buckup Capability 'totals	 43,000	 3,975	 9,700
Table 5.1-16. Software Requirements vs Control/Monitor
Concept 4, Processor in Deployment Adapter
F
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icompared to increased ground control (Con-
cept 1). Increased ground control provides
initial development cost benefits at the expense
of increased ground/Orbiter operational costs
and some decrease in Orbiter interface com-
plexity. When compared to the baseline con-
figuration, this cost benefit disappears after
two years of operation, due primarily to
larger ground crew requirements to support
the total ground control concept. Greater
Orbiter support (Concept 2) increased initial
development costs and Tug/Orbiter operational
complexity and is not recommended.
In general the four concepts are comparable
with respect to Orbiter and crew safety, Orbiter
interface size, power and weight requirements,
and use of Orbiter-supplied payload support
equipment (GPC, PI, PSP, MDM, MTU, etc.).
Aft cabin payload-unique support equipment
consists of three control panels (abort, deploy/
capture, initialization) for the baseline and
Concepts 2 and 3, while Concept 1 requires only
two control panels (abort and RF portion of
deploy/capture panel). The greatest differences
between the various concepts (1, 2, and 3) and
the baseline occur in the amount of Orbiter/
Tug/ground software required and the crew
time required to support Tug activities.
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Figure 5.1-7. Cost Assessment of
Interface Concepts
Greater differences in Orbiter interface requirements result when the baseline is com-
pared to Concept 4 (deployment adapter/TSS). The addition of components in the
D/A and crew area results in a net spacecraft weight penalty of 16 pounds (7.3 kg) for a
delivery mission. The Tug specialist station would require an additional 200 watts
while the D/A processor and S/C MDM would use another 100 watts. The Tug/Orbiter
interface would increase by a data link from the aft crew station to the D/A and a power
connection for the added equipment. No Tug/Orbiter interfaces can be deleted from
the baseline. However, if spacecraft control and monitor hardwires normally routed
to the Orbiter were routed to the deployment adapter processor, a significant Orbiter/
payload interface reduction could result. For Concept 4, total program costs, includ-
ing DDT &E of hardware and software as well as recurring costs, would be. increased by
6. 1 million dollars. One contributor to the increased costs is a net increase of 11 I{
computer memory words, even though Orbiter Cru support software would decrease
by 6 K words. Total crew tasks would be essentially identical, but the mission
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specialist would be required to interface with two independent compute.'s which could
result in confusion in certain situations. An alternative would be to use fo ,
 L-th crew
man for Tug and payload support functions.
The TSS/deployment adapter processor does, however, have potential benefits that may
outweigh the penalties previously discussed. If both Tug and Tug payload were to use
the TSS then more efficient integration of payload interfaces and operations might re-
sult. This is because the integration and interface modifications involved would not
significantly impact the Orbiter contractoror NASA/J'SC.
In summary, it is recommended that the baseline interface concept described in
Section 4.6 of Volume II be continued for monitor and control requirements develop-
ment. The control and monitoring operational allocation responsibilities for this con-
cept are shown in Table 5. 1--17.
This configuration includes recommendations from the various sensiti-,:y analyses and
from coordination meetings among NASA/MSFC and the five Tug study contractors, in
this configuration, the Orbiter is the safing and abort control center and thus is prime
for performing these functions (with
Table 5.1-17. Recommended Interface
	
ground backup). Similarly, the Orbiter is
prime for normal on-orbit operationsOperations Allocation 	
such as status determination and deploy-
ment/capture operations where Orbiter
OPERATION GROUND DRBITEH TUG
MONITORS
caw i	 BIU x
TUG STATUS BIU x
CONTROLS
I
SAFETY CRITICAL BIU x
VENTS BIU B!U x
PURGES BIU R.'U x
UPDATE G&N BIU x
UMBILICAL MECHANISMS x
FORWARD LATCHES x
D/A ROTATION X
D/A LATCHES x
FUEL CELL START x B!U
FUEL CELL STOP BIU x
POWER CHANGEOVER x
PREDEPLOYMENT CHECKOUT x
PREDEPLOYMENT STATUS BIU x
ACS ARMING B/u x
ENGINE NOZZLE x B/U
LOITER x BIU
MAIN PROPULSION ARMING X BIU
MISSION SEQUENCE START x BIU
MAIN PROPULSION SAFING x BIU
PROPELLANT DUMP x
PRECAPTURE CHECKOUT x
ACSSAFING B!U x
,^UEL CELL DEACTIVATION B/U x
ABORT x
equipment is involved in the operations
and direct crew involvement is desired
or operationally efficient.
Ground control is prime for checkout
operations involving detailed data analysis,
large data processing hardware/ software
activities, and for operations where de-
tailed knowledge of the Tug or its sub-
systems is needed. In addition, the
ground will assume prime responsibility
for Tug control once it is deployed from
the Orbiter (after release and initiation
of Tug APS system by Orbiter RF
command).
The current Orbiter support capability
(J'SC 07700, Vol. XIV) to support Orbiter
payload appears adequate (with rather
minor changes) for Tug/Spacecraft re-
quirements. It is therefore also recom-
mended that the Orbiter capability for
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GROUND OPERATIONS
Tug/payload support be adopted as the baseline, and the appropriate change requests
against Orbiter accommodations be used to effect the required Orbiter changes. The
TSS concept should be retained as a potential fall-back position in the event that pres-
ently documented Orbiter support capability is not actually being implemented or that
integration is more difficult than indicated by JSC 07700. It is further recommended
that if the TSS concept is adopted it should be a GFE option available to all pa toads (to
avoid penalizing any one payload for concept DDT&E).
5.2 SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Department of Defense requirements may cause incorporation of security (COMSEC)
units on Tug, its payload, and on the Orbiter to avoid vehicle (payload) spoofing, or
unauthorized communication of monitoring or command data. This task assessed the
impact to the Tug/Orbiter avionics interfaces and operations resulting from secure
communications requirements implementation (Figure 5.2-1).
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Figure 5.2-1. Tug Secure Communications
The objectives of this sensitivity task are to: 1) analyze the Tug command and data
requirements to establish the need for communications security, 2) identify applicable
security techniques to fulfill the Tug security requirements, 3) identify electronic and
system interfaces, 4) perform a comparative analysis between the candidate systems,
5) select a baseline system, and 6) establish the characteristics of the selected tech-
r-Y^-e. Four evaluation factors and their associated ground rules and assumptions
which were employed are listed below.
Mission Classification -- Two different DOD mission groupings are hypothesized: 1)
missions requiring secure communications for command and telemetry links, and 2)
missions requiring no secure communication or security for only the command link.
Both groupings were analyzed in the subsequent discussion.
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Figure 5.2--2. Secure Communications
Sensitivity Approach
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Launch Facility — The same launch facility was assumed for NASA and DOD missions.
The impact of secure communications, directly on the launch facility and tudirectly
through vehicle configuration selection, is discussed in terms of checkout hardware and
software, and the launch facility security operating considerations and modes.
Tug and Payload — The communication system must be designed to prevent classified
plain language information, defined as red data, from appearing at detectable levels on
lines that handle encrypted or unclassified information, defined as black data. Those
vehicle functions requiring a secure communication link were tabulated. Based on this
listing, the communication links were classified as secure or clear. Finally, va.•ious
hardware options are presented for implementing the secure communication link.
Operating Procedures --- A single crew has been assumed for removal of cryptographic
devices not required for NASA missions. To establish the task objectives, the approach
delineated in Figure 5.2-2 was adopted.
The development and implementation of
secure communication requirements for
Tug is contained in the next section; it is
followed by the recommendations, sensi-
tivity study conclusions, and references.
5.2. 1 ANALYSES AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION. Analytical effort has been segre-
gated into six categories within this
section. These are: security require-
ments analysis, security systems
analysis, alternative technique analysis,
implementation, ground support system
requirements analysis, and the security
implementation cost analysis, presented
in Sections 5.2. 1. 1 through 5.2. 1. 6,
respectively.
5, 2. 1.1 Security Require• ,aents Analysis. Communications security requirements for
the DOD missions of the Tug are controlled by AF Regulation 205-7, which requires
cryptographic devices in both the command and telemetry links unless a waiver has
been granted by hQ USAF. The controlling consideration that eetermines the advisabil-
ity of a waiver is the potential for mission compromise via. !rather the command or
telemetry link. The following paragraphs contain a discussion of the information being
processed by these links and the resultant impact on the mission.
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rCommand System — In the attached mode, a hardline command link is maintained be-
tween the Tug and the Orbiter. In the detached mode, an RF command link is main-
tained with the Orbiter and with the ground network.
Typical Tug command requirements are presented in Table 5. 2-1. As indicated in the
table, the Tug uses two types of commands: instruction commands for computer up-
date, and discrete commands processed by the Tug signal processor. Instruction
commands, which are 32 bit words (or two 16 bit words), may consist of a few words
for navigation update or as many as 1000 words of computer memory load.
Command data may be considered sensitive either because of mission information con-
tained in the command, such as guidance update, or because commands received at the
wrong time can be catastrophic to the mission. As can be seen from Table 5.2-1, the
Tug employs a guidance update prior to separation from the Orbiter. The guidance
data, properly interpreted, supplies information about the orbit of the Tug boosted
spacecraft, which may compromise the spacecraft mission.
Mission commands sent inadvertently or in an attempt to spoof the Tug need not be
sensitive commands to damage the mission. A simple control command such as "SAFE
ACS" or "LOITER" received at the wrong time in the mission profile can have very
serious consequences.
Since the missions have the possibility of being spoofed and use potentially sensitive
command data in the form of guidance updates, the Tug baseline design for DOD ~nis-
sions should be configured with an encrypted command link.
The hardline command link from the Orbiter to the Tug does not necessarily have to
be encrypted to maintain command security. However, operating the link in a clear
mode while attached, and in a secure mode for the detached RF link, would require
dual interfaces with the Orbiter or an encryption bypass mode. Also the command data
on the hardline would be considered as "red" (sensitive) data and would require
TEMPEST shielding to isolate the line from the systern "black" (clen.r) lines. Dual
mode operation (clear/encrypted) adds complexity to the system and does not yield an
equipment or cost savings. Therefore the Tug baseline design should use an encrypted
command 1hik for both attached and detached DOD operations.
Data System — The Tug downlink data requirements are: 1) telemetry data, 2) slow
scan TV for inspection or rendezvous, and 3) Orbiter crew voice communications
concerning the mission. The Tug telemetry system generates PCM data at a bit rate of
16 Kbps, which is tranmitted to the Orbiter by hardline or S-band RF link, and to the
SCF ground network by the S-band link. Encryption of telemetry data will be required
if the data is sensitive (i.e. , sensor data) or if it reveals mission operation charac-
teristics. Some Tug missions may be candidates for telemetry link security on the
basis of revealing mission status and vehicle targeting. Vehicle status measurements,
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Table 5.2-1. Typical Tug Command List
Command
Pre--
Deployment
Post-
Deployment
DMS Instruction
Display Data X
Strobe Output X
Enable Task X
Disable Task X
Load Data/Program X X
Nav State Vector
Guidance Target Data
Data Use Enable
RIB` Commit
Enable RF X
Enable ACS X
Arm ACS X
I	 Safe ACS X
Enable I4tain Propulsion System X
Arm Main Propulsion System x
Safe Main Propulsion System X
Verify Program Memory X X
Arm Program X
Disarm Program X
Tug Precapture Safing X
Pause X
Loiter Mode x
Encryptor Bypass (A & B) x X
Encryptor Activate (A & B) X X
Pseudo Random Noise Ranging On X
Pseudo Random Noise Off X
Transmitter A On X X
Transmitter B On X X
Transmitter A Off X X
Transmitter B Off X X
Enable Backup ACS X
either from the Tug or from the spacecraft, may indicate vehicle problems or mission
abort conditions that the spacecraft agency does not want advertised. Transmission of
the Tug guidance data in the process of command verification or memory readout will
supply information as to the final orbit of the spacecraft.
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if the mission is not sensitive to either of these sources of possible compromise, the
remainder of the telemetry data supplies little or no justification for a secure teleme-
try link.
TV data may be sensitive if the target being viewed is sensitive. For those cases, the
slow scan TV system, which operates at approximately 60 Kbps, will require encryp-
tion. Since the voice link is an Orbiter-to-groimd requirement but is not in the Tug
baseline, voice security has not been considered in this study.
5.2. 1.2 Security System Analysis. There are three candidate security systems for
use on the DOD Tug missions. The systems and their mission applicability are as
follows:
System	 Application
KI-23 Command
KG-29 Command
KG-28 Command or Telemetry
The KG--28 system is capable of operating in either a data encryption or command
decryption mode; however, its principal application is as an encryptor. There are
two difficulties with using the unit in the command system; the unit does not supply the
command authentication function, and there is a potential network incompatibility.
Therefore, the KI-23 and KG-29 will be analyzed for the command system, and the
KG-28 will be considered for the telemetry and TV application.
Command Systems — The physical and operational characteri4*. 4---s of the KI-23 and
KG-29 systems are summarized in Table 5.2-2. The interface characteristics for the
two systems are listed in Table 5.2-3.
As shown in Table 5.2-2, the KI-23 system is smaller, lighter, and uses less power
than the KG-29 system, but on the other hand outputs fewer commands per second, and
is limited to a 20 bit command message. The KG-29 command message may contain an
unlimited number of bits when operating in the unauthenticated mode and will output
commands at a rate that is limited only by the input bit rate and the message length.
The interface requirements for the two systems (Table 5.2-2) are sufficiently similar
that their impact on the Tug subsystems will he the same. One possible exception is
that the KG-29 system does not have an internal clock, but depends on the uplink clock
for timing functions. Conditioning of the clock signal may be necessary to maintain the
desired characteristics.
Telemetry System — The physical and operational characteristics of the KG--28 unit
are shown in Table 5. 2--4 and the interface requirements are listed in Table 5.2-5. The
KG-28 is compatible with the Tug mission requirements.
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Table 5.2-2. Command Decryptor Characteristics
KIR-23 IOR-29
Dimensions in. (cm) Decryptor	 P/S
Height 5.81 (14.8) 3.75 ( 9.5)	 1.3 ( 3.3)
Width 3.60 ( 4.1) 4.5	 (11.4)	 4.0 (10.2)
Depth 6.02 (15.3) 9.75 (24.8)	 7.5 (14.0)
Weight lb (kg) 4.4	 ( 2.0) 6.5	 (2.95)	 1.8 ( n. 82)
Voltage 22 Vdc - 33 Vdc x-27.5 ^L5. 5 Vdc
Power 2.4 W @ 28 Vdc 16 W @ 28 Vdc
Data Input Rate 1 bps - 16 Kbps 1 bps - 100 Kbps
Data Output Rate 500 bps Same as input
Format 14 bits or 2 bits - unlimited (non-
20 bits authenticate)
2 bits - 42 bits (authenticate)
TLM Data Rate 1 bps - 128 Kbps 1024 Kbps maximum
5. 2. 1.3 Alternative Technique Analysis. An alternative to using cryptographic de-
vices to achieve command and telemetry security is to employ software algorithms in
the Tug computer or to use an operational technique such as communicating only at
preselected times or using very narrow beam antennas. A variation is to use a com-
bination system of software and one or more of the operational methods. An additional
possibility, beyond the scope of this study, but one that should be studied in depth, is
the use of communication satellites and 60 GHz links that can't be jammed or inter-
cepted from the ground (due to atmospheric phenomena at this frequency).
Software Security Implementation — The DMS computer proposed for the Tug is capable
of performing encryption/decryption functions or of performing any one of several
algorithms on received or transmitted data.
Use of the computer as a cryptographic device is not recommended because of the
TEMPEST problems involved. Computers are not designed for this purpose and it
would be very difficult to keep theca from transmitting key text. For this reason the
only software methods considered here are algorithms and stored secure commands.
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Table 5.2-3. Command Decryptor Interface Requirements
Parameter KIR-23 Decryptor KGR-29 Decryptor
Input Signal
True Level +2.4V to +5. OV +2.2V to +3.4V
False Level -1. OV to +0.4V -1. OV to +0.4V
Impedance 750Q<Z < 2.7KQ , 100 pf 6009 +10%, 60 pf
Rise/Fall Time 5g S maximum 0.05 BP < T c 0.012 BP
Data Code NRZ NRZ
Clock Code RZ RZ
Output Signal
True Level +4. 7 V to +5.2V +2. 2V to +3.4 V
False Level -1. OV to +0.4V -1. OV to +0.4V
Impedance SKSZ, 1000 pf 93St +10%, 60 pf
Data Code NRZ NRZ
Clock Output Pulse width 75 u S 4 p S < Tp < I BP - 4 	 S
Control Signals 100 pS < PW< 2 CLK P --
Increment -- True
Execute/Re jt; -- False
True Leve l 2.4V to 3.4V
False Level -1. OV to 0.4V
Pulse Duration Time from clock trailing
to leading edge
Telemetry
Gate Width 23 bit periods 36 bit periods
Input Clock Pulse width = 10 p S 275 µ S < T < 1 BP
TLM Output
Signal NRZ - 23 bits NRZ - 36 bits
True Level +4. 7V to +5.2V +2.2V to +3.4V
F€use Level -1.OV to +0.4V -1. OV to +0.4V
Load 6009, 7000 pf 9352 4:10%, 60 pf
The computer can be programmed to perform add, subtract, or shift algorithms at a
nominal impact on memory capacity on the order of 200 words. A variation of this
technique involves a time sequence that selects a new algorithm at predetermined
time intervals. Computer memory can also be used to store secure commands that
are accessed from the ground by a special instruction command.
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Table 5.2-4. Telemetry Encryptor
I{GX-28A
Dimensions in. (cm)
Height 5.35	 (13.6)
Width 4.28	 (10.9)
Depth 5.78	 (14.7)
Weight lb (kg) 4.25	 (1. ^1)
Voltage x-27.5 4:5. 5 Vde
Power 7.0 W @ 27.5 Vdc
Data input Rate 1 bps - 1. 024 Mbps
Data Output Rate Same as input
Operational Security Implementation — it is possible to achieve a degree of communi-
cations security by means of operational techniques such as:
a. Operation only over the geographical limits of the United States.
b. Operation only at predetermined times.
c. Use of very narrow beam antennas.
d. Autonomous operation.
The first two options are most useful for orbiting spacecraft with repetitive passes
over the network ground stations. The Tug has a relatively short mission duration
that involves contact with the Orbiter as well as with the ground network. The Tug
mission includes separation from the Orbiter in a timed sequence that mares communi-
cation time windows impractical. Limiting communication to periods when the Tug is
over the continental limits of the United States would place a severe restraint on the
mission, requirements of the payload being boosted by the Tug.
Narrow beam antennas can be used to control access to the data either between the Tug
and Orbiter or the Tug and the ground network. For operation of this type, vehicle
antennas used for command reception or data transmission must be pointed quite
accurately at the transmitting or receiving source. Because the Tug baseline design
uses a phased array, pointed narrow beam antennas are a possible option that should
be studied in greater depth.
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Table 5.2-5. Telemetry Encryptor Interface Requirements
Parameter	 I	 KGX-28A Eacryptor
Input Signal
True Level +2.2V to +3.4V
False Level -1.OV to +0.4V
Damage Level -1.0 < L < 5.OV
Impedance 93S2 X10%, 60 pf
Rise/Fall T-	 a 0.05 BP < T < 0. 10 BP
Data Code NRZ
Clock Code RZ
Output Signal
True Level +2.2V to +3.4V
False Level -1.OV to +0.4V
Impedance 93S2
Data Code l•'R Z
Clock Output --
Control Signals
XMT/RECV
XMT Level	 -1.OV to +0.4V
REC-V Level	 +2.2V to +3.4V
Mode A
True Level	 +2.2V to +3.4• N I
False Level	 --1.0V to -.0.4-
Autonomous operation of the Tug conflicts with 0-biter vicinity safety requirements,
and the possible need to updale the Tug GN&C system.
In summary, several alternative methods appear to have some promise for application
on the Tug system. It is recommended that future investigations be conducted on
algorithms, narrow beam antennas, and a 60 GHz communications satellite link.
5.2. 1.4 Implementation. The electrical interface between the cryptographic equip-
ment and the Tug subsystems are shown for the three candidate systems in
Figure 5.2-d3. The Orbiter subsystems do not have any interfaces directly with the
Tug cryptographic equipment. The indirect effect of secure links between t 1le Tug and
the Orbiter is the imposition of compatible encryption and decryption systems and the
use of interface harnessing capable of transferring black encrypted data or the red
plain language information is a cryptogra phic bypass mode.
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Figure 5.2-3. C~trr,tographic Equipment Electrical Interfaces
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Compromising emanations (referred to by the short term TEMPEST) can be controlled
by a combination of the following:
a. Containment of the red sources.
b. Isolation of the transmitter from TEMPEST sources.
c. Isolation/shielding of red and black lines.
d. Isolation of the power bus from red processors.
Basically two different approaches can be considered for implementing the communi-
cation links in Tug hardware. One approach is a single vehicle hardware configuration
that can be flown on most missions without major modification other than in software.
The appropriate data path for the mission would be determined by the stored programs.
The initial task would be greater to provide a design that assures compatible interfaces
between a larger number of units. Since there is greater opportunity for either HIJACK
or NONSTOP originated emanations that would compromise DOD secure links, the de-
sign task is more demanding in this respect.
The second approach is to alter the hardware setup to provide only NASA links, DOD
links, or DOD secure links depending on the rr_ission requirement, The hardware con-
figuration would be accomplished by installing required units, removing excess units,
and if necessary, installing dummy packages, interface units, or jumper harnesses in
vacant locations.
Based on the relative complexity of protecting the cryptographic devices and keying
material, the second approach involving removal of the devices for clear missions has
been tentatively selected.
5.2.1.5 Ground Support'System Requirements Analysis. Each of the candidate secur-
ity systems has a compliment of ground support equipment that is supplied GFE with
the spaceborne hardware. Here is a summary of these equipments and their use:
KI-23 System — The ground support equipment for the ICI-23 system consists of-
KIT-23	 Command Security Transmitter
IOX-23	 Manual Control and Test Unit
KIP-23
	 Power Supply
The units install in a standard 19 inch (48.2 cm) rack console and require about 37
inches of panel height. The units operate from 115 Vac, 60 Iii.
E
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KG-29 System — The ground support equipment for the KG--29 system consists of:
KGT-29	 Ground Operational Encryptor
KGR-7	 Vehicle Simulator
KT-8	 Maintenance Test Set
The units install in a standard 19 inch (48.2 cm) rac y either directly or with an adaptor
mounting panel. The units operate from 115 Vac, 60 Hz.
KG--28 System — The ground support equipment for the KG-28 system consists of:
KGR-28	 Receive Data Security Equipment
ST-19	 Test Set
KGT--7	 Transmit Data Security Equipment (Vehicle Simulator)
The units install in a standard 19 inch (48.2 cm) rac y by means of adaptor mounting
panels. The units are powered from +4.3 Vdc and +28 Vdc.
Facilities --- The facility requirements for communications security equipment are:
a. Physical security for the cryptographic hardware, support equipment, and coding
data. This may involve controlled access or in the case of the flight hardware in-
stalled on the Tug could consist of physically covering the device and posting a
guard to ensure that unauthorized personnel do not rain access to the device. The
work area must meet the requirements of a controlled area as stated in Para-
graphs 21 and 22 of the COMSEC Supplement to the Industrial Security Manual.
b. A TEMPEST test facility for vehicle qualification and acceptance test operations.
The TEMPEST test facility will require approximately 100 dB of isolation over a
broad frequency range to perform NONSTOP and HIJACK tests.
c. An acceptance test facility for the communication system nr arated on the Tug or
separately. Since test authenticate codes and simulated data will be employed, the
test facility requirements are no more stringent than those required for physical
security of the equipment.
d. A launch site test and prelaunch operation facility. Launch site tests can be per-
formed with test authenticate codes and simulated data for the cryptographic
verification sequence. The bully of the Tug testing including all of the LPS tests
can be performed in cryptographic bypass mode. Prelaunch tests at Complex 39
will utilize the DOD Shuttle system security interface. Tug mission data can be
placed on board the Orbiter as a classified magnetic tape and loaded into the Tug
DMS through the Orbiter interface.
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5.2.1.6 Security Implementation Cost Analysis. The cost analysis for the several
aspects of communication security implementation is based on rough order of magnitude
estimates that are used for trade-off purposes. The cost figures are not intended to be
used for contractual purposes.
Hardware Cost Analysis — The implementation cost estimates for secure command and
data links are listed in Table 5.2-6. The command link costs are dependent on the
selected system; therefore, both candidate systems are included in Table 5. 2-6. A
larger proportion of some of the cost elements in Table 5.2-6 is assigned to the com-
mand system since the command link has a high probability of requiring encryption,
and a majority of the cost exists whether one or both links are secured.
Table 5.2-6. Cryptograpluc Implementation Cost
Command System Data System
KI-23 KG-29 KG-28Cost Element
NRE REC NRE REC NRE REC
Program Management $75K 20K 75K 20K 40K 10K
COMSEC Analysis & 40K - 50K -- 25K -
Predesign
COMSEC Design 150K 200K - 100K -
Procurement* - 240K - 100K - LOOK
Manufacturing & Test 75K 40K 100I{ 40K 50K 25K
Prelaunch Support 10K 40K 10y 40K IOK 25K
Total 350K 340K 435K 200K 225K 160K
*Includes the GFE cost of the cryptographic devices supplied by the DVEC office of
SAMSO.
Facility Cost Analysis — The three facility requirements associated with the COMSEC
equipment are:
a. Physical security for the space -jorne equipment separately ant-d while installed on
the Tug.
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b. Physical security for the COMSEC ground equipment.
c. Test facility for TEMPEST testing.
These facilities may be configured separately, or in combination. As an example the
test equiprt!ent may be installed in the, vehicle test location.
The Tug manufacturing and test facility will require a small differential for controlled
access. T?,e modification will involve establishing controlled access to the dock either
with a cypher lack or by posting a guard at the entrance. In either ca.--. the addition of
walls will be required to control access and limit visibility. Rr security will not be
required because simulated data will be used for the tests.
TEMPTEST testing requires use of a well shielded room (approximately 100 dB) large
enough to accommodate the Tug. A NONSTOP test that involves only high level signals
can be performed on the total vehicle in the dock area. The estimated facility costs
are:
a. A cost for physical and visual security 	 $20 K
b. Construction of test equipment room	 $20 X
Ic. Construction of TEMPEST test facility 	 $100 X
5.2.2 CONCLUSIONS
5.2.2.1 Security Requirements. As stated in Section 5.2.2, a secure command link
will be required for the DOD missions of the Tug to guard against spoofing and dis-
semination of guidance data.
The case for a secure telemetry link is less clear. Other than the possibility of re-
vealing mission status or the vehicle targeting parameters, the Tug telemetry data
does not contain information that would justify encryption of the link. Since it is not
possible at this time to assess the impact of clear text telemetry on specific mission
security and the resultant probability of obtaining a waiver, the Tug baseline design
should provide for encryption of telemetry and TV data.
Several of the alternative techniques (versus a cryptographic system) considered show
promise of application to the Tue mission and should be studied in depth to verify their
suitable. Pending further stud. , cryptographic devices are thus recommended for the
Tug DOD missions.
5.2.2.2 Baseline Configuration. The Tug baseline communications subsystem con-
figuration for the DOD missions includes both command and telemetry link encryption.
Telemetry link and TV link security will be accomplished with the KG-28 system.
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Command link cryptographic equipment selection is discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Command System Selection -- The two command security systems considered for the
Tug-baseline are the KI-23 and XG -29. The TAI-23 is smaller, lighter, and uses less
power than the KG-29. The IC-23 is limited to a 20 bit command message while the
KG--29 can process a 42 bit message in the autha ►-1zLM-:ato mode. In addition the KG-29
can process messages at a significantly faster rate than the KI-23, which may be
important for computer memory updating operations that involve a large number of
words.
The KG-29 system is recommended for the Tug baseline because of its greater flexi-
bility, operating speed, and because of the command word format, which is compatible
with the Tug baseline computer word length of 32 bits.
Baseline Security System Description — The baseline communication system for the
DOD missions, including the cryptographic devices, is shown in Figure 5.2-4. The
cryptographic bypass capa bility for the command lint{ is used in the test or prelaunch
mode but not in flight. The bypass is controlled by coaxial switches whose fail-safe
position is in the cryptographic mode. The bypass mode for the telemetry link may
be selected by command for ground operations or during flight. For both systems, the
ends of the bypass circuit will be shorted to ground when the cryptographic devices are
is the cypher mode to prevent the presence of red data of the cypher line.
Alternate Configuration -- A potential alternate configuration for the DOD missions is
a system with an encrypted command link and a clear text telemetry link. This con-
figuration may be practical for all of the DOD missions if a thorough analysis of the
data establi^;hes that security is not required or for a portion of the missions if the
security requirements caa be isolated to particular payloads and payload data (C&W).
In the first case both nonrecurring and recurring costs would be saved. For the latter
case, only the recurring costs would b- saved for the missions that do not require a
secure data lints.
An important argument against operating a portion of the DOD missions with a clear
telemetry link is that the presence of a high security payload would be pointed up by
the existence • of an encrypted link.
5.2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS. It is recommended that the following trade studies and
analyses be performed to more completely identify the Tug secure communications
system requirements.
a. Analyze the security classification of the DOD payloads to accurately determine
the cost savings in operating the telemetry and TV links unsecured.
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b. Perform a detailed avionics configuration trade study based on the NASA and DOD
noasecure mission requirements versus those of the secure DOD missions.
c. Analyze in depth the alternatives to cryptographic devices such as computer
algorithms, narrow beam antennas, and a 60 GHz communications satellite link.
d. Obtain the 1978 projection for cryptographic hardware characteristics.
e. Coordinate with the Orbiter and launch facility programs on the cryptographic and
TEMPEST interface requirements.
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5.3 TUG SELF CHECKOUT CAPABILITY
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to determine effects on the Orbiter/Tug avionics
support equipment (and associated interfaces) as a function of Tug self-checkout capa-
bility.
In this sensitivity xaaiysi.s, effects of implementing a higher and lower level of onboard
checkout capabilk ;' twith respect to the rzeline Tug) were examined. Outputs include
identification of ^* qt
 w%, a and software ukang is to baseline Orbiter/Tug support equip-
inert and impact of changes on Shuttle interface requirements. For hardware items
and piaysical interfaces, tuese changes are expressed in terms of data processing re-
quirements, input/output equipment, W size, weight, and power requirements.
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Software effects are identified in terms of program complexity (number, size, data
storage requirements, and real-time requirements).
Three levels of self test were analyzed to determine the best self-test method for Tug
using low cost, low risk, and low c+: r!Tilexit^ - as the driving decision criteria. These
levels of self test are indicated in Figure 5.3-1 and discussed herein.
DMS 	 TUG	 oMS	 TUG	 DMS	 5.3. 1 LOW SELF TEST. Low self testti. L...J	 I L-o	 is basically the method used for launch
I-LIJ vehicles such as the D-1 Centaur (mid
50's technology). It was used because
computers were large, heavy, and ex-
_	 RELATIVE pensive (LSI had not yet come into its
INTERFACE 	 ORBITER OR
COMPLEXITY,11 GROi1ND 	 own — not to mention microprocessors)'MONITOR&
CONTROL which forced checkout capabilities to be
UNPROCESSED 	 PARTIAL	 MAXIMUM
	
"stuffed" into one ground computer with
DATA	
PROCESSING
	 PROCESSING
	
costly programming and interfacing
required. In this method an operator
	
Figure 5.3-1. Tug Self Checkout	 at a ground console (usually including a
Concepts	 CRT and keyboard) would systematically
execute ground and vehicle software
programs that would stimulate a vehicle test function and monitor the results via the
vehicle TLM system. These test results would then be displayed to the operator via a
CRT or line printer.
This concept created a complex of interleaved programs and interface logic that was
difficult to manage and control, For example, the vent and pressurization engineer
was forever concerned that the guidance software change might adversely affect the
computer controlled vent and pressurization software system. One of the major prob-
lems with this type of system is that the vehicle/ground interface must operate at rel-
atively high speed. This occurs due to the real-time environment of vehicle test and
the large amount of data transfer between vehicle and ground. This real-time, high-
speed environment increases the complexity of both the hardware and software in-
volved, which in turn results in cost integration and operational) and schedule penalties.
The advantages of this testing method include; 1) the ground based nature of the auto-
mated test equipment (ATE) involved allows the system to expand to meet almost any
level of testing required independently of power requirements, vehicle weight, and
vehicle DMS memory size, 2) this concept causes the least weight and integration
impact to the vehicle since little or no equipment must be added to the vehicle logic,
and 3) the risk is low since the technology exists, and much experience has been
gained through the use of this testing technique on current launch vehicle programs.
The limitations of Tug low self test are greatest during the flight pleases of operation
as shown in Table 5.3--1.
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Table 5.3-1. Tug Low Self-Checkout Capability Characteristics
Ope rational Characteristics
	 Impact
Checkout programs loaded via
uplink from Orbiter or ground
Increase in Orbiter computer support
requirement. Possible dependence on
availability of ground coverage
Less confidence in vehicle
Increased crew training
Dependent on availability of ground
communication coverage. Checkout
and operations speed slaw down due
to mechanics of ground/Tug RF
communication links
Minimal fault isolation
Greater Orbiter crew support
required
Checkout affected by detached
operation
5.3.2 PARTIAL SELF TEST. The partial self--test concept as depicted in the Tug
baseline indicates that the computer complex should include self-test microprocessors
for those systems that are localized and keep the centralized testing concept for those
systems that are dispersed all over the Tug in many small parts. Thus, for Tug op-
erations, microprocessors or b4ii .-ia-test-equipment (BITE) might be integrated into
the logic design of complex Tug systems such as the GN&C system, but would not be
incorporated into dispersed Tug systems such as the electrical power distribution
system. In the power system, individual power circuit status can be monitored via
sensors and processed via either Tug or Orbiter checkout or validation software.
Some operational characteristics associated with the partial self-test approach are
shown in Table 5.3-2.
E	 5.3.3 TOTAL SELF TEST. Total self-test concept involves using microprocessors
throughout the Tug vehicle no matter how simple the hardware to be tested. This
concept is predicated on large scale integrator (LSD) growing to the point where micro-
processors are small., fast, cheap, and easy to design for special purpose aerospace
applications. This is already the case for commercial applications such as calcula-
tors, and in aerospace the B-1 bomber avionics system design very closely approaches
this concept. In this concept, the real--time problems associated with a complex
payload to Orbiter/LPS interface would be almost totally eliminated since only status
and diagnostic data would be conveyed from Tug to the test operator. in its advanced
form, Tug self testing would occur continuously during flight or selected ground oper-
ations and status outputs would be made available only: 1) where specifically re-
quested, 2) automatically at selected mission times, or 3) in the event of a failure and
subsequent switching to redundant systems or components.
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Table 5.3-2. Partial Self-test Characteristics Using BITE
Impact
Less Orbiter/LPS software required to
obtain same level of data.. Interface
real-time requirement less severe
Results in higher level of vehicle
confidence with lower ground/Orbiter
involvement
Aids problem isolation during both
flight and ground operations
Increase of 5 K words to Tug memory
Involvement with Tug redundancy
management concepts and implemen-
tation philosophy
Operational Characteristics
BITE provides status of line re-
placeable unit (LRU) to Tug/
Orbiter DMS
Typical readiness confidence
of 95%
Typical fault isolation to one
LIEU 90% of time
Software must be added to Tug
DMS to perform test and check-
out functions
Allows automatic switching of
redundant components
The results of a trade study to determine other Tug/Orbiter/ground impacts resulting
from these three checkout methods is shown in Table 5.3-3. This data indicates that
significant program cost and perform-
Table 5.3-3. Tug Checkout Sensitivity 	 ance benefits can be gained by both partial
Evaluation Results	 and total self-checkout concepts (with
respect to low self-test). Tug to Orbiter/
AVIONICS
EVALUATION	 LOW PARTIAL TOTA!. SYSTEM
CRITERIA	 SELF TEST SELFTEST SELPTFST REFERENCE
WEIGHT LS Ikgl
-0 • 20191 1 ° 40' 181 76314701
.6 7 1RISK  5
SPEEDAEQR. CHECKOUT 190 13 5 N!A
IKOPS) TUG 35 12 4LW
MEMORY CHECKOUT 60400 20K 1050 NIA
IWOROSI TUG
_
3660 HK 5526 48K
REAL TIME FAST SLOW SLOW FAST
INTERFACE
COMPLEXITY	 WIRESf_RU 15 7 SUS INPUT N!0.
POWER {WATTS) 10 1	 78 35 1.485
OPERATIONAL
COMPLEXITY HIGH t.1EO LOW NYA
COST Ism) *10.4 0 ♦S41 100
ground operational interface complexity,
and Tug power requirements, should
both be reduced (due to decrease in
Tug and intra-Tug physical interface
complexity).
For Tug operations, however, the partial
self-test concept is recommended due to
the lower cost, weight penalty, and pro-
gram risk incurred. It is further recom-
mended that BITE logic be incorporated
for the Tug DMS, engine control elec-
tronics, signal conditioners, portions of the GN&C system, the rendezvous and docking
system, and for the Tug fuel cells. Other Tug anionic and nonavionic systems would
be monitored via remote sensors that supply system health data to the Tug DMS for
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analysis, Tug system health information would then be provided to the Orbiter and
ground via the Tug telemetry downlinks in the form of Tug systems status words.
Table 5.3-4 indicates typical status work information communicated in this manner;
Orbiter or ground support software programs would compare (in non-real-time) this
data with expected system status data tables to determine the existence and nature of
problems.
To summarize, the recommended approach is to employ partial self-checkout tech-
niques at least to the extent that the Orbiter software is required only to monitor data
and is not required to perform checkout operations as such.
Table 5.3--4. Typical Tug TLM Status Word/Bits
Sun tracker check Buffer formatter check
Rate gyro check Tape recorder check
Control electronics check Instrumentation checks
Communications check GN&C checks
AESPA transmitter/receiver check Gyro checks
TV systems check Accelerometer checks
Phase control/ receiver check. Rendezvous and docking
Electrical power system Scanning laser radar
Fuel cell checks Docking mechanism
Battery check Propulsion/ mechanical check
Aft power distributor Engine check
Forward power distributor Pneumatic check
DMS check Hydraulic check
CPU check Attitude propulsion checks
CIU check Thrust vector control
DIU check Vent and pressurization system
IOP check Propellants/ structures
Main memory check Interface checks
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5.4 FLUID SERVICES
r
Future changes in Shuttle/Tug operations may revise: optimization results or make
alternative fluid service/interface concepts and techniques rejected in Task 2 (Sec-
tion 4.4) more attractive for the baseline Tug. In addition, future Tug design changes
(e.g., the type of propellant used) could have major effects on service line/interface
requirements. A change from cryogenic to storable main propellants, for example,
would affect all main propulsion services to some degree. Some services may be re-
quired for one propellant combination and not the other, and where similar services
are required (e.g., fill and drain, vent), operational procedures, optimum diameter,
insulation requi.rem,^mts, and environment (pressures, temperatures, corrosiveness,
is	 etc.) may be widely different.
This task investigated sensitivities for changes, alternatives, and variations in Tug
fluid systems design and operation. Five subsystem areas: main propulsion, leafage
vent, auxiliary propulsion, pressurization, and fuel cells were included in this evalua-
tion. T.ible 5.4-1 indicates the alternative services investigated within each subsys-
tem, and summarizes the interface effects.
The main Tug change considered was a change from cryogenic to storable main pro-
pellants, which simplifies service line requirements (i. e. , no topping line or line
insulation requirements) as shown, but which introduces potential abort dump corrosion
and contamination problems, which were not evaluated in this study. The interface
revisions associated with a change in main propellants are major, and they require
detailed analyses similar to those accomplished for cryogenic fluid services in
Section 4.4. Such analyses were beyond the scope of this task.
Sensitivity of the cryogenic Tug services to revised abort requirements is covered in
Section 5. S.
External leakage vent capability was investigated for storable propellants. It was
concluded that provision of these overboard purge vents for propellant tank doors and
service line joints/disconnects would probably be desirable. Line sizes for this inter-
face would not change appreciably, 0. 5 inch (1.27 cm) diameter, but materials revi-
sions would be necessary to withstand the corrosive propellants. Line heaters and
safing devices might be necessary to meet environmental requirements.
Investigation of interface effects due to changes in the auxiliary propulsion and pres-
surization subsystems resulted in insignificant sensitivities. The only potential inter-
face impact is caused by a nonintegrated cryogenic auxiliary propulsion system.
Separate vacuum jacketed LH2 and LO2 fill and drain lines would be required with this
operationally undesirable option.
Table 5.4-1. Tug Fluid Services Sensitivity
en
I
ena
Subsystem Alternative Service Effect
Main Storables instead of Cryo e Fill, Drain & Abort Dump . Approx. same dia line for N2O4
Propellant . Smaller line for MMH
a Vacuum jacket not required
. No topping line required
s Vent/Relief • Smaller lines
. No zero-g vent
• Load in PCR or Earlier . Eliminates all services except dump
Revised Dump Time a Abort Dump *Potential line size change
Constraint
Revised Loading Timelines a Fill & Drain - a No effect since abort dump sizes lines
Leakage Vent Storables instead of Cyro *Leakage Membrane, Seals a Dispose of liquids instead of gases
& Discon. Panel Vent s Potential evaporative freezing problems
e Potential leak, residuals hazards
upon return
Auxiliary Biprop instead of N2H4 . Fill & Drain a Accomplish in PCR, no added interfaces
Propulsion a Vent Relief ®Adadedinterface, approx. 0.5 in. (1.27 cm) d
Cryo instead of N 20 a Fill, Drain & Dump a No added I/F if main tank propellants
used
a Two added I/F if separate storage used
a Vent/Relief a None -- comuined w/main tank vents
Pressurization GN2 instead of Helium a Charge & Vent . No significant change
Fuel Cells Supercritical instead of a Fill, Drain & Dump a Adds two interfaces
Main Tank Propellants a Vent . None - combine w/main tank vents
a Ground Cooling a Adds two interfaces
MODIFIED
ORB ITER
TYPE
Et
ORBITER
FUEL CELL
COOLANT
ELECTRICAL
HARDWIRE
SAFETY CONTROL
t	 t 
	 1
	
r^ iy	 rL	 Al
.L.
VENT & Ilk PRODUCT
	
PURGE	 H2O EXHAUST
REACTANT	 (NO ORBITER
	
FILL & DRAIN	 INTERFACE)
Modified Orbiter Integrated Lightweight
Equipment (Dedicated Reactant (Reactants from MainSupply System Propellant Tanks)
lb	 ckg) lb	 (kg)
Feed Lines and Disconnects 25.0	 (11.3) 8.0	 (3.6)
Purge Vent and Safing 4.8	 ( 2.2) 3.0	 (1.4)
Redundancy Hardware 9.0	 ( 4.1) --
Total 38.8	 (17.6) 11.0	 (;;.0)
lightweight fuel cells for the recommended Tug configuration. Figure 5.4-1 depicts
interfaces for the modified Orbiter and integrated lightweight fuel cells. Since the
lightweight cell is designed to operate with low-pressure, propellant grade reactants,
it draws 1.H2 and LO2 directly from the Tug propellant tanks and has no special fluid
interface requirements. Conversely, the modified Orbiter fuel cell needs high-purity,
saturated reactants that require separate storage and interface (vacuum jacketed LH2
and L02 fill and drain) equipment. Additionally, a prelaunch ground water coolant loop
is needed with the non-thermally integrated fuel cell to remove waste heat, resulting
in two more Orbiter interfaces. Both fuel cell types share vent and purge functions
with Tug main propellants. Therefore, the modified Orbiter cell requires four dedi-
cated umbilicals compared with none for the integrated lightweight fuel cell design.
Table 5. 4 -2 includes a comparison of interface weight associated with these two fuel
yell systems.
INTEGRATED
LIGHTWEIGHT
TYPE
t
in
t	 t	 I	 t
.L 1-
PRODUCT	 VENT &
H 2O EXHAUST ELECTRICAL	 PURGE
(NO ORB ITER HARDWIRE
INTERFACE)	 SAFETY CONTROLS
FOUR DEDICATED INTERFACES
	
NO DEDICATED INTERFACES
Figure 5.4-1. Fuel Cell Fluid Interface Sensitivity '
Table 5.4-2. Fuel Interface Weight Comparison
DIRECT FROM'
ORB ITE"
	
FROM ORBITER
WITH MINIMUM
TUG INTERFACE
5. 5 TtG PAYLOAD SERVICES
Payload services may be accommodated with alternative routings as indim-ted in
Figure 5.5-1. The payload Orbiter services accommodations trade, performed in
FROM ORBITER	 Section 3, recommended discriminatory
ROUTED COMPLETELY 	 use of all these routing options except
THROUGH TUG 	
spacecraft direct to Orbiter. Service
TUG-SUPPLIED	
accommodation recommendations from
this trade are presented in Table 5. 5-1.
From the data in this table it is obvious
	
^.	 that the Tug/Orbiter interface is affected
by the payload service requirements
imposed on the Orbiter either directly or
through the Tug. This sensitivity task
	
11gure 5..;-1. Orbiter/Payload Interface 	 investigates the impact on Tug/Orbiter
Options
	
	
interface requirements of baseline Tug
and payload changes that affect the pay-
load/Orbiter interface requirements. Two types of baseline Tug changes were
considero l;
a. Changes affecting payload/Orbiter requirements accommodated through the Tug.
h. Changes affecting payload services provided by the Tug.
Changes of the first type affect the number and type of payload/Orbiter services that
can be routed through the Tug. An example is a Tug diameter change that precludes
muting a payload propellant line along the Tug. This results in changes in the umbili-
cal panel rind fluid raceway requirements.
Tug and payload changes that affect payload services provided by the Tug, while it is in
the Orbiter, impact the Tug/Orbiter interface since they change the payload/Orbiter
interface requirements. For example, a change in the Tug power available or needed
for payloads may affect the power requirements that the Orbiter must supply to the
payload. If the Tug can internally supply all payload power requirements, an active
electrical power interface between payload and Orbiter is eliminated. This would
change umbilical and raceway requirements.
Obviously sensitivities addressed in this investigation must be evaluated in reference
to the work accomplished in Section 3 and summarized in Table 5. 5-1. Both fluid and
electrical service sensitivities were evaluated. Sensitivities for seven payload fluid
services and 14 possible changes were evaluated as summarized in Table 5. 5-2. No
revisions to the previously recommended payload/Orbiter fluid service interfaces of
Table 5. 5-1 resulted from these analyses.
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Table 5.5-1. Recommended Payload Semice 
-^C:CllMMOd^Ltions Irum Section 3
Payload Function Service r.e%cl lccon^m«r^,;?i^	 i
Interface
^	 Tug Orlkiier
Prop. F&D N 0. 5 in. (1. 27 cm) Ilia each prop. Remote No No
Aboxt Dump < 500 lb (227 kg) Self contain No No
>> 500 1b (227 kg) Overboard stump kit No* Yes
Vent -0. 5 in. (L 27 cm) dia N 2 H4
 prop. Integrate w/Tug RCS vent Yes Existing
- 0. 5 in. (1. 27 cm) dia each other prop. Overboard vent kit No* Yes
Press Fill - 0.25 in. (0. 63 cm) dia Remote No No
Vent -0.25 in, (0.63 cm) dia Into cargo bay No No
Battery Vent -0. 5 in. (1.27 cm) dia Integrate w/Tug bat. vent Yes Existing
- or self contain
LHe F&D --1. 0 in. dia (2. 54 cm) Direct to 835 T-4 panel No* Yes
Vent -1, 0 in. dia (2.54 cm) Into cargo bay No No
RTG Cooling -0. 5 in. (1. 27 ern) dia H2O inlet/outlet Thermal control unit No Yes
-3. 0 in. (7. 62 cm) dia steam rent (water boiler) kit No Yes
Shroud Repress No known Payload autonomous No No
Conditioning N 3. 0 in. (7. 62 cm) dia class < 5000 GN2 Direct to Orbiter No* Yes
Communication 2 Kbs up 51 Kbs dawn Via Tug avionics Yes Yes
Caution & Warning 35 signals Through Tug Yes Yes
Data Processing Storage & Computation Orbiter supplied No Yes
Power 700 W ground & on-orbit Orbiter 695 panel via Tug Yes Yes
600 W ascent From Tug fuel cell Yes No
*Assumes forward umbilical panel
Propellant Fill & ^	 Propellant Quantity Increased payload penalty for de-
Drain Increase signing to crash loads full or incor-
poration of abort dump capability
On Pad Fill & Drain Adds 4 active interfaces and 21 lb
(9. 5 kg) per fluid accommodated
Abort Dump Required Same hardware as fill & drain ex-
cept for PL-01-A (Biprops) where
larger lines (1 in. (2.54 cm)) & in-
creased weight penalty (x-38 lb
(17 kg)/fluid) result
Propellant Vent Vent Not Required Eliminates 6 interfaces & saves
approx. 42 lb (19 kg) for biprop.
Eliminates P/L to Tug I/F & saves
approx. 10 lb (4. 5 kg) for N2H4
Pressurant Fill Pressure Quantity' Negligible
Increase
On Pad Fill Adds 3 active interfaces and 20 lb
(9 kg)
Vent into Cargo Bay Not Same as on pad fill
Allowed
Cryo Fill, Drain Quantity Increase Same as propellant quantity increase
& Vent Fill/Top Until T-0 Slight increase in line diameter
adds. 1 active interface & approx.
40 lb (18 kg)
Vent into Cargo Bay not Adds 4 active interfaces & approx.
Allowed 40 lb (18 kg)
RTG Cooling Increased Heat Load Increases water required for heat
sink & water boiler (approx. 12 lb
(5.4 kg) H2O/hr/1000 Btu)
Cooling Kit Fwd in Bay Adds 60 ft (18 m) of steam vent line,
Instead of Aft increases dia to approx. 4 in. (10
cm), adds approx. 70 lb (32 kg)
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Table 5. 5-2. Payload Fluid Service Sensitivities
P/L Service
	 Possible Change
Accommodated I	 to Service	 I	 Effect
Table 5.5-2. Payload Fluid Service Sensitivities (Contd)
P/L Service
Accommodated
Possible Change
to Service Effect
Shroud Purge & Eliminate Shroud Increases cargo bay clean ness
Repressurization level to s 5000 (probably not:
practical)
Eliminates 3 active interfaces,
saves approx. 70 lb (32 kg)
Battery Vent Eliminate Vent Saves 2 active interfaces and approx.
Requirements 10 lb (4. 5 kg)
Electrical service sensitivities are summarized in Table 5.5-3. Effects for four
payload services and eight possible changes are included. As was the case for fluids,
no revisions to those avionics services recommendations in Table 5. 5--1 were made.
In addition to the effects of possible changes listed in Tables 5. 5-2 and 5. 5-3, one
general conclusion can be reached from the Tug payload services sensitivity investi-
gation: a fairly direct payload-to-Orbiter (standardized by routing through the for-
ward end of Tug) umbilical connection serves to desensitize both Tug and its payload
from changes in payload services. When the Space Transportation System becomes
operational, scientific and exploitive payloads with exotic service needs will want to
take advantage of its unique capability. If a standard method for accommodating these
services exists (forward umbilical panel) the impact of accepting such payloads will be
minimized.
5.6 ALTERNATIVE ABORT MODES
Shuttle performance and Orbiter/Tug interface provisions are affected to a major
degree both by 1) changes in Oi , biter abort modes and by 2) selection between alterna-
tive design approaches for implementing given abort requirements. As an example of
1) elimination of the RTLS abort mode would eliminate rapid dump requirements and
reduce service line interface weights for both Orbiter and Tug. As an example of 2)
elimination of rapid LH 2 dump while retaining RTLS abort would reduce penalties
associated with dump while adding penalties due to landing full of LH 2 , including in-
creased interface structural loads, landing weights, and post-landing operations
complexity.
Tug impacts and Shuttle requirements effects for both alternative non-baseline abort
modes and alternative abort implementation concepts have been identified. Data was
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Table 5. 5-3. Payload Electrical Service Sensitivities
f,
P/L Service
Accommodated
Possible Change
to Service Effect
Communication Not Integrated with Tug Minor Tug weight increase for added
Avionics link 5 lb (2, 3 kg)
Simplifies Tug avionics (C &W impact)
Data Rate Increase No Tug effect — Orbiter transmis-
sion/receiving impact
Hardwired Rather Than Significant P/L weight penalty in-
Multiplexed crease 185 lb (75 kg) if routed
through Tug
Minor Tug increase through forward
panel
Use of Optical Data Significant weight reduction with
Links added benefits of superior P/L to
Orbiter isolation and immunity to
EMC
Caution & Warning Increased Quantity of Tug weight increase 40 lb (18 kg)/35
Hardwired Signals functions
Redundant Multiplexed Tug weight saving 40 lb (18 kg)/35
Rather Than Hardwired functions
C &W philosophy impact
Data Processing Increased Requirements No Tug effect — added Orbiter or
payload supplied equipment capability
Power Increased Ascent Max of 2.4 kW available for P/L
Requirements use (Tug capability 3.5 kW for 8 hrs
at no penalty)
Increased Ground & On-- Route large transmission line through
Orbit Requirements forward umbilical from 895 panel
small Tug wt penalty
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developed in sufficient detail to allow Shuttle program assessment of Orbiter impacts in
addition to evaluation of Tug/Orbiter interface sensitivities.
The full range of abort mode revisions and corresponding interface service, Tug, and
Orbiter effects are summarized in Table 5.6-1. Some of these alternatives have been
addressed in Section 4.4.2 (Orbital dump using Orbiter ALPS setting), and others have
extremely low probabilities of Shuttle consideration. The three most important alter-
natives addressed in this abort sensitivi'y study are effects of: RTLS dump time sensi-
tivity, progressive elimination of abort requirements, and elimination of Tug LH2
abort dump.
Table 5.6-1. Alternative Abort Modes
Probable interfacei
Alteruarive	 service line efferls
Probablr hug	 Orbiter Uperalions
Effects	 Eff • r 1,	 Comments
No Abort	 Reduced service line Reduced pressurization
diameters weight
Eliminate four Orbiter Reduced lank weights
controls
Eliminate aft •faring
dump purls
No R I LS Abort Reduced service line Reduced pmssurttation
diameters weight
Reduced task weights
Net
	
MS LFI _, Rrdurrd dump lmr Redut ed pressurisation Increased landing weight Landing weight & cg
Dump diamrlcr weight prnaltir% within specification(land with 1-11_1 Increased structural Minor 1'cg slrucluraj Pu,11aulling 1.11, dlspnssl
Inads weight penaltie%
Huriznitlal vrntldrain
requ irement%
No 111-1-15S.  1. 11," or Increased strurtural Reduced pressurization lncrrased landing weight CC without paylnad
LO., Dump loads weight penalties currently ureaeceptablr
hand full ). ;Major % trurtural wrighl Revised 1 ugIPll. cg
nfualtirs
Horizontal vrntldrain Pnsllanding LU , & 1-11,4 landing weight above
rrquirrmtnts disposal spec if icatio n
0 7T3=, ., ire Rrdt tr	 urtip7linr	 ia. Furlhrt reduction in Same as above Same as above
LO, Dump M, dump line
N-,brbital 1.0 2 Eliminate ?`Urbocr diameter
lrinlp controls
till It 
	
I.S or Reduced dump. fin, di.. hurther reduction in Same as above Same as above
Orbital Dump of Eliminate aft-living dump 1.11.., dump line
I.()_ or 1-H, ports diamctrr
Eliminatc 4 Orbiter
<ontnav
Orbital dump at Lliminatc aft farin g Advanced development None
lrro . g dump pn • 1s of passive propellant
Eliminate 4 Orbiter control devices
uo trol%
_6Thi[a7Bump Increase dump line dia. Incre isrd dump hne dia. Operate ALPS to nrar
Cvnlg 4CP9 Eliminate aft - faring dump deplrtton
5etlling purls
Uump Time: ^_Ufl Dump line diamctrr Vartation in dump line None
let -10f, sec. variatinus diameters X
prrssurizatiun %^%trm
Wright
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Design for Shuttle abort has significant impact on the design of Tug and its fluid service
equipment. The following sections address the effect of variations in abort require-
ments and in methods of meeting baseline abort requirements.
5.6.1 DUMP TIME SENSITIVITY. For RTLS abort a minimum of 300 seconds of
SSME powered time is available for propellant dump. This 300 second time was
assumed as a design requirement for all analyses and trades of Section 4.4 (Task 2).
Analyses were made in Task 3 to determine the sensitivity of dump line diameter,
tank dump pressure, and deployment payload to variation in dump time from 200 to 500
seconds. Figures 5.6-1 and 5. 6-2 give diameter requirements for a range of tank
RTLSABDR T 	 dump pressures. Figure 5.6-3 gives
8-or VAPOR PRESSURE - 15.5 PSIA (10.1 NICM2)
 
k120)	 diameter requirements for the baseline
23 Tug tanks pressures of 17.0 (11.7) and
7.0 ('B) 18. 0 psis (12.4 N/cm2).	 Required diam-
1i6) eters range from 5.8 (14.7) dawn to 3. 6
6.0 in. (9. 1 cm) for LH2 and from 4.7 (11.9)Z)
114) down to 3. 1 in. (7.4 cm) for L02 .	 Fig-
¢
a 5.0
TANK PRESSUURE
PSIA WCM Z ) ure 5. 6-4 gives the corresponding sensi-
" ^ 1 16.2 0 1.21 tivity of payload for the deployment
0
4.0
17111.71
18112.4} mission to dump times.{10) 20113.8)
5. 6.2 ELIMINATION OF ABORT RE-
U
i^
L`
i0
a
U
0
lag
	200	 300	 490	 500
DUMP TIME -SECONDS
Figure 5.6-1. LH2
 Dump Line Diameter
Requirement Versus
Dump Time
RTLSABDRT
TANK
PRESSURE
181
	
PSIA IN/CM2)
16.01111
1141	 17.011 1.11
8.0
(12)	 12.
\\N
20.013.81
(10)
!2.
15.
:8)
0	 lag	 200	 300	 400	 5110
DUMP TIME - SECONDS
Figure 5.6-2. L02 Dump Line Diameter
Requirements Versus
Dump Time
QUIREMENTS. Requirements imposed
on Tug for compatibility with current
Orbiter abort operations result in sub-
stantial Tug p--rformance penalties. This
section summarizes analyses of the
effects on payload for some alternative
abort operations, as follows:
a. No Orbiter abort -- The Tug and its
support systems are not designed for
Orbiter abort. No propellant dump
or drain capability is needed after
launch. The fill, drain, and topping
lines are sized for prelaunch ground
operations only. Sufficient helium
is carried in the deployment adapter
for repress urization of the propellant
tank after normal recovery only,
b. No Orbiter RTLS Abort - No re-
quirement to design the Tug for
RTLS abort. Only low-g dump
capability is pr vided for AOA, ATO,
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	Figure 5.6-3. Dump Line Diameter	 Figure 5. 6-4. Payload Sensitivity
	
Requirements Versus	 to Dump Time
Dump Time
and AFO. This requires increasing the diameters of the fill and drain lines and
pressurizing the L02 tank to 18.0 psia (12.4 N/cm 2). Helium requirement is
increased 10 lb (4. 5 kg).
c. No LH2 Dump -- The Orbiter aborts, but Tug LH2 dump capability is not provided.
The Tug lands full of LH2 for all aborts and ground venting/ draining capability is
provided. L02 dump capability is provided for all aborts by further increasing
LO  dump line diameter.
d. NO RTLS LH2 Dump -w The Orbiter aborts, but only low-g LH2 dump is provided.
The Orbiter lands fail of LH2 for RTLS abort and ground LH2 venting/ draining
capability is provided. LH 2
 fill and drain line is increased in diameter from
2.0 to 3. 0 in. (5. 08 to 7. 62 cm) to provide the low-g dump capability.
Tug tank pressures, line diameters, and weights for the baseline and for the alterna-
tives defined above are summarized in Table 5.6-2. Eliminating all abort require-
ments (no abort) improves payload for the deployment mission by 782 lb (355 kg).
Most of the improvement (600 lb or 272 kg) can be obta ► ned by eliminating the RTLS
abort requirement (no RTLS abort), retaining the low-g dump capability only.
.	 5. 6.3 ELIMINATION OF TUG LH2 ABORT DUMP. Data presented in Table 5.6-2
i`	 shows that elimination of LH 2 abort dump capability improves deployment payload by
429 lb (195 kg). This improvement results from weight savings due to reduction in
fill and drain line diairieter and reduction in helium pressurant requirements, in part
i	 offsea;° addition of equipment for post-landing venting and draining of LH2. This
payla,^ ,' improvement is gained at the expense of increased operational complexity and
poteQtia.l reduction in safety.
P
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cTable 5. 6-2. Alternative Abort Modes Sensitivity
_ cn
a
E
1
i
Item Baseline No Abort
No RTLS
Abort
No LH2
Da .np
No RTLS
LH2 Dump
Nominal Abort Tank
Pressure psia (N/cm2)
LH2 18 - 15.5-10 - 15.5-10
(12.4) (10.7-6.9) (10.7-6.9)
LO2 17 - 18 17 17
(11.7) (12.4) (11.7) (11.7)
Fill, Drain, Dump Line
Dia. inch (cm)
LH2 5.0 2.25 3.0 2.25 3.0
(12.7) (5.7) (7.6) (5.7) (7.6)
LO2 5.4/3.8 2.25 2.75 5.4/3.8 5.4/3.8
(13.7/9.7) (5.7) (7.0) (13.7/9.7) (13.7/9.7)
Helium Pressurant 60 26 36 35 35
Required lb (kg) (27.2) (11.8) (16.3) (15.9) (15.9)
Dump System Wt lb (kg)
Tug Ref -216 -170 -100 -65
(-97.8) (-77) (-45) (-29)
Adapter/Orbiter Ref -585 -418 -447 -495
(-265) (--20) (-203; (-225)
Payload increase lb (kg)
Deploy Ref 782 (355) 600 (272) 429 (195) 314 (142)
Retrieve Ref 409 (186) 314 (142) 222 (101) 167 (76)
I
y.
30
z
20NS
10L
0
a. The Orbiter must land with the Tug full of LH2, approximately 7400 lb (3360 kg).
In event of a serious landing mishap, this could possibly be hazardous.
b. H2 must be vented almost continuously after entry, as shown in Figure 5. 6-5, and
horizontal vent equipment (Section 4.4.2.4) is required. This figure shows LH2
tank absolute pressure and venting rate histories for a complete RTLS abort with-
out LH2 dump. Tank pressure is allowed to rise to the assumed design limit of
20 psi (13.8 N/cm2) differential during entrv. A tank pressure blowdown to
atmospheric pressure just before landing touchdown was assumed to determine
the maximum vent free time available after landing. After lockup at atmospheric
pressure, the tank pressure builds back up to the design limit (34.7 psia or 23.9
N/cm2) within two minutes, where venting must be resumed at an average rate of
slightly less than 400 lb/hr (181 kg/hr).
40
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TIME FROM LIFTOFF (SEC)
Figure 5.6-5. LH2
 Tank Pressure and Venting History,
RTLS Abort Without LH2 Dump
Figure 5.6-6 shows LH2 tank pressure history after landing for an RTLS abort
with LH2
 dump. Time available after atmospheric lockup varies from 26 to 36
minutes for maximum and minimum post-dump residuals respectively. Thus LH2
dumping daring RTLS abort allows a vent-free period of about 30 minutes after
touchdown during which ground-safing equipment may be attached if required.
The two minute maximum vent-free period permissible without dump would be
inadequate for this purpose.
c. The LH2
 must be drained after landing. This requires addition of horizontal
drain plumbing (as discussed in Section 4.4.2.4) and access to ground receiving
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25 equipment for the LH2
 dumped.
The ground drain plumbing would
have to be attached to the T-0 panel
during H2 venting, as discussed
above.
5.7 TUG LENGTH
0
TI ME FAOM LANDING. MIN.	 Interface analyses performed in the pre-
liminary screening and detailed assess-
Figure 5.6-6. LH2 Tank Pressure After 	 ment tasks considered a reference Tug
Landing, RTLS Abort	 with fixed length. The possible need to
With LH2 Dump	 deploy very long spacecraft or perform
high-energy retrieval missions may re-
sult in a Tug length different than the reference configuration. Tug length sensitivity
was therefore investigated to determine interface requirements impact for lengths
varying from 20 - 35 ft (6 - 10.5 m). Interface considerations resulting from these
length changes include structural attachment and pivot locations, reaction magnitudes,
and Tug center-of-gravity position.
The :reference configurations and their pertinent characteristics are summarized in
Figure 5.7-1. Mass properties for the deployment mission options assumed the ref-
erence spacecraft (Section 4. 2, 1.4) cantilevered from the Tug forward interface.
CONFIGURATION CHARACTERISTICS
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Figure 5.7-1. Characteristics of Reference Configurations
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Configuration 4 was the Convair STSS Program 2 vehicle. Configuration 3 was the
study reference configuration (Section 4.2. 1. 1). Configuration 2 was a point design
developed during Convair inhouse short-Tug studies, and Configuration i was a still
shorter derivative of 2.
The various effects of Tug length variation are presented in Figure 5.7-2. As shown
certain Tug lengths were not permissible if support locations were limited to those
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Figure 5.7-2. Effects of Tug Length Variation
currently provided by the Orbiter. This situation resulted from limits on acceptable
locations of the forward interface frame within the Tug structural system. Typically,
a 6 to 8 in. (15.2 to 20.3 cm) deep interface frame was required for distributing sup-
port fitting loads into the Tug shell. Tug frame alignment had to coincide with an
Orbiter attachment station, but frame location relative to the Tug forward interface
was constrained by the fuel tank forward bulkhead. The possibility of additional limits
on forward support frame location due to avionics package size and mounting require-
ments was also investigated, but it was found that mounting requirements for currently
defined Tug avionics packages did not further constrain interface frame location. The
resulting Tug lengths precluded by the bulkhead clearance constraint are indicated as
deadbands.
Because of the deploy adapter aft extension in the two short Tug configurations, the
pivot had to be placed near Xo 1302/Zo 490 to avoid violation of the cargo bay envelope
by , -dapter during rotation. Since the adapter terminated at the aft support station
in the two long-Tug configurations, the pivot could be incorporated into the aft support
fittings (at Xo 1246/Zo 414) without clearance envelope violation caused by rotation.
Support reactions and the resulting accumulated exceedance of Orbiter capability were
computed for two support arrangements (1-1 and 2-1, Section 4.2.2.1) for each of the
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reference Tugs. The computations used cargo bay accelerations from MSFC
68M00039--1 and employed the computer program and exceedance computation method
discussed in Section 4.2.2.2. The resulting reaction trends as a function of Tug
length are shown for support arrangement 1-1. Arrows indicate trend directions for
spheroidal, S, and toroidal, T, oxidizer tank configurations. As noted within a given
oxidizer tank configuration family, the aft reactions increased and forward reactions
decreased with increasing vehicle length.
The trends were similar for support arrangement 2-1, but individual reactions differed
in magnitude. Comparing the accumulated exceedance, a trend toward increasing ex-
ceedance with increasing length, within oxidizer tank families, was found except in the
spheroidal tank (long Tugs) using support arrangement 1-1, where little variation
occurred. Support arrangement 2-1 exhibited an advantage over 1-1 in all Tug lengths.
The reduced-length high-performance Tugs employed toroidal oxidizer tanks to provide
increased propellant packaging efficiency over the reference Tug and therefore exhibited
a further-aft cg. As shown, the only Tug penalty imposed by the Orbiter cg limit
was a ballast requirement for lengths less than 25 ft (7.6 m) when returning without a
spacecraft (i.e., nominal descent from a deployment mission or abort descent from a
retrieval mission, assuming dump of both propellants).
5.8 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES SUMMARY
No major revisions to the subsystem analyses results of Task 2 (Section 4) were rec-
ommended due to the sensitivity analyses. In several areas, however, minor revisions
were recommended to render Tug/payload/Orbiter interfaces more amenable to po-
tential revisions.
Where appropriate, results from these seven sensitivities that served to desensitize
Tug interface requirements were integrated into the Task 2 interface recommendations
discussed in Section 4. A summary of significant results and data obtained from these
sensitivity studies is contained in Figure 5.8-1 and the following text.
Two of the seven sensitivity studies indicated major potential Tug/Orbiter interface
impact — fluid services and Tug length. No compromise solution appeared feasible
to desensitize the incorporation of a Tug with storable main propellants or significant
length revisions. If Tug revisions of this type do occur, major changes in Orbiter
and Tug peripheral equipment and fluid interface kits will be required. The overall
result of the sensitivity analysis task is that no major Tug/Orbiter interface revisions
to the recommendations of Task 2 are needed or desirable.
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Figure 5.8- 1. Sensitivity Investigation Results
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